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PREFACE 
What is to be done, and who is to do it? 
Donald Denoon 
These papers entrench and extend the tradition of 
pre-Christmas Canberra gatherings, attracting 
practitioners in several disciplines, addressing a 
topical theme by means of historical analyses. 
This conference was typical in the high calibre of 
discussion. It was characteristic also in a less 
happy sense: Pacific Island history continues to 
be written mainly by non-indigenous scholars 
based outside the islands. 1 To be sure, native 
Hawaiian and Maori scholars are trenchant in 
their academic and political statements; and 
Fijian and Papua New Guinean academics 
exercise increasing authority in the intellectual 
life of their own countries. Many, such as 
Madiu Andrew and James Gissua in this 
collection, and Nahau Rooney who also attended, 
are drawn into political and administrative 
domains; and a few who persevere in academia 
project their ideas onto the larger, regional 
canvas. Pacific Island History, as a broad, 
regional sub-discipline, seems more congenial to 
expatriate than to indigenous scholarship. The 
only general accounts of the region - by Oskar 
Spate, Kerry Howe, Ian Campbell and Deryck 
Scarr - have been constructed by metropolitan 
scholars; and the ethno-history tradition - from 
Marshall Sahlins to Greg Dening, Klaus 
Neumann, Nicholas Thomas and Gananath 
Obeyesekere - attracts scholars from the same 
circumstances. 
Whether the explanation lies in personal 
preference, the intellectual climates and heavy 
teaching loads of regional universities, limited 
opportunities for travel, or the sheer cost of 
research, the outcome is the same. This 
imbalance poses the question how best to 
harmonise the regional perspectives of much 
expatriate research, with the mainly national 
focus of most indigenous discourse. The 
assessment of the colonial inheritance might seem 
an unlikely place to seek that harmony. At 
independence and immediately thereafter, no such 
discussion could have taken place: but the 
passage of time has made the debate not only 
possible but necessary. Not only do many 
governments lurch from crisis to crisis, but 'the 
state' itself is contested in many parts of the 
region. In the extreme case of the new 
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Micronesian states, carved out of the former 
American Trust Territory, the limits of 
sovereignty are so clear and substantial that 
international recognition is at issue. Elsewhere, 
differing degrees of 'free association' with former 
colonial powers raise similar questions in a minor 
key. The financial crises of Papua New Guinea, 
so well delineated by Desh Gupta, are mirrored 
on a smaller scale elsewhere. Development 
strategies are by no means agreed, whether in 
agriculture or in manufacturing; and Hanlon's 
portrayal of economic development as a political 
ideology rather than an economic enterprise could 
be applied usefully to many new nations beyond 
Micronesia. 
A conference designed to illuminate the 
impacts of colonialism on Pacific Islanders also 
threw much light on the influence of Islanders on 
colonialism. This represents a curious inversion. 
A generation ago, scholars commonly analysed 
colonial structures, often under the rubric of 
comparative colonial administrative studies. In 
reaction to that emphasis, a dominant theme of 
recent historical and anthropological writing 
about Pacific Islands is the revelation and re­
evaluation of indigenous agency in the creation 
and elaboration of colonial power-structures. 
That enthusiasm expressed the sense of liberal 
scholars that decolonisation was desirable and 
inevitable, and the link between historical agency 
and the recovery of sovereignty was often 
explicit. 
An occasional and unfortunate 
consequence of the search for indigenous agency 
was the assertion of a homogeneous Islander 
agenda, minimising the diversity of interests 
spawned by gender, ethnicity and social 
condition. 2 As these errors are corrected in 
tum, and increasing social complexity swims into 
focus, colonialism itself receded into the 
background as an uninteresting given. A re­
evaluation of colonial authority is clearly 
overdue, as an element of unravelling the crises 
which beset national government structures from 
New Guinea to Samoa, and the challenges to the 
legitimacy of the state itself from Hawaii to New 
Zealand. The conference, and the papers which 
it generated, show that it is possible to present 
nuanced accounts of both social and governmental 
dimensions, privileging neither, and exploring the 
dynamic interactions between them. 
Robert Parker's evaluation of the 
Australian administrative record in Papua New 
Guinea is both a reminder of older scholarship, 
and a prefiguring of the re-emergence of 
'governance' as an essential dimension of post­
colonial research. In that tradition, I.armour 
demonstrates the enduring value of comparative 
studies of policy development and application. In 
stark contrast is Andrew Peacock's memory of 
the transitional years in Papua New Guinea as an 
era of exceptional hazards, narrowly (and perhaps 
luckily) avoided. Parker and I.armour perceive 
colonial (and by implication post-colonial) 
governance as a deeply flawed enterprise whose 
ultimate purpose, however, is to steer human 
affairs into orderly channels, and to achieve a 
rational distribution of resources. Politicians and 
administrators may share that aspiration, but are 
necessarily more alert to the misadventures which 
at every tum threaten to derail the project. 
The colonial inheritance bedevils policy­
formation in every state and in virtually every 
dimension of life. Maddocks elegantly describes 
the unforeseen consequences of the application of 
'appropriate technology' and techniques in the 
education of medical students; and parallel 
arguments have been developed elsewhere, for 
the counter-productive effect of 'appropriate 
education' in late-colonial school systems. When 
political independence coincided with an un­
developed economy, curious alliances developed. 
Trade unions (as in Papua New Guinea, analysed 
by Andrew and by Gissua) performed not only 
the conventional role of representing workers in 
industrial negotiations, but were also the sites of 
the accumulation of capital, and took upon 
themselves the role of modernising sectors of the 
economy long neglected in the colonial 
dispensation. The already-vexed and confused 
politics of Fiji (described by Lal) are 
compounded by the adoption of the common 
development option of textile production by 
means of a low-paid and mainly female labour 
force (analysed by Leckie). In the longer term, 
these roles created peculiar dilemmas for union 
leaders, without precedent in better developed 
economies. 
These papers variously analyse 
governance by elucidating the interaction of post­
colonial structures of government, lop-sided 
economic conditions, and powerful ethnic and 
'wantok' interests. The research agenda of 
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governance runs far beyond the specific topics 
addressed here. In the eastern Pacific, the 
ascribed authority of chiefly families is under 
siege - precisely as inherited authority is sought 
in the western islands, as an alternative to the 
perceived venality of elected politicians. 
Especially in Melanesia, no agreement has been 
reached on the optimum division of powers and 
resources between the centre and autonomous 
provinces (considered in the context of the 
Solomon Islands by Frazer). The politics of 
natural resource exploitation would be a matter of 
urgent concern even if the Australian Government 
had not insisted on highlighting these questions at 
the 1994 South Pacific Forum meeting. Indeed it 
is politics rather than economic or environmental 
issues which introduces such uncertainty to the 
management of (for example) forest resources 
throughout the eastern Pacific and oil, copper and 
gold mining in the same region. In Bougainville, 
Ok Tedi, Misima and the Western and Southern 
Highlands, it is the interaction of local and 
provincial and national sources of authority, 
rather than geological or engineering issues, 
which will determine whether massive ore 
deposits are mined at all. It may be no accident 
that regional resource-management has been most 
successful in respect of fisheries - an arena 
controlled exclusively by national governments. 
Paradoxically, the colonial inheritance 
gains significance as the colonial era recedes into 
the past. This collection not only summarises 
current issues and recent research: it is equally a 
foretaste of the work to be done to understand 
today's state structures in their historical and 
political contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Brij VI.al 
In December, 1993, the Division of Pacific and 
Asian History in the Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies of the Australian National University 
hosted an international conference on 'Colonial 
Inheritance: The Pacific Islands Experience.' It 
followed two previous such gatherings, one looking 
at the French presence in the Pacific Islands and 
the other at developments in Pacific Islands 
historiography. 1 Our agenda in 1993 was simple. 
Colonialism had left its indelible influence on the 
economies, politics and social policies, on arts, 
styles, values and leisure, on institutions and 
structures, and on self-perceptions, on identities of 
communities and new nations of the region. Our 
intention was to assess the material and non­
material assets and debts, to invite comparisons, 
and to ask for an evaluation of colonial records and 
legacies in the light of subsequent events. We 
proposed to carry out such an evaluation around a 
number of key processes, institutions and issues, 
including the structure and function of the state and 
parliamentary politics in the post-colonial Pacific, 
education, media, literature, and economic and 
political developments from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives. 
To that end, we invited a number of 
scholars and participants in the events to make a 
detailed evaluation of colonialism's legacy in the 
Pacific Islands. We chose the participants on the 
basis of their experience with and involvement in 
the issues on our agenda. Surveys and references 
to explanatory theories in other places and among 
other peoples, we felt, were often irrelevant and 
another imposition of exotic, inappropriate cultural 
artefacts on a region and people already laden with 
foreign baggage. This volume contains a revised 
selection of papers presented at the conference. 
We are thankful to the various authors for their 
willingness to participate. And we express regret 
to other participants whose papers could not be 
included here for reasons of cost and other 
contingencies. 
As I listened to the papers and to the 
discussions that followed, I thought back to two 
other conferences I had attended. The first was a 
conference on social issues in national development 
planning held at the University of the South Pacific 
in Suva in 1975, and attended by many 
distinguished Pacific island political leaders, 
intellectuals and community workers. The date is 
important. The mid-1970s was the high noon of 
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immediate post and pre-independence euphoria in 
the region. By then, several islands had gained 
their independence: Western Samoa (1962), the 
Cook Islands (1965), Nauru (1968), Fiji and Tonga 
(1970), Niue (1974), and Papua New Guinea 
(1975). The Solomon Islands followed in 1978, 
Kiribati in 1979 and Vanuatu in 1980. 
Optimism tinged with innocence pervaded 
the conference. Planned development was the way 
forward, everyone gathered agreed. Broad 
community participation in national decision 
making was important, and non-material values had 
to be given their due place in the planning process. 
Leaders and would-be leaders talked idealistically 
about the goals of development. These included 
local control of the economy, economic self­
reliance, equitable distribution of economic benefits 
and services among the people, decentralisation of 
economic activity, change with respect for custom, 
emphasis on rural development and greater 
participation by women in all forms of social and 
economic activity. In short, people-directed 
development in the 'Pacific Way.' That was the 
catch-phrase of the 1970s, embodying a mix of 
consensus, compromise, dialogue, togetherness and 
a sense of shared destiny. These values are 
reflected in all the development plans of the island 
countries around this time. 
In 1986, I attended the 17th Waigani 
Seminar in on 'The Ethics of Development' in Port 
Moresby. The very topic of the conference 
suggested that something had gone wrong. Many 
papers confirmed this view. Development of sorts 
had, of course, taken place but in ways that seemed 
to mock the goals articulated in the development 
plans. Father John Momis of the Melanesian 
Alliance captured the pervasive mood of 
pessimism. The 'ethical rules we set for ourselves 
at independence have been largely ignored,' he told 
the gathering. 'We have a country incredibly rich 
in resources, with a manageable population, yet 
listening to our people and observing trends, it is 
clear that things are not going right. We are 
developing a very disadvantaged class of urban 
squatters and a large group of poor unemployed. 
We have great divisions between the minority who 
are very rich and the rest of the population. '2 
Momis's views were echoed by many others. Ron 
Crocombe, a noted scholar of Pacific affairs, said: 
'Nepotism, the favouring of relatives, subordinates 
and associates of the powerful, traditionally an 
acceptable principle, has become a major problem 
in the central Pacific aristocracies today, where it 
reduces the confidence and motivation of the 
ordinary people. '3 
Clearly, the Pacific islands of the late 
1980s and the 1990s are a very different place to 
what they were in the mid-1970s. Politically­
motivated assassinations, military coups, 
secessionist movements, urban violence, 
mismanagement of natural resources, creeping 
corruption in public life: these are a part, though 
not, of course, the only part, of the contemporary 
reality of Pacific island life that would have been 
unimaginable in the 1970s. Scholars from various 
disciplines have explored the causes and 
consequences of these problems from a variety of 
perspectives. This collection of papers attempts to 
examine one dimension: the contribution of colonial 
inheritance to some of the problems besetting the 
post-colonial Pacific. That inheritance differed 
from place to place and from time to time. As a 
result, no clear pattern emerges, but there is broad 
agreement that the legacy bequeathed by 
colonialism is a factor that cannot be ignored in any 
understanding of the problems and dilemmas facing 
the islands today. 
The volume opens with papers on Papua 
New Guinea. Andrew Peacock, who was the 
Minister for External Territories shortly before 
PNG gained her independence, and who played a 
key role in the negotiations leading to it, describes 
his feelings and experiences. As a record of one 
who was present at a critical moment in Papua 
New Guinea's history, Peacock's paper is an 
important document. Robert Parker, who has had 
a long professional association with PNG politics, 
discusses the administrative legacy bequeathed by 
Australia. He provides a critical appraisal of the 
Hasluck era, particularly the attempts to impose an 
Australian law and order system which he says was 
largely irrelevant to the needs of ordinary villages. 
The result was a 'steady decline during the decade 
[1960s] in indigenous respect for and resort to 
Australian legal institutions, and . . . a resurgence 
of illicit traditional dispute-setting practices 
including resort to violence, along with a decline in 
the general security of persons and property. ' In 
the last years of colonial rule, when Papua New 
Guineans were taking control, the Village Courts 
Act was passed in 1973 , with the first village 
courts introduced in 1975. But by then, Parker 
suggests, much harm had already been done, and 
post-independence Papua New Guineans have had 
to bear the burden of Hasluck's policies. 
Hank Nelson takes a broader look at 
Australian legacy in Papua New Guinea. He 
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explores the complexity of governing a colony that 
few Australians knew or cared about. He is critical 
of Australia's record. 'By any quantitative 
measure, Australia left Papua New Guinea poor, 
sick, ill-educated and with little effective 
infrastructure of government, ' he says; but, then, 
he asks, which colonial power did any better? In 
fact, since evaluation is inherently a comparative 
exercise, Australia's record stands up rather well 
when placed against that of France, for example, or 
Indonesia, or the United States. Nelson's point 
about colonialism's penchant for drawing neat 
arbitrary lines for administrative self-interest 
regardless of the cultural realities on the ground, 
goes to the core of the Bougainville crisis: two 
culturally and ethnically different groups forced 
into an arranged marriage of convenience by two 
careless parents with little forethought about the 
consequences of their decision. In some places, 
such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, such marriages were 
terminated amicably at independence, but 
elsewhere, the (sometimes) uneasy union or 
division continues. The lines, once drawn, cannot 
be redrawn easily. 
Colonial intervention not only drew 
arbitrary lines between islands and regions; it also 
altered the balance of power within them. Regions 
and groups favoured by the colonial rulers 
advanced, often at the expense of those that resisted 
colonial intrusion. In Fiji, for instance, the more 
Polynesian-influenced eastern maritime provinces, 
rose to a position of hegemony in Fijian affairs 
under colonial tutelage. Similarly, their paramount 
chiefs became the arbiters of Fijian custom and 
tradition throughout Fiji, including the less 
hierarchically demarcated Melanesian areas. In 
time, and backed by the force of law, this 
arrangement became the new orthodoxy; and those 
who challenged this order did so at their cost. An 
important part of the political struggle in post-coup 
Fiji is the attempt to redefine the balance of power 
in Fijian society. This effort is most prominently 
manifested in the demands by western Fijians for 
the recognition of the fourth confederacy, the Y asa 
V akaRa, which, they hope, will accord them power 
commensurate with their number and contribution 
to the national economy. Not surprisingly, their 
demand runs into stiff opposition from the Fijian 
establishment. But how long this colonially-created 
imbalance can be maintained is an urgent issue in 
Fijian politics. 
Colonial and post-colonial politics in Fiji 
is the subject of my chapter. I examine the 
political culture Fiji inherited from its colonial past 
and how that continues to inform the present 
political debate in the country. Race and racial 
compartmentalisation formed the cornerstone of the 
colonial polity. With few modifications, that 
pattern has continued in post-colonial Fiji. When 
the pillars of the racially-based system were 
threatened by the victory of the Coalition, a 
military coup restored the status quo. Fijian 
(chiefly) political paramountcy is entrenched in the 
post-coup constitution decreed in June 1990, but 
that constitution has not provided the framework to 
solve some of the fundamental problems facing the 
Fijian people and the nation at large. I argue that 
a workable and broadly acceptable constitution will 
need to be based on new thinking that moves away 
from an emphasis on race as the principle of 
political organisation to one that is more inclusive 
and broadly participatory. 
Nancy Pollock examines the sorry legacy 
of colonial rule in Nauru, and describes a history 
of depopulation and devastation through the mining 
of phosphate. Australia, Pollock argues, failed to 
meet the condition of its mandate by allowing the 
interests of the phosphateers to take 'precedence 
over financial and political interests of the 
Nauruans. '  In 1992, following a ruling of the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague, 
Australia agreed to pay over one hundred million 
dollars as compensation for mining damage during 
its administration, but the social and psychological 
costs of marginalisation cannot be measured in 
monetary terms. 
Unlike Nauru, Tonga was never formally 
colonised but was a British protectorate. Tonga is 
a monarchy, and so it is not surprising that state 
power is concentrated in the hands of a few hand­
picked nobility who are answerable to the king. 
But the social and economic foundations of Tongan 
society have been changing since 1970. More and 
more Tongans migrate to Australia and New 
Zealand and other countries for short-term 
employment. Others leave permanently but 
contribute through regular remittances. Western­
style university education and exposure to ideas of 
democracy, individual freedom, political 
accountability of leaders, free speech and the like 
have wrought important changes in Tongan society. 
Sione Latukefu examines the historical origins of 
some of these developments. 
Micronesia, colonised successively by 
Spain, Germany, Japan and the United States, has 
a cumulative, multi-layered legacy. When the 
trusteeship arrangement which gave the United 
States the administrative jurisdiction over the 
islands came to an end in the mid-1980s, the 
various island entities, now firmly in a dependent 
relationship, entered into compacts of free 
association with the United States. Just how free 
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or voluntary is this arrangement is the subject of 
much dispute. The argument that with the 
inauguration of the compacts, which formally 
terminated the trusteeship, the Micronesian islands 
became independent is strongly contested by Glenn 
Petersen. He takes us on a tour of the tortuous 
negotiations which produced the compacts and 
asserts that the independence claim is spurious. In 
fact, he argues, the United States 'never intended 
to grant, has not in fact granted, and does not in 
fact intend to grant' independence to Micronesia. 
David Hanlon is in broad agreement with this view. 
'I work from the assumption that the decades-old 
program of economic development has existed as a 
part of a larger colonial agenda designed to make 
or re-make the islands in ways that reflected, 
served and affirmed the national ideology of the 
United States. ' For him, the whole project was a 
'somewhat disguised but nonetheless insidious 
effort to better possess Micronesians by remaking 
them in an image and likeness that was distinctively 
reflective of and submissive to the dominant values 
and interests of American society. ' American 
possession of Micronesia will endure. 
In the Melanesian states - Papua New 
Guinea, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands - a 
conscious effort was made at the time of 
independence to shift power from the centre to the 
provinces and regions. This was done partly to 
acknowledge the social and cultural diversity that is 
Melanesia. Decentralisation, the leaders believed, 
would address local concerns and needs, encourage 
local participation in the process of administration, 
mobilise support for development plans, and 
generally spread the ideals of democracy. But the 
reality turned out to be different. As Ian Frazer 
says for the Solomon Islands, 'provincial capitals 
have become mini versions of the larger nations, 
replicating on a smaller scale the same kind of 
inequality and uneven development that is found 
nationally. Provincial government might have 
brought some modification to the highly centralised 
government system that existed under colonialism 
but it has not escaped the same problems of 
centralisation and elitism at the provincial level. ' 
Frazer's assessment is echoed in other 
studies of local government and decentralisation in 
the Pacific. In Tonga, for example, the 'local 
government is a means by which the central 
government may inform, consult or placate local 
communities without conceding them any power -
particularly the power to disagree. '4 And in Papua 
New Guinea, too , the prospects for genuine power 
sharing between the centre and the provinces do not 
look bright. The problems of bureaucratic inertia, 
inefficiency, corruption and lack of resources aside, 
the major obstacle seems to be that some of the 
new leaders have inherited the mentality of their 
former colonial masters. 
This is evident in other fields such as 
public health. In a sensitive survey, Ian Maddocks 
looks at the development of medical training in 
Papua New Guinea. He was there at the beginning 
and centrally involved in the profession of 
medicine. He and others who worked with him 
had a vision of health care for the country 'in 
which many rurally-based graduates concentrated 
on disease prevention and health promotion, 
supervised effective measures of disease control 
and provided frugal but effective curative care for 
common diseases' through a 'planned and a 
centrally-controlled health system.' But Maddocks 
realises now that his vision was influenced by his 
Australian experience and, in the Papua New 
Guinea context, an alien system of ethics. The 
cultural background of the students, their own 
aspirations and understandings of what was 
involved in being a medical doctor were not given 
their due weight. 'We promoted rural practice, but 
of course we did not demonstrate it. ' It is an honest 
assessment. Is this legacy to some extent a part of 
the problem afflicting public health services in 
Papua New Guinea today, along with lack of 
resources and poor infrastructure? Whatever the 
reasons, it is clear that attempts to decentralise 
health services in that country have failed. As one 
recent survey says 'Decentralisation appears to 
have made little difference to trends in maternal 
and child health service performance indicators. 
Such changes as can be attributed to 
decentralisation have, in fact, indicated a negative 
effect. '5 Papua New Guinea, however, is not the 
only island state to experience this predicament. 
Nor is it an exception in the fields of 
agriculture and economic development, explored 
here by Scott MacWilliam and Desh Gupta. 
Mac William contests the view that attributes PNG's 
agricultural problems solely to colonial neglect. He 
identifies other sources of strains in the scheme of 
smallholder farming, including the collapse of 
international arrangements, the drive by 
governments to reduce expenditures, and the 
growing economic and political influence of the 
indigenous capitalist class. Gupta focuses more 
specifically on the performance of the post­
independence PNG economy, and identifies factors 
which constrain socio-economic developments. 
These include not only the ongoing crisis in the 
mining industry, but also the pattern of government 
expenditure which has failed to provide a stimulus 
to the economy. 
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Robbie Robertson provides a detailed 
account of Fiji's post-coup, Tax Free Zone 
experiment in which the state did participate 
actively. The Tax Free Factories, particularly in 
the garment industry, 'became a show piece of 
postcoup Fiji's economic planning,' he writes, but 
the experiment also created enormous social and 
economic problems for workers who 'confront new 
government-sanctioned forms of exploitation: 
extended working hours without additional or 
overtime pay, body searches, reduced lunch breaks, 
payment in kind, and illegal night work.' For all 
the visible signs of growth, Robertson argues, Fiji 
'has yet to deviate from the well worn neocolonial 
path.' 
Land and patterns of landownership lie at 
the core of many social and political issues in 
Pacific island societies. They exercised the minds 
of political leaders at the time of independence. 
Some islanders wanted to eliminate all colonially­
derived land titles in favour of pre-colonial 
arrangements, while others wanted to restrict 
foreign ownership of indigenous land. Peter 
I.armour examines the approach of four Melanesian 
states to these issues, and asks why changes in land 
policy at the time of independence were followed 
by legislative inactivity afterwards. Among the 
reasons are the emergence of other pressing 
concerns such as mining and forestry, the global 
retrenchment of state intervention in the public 
arena, and the absence of political will to confront 
controversial initiatives. While land will remain a 
sensitive issues throughout the Pacific, it is likely 
to become one of the most contentious issues in Fiji 
for the remaining years of this century, as the 
government grapples with the problems caused by 
the expiry of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants 
Act that regulates lease arrangements between Indo­
Fijian tenants and Fijian landlords. 
Gissua, Andrew and Leckie explore 
aspects of the trade union movement and industrial 
relations in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. They 
discuss the colonial inheritance of industrial 
relations and the struggle of unionised labour. 
They agree that the colonial legacy has had an 
important influence in shaping the structure ofpost­
colonial industrial relations, and they point to the 
difficulties that lie ahead for the union movement: 
divisions in their ranks, poor leadership and 
inadequate mechanisms for resolving industrial 
disputes. Nowhere in the islands have the trade 
unions become as prominent as in Fiji. Radicalised 
by the anti-union policies and practices of the 
Alliance government, the Fiji Trade Union 
Congress backed the Fiji Labour Party in 1985 
which, in coalition with the National Federation 
Party, won the general election only to be deposed 
in a military coup in May 1987, after being in 
office for just a month. Since then the unions have 
had to face the wrath of the post-coup government 
determined to curtail their power, indeed to reduce 
them to political impotence. The future looks 
grim. The state's encouragement of racially-based 
unions (such as the Viti Civil Service Association), 
coercive legislation, the emphasis on deregulation 
and privatisation, the pressure to rationalise 
expenditure from international financial institutions, 
all work to undermine the development of a 
multiracial working class solidarity. In Fiji, it has 
been the intervention, or the threat of intervention, 
of such organisations as the International Council of 
Free Trade Unions, which has prevented the 
government from assuming an even more hostile, 
anti-trade union stance. 
Paul Sharrad and Sina Va'ai look at the 
evolution of creative writing in the islands, which 
was virtually non-existent at the time of 
independence. The impetus for this came from two 
regional universities, the University of Papua New 
Guinea and the University of the South Pacific, 
both founded in the late 1960s. These two 
institutions have played a far greater role in the 
transformation of Pacific island society than has 
generally been realised. Apart from training people 
to meet the developmental needs of the various 
post-colonial governments, they also produced the 
first generation of creative writers in the islands, 
their work facilitated by committed individuals and 
institutions such as Albert Wendt and Marjorie 
Crocombe and the South Pacific Creative Arts 
Society in Suva and Ulli Beier in Port Moresby. 
Short stories, plays, poems, novella were published 
in periodicals such as Mana and Kovave and in 
small anthologies. The 1970s was the heyday of 
creative writing in the islands. Of course, much is 
still being done, as Va'ai's survey shows, but 
perhaps the scene has changed. To take the 
example of Fiji alone, writers such as Satendra 
Nandan, Sudesh Mishra, Som Prakash, Vilisoni 
Hereniko, Raymond Pillay have left the islands, 
while others have either faded from the scene (Pio 
Manoa) or entered other professions (Jo Nacola). 
Beier has returned to Europe and Wendt is working 
in New Zealand. 
In the final contribution to this volume, 
Sean Dorney, the Australian Broadcasting 
Company's television correspondent in Port 
Moresby provides a personal account of the 
excitements and frustrations of working in Papua 
New Guinea. He highlights the ignorance about 
the country in Australia where, as Dorney says, 
sometimes even journalists do not know that East 
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Timor is not Bougainville. Such ignorance is not 
confined to Australians. Nonetheless, for all its 
problems, Dorney argues, the media is alive and 
well in Papua New Guinea. Newspapers have been 
published in the Pacific islands in various forms for 
more than one hundred and fifty years. The oldest 
surviving one is the Fiji Times, founded in 1869. 
Today, all the major island groups have 
newspapers. Television is a very recent 
introduction, and nearly everywhere govemment­
controlled. What social and psychological changes 
this new medium will bring to the island populace 
it is too early to tell, but there can be little doubt 
that the telecommunications revolution is there to 
stay and will impinge on island life in unanticipated 
ways in years to come. 
In recent years, there has emerged a 
growing body of literature on contemporary social, 
political and economic developments in the Pacific 
islands. 6 The latest and perhaps the most moving 
contribution comes from the Tongan novelist and 
anthropologist Epeli Hau'ofa, now teaching at the 
University of the South Pacific. He rejects the 
view that denies islanders agency in the modem 
world, consigning them to a permanent state of 
helplessness and hopelessness: 
The idea that the countries of 
Polynesia and Micronesia are too 
small, too poor and too isolated 
to develop any meaningful degree 
of autonomy, is an economistic 
and geographic deterministic 
view of a very narrow kind, that 
overlooks culture history, and the 
contemporary process of what 
may be called 'world enlarge­
ment' carried out by tens of 
thousands of ordinary Pacific 
islanders right across the ocean 
from east to west and north to 
south, under the very noses of 
academic and consultancy 
experts, regional and international 
development agencies, bureau­
cratic planners and their advisers, 
and customs and immigrations 
officials, making nonsense of all 
national and economic bound­
aries, borders that have been 
defined only recently, criss­
crossing an ocean that had been 
boundless for ages before Captain 
Cook's apotheosis.' (6) 
The Pacific, be says, is a sea of islands, 
and not just islands in the sea. The way forward is 
clear, Hau'ofa says: 
Oceania is us, Oceania is 
expanding, Oceania is hospitable 
and generous, Oceania is 
humanity rising from the depths 
of brine and regions of fire 
deeper still, Oceania is us. We 
are the sea, we are the ocean, we 
must wake up to this ancient truth 
and together use it to overturn all 
hegemonic views that aim 
ultimately to confine us again, 
physically and psychologically, in 
the tiny spaces which we have 
resisted accepting as our sole 
appointed place, and from which 
we have recently liberated 
ourselves. We must not allow 
anyone to belittle us again, and 
take our freedom. 
All the contributors to this volume will 
share Hau'ofa's anguish, even his outrage at the 
manner in which the islands have been consigned to 
the margins of history. They, too, would stand up 
for freedom and independence for the island 
peoples. But they will all also agree, I think, that 
the colonially-constructed lines across the sea will 
not be erased easily. 
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Ministerial Memoir: Papua New Guinea's Transition to Independence 
Andrew Peacock 
You MAY ASSUME that politicians like using the 
first personal pronoun; it might be my upbringing 
or some form of false modesty, but I generally 
don't. But I am required to do so today, having 
been asked to give the background, from a practical 
and political viewpoint, to the events leading up to 
the Independence of Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
In fact I attended every Independence 
ceremony in the South Pacific between 1970 and 
1980, with the single exception of Fiji's. But my 
concentrated focus, in particular over a ten month 
period in 1972, was on PNG. I was sworn in as 
External Territories Minister on 2 February 1972 
and voted out of office, along with my Liberal­
Country Party colleagues, on 2 December of that 
year. 
I will begin by giving you a little 
background as to how I became External 
Territories Minister. 
In 1971 I was labouring under a variety of 
pressures as a very young Minister for the Army, 
having been appointed at the age of 30. AB you 
know, we were very heavily involved in Vietnam. 
I had already visited PNG once whilst a student at 
Melbourne University. The Army portfolio took 
me frequently to PNG because as Army Minister I 
was responsible for the Pacific Islands Regiment 
(PIR) as it then was, now the PNG Defence Force. 
In March 1971  there was a change of 
Prime Minister in Australia and I went down with 
the ship supporting John Gorton. For some 
unaccountable reason known only to Doug 
Anthony, leader of the Country Party, Bill 
McMahon, the new Prime Minister, wanted to sack 
eight of Gorton's Ministers. Anthony understood 
that if those eight got frustrated and crossed the 
floor, the Government would fall, and so he 
stopped McMahon after he'd sacked only four or 
five. I don't know if I was on the list or not, but 
I remained. 
However, I wasn't told by the new Prime 
Minister that I would remain a Minister, but by his 
Private Secretary. Between March 1971 when 
McMahon took up office and the third week of the 
Budget Session, whilst viewed by the public as a 
key and active Minister, I had not had one 
conversation with my new Prime Minister. One 
day in the first week in September, the telephone 
rang on my Ministerial desk and the Prime 
Ministerial light came on. I pressed the button and 
said 'Yes, Prime Minister'. McMahon said 'Who's 
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that?'. 'It's Andrew Peacock', I said. 'I don't 
want to talk to you', he said and hung up. A 
rather shattering experience for one who felt that he 
was on a steady upward incline toward the position 
that McMahon held. 
And so matters continued until a cyclone 
hit Townsville in December 1971 .  The Prime 
Minister was planning to go for a holiday on the 
Gold Coast, but was persuaded that this would not 
look well in the midst of the devastation and that he 
should instead go and visit Townsville. AB I was 
the Army Minister responsible for the important 
army barracks at Townsville, the Prime Minister 
reluctantly had to take me with him. We didn't 
talk much on the flight up. He was reading a book 
on swimming pool maintenance, so I talked to 
Sonia, his wife. 
We dashed through Townsville - I  think it 
took about 40 minutes. We then took off for 
Coolangatta airport. A cartoon the next day 
showed a devastated bar with a couple of blokes 
leaning on it and the caption was 'Geez, first a 
cyclone and now a lightning visit'. Anyhow, by 
the time we finished it was late in the day and 
Sonia suggested I stay the night in the same 
apartment as the McMahons, which I did. He had 
no say in this arrangement, being still immersed in 
swimming pool maintenance. But he did awaken 
me at five the next morning to go for a run on the 
beach - Bill was an extremely fit fellow. So we 
went for a run - I got exhausted, sat down, he kept 
running, came back, sat down next to me and said 
'If you didn't have this Army portfolio, which one 
would you like?'. I said 'Territories - I love 
PNG.' He said, 'Why?'. And I said, 'Because I 
think it's an enormous challenge. I think we could 
do a lot. I think we're going too slowly up there.' 
He said, 'Well, we're spending a lot of money on 
it too, you know.' That was the end of the 
conversation. 
Three weeks later he called me to say that 
Ceb Barnes' had decided to stand down and that I 
could have the Territories portfolio if I wanted it. 
These were the only two conversations I had with 
him during the ten months he had been Prime 
Minister. 
I was sworn in on 2 February 1972. I 
spoke with Ceb Barnes for half an hour. He gave 
me his summary of the development of PNG, 
which was that Hasluck's task had been education 
and general development, his own had beenand 
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industrial development and commerce, and that my 
job would be law and order. I blanched a bit at 
that. I then spent an hour with David Hay who had 
been Administrator and was then Secretary of the 
Department of External Territories. I then went to 
PNG, which in those days involved going via 
Sydney and Brisbane and only then up to Moresby. 
I arrived on the same day I had been sworn in and 
immediately held a 40 minute press conference! 
At this point, I would like to say that there 
is now a fetish about media management by 
political parties and politicians in Australia. For 
example, there is no way now that a 32 year old, 
just sworn in as Minister, would fly out of the 
country and immediately sit down and give a 40 
minute press conference. It just wouldn't happen. 
Nowadays, these things have to be managed! 
There would be some weeks of reading in and 
analysis of what policy aspects to emphasise. 
Politicians criticise the media, but in my view the 
media has every justification for anger at this sort 
of thing. And when late yesterday I got out a very 
lengthy transcript of that first press conference, I 
was staggered at the brashness of a 32 year old 
flying to PNG the day he was sworn in as Minister 
and saying what he wanted to do. I had not got 
Cabinet endorsement for my position but the press 
were fairly lenient with me because I was meeting 
with them straight away. This loss of frankness in 
Ministers' dealings with the media is an interesting 
change in our political culture. 
To return to the situation in PNG, my 
predecessor, Ceb Barnes, emphasised that I was 
going to have to address law and order issues. I 
didn't find this surprising because there were 
already stirrings for self-government. There were 
the demonstrations led by Michael Somare of the 
Pangu Party, there was extensive cargo cult 
activity, a breakdown in law and order was 
commencing, particularly in the Highland payback 
attacks were rising. 
For the first time, a District Commissioner 
(a Mr Jack Emmanuel), had been murdered on the 
Gazelle Peninsula. The Mataungan Association had 
been formed, Oscar Tammur and John Kaputin 
were agitating over land tenure and the like. There 
were the stirrings of secession on Bougainville. It 
seemed to many a tenuous situation. 
I was approaching this situation from a 
fairly simple perspective based, in part, on advice 
I received the day I was sworn in as External 
Territories Minister from my predecessor in the 
seat of Kooyong, the late Sir Robert Menzies, who 
had long taken an interest in my career. He 
telephoned me - he wasn't well, he'd had a stroke -
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and wished me well and asked me what I thought 
of my new position. I said 'I think we've got to 
quicken the pace to self-government' .  He said 'It's 
probably better to go sooner than later' . And I 
totally agreed with him. 
So I made my first Ministerial visit with 
my predecessor's comments on law and order in 
my mind. It was my firm view that given this 
deterioration in the security situation, if the 
Government sought to restrain the movement 
towards self-government and independence, it 
would bring about a backlash of perhaps even 
horrific proportions - even in a relatively small 
country such as PNG. 
And I had sought no guidance from 
Cabinet; that reality started to dawn when I was in 
the plane on the way to Port Moresby. But I 
quickly formed the view that I really had to try and 
work myself out of the job. I had to increase the 
pace towards independence and get to a point 
where, hopefully, someone on the PNG side would 
say, 'I think you've got to slow down'. 
In fact, by August 1972 Michael Somare 
did ask me to slow down. He said that the pro­
self-government groups weren't able to cope with 
the pace. It was sound advice from him, as we 
needed to get as smooth and orderly a transition as 
possible. But I felt I had to achieve a particular 
momentum to put behind us criticisms of the 
Government's past performance. 
Leaving aside my own role in 1972, let me 
expand on these criticisms. I actually concluded 
my term as Minister for External Territories feeling 
that whilst the pace of change had not been fast 
enough, Australia had not, overall, been a bad 
colonial power. In the 60s, I had felt that despite 
the bricks and mortar that the British left, the 
French were, interestingly enough, better 
colonialists. I changed my mind in the 70s when 
as Foreign Minister I had to handle certain other 
issues in the Pacific. But in the 60s I held the view 
that the French were classically non-racist. And I 
felt that British rule placed all sorts of other 
impediments in the way of territories emerging into 
independence - even though their institutional 
framework was better. The French cultural 
element was better. 
I didn't have much guidance on what 
awaited me in PNG. I knew that I had a first class 
Administrator in Les Johnson; Gough Whitlam paid 
credit to him in the Parliament when he retired. 
Whitlam referred to him as 'the final and the finest 
Administrator' , and he was. He'd also been 
Director of Education and was just the right man 
for the job. In fact, using the first personal 
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pronoun, I think, as it fell into place in 1972, we 
were all the right people at that time. 
Les wanted to move the pace. David Hay 
had been more conservative as Administrator, but 
then he had been enormously constrained by 
Canberra. The Department of External Territories 
gave the Administrator very little leeway 
whatsoever; Administrators had to report back to 
Canberra all the time for advice. David, therefore, 
understanding this situation, wanted as Secretary of 
the Department to free things up. I also had a 
Department which everyone in Canberra viewed as 
the dregs of the civil service. I found that to be 
totally untrue. I found, over time, that I had a 
Department that would really move to the pace and, 
in the way that the Pentagon Papers revealed that 
the United States bureaucracy had done extensive 
contingency planning, it had quietly been doing far 
more work on a more rapid transition to self­
government and the devolution of power than had 
been evident in public statements. 
There were some flaws in the 
Department's advice to me through the period of 
1972 and some flaws in the Administration's advice 
to me. I made mistakes. But I found myself, once 
we increased the pace, to be extremely well served 
by both the Department and the Administration. 
I made something like 21  trips to PNG in 
1972. But as I said, I was already convinced when 
I first arrived that we had to move sooner rather 
than later, although I was constrained in the first 
two months because we had to await the House of 
Assembly elections. This election was fought on 
the issue of whether or not there should be internal 
self-government. 
The largest party, the United Party, was 
opposed to self-government. I got sick of going 
around PNG to be met at airstrips by a man in a 
grass skirt with a bone through his nose, bilas'- in 
his hair, carrying a bloody pig and a bilum3 and 
someone standing beside saying 'this man is the 
physical embodiment of the reason why you can't 
have self-government' . It was quite clear that it 
was a setup; it happened too often. This was part 
of the United Party's orchestrated campaign 
opposing early self-government. 
The elections were held in late February 
and early March. The House of Assembly was to 
convene on 20 April and the first vote there would 
determine who had the numbers. To form the 
Government would require 50 votes. The results 
of the election gave the United Party 46 or 47 
seats. The Pangu Party under Michael Somare had 
26 or 27. The Peoples Progress Party under Julius 
Chan had 10 seats. 
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The first piece of rare flawed advice I got 
from my advisers in Canberra was that it was 
obvious that the United Party would govern with a 
small coalition of independents. There were a 
number of independents, particularly from the 
Highlands, who did not want early self­
government. My Department also advised me to 
find a way to distance myself from my earlier 
public statements in favour of self-government. I 
had already been criticised for making these while 
the election was being fought. It was difficult, but 
I had to express a view. 
I had with me as my Press Secretary an 
outstanding young man named Michael Darling. 
He was fluent in Pidgin, he had frequently visited 
PNG as a student and he had served as a 
conscripted platoon commander in the PIR at 
Wewak. After leaving the Army he had hiked 
right through PNG, taking canoe trips to the 
islands. And he had met and knew probably half 
the activists in the Pangu Party. He had been my 
Press Secretary as Army Minister and he stayed 
with me for my first six months as Territories 
Minister. 
Michael Darling kept saying to me 
'Somare is extremely confident of being able to 
form a Government, so for God's sake don't listen 
to this advice from Canberra. Pangu is emphatic 
they can form a Government. '  So I talked to 
Michael Somare and he was in fact emphatic that 
he could form a Government. I then had a very 
worthwhile conversation with Julius Chan who said 
to me 'Look, philosophically I'm with the United 
Party, but they will not do for PNG what Pangu 
will do for PNG. So my inclinations are now to 
support Pangu, but I want to wait and see what 
happens. ' Obviously there was a personal element 
involved there and understandably so. 
The night before the House of Assembly 
convened on 20 April, Michael Darling brought me 
a count which showed that Pangu, with all their 
efforts to form a coalition still only had 46 
members, and therefore were theoretically one 
short of the United Party. At the very time I was 
reading this, Les Johnson brought me a statement 
of Michael Somare's announcing that he did in fact 
have the numbers, that he had more than 50 votes, 
and that the Peoples Progress Party had better 
decide whether they were going to join Pangu in 
Government or not. Somare's statement went on to 
say that if the Peoples Progress Party didn't decide 
in the next half hour, he was going to announce his 
prospective Ministry and they wouldn't be part of 
it. Twenty minutes later Chan announced that he 
would join a coalition with the Pangu Party and 
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when they went in to vote the next day, the 
coalition had 53 or 54 votes. In fact Somare, 
consummate politician that he was, announced that 
he had the numbers when he didn't - it was a bluff 
and it worked. 
I dwell on this because whoever formed 
the Government at that time really determined the 
future of PNG. In my view, had the United Party 
been the Government and sought to constrain the 
movement to self-government, we would have had 
a vastly different situation. For example, I would 
not have been able to win any support for a faster 
pace in Canberra. Australian policy would have 
been one of restraint and the reaction would have 
been demonstrations and bloodshed. &> lW 
now had a Government comprising a national 
coalition that in the case of Pangu wanted 
immediate self-government, but in the case of the 
People's Progress Party was more interested in the 
form of the Government that was put together. 
Michael Somare saw me the next day and said 'I 
want early, not immediate, but early self­
government but at present I'm more interested in 
the shape of self-government' . I responded by 
proposing that we hold constitutional talks in June 
1972. Interestingly enough he suggested July - a 
month later. And ultimately we decided to hold 
constitutional talks, the first of a series of historic 
talks to transfer power, on 27 and 28 July 1972. 
To illustrate developments from the 
perspective of the Australian Government, I want 
to tell you of some of the difficulties I had. I 
happen to think my Department 
.
of Ext�mal 
Territories did a very good job, but 1t sometimes 
displayed a tendency towards 'steady as she goes' 
and 'keep things moving slowly' .  I still retain the 
first briefing note I got from the Department 
because it worried me as much as did Ceb Barnes' 
comments on law and order. The note said that: 
The outlook for PNG is at best uncertain 
for the following reasons: 
1 .  There are few accepted leaders prepared 
to accept the responsibility of exercising 
power nationally. 
2. Modem ways in relation to local 
government, paying tax, the law, disposal 
of land, etc. have not yet generally taken 
root. Their continuance still depends on 
the administration. There are simply no 
indigenous equivalents on which to fall 
back. 
3 .  The administrative framework of 
government still depends on expatriates. 
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And I can go on. 
4. The economy still heavily depends on 
expatriates. The economy is heavily 
dependent on increasing annual Australian 
grants, etc. 
The message was clearly that PNG was 
just not ready for self-government; you cannot 
move so quickly. 
This document was given to me on 2 
February 1972. By the end of February, I had 
made three trips to PNG and I concluded I wasn't 
going to accept that sort of advice. And as I told 
you, I was still awaiting the outcome of the House 
of Assembly election. In this mood, I made an 
address to the University of Papua New Guinea 
which radicals like Hank Nelson were boycotting 
because they thought I was just another Tory trying 
to frustrate the inevitable left of centre victory! 
And with this Departmental advice still ingrained in 
my mind, I said in that speech: 
In the past, and in other 
countries, there have been people 
who have argued that because 
there are not experts in all fields 
then a country should not move 
to self-government. This is not 
the view of the Australian 
Government. 
Remember that at this stage I didn't even 
have Cabinet endorsement for my position! 
The Government believes it 
should help PNG move towards 
self-government. It should not 
just sit back and wait for it to 
happen. 
That caused quite a stir and as a 
consequence I was required to lodge a �binet 
submission. Interestingly enough all my Liberal 
colleagues supported me in Cabinet. I had some 
opposition from the Country Party as it had close 
ties with the United Party. 
Their more conservative outlook was 
understandable, but even so I was given a fair 
degree of encouragement. So much so that within 
a few weeks and still before the House of 
Assembly had met, I was saying in Brisbane on 8 
April: 
We believe the best way for 
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people in Government to learn 
the skills of Government is to 
actually practice them. The 
Australian Government believes it 
should help PNG towards self­
government. We should be 
remiss if we sat back and just 
waited for it to happen. This is 
quite a different matter from 
imposing self-government 
regardless of the wishes of the 
people. 
What I have been saying should 
not be taken as indicating that we 
are imposing a Westminster 
system of Government on PNG. 
It is the policy of the Australian 
Government that the choice of the 
system of government to be 
ultimately adopted in PNG is one 
for the people of that country. 
You will note that by now I was calling 
PNG a country - a significant change of 
terminology. Prior to that we had always referred 
to the 'territory' - it was all part of the symbolism 
as well as the reality of colonial rule. I continued: 
There never has been an intention 
to bind PNG to an Australian 
Constitution or an Australian 
pattern of administration. There 
is ample room for innovation and 
experiment. I would anticipate 
that talks will be held at a 
Ministerial level later this year 
between the Commonwealth and 
PNG leaders on the question of 
handing over further powers and 
moving further towards self­
government. I would not be 
surprised if a timetable including 
a target date for self-government 
was one of the topics of these 
talks and I would welcome this. 
I'm rather proud that I was saying this as 
early as April 1972, today I probably wouldn't 
have done it, but in my early thirties I did. It was 
befo�e the results of the House of Assembly 
election were known. I was spelling out that we 
had no objections to a timetable, but that we would 
not impose one ourselves. I went on: 
The preparations I want to make 
will be with the aim of putting 
PNG in the strongest position to 
handle its own affairs by the time 
of self-government. This is an 
aim that is uppermost in my mind 
and one that will figure 
predominantly at the talks to be 
held later this year. A country 
that handles its own affairs is 
self-governing in fact and not just 
in legal form. PNG must gain 
the realities of self-government 
and not just the facade. The 
realities of government mean that 
Papuans and New Guineans must 
see their way clear to run their 
own affairs without having to 
rely for expertise and skills on 
outside sources. There are real 
difficulties in that there is a lack 
of depth in the civil service at 
this juncture. But that simple 
fact does not provide any reason 
to stall the movement towards 
self-government. 
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I was criticised for that speech because a 
new Government hadn't been formed in the House 
of Assembly. But it was crucial in my mind to 
establish, particularly amongst Papuans and New 
Guineans, that there was an absolute preparedness 
on Australia's part to move quickly to self­
government provided the elected House of 
Assembly so wanted it. And I think that this 
created an atmosphere in which, when Michael 
Somare put his coalition together, they could begin 
to move immediately towards self-government. 
So within a matter of eight weeks, we had 
totally reversed the perception of 'no self­
government for many years, no independence for 
some generations' . That was risky but it was the 
only way to go. I got a lot of support from 
Ministers in my own Party - senior though they 
were to me. I had no Liberal dissent and whilst 
the Country Party were slower on this, in fairness 
to them, because of their contact with the United 
Party, I can understand them being wary. 
I made other speeches, again as early as 
April 1972, talking about the post-independence 
challenge in PNG. Speeches calling on Australians 
to adjust to the likelihood that PNG would soon be 
independent and that we would have to establish 
post-independence relations on a sound footing. I 
said that we would be remiss if we found ourselves 
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celebrating the independence of PNG without 
adequate preparation for the post-independence 
period, particularly post-independence relations 
between the two countries. I repeat, all this had 
happened in a matter of months and I'm rather 
pleased that the record stands up so well. 
Now this is very much first personal 
pronoun stuff. But I began this talk prepared to 
eschew false modesty. The longer you are in 
politics the more you recognise you do not really 
make much difference to your own country - but I 
might have made one in PNG. And bearing in 
mind Julius Chan's criticism the other day of a 
current lack of Australian respect for PNG's 
sovereignty, I recall that at the beginning of June 
1972 I said: 
While Australia will remain 
important to PNG, we should not 
seek to build an exclusive 
relationship based on the 
mistaken belief that past 
assistance places PNG under an 
obligation to us. Looked at from 
PNG's point of view, Indonesia, 
Singapore , Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Japan as well as 
the island nations of the Pacific 
will have important places in the 
eyes of PNG governments. I 
cannot anticipate that there will 
be no divergences of interest 
after independence and that PNG 
will not grow away from 
Australia. It may tum to other 
models  o f  government ,  
administrative organisation, and 
even economic organisation. 
Independence, however, should 
mean exactly what it says. 
I believe this stands up fairly well. 
I want to emphasise that all of the 
travelling I did to PNG and all of the discussions I 
held there just reinforced in my own mind the view 
that though Australia had been slow at moving 
towards acceptance of independence, we were now 
on the right track. The worry was always that 
when we did transfer power, there would be a lack 
of depth in the PNG civil seivice. It seemed to me 
we couldn't correct that overnight. We had 
established training colleges and these were doing 
a sound job, but there were still insufficient trained 
people. 
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To give you a flavour of the sort of 
pressure our efforts to accelerate the move to 
independence came under from more conseivative 
elements, I will describe the constitutional talks on 
27 July 1972 . 
On 27 and 28 July, Michael Somare and I 
sat down to discuss the transfer of extensive 
legislative and administrative power to PNG. We 
had an enormous range of powers and programs to 
hand over. Some powers had already been 
transferred but even so Australia had until recently 
exercised a veto because the Governor-General, on 
the advice of the Minister for External Territories, 
could overturn any proposal by any Minister in 
PNG. 
Looking through the speeches made at 
those discussions I note Michael Somare's comment 
that he was very glad that Australia had such a 
progressive Minister for External Territories - no 
false modesty here! 
Another interesting speech was by the 
Leader of the Opposition, Matt Toliman, who was 
a very fine person and from the Gaz.elle Peninsula. 
He had been a Minister in the previous House of 
Assembly and was Leader of the United Party. 
Matt Toliman, speaking on behalf of the 
Opposition, was not in favour of the more rapid 
pace towards independence. The United Party was 
starting to adjust to the fact that there had to be 
self-government, but they weren't keen on 
independence. 
to say: 
On 27 July 1972, Toliman went so far as 
Should the Government's policy 
on full internal self-government 
be attained by early 1974, we 
feel that it is still not too late to 
examine alternatives to early 
independence. We think there 
should, and could, be a special 
relationship between a self­
governing PNG and the 
Commonwealth of Australia 
along the lines of the United 
States of America/Puerto Rico 
arrangement. We all know the 
feelings of the vast majority of 
the people. They oppose early or 
full independence and we are 
sure they would follow the 
United Party policy on this point. 
So, whilst admitting there were grounds 
for criticism of Australia's earlier delay in 
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countenancing independence, the irony is that by 
mid 1972 the Leader of the PNG Opposition, who 
had won more seats than any other party but less 
than an absolute majority, was still arguing that the 
destiny ofPNG should be in some Commonwealth 
association with Australia akin to the US/Puerto 
Rican arrangement. Interestingly enough, that 
latter relationship has recently been confirmed. 
We didn't entertain that notion for a 
moment and even in the United Party support for it 
was waning. Matt Toliman was no longer in 
control of 46 or 47 members even though they'd all 
been elected as United Party representatives. Mr 
Thomas Kavali had been elected to the House the 
sole representative of the New Guinea National 
Party. A very astute man, Mr Kavali.  Whilst 
Michael Somare was trying to put his coalition 
together, Kavali had persuaded six of the 
independent Highlanders to join his New Guinea 
National Party, even though they had been elected 
as independents. He also took one or two from the 
United Party and brought those into coalition with 
Somare as well. So the New Guinea National 
Party had established a role for itself. 
But even though the United Party 
numbered less than 47, Matt Toliman was still the 
Leader of the Opposition and still leader of the 
largest party in the Parliament. And he was calling 
for a slowdown in the move towards independence. 
I fear that I may not be addressing the 
academic concerns of this audience. But I think 
that there is currently a rush to rewrite the history 
of this period. I recently saw an ABC TV program 
that completely glossed over this period, which 
really did see the development of a framework for 
PNG as a fine independent nation. It is 
understandable that some might want to gloss over 
this period because there was, prior to 1972, some 
degree of paternalism in the relationship. It is 
probably difficult to be an administering authority 
without being in some way paternalist, particularly 
at that time. It was not 1993. It was a vastly 
different world - as all of us know. But I think it 
is important to recognise that the way in which a 
trustee leaves a territory, one in which it is the 
governing authority, accountable to the United 
Nations as well as to its own people, is 
extraordinarily important. I was always very proud 
of the way we finished the job. 
I say 'we' although the Coalition was 
swept out of power on 2 December 1972 and the 
actual task of seeing through the date of self­
government and independence was left to the then 
Labor Party. Gough Whitlam and I used to talk 
about it a great deal. We got on well in those days 
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and he spoke well of my period as Minister. And 
it does seem to me we left PNG with a 
substantially larger reservoir of goodwill between 
the former colonial power and the newly emergent 
country than existed in most other comparable 
situations. Fiji is often held up to me as an 
example of where there was a smooth and easy 
transition, but I don't think the Fijian situation was 
as difficult as PNG's could have been. I feel that 
we minimised the difficulties in the transition 
because we moved the pace. 
I should add that there were also, of 
course, pressures in Australia to desist from faster 
moves to early self-government. The movement 
towards a centralised system of government ran 
counter to the churches' interest; the Catholic 
Church, for example. I'm not critical of the work 
they did, but of their attitude towards self­
government and independence. The Catholic 
Church, for example, was strongly in favour of a 
federal structure in PNG. The Democratic Labour 
Party, so influential in Australia in keeping the 
Liberal/National Parties in power for so long, were 
also in favour of a federated PNG. 
But I was strongly of the view then that a 
country containing 500 different tribes speaking 
more than 700 different languages needed not a 
fragmented system, but a more centralised system. 
After I ceased to be Territories Minister, 
the question of autonomy for Bougainville arose. 
I'd always believed that Bougainville ought to have 
a degree of autonomy, but when the provincial 
system of Government was first mooted in PNG, I 
discussed the matter with Michael Somare. At that 
stage I was the Shadow Foreign Minister and I 
rang him and said: 'Why are you doing this? Why 
are you setting up a provincial system of 
government? This is going to haunt you in the 
future. ' 
And he said to me (and I well remember 
the conversation): 'lf l don't establish a provincial 
system, I may lose Bougainville and PNG will end 
up just another exporter of coffee, tea and copra. 
I have to have Bougainville's copper contributing 
its resources and revenue to the task of nation 
building. Unless I give Bougainville that 
autonomy, PNG will not be a viable entity. '  This 
was the origin of the system of provincial 
government. I agreed with Somare's political 
assessment. He persuaded me, as so often was the 
case. 
I think PNG owes the Somares and the 
Chans of this world an enormous amount. 
Particularly, at that time, Michael Somare. I had 
met Somare when I first went to PNG and when he 
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was an angry young man. He was to become a 
very close personal friend. I suppose in those days 
we were both a couple of smooth operators and we 
probably deserved one another! But we were able 
to achieve a fair amount together and his 
astuteness, his timing, his capacity for negotiation 
in 1972 in putting that coalition together was 
something at which I marvelled. 
And it is well to remember that had it not 
come together, then the future of PNG and its 
relations with Australia would have been vastly 
different. I had started out on the assumption that 
because the Westminster system was the system I 
knew well, it was the system for PNG. But I very 
quickly came to realise that institutionalised 
division between Government and Opposition might 
well be the antithesis of what a Melanesian society 
requires, a society where you need to sit and talk 
and talk your way through problems. At the end of 
the day we did hand over a Westminster system, 
but we did so on the basis that we expected this to 
change and change substantially. I've been amazed 
that it hasn't changed to a far greater extent. 
That covers my involvement with PNG as 
External Territories Minister. However, I was 
very pleased some years later, as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to renew my involvement on at 
least two important occasions. One was the 
negotiation of that extraordinarily intricate Torres 
Strait Agreement that demarcates the maritime 
boundary between PNG and Australia. I in fact 
had far more difficulty in negotiating this 
Agreement with Queensland than I did with PNG. 
The other issue was the move, over a three 
or five year period, to untied grant aid. This shift 
epitomised my view that PNG must be allowed to 
set its own priorities rather than be forced to accept 
tied program aid. I note that the Australian 
Government has now reversed that decision. I 
think, however, untied aid was the right decision to 
take in the 70s. There was already too much 
determination of development priorities by 
Australia. I now reluctantly accept the need to 
return to program aid. This means, however, that 
Australia will now be seen in PNG as just another 
aid donor, and I do regret that. 
PNG achieved independence on 16 
September 1975 and here we are in December 
1993. I think we are witnessing a situation where, 
for whatever reason, bilateral relations have drifted 
somewhat. 
I think it is a slightly ominous drift. If I 
were to name Australia's key foreign policy 
relationships, they would have to be: PNG, New 
Zealand, each ASEAN country, Japan and the 
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United States. Of course, it is always a dangerous 
thing to identify 'special relationships' because 
those not deemed as special can take offence -
though it's not as offensive as accusing someone of 
being recalcitrant. But I don't think there would be 
too much disagreement over this list. 
And so I conclude a fairly personal 
account - including perhaps excessive use of the 
first personal pronoun - an account of an interesting 
10 months in PNG. I have left many anecdotes 
out, but nevertheless, I have tried to give you the 
flavour and thoughts of someone seeking to bring 
about historic change. 
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Appraising the Colonial Record: Australia in Papua New Guinea 
R. S. Parker 
What developments in a colonial territory's 
history can be attributed - especially after a lapse 
of years - to the policies of a colonial ruler, as 
distinct from factors ranging from terrain, 
resources and general 'culture contact' to 
indigenous culture, economy, and post-colonial 
politics? Are there any plausible standards, 
ethical, moral or social, that can be fruitfully 
applied to such assessments? 
One criterion seems at first sight easy to 
apply: how was the colony created? Unless it 
was by settlers from the metropolitan country 
moving to an empty land, or by annexation 
convincingly approved by current inhabitants, 
colonisation must have originated in an invasion 
and occupation by force, and prima facie the 
annexing power had no right to be there. 
Australia's colonies of Papua and New 
Guinea belonged in this category. 
At no time were the indigenous 
inhabitants of Papua or New Guinea consulted 
about the various dispositions by Germany, 
Britain and Australia of their ancestral lands 
except the final liberation (and that was a non­
negotiable Australian decision). In the beginning, 
white men appeared in various parts of Niugini 
and told those they met that they now owed 
allegiance to a Queen, a King or a Kaiser and 
were subject to an inscrutable influence - a 
foreign system of law. This is the most 
important sense in which a colonial hegemony 
may be pronounced beyond the pale of moral 
acceptance. We may say that all colonies 
similarly established have been morally 
illegitimate to that extent. 
However, the establishment of a colony 
determines its later history only in part. There 
are many options for ruling; many kinds of 
relationship may evolve between rulers and ruled; 
colonies, and their indigenous and non-indigenous 
inhabitants, undergo cultural changes positive and 
negative, attain many degrees of peace and 
prosperity or the reverse. It may be possible to 
allot different marks for the colonial regimes' 
contribution to some of these outcomes - better 
marks for some regimes than others; and 
conceivably to compare the record of a colonial 
occupation with those of the pre- and post­
colonial periods in the same territory. Is it 
possible to conceive a balancing of an illegitimate 
mode of acquisition against net gains as a colony? 
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To illuminate the problems the subject 
selected, chosen partly for its presumed 
familiarity to more experienced students of the 
colonised world, is the clash between Western 
ideas of the administration of 'justice' and a 
'tribal' society's approach to social order and the 
settlement of disputes. 
Early Australian declarations of policy 
towards both Papua and New Guinea included the 
preservation of 'native laws and customs in so far 
as these [were] not repugnant to the standards of 
the civilised world' . However, the very nature 
of indigenous 'law' was fundamentally at odds 
with Western concepts, that is with the idea of a 
set of specialised institutions trying to apply a 
body of fixed rules objectively and consistently to 
the maintenance of social norms and the 
resolution of disputes. 
Instead, the economic, social and moral 
obligations of group members were based upon 
the patterns of kinship. The rules which 
undoubtedly existed - governing family relations, 
the disposition of land and personal property, and 
social behaviour - varied from village to village, 
and were not embodied in written codes but 
inculcated by adult example and precept and by 
initiation rites. 'Anti-social' behaviour within 
the village was discouraged by community 
censure and the sense of 'shame' . Civil disputes 
were talked out by lengthy debate between the 
parties with possible intervention by village elders 
or 'big men' - or determined by superior force. 
The criterion for peaceful resolution was the 
restoration of social harmony rather than the 
satisfaction of abstract canons of uniform 
'justice' .  The only remedy against affront or 
injury was self-help: an attempt by the injured 
party's group to inflict retribution or secure 
appropriate compensation from any or all of the 
offender's group. 
In short, courts, law and judicial 
proceedings in the Western sense were unknown, 
and remained an enigma to the bulk of the 
population up to independence. In addition, 
many of the indigenous customs themselves, 
beginning with inter-village warfare and 
individual violence, were unacceptable to the 
white rulers and prohibited by white law. 
Hence the development of law and legal 
institutions, as far as this affected the indigenous 
population, was one of the most baffling areas of 
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policy for all the colonial administrations in 
Papua and New Guinea. Before the 1950s all of 
them, in fact, despaired of finding any indigenous 
institutions or individuals capable of applying law 
as Westerners conceived the process, and they 
were unwilling to countenance any other 
approach to the matter, at least in the short run. 
At the same time all the colonial regimes before 
World War II lacked the resources to install a 
specialised court system of their own wholly 
staffed by full-time professionals. 
As a result, the Australian attempts to 
give some recognition, in their own courts, to the 
different rules under which indigenes were 
accustomed to live, proved quite unable to 
obviate the indigenous need for the continuance 
of their own methods of social regulation at the 
village level. The administrators were tom 
between the desire to disparage and discourage 
these methods and the reluctant admission that it 
might be wiser to accord some qualified 
legitimacy to what they could not destroy. In 
the end, Papua New Guinea reached 
independence without any promising resolution of 
these problems or of the underlying conflict 
between basically incompatible conceptions of 
social regulation. 
While most of the introduced law applied 
to everyone in both territories, there was in this 
period a body of law governing indigenes alone, 
and therefore discriminatory on racial grounds. 
Essentially, it embodied the Australian sense of 
obligation to legitimise by legal enactment the 
powers assigned to field officers of the 
Administrations to establish 'law and order' and 
bring about the improvement of village life - on 
the assumption that even the latter could only be 
achieved by coercion. 1 
The first of these Native Regulations 
formed a simplified criminal code forbidding such 
activities as theft, adultery and sorcery; the list 
came to include other acts which were not 
offences under the law applicable to expatriates. 
In time they also covered almost every aspect of 
native life and development, applying the 
principle of coercion to improvements in village 
hygiene, education, the cultivation of cash crops, 
even recourse to medical treatment. 
The administration of these regulations 
was a prime function of field officers: in their 
administrative capacity by way of orders to 
villagers (to which the regulations required 
obedience); in their police capacity by way of 
arresting and charging suspected offenders against 
the regulations; in their capacity as jailers when 
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offenders were sentenced to imprisonment; and 
in their magisterial capacity as Courts for Native 
Matters (Papua) and Courts for Native Affairs 
(New Guinea). 
These courts had a limited jurisdiction to 
deal only with disputes between, and offences by, 
native people. Their importance among the 
functions of field officers was registered in Papua 
by the very title of 'Resident Magistrates' .  The 
corresponding officers in New Guinea inherited 
the German title of 'District Officer' .  Despite 
some differences in jurisdiction, in both sets of 
courts there was an emphasis on informal 
procedures, relaxed rules of evidence, allowance 
of the use of indigenous languages and the 
discovery and recording of relevant native 
custom.2 
It is not necessary here to describe the 
higher courts which had both native and 
expatriate jurisdiction, except to say that they 
applied rules of evidence and procedure mainly 
modelled on those in the Australian States, and to 
record T.E. Barnett's remark that 'for native 
litigants, the existence of an adversary procedure 
in courts, with the parties expected to follow 
formal rules and established English conventions, 
tends to make the whole procedure meaningless 
and confusing' .  3 
This exotic legal system had no place for 
indigenes except as litigants, accused, witnesses , 
interpreters, or policemen. Australian authorities 
made no effort in either territory to establish 
statutory tribunals staffed by indigenous people, 
though it was clear that the volume and 
peculiarities of conflict among native citizens 
were far greater than the introduced courts could 
cope with, and that those courts had often an 
imperfect understanding of the cases they did 
handle. 
Reluctantly recognising these facts, the 
Australian Administrations made three kinds of 
concession. First, they omitted certain subjects 
from the jurisdiction of the introduced courts, 
most notably rights over native land which were 
accepted as being governed by native custom and 
were protected by colonial law. Second, they 
allowed their courts to take indigenous customs 
into account in hearing and deciding civil cases 
and generally 'permitted' indigenous 'tribal 
institutions, customs and usages . . . to continue in 
existence' subject to territory ordinances and the 
'general principles of humanity'.  4 Third, they 
affected not to notice the informal exercise of 
quasi-judicial powers throughout the territories by 
village big-men, village councillors, and 
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indigenous minor government officials - often 
with the tacit assent of government field officers. 
The question of land tenure is too big 
and complex for inclusion here. Of the other 
responses, 'recognition of native custom' raised 
problems familiar in all similar colonies. At the 
end of the 1960s an Australian lawyer could still 
say that native customs were 'uncertain and hard 
to prove, vary from place to place, and even 
from time to time in the same place, and the 
same sanctions may not be applied to all persons 
in the same way for similar offences'.  5 
Dilemmas abounded. Should the state of custom 
be proved to the court as a matter of fact or of 
law, or simply be given judicial recognition? 
What kind of evidence could be 'proof of a 
custom, given that it was 'uncodified, rarely 
recorded in any readily available or completely 
trustworthy form, unsystematised and largely 
inchoate' ?6 How long should a custom have 
been in force to be recognised? What should be 
done in case of a conflict of custom (e.g. where 
litigants came from different areas)? 
In practice the answers given to such 
questions varied with the attitudes of individual 
magistrates and judges, and the extent to which 
the courts made any obeisance to 'custom' varied 
with the subject matter. For example, they 
accepted the validity of native customary 
marriages and marriage customs, including 
polygamy, and evaded divorce; native customary 
marriages could only be dissolved by customary 
procedures. In criminal cases, on the other hand, 
the introduced written law was applied 
exclusively and no customary offences were 
recognised. Notions of group responsibility and 
'pay-back' were ignored, police were required to 
find a specific offender, guilt had to be proved 
according to the laws of evidence and punishment 
consisted of fines, imprisonment or execution. 
Even here, however, there was some allowance 
for custom, in the more ready acceptance of 
defences of 'accident' or 'provocation' ,  and in 
sentencing. 
Nevertheless, from sheer necessity the 
great majority of village 'crimes' and disputes 
continued to be dealt with, at least in the first 
instance, by informal village processes, 
frequently conducted by village constables, 
village councillors and in New Guinea the native 
officials inherited from the German regime, the 
luluai. Though not appointed with judicial 
powers, the officials acted sometimes because 
they were already traditional 'big-men' , 
sometimes because they could use their official 
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prestige in this manner to become big - or bigger 
- men within the village community. 
The practice was condoned by both 
Administrations but acknowledged more openly in 
New Guinea than in Papua. At the end of the 
period under review D.M. Fenbury estimated that 
up to 75 per cent of native causes in Niugini 
were heard by what he called 'illicit tribunals' -
illicit, presumably, in so far as the members, by 
using official insignia (luluai, councillor or police 
caps and badges) or aping 'court' procedure, 
illegally claimed some sort of government 
imprimatur for their activity, as against purely 
traditional modes of settlement which the 
Administration could hardly proscribe at village 
level. 7 
After the brief interregnum of P. C. 
Spender's ministry (1949-51) following the defeat 
of Labor in 1949, Prime Minister Menzies 
appointed P.M.C. Hasluck, a former political 
science tutor, journalist and External Affairs 
officer from Western Australia, to a single 
consolidated portfolio of Territories (including 
Papua and New Guinea along with the Northern 
Territory of Australia and a number of minuscule 
island territories in the Indian Ocean and the 
south-west Pacific). 
In a summary sketch of the attitudes 
Hasluck brought to his task in Niugini, we must 
first note his belief in the benefits of transplanting 
Australian institutions and practices there despite 
the very different Territorial environment. In 
this he showed a typical Australian Philistinism 
and insularity, but in a marked degree. At the 
end of the 1950s he summed up in a phrase what 
he had often said at greater length: 'The New 
Guinea situation is unique and comparisons with 
Africa and Asia are inapplicable' . 8 
Instead of a judicious resort to such 
experience and knowledge (which of course need 
not have precluded taking due account of the 
Territory's peculiarities) Hasluck relied on 
establishing a set of 'principles' in the emerging 
polity - 'justice' , 'freedom' , 'representation' ,  
'trusteeship', - while disclaiming any specific 
'blueprints' or 'goals' . 
This raises a more general question 
which is nevertheless relevant to our subject. 
Consistently with his scorn of goals, Minister 
Hasluck was not an originator of new policies. 
He declares in his own memoir that 
At the commencement of my 
work I found no need to restate 
policy .  My reading of 
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departmental papers and public 
pronouncements did not arouse 
any immediate doubts about the 
objectives and principles that 
had been declared. 9 
And scholars generally agree that Hasluck 
continued on the path laid down by his 
predecessors, Labor's E.J. Ward and his own 
party's P.C. Spender. What then is left as 
Hasluck's 'contribution' - as what his severest 
critics10 called 'Hasluck's undoubted achieve­
ments'? 
I think it can best be summed up in a 
section heading of one of his own frequent 
addresses: 'An Increased Scale of Effort' .  He 
succeeded in getting the Australian appropriations 
for Papua and New Guinea multiplied several 
times over in a dozen years, and relentlessly 
drove his public servants to spend the money on 
more of what was already planned: more staff in 
the Territory, more pacification, more patrolling, 
more hospitals, drugs and health education, more 
schools and training, more indigenes in the cash 
economy, more cash economy, more wharves, 
airstrips, and roads. When he left the portfolio, 
he had also laid the foundations for two 
universities, for a House of Assembly with an 
overwhelming non-official majority elected on a 
common roll, and for a World Bank investigation 
to produce a comprehensive economic 
development plan. In this light, we might 
imagine Hasluck himself summing up his general 
approach to colonial administration as 
'pragmatism informed by principle' .  
Although the 1950 UN Visiting Mission 
expressed the hope that plans to establish 'native 
courts' would proceed as quickly as possible, the 
government's policy as framed by Hasluck was 
directly opposed to this. He formed a number of 
views on judicial reform during the decade. He 
rejected official proposals inconsistent with these 
and initiated moves to install his own concepts; 
the net result was that there was no important 
change during the 1950s. 
The idea of entrusting village influentials 
with wide civil powers and criminal jurisdiction 
at grassroots level, in such matters as assaults, 
theft and disobedience to lawful orders, dated 
back at least to 1924, when Colonel John 
Ainsworth, a former Chief Native Commissioner 
of Kenya, reported to the Australian government 
on the administration of New Guinea. Nothing 
was done in either territory beyond J.H.P. 
Murray's experiment with 'native assessors' in 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Papua, 1929-42. The idea of authorising 'village 
courts' was raised again after World War II in 
the Army Directorate of Research, especially by 
Drs L.P. Mair and H. Ian Hogbin, 
anthropologists, supported by the lawyer J.H. 
Wootten. Like Murray and other orthodox 
lawyers at every stage, the then Chief Justice in 
Papua and New Guinea, Mr (later Sir) Beaumont 
Phillips, poured cold water on the proposals on 
the grounds that Papuans and New Guineans had 
no conception of 'justice' in the British mode and 
no legal training. Nevertheless Mair and Hogbin 
were able to persuade the Minister for External 
Territories, E.J. Ward, to include in the Papua 
and New Guinea Act 1949 a provision for 'native 
village courts and other tribunals on which 
natives may sit as adjudicating officers or 
assessors' . 1 1  
This was the provision on which the 
1950 Visiting Mission based its hopes. But in the 
absence of any interest on the part of Ministers 
Spender and Hasluck, it was 1954 before a 
Village Courts Ordinance was drafted, largely 
under the influence of D.M. Fenbury and C.J. 
Lynch (an unorthodox legal officer in the 
Territory department of Law, later Legislative 
Draftsman), and submitted to Hasluck with the 
endorsement of the Executive Council. In 
rejecting the proposal out of hand, Hasluck went 
beyond the indigene' s 'unfamiliarity with justice' , 
and foreshadowed his confessed preference, in 
this field, for advice 'from lawyers bred in the 
British and Australian tradition of the rule of law 
and not from field officers of the 
Administration' . 12 
He argued that: 
(1) any separate system of courts for natives 
(and hence the existing Courts of Native 
Affairs and Courts for Native Matters) 
was undesirable in principle; 
(2) the proposed courts would be unduly 
subject to the influence of the 
Administration; 
(3) their freedom to invoke local custom in 
the settlement of disputes would produce 
a chaos of conflicting precedents; 
(4) they would undermine British principles 
of the administration of justice, by 
applying the traditional principle of 
maintaining village harmony and 
satisfying all parties rather than 
enforcing a uniform abstract rule; 
(5) the draft unduly subordinated the judicial 
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system to administrative convenience; 
(6) exemption of the village courts from the 
orthodox rules of evidence would make 
for two systems of justice - the native 
receiving substandard justice; 
(7) the proposed selection of court members 
from panels nominated by local 
councillors or elders, and the localised 
character of the courts generally, would 
invite nepotism and corruption. 13 
These objections reflected Hasluck's 
underlying convictions that Papua and New 
Guinea badly needed 'a single body of law and a 
single system of justice, equally accessible to all 
and even in its incidence' ,  and that the 'courts 
should be freed from Administration influence so 
that in future years they could not become the 
instrument of any government' . 14 In other words 
he wished to introduce the (British-derived) 
Australian judicial system in its entirety, along 
with all its legal principles; his policy was 
'assimilationist' here as elsewhere. What is 
more, he wanted immediate change in this 
direction, and demanded it from the 
Administration throughout the 1950s. 
Encountering delay or even resistance, 
he called on the aid of orthodox lawyers from 
Australia - not so much to get an objective 
appraisal of the problems as to secure 
'independent' rationalisations of his already 
confirmed beliefs. Thus in 1952 he asked 
Professor (later Sir) Kenneth Bailey, a Melbourne 
constitutional lawyer, 'to investigate and report 
on criminal Justice in the Territory' - but never 
got a definitive report. When Chief Justice 
Phillips retired in 1957 Hasluck found a 
successor in Melbourne barrister, A.H. Mann, 
Q.C. , who, as Hasluck later wrote, 'fully shared 
my own ideas' ; 15 by mid-1959 he had secured 
from Mann an acceptable paper outlining 'Points 
calling for investigation and revision in the legal 
system' . 
This fortified Hasluck, still encountering 
Administration scepticism and inaction, in 
eliciting from D.P. (later Sir David) Derham, this 
time a Melbourne Professor of Jurisprudence, a 
'report on the system for the administration of 
justice in the Territory' which was delivered at 
the end of 1960. Derham's report, produced after 
a five-week investigation in the Territory, duly 
confirmed Hasluck's preconceptions, but also 
contained warnings against precipitate change 
which Hasluck ignored when ordering, early in 
1961 ,  the immediate implementation of Derham's 
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recommendations. 
The responsible Territory officials, in 
fact, fully shared the Minister's ultimate aims, 
but neither Hasluck nor his orthodox legal 
mentors from Australia could see this since they 
did not have enough first-hand experience of 
Papua and New Guinea (or of similar territories 
elsewhere) to understand the officials' arguments 
- some practical and some sociologically 
sophisticated - against attempts to impose the 
full panoply of Australian justice directly and 
immediately. In the first place, as Fenbury 
and others argued, it was not possible to carry 
out Hasluck's wish to transfer the field staffs 
police, judicial and custodial (prison) functions 
rapidly to elaborate, specialised institutions on 
British or Australian lines - whether manned by 
whites or blacks - because the necessary 
resources of trained and experienced manpower, 
as well as of capital installations and equipment, 
were not remotely in sight and would take many 
years to mobilise no matter how much of the 
available effort was put into it. In the meantime 
the maintenance of rough-and-ready 'kiap justice' 
and with it the morale of the field staff was 
essential if there was to be any British-type 
justice at all. As it was, 'kiap justice' was itself 
inadequate to cover the field, as shown by the 
universal presence of 'illicit' village tribunals 
operated by luluai, councillors, other native 
officials and traditional village elders, variously 
estimated to be dealing with 70 to 90 per cent of 
grassroots 'crime' and litigation, in accordance 
mainly with traditional norms. 
As for their proposal for village courts, 
the sponsoring officials argued that such a 
system, supervised by the government but 
drawing upon experienced indigenous manpower, 
would not only be more practicable in the short 
run than an extension of orthodox tribunals on the 
Australian model, but also be preferable as a 
'fountain of British justice' and as a basis for an 
ultimately uniform body of 'common law' . 
While Hasluck (and Mann) thought they could 
build in the Territory 'a code . . .  based on 
English common law' which would ultimately 
evolve (through interpretation and the recognition 
of local customary practices) into a 'Territory 
common law' , 16 the Administration officers 
believed the process must happen the other way 
round. 
An alien system of (British or 
Australian) common law could not be imposed 
from without, because villagers mainly needed -
and respected - their own common law in the 
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form of local custom. Building upon that, 
however varied it might be at the outset, the 
necessities of social and economic evolution, the 
spread of common education and geographical 
mobility, and the integration of the village court 
system with the introduced hierarchy of higher 
courts would gradually develop a consistent body 
of Territory common law. After all, this was 
how common law had evolved in British 
communities themselves. 
And a government-sponsored village 
court system would offer not only the one 
reasonable hope of displacing the universal 
system of illicit village tribunals, but also a 
prospect of integrating local customs where those 
tribunals offered none. In the absence of a 
legitimate village courts system, the existing 
Australian court structure, not reaching down to 
the village level, provided no alternative to the 
pervasive illegal tribunals. 17 
Having rejected - perhaps failed to 
understand these arguments, Hasluck 
concentrated on other issues during the 1950s, 
some important, some comparatively trivial. He 
tried to underline the dignity of the judiciary and 
its separateness from the executive. In 1953 he 
disapproved of the practice whereby the Chief 
Justice became Acting Administrator during the 
absence of the Administrator; in 1955 he ruled 
that the Assistant Administrator and not the Chief 
Justice should act on such occasions. In 1956 he 
refused to consider nominations made by the 
Administrator for a new Chief Justice. He 
related judicial salaries in the Territory to those 
in Australia, not to those of the Administrator or 
other Territory officials. 
All this was intended to rub in the idea 
that the judiciary was co-ordinate with, and 
independent of, the Administration, and that at no 
level should the courts be thought to be an arm of 
the Administration. The new Chief Justice 
Mann's idea of establishing the majesty of the 
law in indigenous minds was personally to design 
and have erected, at various points in the 
Territory, a bizarre and expensive style of 
courthouse, vaguely aping the Sepik haus 
tambaran but in concrete and galvanised iron, for 
use by the judges on circuit and their entourage. 
Field officers deplored the waste of money on 
this futile ostentation since the buildings could be 
put to no other use and lay idle most of the time. 
To sum up, the official system of justice 
that prevailed throughout the 1950s continued to 
be a mixture of formalised law and courts wholly 
derived from Australia (though with an extremely 
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limited jury system for capital cases against 
Europeans only) and of 'ldap justice' at the 
lower, rural levels, under which field officers 
combined police, magisterial and custodial 
powers. Alongside this dual system the illegal 
village courts, 'kot bilong mipela' (i.e. 'our 
courts'), remained indispensable to deal with the 
bulk of inter-native litigation at the grassroots. 
At the same time the Minister of Territories was 
embarking on a program, not to build a legal 
system upon indigenous foundations or even to 
integrate introduced with indigenous institutions, 
but to make the whole judicial system an even 
closer and more rigid approximation to that of 
industrialised Western nations. 
In the early 1960s the upper end of the 
introduced court system comprised the Supreme 
Court (with appeal by leave to the High Court of 
Australia), and the Courts of Petty Sessions 
(Papua) and District Courts (New Guinea). 
These courts had jurisdiction over people of all 
races, but in practice operated mainly for the 
expatriate population and the more sophisticated 
indigenous people living in urban areas. The 
Supreme Court, however, went on circuit 
throughout the Territory to hold criminal trials 
which formed the bulk of its work. 
Between these higher courts and 
traditional village dispute settlement lay the 
intermediate realm of the Courts for Native 
Matters (Papua) and Courts for Native Affairs 
(New Guinea), which as we have seen 
administered the Native Regulations applicable 
only to indigenous people. These courts were 
staffed almost entirely by field officers of the 
Administration - the ldap - who, of course, were 
vested with administrative, police and custodial 
powers as well as their functions as magistrates. 
In the latter respect this part of the system 
offended against the European juridical principle 
of 'separation of powers' between judicial and 
executive agencies. 
These courts were 'intermediate' ,  also, 
in the sense that field officers (who received an 
elementary legal education as part of their formal 
training) tended, as a matter of practical 
necessity, to combine elements of the traditional 
indigenous approach to dispute settlement with 
their more orthodox magisterial role. Thinly 
spread though it was, the ldap service provided 
the only regularly accessible form of Australian 
authority throughout the rural hinterland, and 
villagers brought to the ldap those disputes they 
could not settle - or keep settled - among 
themselves. Armed with a degree of intimate 
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local knowledge, aware of government policies 
and interests in his district, burdened with many 
other duties, and having the necessary 
administrative discretion, the kiap often settled 
such matters 'out of court' , by informal inquiries, 
consultations and mediation, to the optimal 
satisfaction of those concerned - rather than take 
the time and tedious trouble to hold a formal 
court with its legalistic procedures which might 
meet more exacting standards of 'justice' but be 
less effective in keeping the peace in the village. 
Added to the complexity and 
contradictions in the legal situation as a whole 
was the lack of any indigenous participation in 
the administration of the Australian law, except 
as interpreters, policemen, witnesses, litigants or 
defendants. This was the result partly of policy 
but mainly of a dearth of professionally-trained 
lawyers of any kind. There was not a single 
fully-qualified indigenous lawyer in the Territory 
as late as mid-1966. By the end of the decade 
there was one - with an Australian degree. 
There was a grave shortage of expatriate lawyers. 
In mid-1966 it was estimated that there were 
between 50 and 60 qualified lawyers engaged in 
professional legal work in the Territory, 
including the judges and full-time magistrates, the 
legal staff in the department of Law and its 
Public Solicitor's Office, and fewer than a do:zen 
private practitioners. The Secretary for Law 
claimed at that time that his department was 40 
per cent. understaffed in the professional sector. 18 
As J.H. (later Mr Justice) Wootten told a Port 
Moresby seminar: 
The simple fact is that the great 
bulk of the legal work of the 
Territory is not being done at 
all. The only persons whose 
legal problems are being 
adequately attended to are the 
Administration and the tiny 
handful of non-indigenous 
inhabitants. . . .  [Very largely 
the] two millions [sic] 
indigenous inhabitants . . . are 
touched by the legal system of 
the Territory only if they are 
charged with a major criminal 
offence in which event they will 
be prosecuted, defended and 
tried by professional lawyers. 19 
This was the position nearly six years after 
Hasluck had inaugurated a series of paper 
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reforms - that is, legislation and official 
instructions - whose success depended above 
everything else on a Territory-wide supply of 
qualified lawyers, especially indigenous lawyers, 
and of professionally trained police. The 
shortage of such police, though somewhat 
reduced, also remained endemic throughout the 
decade. 
In Professor Derham's Report on the 
System for the Administration of Justice in the 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea, delivered to 
the Minister in December 1960, Hasluck found 
full confirmation of the views he had already 
formed about the above situation, and a series of 
precise and palatable recommendations for 
dealing with it. Restricting the report's 
circulation to selected officials and allowing no 
time for critical comment, early in February 
1961 ,  by his own account, he directed that 
'immediate action should be taken to put the 
recommendations into effect' .  :!I 
This apparently meant the main 
recommendations: there were some which no 
attempt was ever made to implement. In a short 
statement to parliament in October 1961  Hasluck 
summarised a number of Derham ' s  
recommendations and very briefly indicated the 
ways in which he proposed to carry them out. 21 
Derham's primary points confirmed Hasluck's 
existing convictions: judicial functions and 
executive functions should be separated and 
administered by different persons; there should 
not be separate systems of law and courts for the 
different races - all should be subject to the 
same unified system, which qualified indigenous 
people should help to administer. 
Bringing the existing arrangements into 
conformity with these two principles depended 
for its success upon the inter- related timing of a 
number of necessary intermediate steps - none 
of them likely to be easy or rapid. In particular, 
a nationwide corps of legally-trained indigenous 
officials and a nationwide body of trained 
professional police - neither of which existed in 
1961  - would be needed if kiaps and local 
government councils were to be divested of their 
judicial and police powers without creating a 
vacuum of government- maintained law and order 
throughout the rural areas. 
Derham himself was aware of the 
problem. His report advocated a gradual change, 
beginning in the 'more advanced areas of Lae, 
Port Moresby and Rabaul' ,  and did not propose 
that field officers should be stripped of their 
judicial and police powers before others had been 
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recruited and trained to assume them. A few 
years later he greeted the Ordinance for 
establishing a single system of Local Courts (see 
below) with the same warning: 
I have real doubts . . . as to 
whether it is wise or even 
possible to introduce in one 
stride such a separate and 
independent jurisdiction with 
common forms and common 
powers over the whole 
Territory . . . .  
[T] o  deprive the administrative 
o ffic ers responsible for 
government of their magisterial 
powers before it is possible to 
provide competent officers to 
exercise those powers separately 
and frequently, may be to 
attempt too much at one time. 22 
However, the actual rate of change was not 
determined by Hasluck's or anyone else's will, 
but by administrative bottlenecks, manpower 
shortages, legislative delays, official resistance 
and indifference. This can be illustrated by brief 
reference to what happened to a few of Derham's 
recommendations during the 1960s. 
First, Derham fully endorsed Hasluck's 
1955 rejection of 'native village courts' of lay 
justices applying largely native custom. He 
proposed that the courts especially concerned 
with native matters should be made 'an ordinary 
part of the judicial system' , and should cease to 
have a separate 'native matters' jurisdiction as 
soon as trained native people were available as 
magistrates. Hasluck accordingly ordered that a 
new Local Courts Ordinance should replace the 
Courts for Native Matters and Courts for Native 
Affairs, to be followed as soon as possible by 
repeal of the Native Regulations applying only to 
indigenes. 
The Local Courts Ordinance did not pass 
the Legislative Council until 1963 , and from lack 
of the necessary manpower and resources was not 
proclaimed in force until January 1966. Once 
established, the integrated local courts were 
supposed to be reasonably accessible to villagers 
and deal with 'native custom' matters among 
others - hence to be staffed in part by Assistant 
Magistrates, honorary and untrained, empowered 
to accept complaints, make orders binding people 
to keep the peace and to protect property. 
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By 1969 about 250 of these had been 
appointed - many illiterate and most unable to 
speak English - and could supply only a minority 
of localities. The bulk of magistrates in local 
courts during the decade had to be the same kiaps 
who had run the predecessor courts, so the 
'separation of powers' was not achieved and the 
mediation procedures were much the same as the 
kiaps had practised for decades. But once a 
matter was in the court the Western adversary 
system was invoked and the magistrate was not 
encouraged to take an inquisitional role. 23 
The Native Regulations continued in 
force through most of the decade and were 
administered by the Local Courts when 
established. Even after the bulk of the 
Regulations were repealed in 1969 a number - on 
health, adultery, sorcery and administrative 
control - remained. 
Second, looking to the independent state 
of the near future, Derham recommended that as 
soon as possible there should be native 
participation in the membership and admin­
istration of local courts, but said that persons not 
qualified in Western law should not exercise 
judicial functions. He proposed that selected 
field officers should be trained to become full­
time magistrates, and that there should be a 
scheme of training of native people as magistrates 
and clerks of court. 
Hasluck approved such a scheme in 
1962, but the difficulty was to find indigenous 
people literate in English and with enough basic 
education to begin training. After a pilot scheme 
in 1963 , two courses began at the Administrative 
College of Papua and New Guinea three years 
later, turning out about sixteen graduates by the 
end of 1967 for appointment as assistant 
magistrates to gain experience with a serving 
magistrate before their final appointment as 
magistrates. By about the same time ten 
indigenous patrol officers had also been appointed 
as part-time local court magistrates and received 
some legal training. More than twelve years 
were to elapse after the Derham Report before a 
reasonable number of Papuans and New Guineans 
became available for magisterial work in the 
lower courts. 24 
Third, following another of Derham's 
recommendations, Hasluck initiated a new Local 
Government Ordinance (1963 , proclaimed in 
force 1965), depriving local government councils 
of their constables and law and order functions. 
Hasluck set about recruiting and training more 
police, some from abroad. Again there was a 
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dearth of qualified recruits, and Downs25 draws a 
picture of corrupt local police in rural areas 
'dispensing a brand of rough justice that they 
were totally incompetent by training or 
experience to prescribe and had no authority to 
perform' . 
Fourth, there was Derham's recommend­
ation that local courts should be empowered to 
take note of established native customs in 
specified matters. The Local Courts Ordinance 
granted them jurisdiction over 'all matters arising 
out of and regulated by native custom, other than 
such matters as are within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Land Titles Commission' . To 
fill this out and provide more general guidance, 
the Administration got the Legislative Council to 
pass in 1963 the Native Customs (Recognition) 
Ordinance, which set out the rules allowing 
courts to 'enforce' or otherwise 'take into 
account' native custom in civil cases. 26 Barnett 
thought at the time that ' [c]onsidering the great 
variety of customs and conditions, the local 
court, as an arm of the central government, is 
likely to be a clumsy instrument for dealing with 
such delicate matters' ,  and he described the 
Native Customs (Recognition) Ordinance as 'an 
extremely difficult Ordinance raising untold legal 
problems . .  . ' .  n 
The Native Customs (Recognition) 
Ordinance 1963, based partly on British Solomon 
Islands and Ghanaian legislation, preserved the 
vagueness of the notion of 'custom' in Papua and 
New Guinea, which as Lynch noted was 'largely 
inchoate and has usually been taken to be 
enormously variable over relatively short 
distances' ,  was 'vastly different from anything 
that could be called customary law in any 
lawyer's sense', and even more different from 
the English legal concept of custom as a rule 
existing 'from time immemorial' . 28 The 
Ordinance, per contra, defined a custom in 
relation to the time and place where an issue 
arose, and permitted a wide range of evidence to 
establish itself including hearsay and expressions 
of opinion. It required all courts to recognise, 
take account of, and enforce native customs in 
regard to specified matters in civil cases, and 
these matters included land, marriage, divorce, 
custody of children and transactions intended by 
the parties to be governed by custom. There was 
a general limitation that customs would not be 
recognised if 'repugnant to the principles of 
humanity' ,  inconsistent with legislation, contrary 
to the welfare of a child, or if recognised likely 
to cause injustice or be against public interest. 29 
17 
There was no prov1s1on for the 
codification of custom (usual in Africa), and 
Barnett noted the problems the Ordinance set for 
courts, of deciding whether to apply customary 
law where a common law rule was applicable, 
and how to choose between two or more 
conflicting customs. 30 In a survey of the legal 
system at the end of the decade Barnett summed 
up: 
Most village litigants have 
access in practice only to Local 
Courts, which usually deal with 
[disputes involving custom] by a 
process of mediation based on 
the magistrate's view of 
reasonableness and justice [i.e. 
nearer to the established kiap 
approach than to Derham's] . 
The parties (and sometimes the 
part-time kiap-magistrates) have 
little idea of the rules of 
common law. There is no legal 
impediment barring village 
litigants from the District or 
Supreme Courts, but in practice 
lack of finance, experience and 
legal advice frequently stops 
them. As a result there is little 
judicial guidance on the 
resolution of the conflict 
between common law and 
custom, both of which may 
apply to natives in civil cases. 31 
We need not accept the notion, 
developed by a number of observers, of a 'gap' 
in the law and order system, created during the 
1960s by the policy of removing rural law and 
order functions from field officers and local 
government councils before an adequate coverage 
of rural areas could be assumed by professional 
police and local courts with indigenous 
professional staff. In practice, kiaps and 'illicit 
indigenous tribunals' continued in most of their 
accustomed roles. There is, however, a 
considerable body of testimony to a steady 
decline during the decade in indigenous respect 
for and resort to Australian legal institutions, and 
to a resurgence of illicit traditional 
dispute-settling practices including resort to 
violence, along with a decline in the general 
security of persons and property. These trends 
were generally attributed, not so much to the 
notion of the •gap' as to the attempts of the 
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Administration and the official courts - under 
Ministerial direction and government policy - to 
make increasing use of Europe.an statutory and 
common law concepts and strict rules of evidence 
in the administration of the law by all responsible 
officials. 32 
Evidence supporting these assertions -
not entirely free from the possibility of bias in its 
mode of compilation - was assembled in a 
survey initiated in 1963 by Fenbury, as Secretary 
of the department of the Administrator, and with 
the Administrator's approval. He asked District 
Commissioners to report on 'current trends in 
indigenous attitudes towards the Territory courts 
and the law generally' - excluding any views of 
their own about the system. A summary of the 
D.C.s' answers prepared in the department said 
they were 'virtually unanimous' that 
The indigene had confidence in 
the Department of Native 
Affairs Officer, [and] under­
stood the punitive aspects of the 
administration of justice, but not 
the present corrective and 
educational intentions, nor the 
move for separation of the 
executive and judicial functions. 
According to the summary the people 
reportedly directed their heaviest criticism at the 
Supreme Court. The indigene did not understand 
the court processes, particularly legal argument, 
the relationship between the participants and 
counsel, the intricacies of pleading, and acquittal 
through legal technicalities. 
To the indigene the Supreme 
C ou r t  i s  par t  o f  the  
Government, and its aloofness, 
incomprehensibility, inconsist­
ency, and weakness are the 
faults of the Government, and 
justice is manifestly not done. 
Detailed examples were given of delays 
in hearings by the Supreme Court, a growing 
backlog of land disputes which had been removed 
from the jurisdiction of Native Affairs officers 
without adequate alternative provision, indigenes 
treating corrective institutions as 'something of a 
joke' , their bafflement at the apparent lightness 
and inconsistency of sentences, hence taking the 
law violently into their own hands, increases in 
capital crime, and so on. 33 
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The same problems were repeatedly 
noted by a variety of commentators of different 
backgrounds throughout the decade and beyond. 
Charles Rowley, a historian who was 
Principal of the Australian School of Pacific 
Administration for fifteen years and had 
experience of the Territory dating back to World 
War II, commented in 1965: 
Perhaps the pursuit of a too 
lofty ideal of legal unity may 
simply expedite the development 
of antipathy to a central 
administration which seems to 
some local leaders to neglect its 
responsibility to govern; so that 
a villager may break village 
customs and cause hardship to 
others, but make no breach of 
law which may be established in 
court, or a known tax defaulter 
can use a technicality to escape 
penalty.34 
The Dean of the new Law Faculty in the 
University of Papua and New Guinea, Professor 
P. Gerard Nash, headed a section of his inaugural 
lecture: 'Why our Procedural and Evidentiary 
rules are not per se appropriate to the Territory' .  
He thought the real problem lay in  the point 
made at the beginning of this paper, viz. in 'the 
completely different set of concepts possessed by 
the primitive indigene and the expatriate barrister 
and judge, by whom the trial is conducted' .  He 
quoted the recent Report on Higher Education in 
Papua and New Guinea, 35 which referred to 
The inherent difficulty of 
exchanging terms, concepts, and 
thought processes, developed 
over centuries, between two 
radically different cultures, 
poles apart in social structure, 
economic basis, and historical 
evolution - and expressing 
themselves in languages which 
have no faintest family 
relationship. 36 
Professor Nash went on to detail the practical 
problems of evidence in the courts of the day. 37 
Among these and other critiques of the 
kind none is stronger or more comprehensive 
than that of Ian Downs, field officer and District 
Commissioner of the 1940s and 1950s, planter 
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and businessman, member of the Legislative 
Council and House of Assembly, and author of 
the officially-sponsored history of Australia's 
post-World War II administration of the 
Territory. Downs devotes twelve pages of his 
book to the issues and policies of the 1960s in the 
administration of justice, focusing on the Derham 
Report, its background, and the attempted and 
actual changes which followed. Here are some 
of the points he made: 
The [local government] council 
system had been designed to 
teach the people to conduct their 
own affairs in accordance with 
the rule of law. It was naive to 
imagine that councillors and 
council business could remain 
aloof from law and order. The 
vacuum was partly filled by 
councillors convening their own 
illicit tribunals. 38 
Our courts  s e e med to  
Melanesians to place too high a 
value on the sanctity of the rules 
of evidence, to be diverted by 
what seemed to be technical 
trivia, to over-value inanimate 
objects, to have a biased regard 
for the status of women and to 
have no comprehension of 
vendetta responsibilities and 
metaphysical influences on the 
motives of people. 39 
As in other matters, after the 1972 
election and formation of the indigene-led, 
virtually autonomous National Coalition in the 
House of Assembly, the Australian Department of 
External Territories abdicated the tight control it 
had previously exercised over the development of 
legal institutions and legal policy in Papua New 
Guinea. An academic lawyer working in Port 
Moresby at the time writes that the immediate 
result was a virtual vacuum in such policy­
making. The Department of Law in Port 
Moresby (as distinct from one or two of its 
individual members) had never taken much 
interest in attempts to develop locally adapted 
legal institutions and techniques, and at the time 
was particularly ill-equipped to do so. The 
officials who had shown an imaginative and well­
informed concern with those problems were all 
working outside the Department: C.J. Lynch as 
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Legislative Counsel (i.e. chief parliamentary 
draftsman); Peter Lalor as Public Solicitor, long 
in tense relations with the Department; and John 
Ley, Counsel to the House of Assembly and from 
September 1972 released to serve the 
Constitutional Planning Committee. That 
committee had also appropriated one of the ablest 
indigenous lawyers, Bernard Narakobi (later 
Chief Justice). 
Hence it is understandable that there was 
only one important structural change to the legal 
system in the first half of the 1970s, namely the 
establishment of village courts (see below); other 
changes were by way of administrative and 
staffing developments in the existing system. 
The Administration's attempts to 
increase indigenous staffmg in legal institutions 
offered a particularly painful example of the 
paucity of suitably-educated indigenous people. 
At the Local Court level the number of 
full-time indigenous Magistrates rose from 27 in 
mid-1971 to 50 at mid-973 , with 17 more about 
to be appointed. We have noted the appointment 
of between 140 and 150 indigenous Assistant 
Magistrates, to sit with Local Courts at hearings 
and, where helpful, to mediate between parties. 
Division of District Administration field officers 
were appointed as Local Court Magistrates from 
time to time in remote areas to supplement the 
full time Magistrates when necessary. The 
majority of these were still Australian in the mid-
1970s. 
Dependence on the kiap in the 
administration of justice remained still greater at 
the District Court level. Of the eighteen District 
Courts (one for each District) at this period, from 
nine to twelve were manned by Resident 
Magistrates, all kiaps of whom four were 
indigenous by 1973; five by Stipendiary 
Magistrates (qualified barristers or solicitors, 
probably all expatriate in the period); and the 
remaining courts by Reserve Magistrates who 
were drawn from the body of indigenous Local 
Court Magistrates. 40 
As one of the last gestures of Australian 
judicial policy, the Papua New Guinea Act was 
amended in 1973 to permit appointment of non­
Australians to the Supreme Court, but only one 
such appointment had been made up to 1977. 
John Kaputin, while Minister for Justice in 1973-
74, established a precedent of appointing to the 
Supreme Court Australian lawyers with PNG 
experience. 
As we have seen, the introduced 
Australian law (specifically the Laws Repeal and 
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Adopting Ordinance 1921-1952) purported to 
'permit' the tribal institutions, customs and 
usages of the indigenous people 'to continue in 
existence in so far as the same are not repugnant 
to the general principles of humanity' .  We also 
noted that the Native Customs (Recognition) 
Ordinance 1963 authorised 'native custom' to be 
recognised, enforced and pleaded in all 
(introduced) courts, unless repugnant to 
humanity, inconsistent with Australian law in the 
Territory, 'against the public interest' ,  or not in 
the best interests of a child. However, given the 
attitudes of Australian Ministers and officials, 
backed up by the views of Professor David 
Derham in his Report on ihe Administration of 
Justice of 1960, along with the domination of the 
courts - upon and in front of the bench - by 
Australian lawyers and kiaps, custom had 
received short shrift in court proceedings except 
as a factor to be considered when fixing 
sentences in criminal trials. There were, 
however, a few instances of attention being paid 
to custom, if only in order to modify its 
influence. 
Under the Local Government Ordinance 
1963-1971 ,  local government councils could 
recommend to the Administrator the enforcement, 
variation or abolition of any native custom in the 
council area. Councils could also vary custom by 
implication when they made council rules. The 
main example of this was the practice, growing 
during the 1960s and 1970s, of councils trying to 
limit the steady inflation of bride price which was 
occurring in some areas, especially where bride 
price was commuted into cash as the cash income 
of villagers increased. By 1971 some thirty-nine 
councils had made rules setting maximum bride 
price or otherwise regulating marriage 
settlements. 41 
Another example of the growing 
recognition of customary institutions was 
legislation to facilitate business activity by 
customary groups. In 1969 when C.J. Lynch 
drafted a bill for this purpose, it was set aside 
because legislation based on Australian companies 
law to ease the activities of foreign businesses 
and local entrepreneurs was considered more 
urgent. However, in 1973 under the National 
Coalition, Lynch as First Legislative Counsel had 
the opportunity to redraft a bill nearer to his 
original intentions, prepared on T.E. Barnett's 
initiative by an Australian academic lawyer, Peter 
Fitzpatrick; the House of Assembly passed it in 
June 1974 as the Business Groups Incorporation 
Act. 
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More generally, as Bayne points out-
The sentiment that the legal 
system imposed by the 
Australian government was 
antithetical to the values of 
Papua New Guinea communities 
was articulated by politicians 
whenever legal issues were 
discussed in the House of 
Assembly and remained evident 
in the period after indepen­
dence. 42 
Of course the architects of that system, such as 
Hasluck and Derham, would neither have denied 
the fact nor apologised for it. The values of 
Papua New Guinea communities in the 
jurisprudential field were antithetical to them, and 
they deliberately sought to supersede them. 
Their attitude was maintained into the 1970s by 
the Australian Administration, as in the following 
reference in the Annual Reports to what David 
Fenbury had called 'illicit native tribunals' :  
No action has been taken to 
recognise the jurisdiction of 
extra-legal indigenous tribunals. 
Any tribunal other than one 
established by law is illegal, and 
the policy is to encourage the 
people to tum to the proper 
judicial authority which is 
provided by statute. 43 
Nevertheless, by this time the 
Administration had begun to have second 
thoughts about the opposition it had maintained 
since Hasluck's time to the idea of official courts 
administered by ordinary Papuans and New 
Guineans. This arose from concern about the 
efficacy of the existing 'local' court system -
which as indicated earlier was far from a 
grassroots system. 
In February 1971 External Territories 
Minister Barnes asked a senior officer in his 
Canberra Department along with the Territory 
Secretary for Law to report on a number of 
questions: how to relieve the pressure on 
Supreme Court judges of appeals from lower 
courts, especially since the establishment of the 
Full Court of the Supreme Court in 1969; how to 
speed up the localisation of magistrate positions 
in the lower courts; and how effective was the 
present court system 'at village level' having in 
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mind 'proposals for the establishment of village 
courts and village constables' . 44 By December 
these officers had drawn up detailed terms of 
reference for designing a scheme to link legal 
administration with villages by means of village 
justices. 
This had produced no results before the 
accession to power in 1972 of the National 
Coalition, which proceed  to appoint one 
expatriate and one indigenous District Court 
Magistrate to recommend a system of village 
courts. Accepting their proposals, the 
Government produced a White Paper which was 
enthusiastically endorsed by the House of 
Assembly. The Department of Law circulated in 
April 1973 a set of legislative proposals for 
discussion; reservations were expressed by a 
number of different legal authorities including the 
Law Society and speakers at the 1973 Waigani 
Seminar. 
The first draft of the Village Courts Bill 
did little more than provide official recognition 
for existing unofficial mediatory procedures. 45 
Dissatisfied with its provisions, the Pangu party's 
Barry (later Sir Barry) Holloway, Speaker of the 
House of Assembly, initiated discussions with 
Ministers, senior officials and others from which 
emerged the Village Courts Act passed late in 
1973 .46 The Act demanded no formal 
qualifications for village court magistrates, but 
gave ample powers to the courts to adjudicate and 
make orders for compensation, fines or the 
performance of community work. A village 
court was not to be bound by any law, other than 
the Act, that was not expressly applied to it, but 
'shall . . . decide any matter before it in 
accordance with substantial justice' (s. 30). 
Under section 20 the courts were required to 
apply relevant custom as determined in 
accordance with the Native Customs 
(Recognition) Ordinance. Custom could be 
applied even if contrary to some other law, and 
local government councils could make rules 
declaring the custom in their own areas. The 
first village court was established in February 
1975. 
This was the one important structural 
change to the justice system in the twilight years 
of the colonial regime. It suggested that the ideas 
of Fenbury and Lynch, so summarily dismissed 
by Hasluck nearly twenty years before, were 
more congenial to emerging indigenous leaders 
than those of the colonial government and 
conventional Australian lawyers which had 
prevailed ever since. This did not mean that the 
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village court experiment would necessarily work 
smoothly or successfully. It would simply be 
another part of the complex colonial inheritance 
for Niuginians to manage henceforth. 
The incompatibility of Niugini's 
traditional mode of social regulation with 
Australian concepts and institutions of 'justice' 
raised the most fundamental and difficult issues 
for colonial policy and, by the same token, for its 
valuation. Hasluck and his advisers mustered a 
multitude of arguments against customary law in 
an emerging modem state. 
Value dilemmas abound here. Can the 
colonial power rightly call upon Niuginians to 
abandon their time-honoured customary culture? 
But is it not its duty to equip them for a 
Westernised future? Should it secure indigenous 
consent to a revolutionary change? But how 
could non-literate agriculturists give 'informed 
consent' in such a matter? Thanks to 
administrative bottlenecks and educational 
backlogs, Australia left no clear legacy in this 
field at Independence. Can a colonial policy, 
however well-meaning, be censured for 
administrative incompetence? 
What primarily made havoc of 
Australian colonial policy at the last was the 
sudden imminence of Independence, in 1970. 
Policy was smothered by the mechanics of 
'casting off , as expected decades of further 
'preparation' evaporated overnight. This did not 
happen by indigenous demand - they weren't 
doing the casting off - but as a by-product of 
Australian domestic politics. Which prompts a 
couple of final provocative thoughts for people 
now enjoying hindsight: Did the Niuginians 
consent to Independence? Did Independence 
come too soon? 
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From ANZAC Day to Remembrance Day: Remnants of Australian Rule 
in Papua New Guinea 
Hank Nelson 
On 23 July 1994 Sir Fred Reiher, the Papua New 
Guinea High Commissioner to Australia, laid a 
wreath at the Fuzzy Wuzzy Angel monument at the 
Canberra Services Club. 1 It was the thirteenth 
Remembrance Day, the day when the people of 
Papua New Guinea recall the experience of war. 
When Papua New Guinea was an 
Australian Territory Anuc Day was a big 
occasion. Those extensive areas of white crosses 
of the war cemeteries outside Port Moresby, Lae 
and Rabaul were appropriate settings for moving 
ceremonies. But Anzac Day, so obviously 
Australian, was not an appropriate national holiday 
in independent Papua New Guinea. The 
government of Papua New Guinea searched for a 
replacement. It was to be called Remembrance 
Day, and it was briefly celebrated on 15 August, 
the day when the war ended in the Pacific.2 In 
1945 there were still ground fighting in the Sepik 
District of the mainland, on Bougainville and on 
New Britain. The end of the war was certainly 
significant in Papua New Guinea. But from 1982 
Remembrance Day has been celebrated on 23 July, 
the day when the Papuan Infantry first went into 
battle against the Japanese in 1942. It was a brief 
encounter at Awala, before the Papuan police and 
infantry joined the retreat through Kokoda. 3 The 
shift to 23 July has been to something more 
specific to Papua New Guinea, a shift to battle 
rather than peace, and to soldiers and to a 
beginning - the beginning of the recognition that 
Papua New Guinean soldiers would gain in a 
World War. Remembrance Day is now much more 
like Anzac Day. And An7.ac Day, while it is not a 
national holiday, is still important in Papua New 
Guinea. It is still a day for dawn services, wreath 
layings and meetings of black and white ex­
servicemen. 4 Papua New Guinean perceptions of 
war, the way they remember war, and the 
importance they give to war in making their nation 
have clearly been influenced by Australia. Also, 
Remembrance Day as it is now emphasises a 
wartime partnership.and shared experience between 
Australians and Papua New Guineans. It begins 
with Australians and Papuans side by side in battle. 
Wartime memory in Australia is a potent force 
sustaining sympathy for Papua New Guinea: 
Remembrance Day now generates some reciprocal 
sentiment. 
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There is still a significant difference from 
Anuc Day: Remembrance Day does not have 
popular support. In 1993 in Kavieng a New 
Ireland leader of the ex-servicemen rose to speak, 
and wept at the obvious neglect of the veterans -
few people had turned up for the ceremony, shops 
had not closed, and politicians and senior public 
servants had stayed away. 5 In Port Moresby in 
1994 the Lord Mayor, David Unagi, 'was angry 
and disappointed at the poor attendance at the 
Remembrance Day celebrations at Ela Beach'. 6 
But it is difficult to generate popular enthusiasm on 
23 July. It is not just that on that day in 1942 little 
happened, but that at the time the significance of 
the fighting for the Papuans was unrecognised and 
unreported. Speakers have few incidents to talk 
about, few particular men to name, and almost 
nothing to say about how the news was spread and 
received. Where in Australia during the Second 
World War over half a million people served 
overseas less than 10,000 Papuan New Guineans 
formally enrolled as soldiers, policemen and 
medical assistants, and the Papua New Guinean ex­
servicemen have suffered from a lower life­
expectancy, and the survivors are less likely to be 
living in the major urban centres. 7 Papua New 
Guinean ex-servicemen have neither the numbers 
nor the national organisation to provide a basis for 
popular support. The shift of emphasis in 
Remembrance Day to the soldiers has been away 
from the dominant Papua New Guinean experiences 
of the war. 
The Second World War had a profound 
but uneven impact on Papua New Guinea. Those 
at the centre of the turmoil had nearly four years of 
violence, but for many people of the highlands the 
news and disease that travelled, community to 
community, from distant, strange people and 
strange events was all they knew of a world war. 8 
And thousands were beyond even the talk of war. 
In 1945 the people of villages inland from Wewak 
or Torokina or Kerema or Salamaua did not know 
whether their experiences of war were common or 
unique - there was no generalised national 
experience of war. That was true for the next 
twenty years. Films, newspapers, radio, books, 
public speeches and school lessons were rarely 
directed at Papua New Guineans: there was no 
turning of particular peoples' knowledge of war 
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into a national experience. 9 The history of the war 
remained what was remembered and spoken - the 
history of the war stayed local for a generation. At 
that level, memories of the war could still be 
painful and divisive, they might not easily be made 
public, and even within a small community they are 
not uniform or comprehensive. In those desperate 
days of battles and changing rulers, when one third 
of the community died, people made difficult and 
terrible decisions to ensure the survival of 
themselves and their families. 10 And it is the 
strengths, weaknesses, divisions and complete 
absence of particular histories of war that have to 
be combated by those who want 23 July to be 
popular and national. 
Even where Papua New Guineans want to 
create an institution that is theirs, but owes 
something to Australia and a shared history, 
unexpected forces from the past and the present 
complicate and distort events, and at any given time 
the product is different from the intention, and even 
from the best description. 
In spite of the involvement of Australians 
in overseas wars, and the stress that Australians 
have placed on what they have done in war, it is 
probable that the most significant task undertaken 
by Australians overseas was their role in the 
making of the independent nation of Papua New 
Guinea. But Australian concerns about policies in 
Papua New Guinea may not have influenced the 
result in one seat in one federal election. Consider 
cases where other nations have ruled countries 
close to them - France and Algeria, England and 
Ireland. Governments have been determined by the 
question of colonial policy. Australia's possession 
of Papua New Guinea has had almost no impact on 
who Australians thought that they were. What 
Australians have done in Papua New Guinea is not 
seen as a significant Australian achievement or 
failure. In war Australians have always been 
junior partners. But in Papua New Guinea 
Australians decided policy and put it into action. 
And what Australians bequeathed the three million 
people of Papua New Guinea in 1975 has a 
significant influence in that country and in the 
region. We should wonder why Australians so 
rarely consider their record in Papua New Guinea. 
We should wonder why there are so few signs in 
Australia - in monuments, in language, in art, in 
consciousness - of the ninety-one years of 
Australia's formal relationship with Papua New 
Guinea. By design (through the white Australia 
policy) and indifference Australians have insulated 
themselves from reciprocal influence. 
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Independence Day, 16 September 1975, in 
Port Moresby was a day of public euphoria and 
optimism. There was much to applaud. The 
Australians had taken their leave quickly, 
peacefully and generously. There were no political 
prisoners to be released; no freedom fighters to 
emerge from the hills and take their uniforms, guns 
and anger into office; and no smoke from the 
burning of the out-going government's files to drift 
among the celebrating crowd. As John Guise, the 
first Governor-General said, they lowered the 
Australian flag, they did not tear it down. But two 
decades of independence have revealed defects and 
rigidity in the Australian legacy. The easy 
assertions about finding a new way and Julius 
Chan's simple statement, 'Now it's up to us', 
seems to have been too optimistic. The burden of 
the past is often heavy on the present. 
There are two assertions now made about the 
timing of Papua New Guinea's independence. One 
is that when the Whitlam Australian Labor 
Government came to power in 1972 then there was 
a sharp quickening of the speed of Australia's 
disengagement. It is true that Whitlam made 
aggressive statements before coming to power. For 
example, early in 1971 Whitlam made it clear that 
if Labor won the next election - and that was then 
increasingly likely - Papua New Guinea would soon 
be given self-government and independence. He 
said: 
It may be true that men cannot be 
forced to be free; it is certainly 
true that men cannot be forced to 
rule others. An Australian Labor 
Government will not be 
blackmailed into accepting an 
unnatural role as rulers over 
those who have no say and can 
have no say in electing us. 1 1  
It was a clear statement that Papua New Guinea 
was going to be independent - he was almost saying 
that Papua New Guineans were going to be 
independent whether they wanted to be or not. 
Note the changes in the moral stance of 
the colonial power. What was before 1914 the 
responsibility of the superior to the inferior - the 
white man's burden - was a sacred trust from 
1919, and was after 1945 a responsibility under a 
United Nations trust and an obligation to repay a 
war debt to the Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels. By 1971  
that same sacred trust and debt of  war had become 
immoral, repugnant. 
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But we now know that the Administrator, 
Les Johnson, thought that Whitlam's assertions 
were close to what was then the Australian 
administration's working assumptions. 12 Whitlam 
had made the Australian public aware of what was 
happening to their immediate north; but the fact 
that the Whitlam government came to power in 
1972 had almost no impact on the course of events 
and only a slight influence on their speed. The 
change of government and the change of minister 
from Andrew Peacock to Bill Morrison made no 
difference to the date of internal self-government. 
On the motion of Michael Somare the House of 
Assembly set the target date of 1 December 1973 
for self-government while Peacock was Minister, 
and that was achieved - without public ceremony -
when Morrison was Minister. 13 Perhaps the change 
of government advanced the date of independence 
by between six months and two years, but once all 
powers except defence and external affairs were 
transferred then it was in the interests of Australia 
to go quickly. Obviously Australia did not want to 
be in the position of formal responsibility without 
controlling the policies or instruments of power. In 
any case, in the light of what could have been done 
to prepare Papua New Guinea for independence, a 
difference of less than two years would have been 
of almost no significance. 
It is still worth asking whether the 
Australians granted independence too soon. But 
whatever the deficiencies in their preparations for 
independence, they got the timing about right. In 
1973 and 1974 the Australians faced problems that 
they could not solve. The dissident movements on 
the Gazelle Peninsula and on Bougainville and the 
increasing lawlessness in the highlands meant that 
had Australia stayed another five years - and five 
years was a minimum to make any worthwhile 
difference - the Australians would have had to use 
force. Australians would have had to gaol people 
who would have been seen as political prisoners. 
Whether or not the batons were wielded and rifles 
were fired by black police or troops, the situation 
would have appeared the same to the international 
community: Australians would have been seen as 
imperialist thugs. There is an inescapable problem 
for a colonial power faced with a dissident 
movement. When the dissidents come into violent 
confrontation with the colonial power then they 
gather the support of others in the colony. The 
dissidents are seen as nationalists, even if their 
aims - as in a separatist movement - are to leave 
the embryonic nation. The colonial power becomes 
the common enemy of what are in other 
circumstances incompatible forces. Australia 
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escaped, but only just, that unenviable situation 
where there could be no success, and opprobrium 
and defeat were likely. 
If we glance at the present political map of 
Africa we see all those patches, those distorted 
rectangles, straight arbitrary lines, curves to 
enclose pockets of nations and lines that wander 
with rivers. So many of the lines came out of the 
colonisation of Africa. People have died and 
continue to die to change lines on the map of 
Africa. The lines may be the most obvious, 
important and enduring legacies of colonialism in 
Africa. 
Australians and New Zealanders rarely 
think about borders. The sea makes the lines on 
their maps - and in their minds when they think 
about the limits of nationhood. It was something 
many brought with them from the British Isles. 
Nations end where dirt ends and water begins. But 
continental Europeans, and particularly eastern 
Europeans, can rarely be unconscious of the 
significance of lines on maps. 
And lines on maps have been an important 
legacy of colonialism in our area. Samoa is 
divided. Half is an unincorporated territory of the 
USA, and most of that hairs people live in the 
United States, and the other half is the independent 
state of Western Samoa - with strong ties to New 
Zealand. The division ofTimor between the Dutch 
and Portuguese is still strong in minds even if the 
line is diminished on the map. The lines on the 
map inherited by the new nation of Papua New 
Guinea are certainly significant. They are the 
legacy of the four colonial powers that have ruled 
the island. 
In 1828 the Dutch claimed New Guinea to 
the 141st meridian. 14 They claimed it as part - or 
perhaps an extension - of sultanates that came 
within their territory in the East Indies. It was the 
141st meridian in the south, but just where the 
boundary was in the north was uncertain. It did 
not matter. When Germany and Britain laid claim 
to eastern New Guinea in 1884 both accepted the 
141st meridian. The line was fixed although at that 
time there was no permanent Dutch settlement in 
New Guinea. 
There was some moderation of the 141st 
meridian. When it was discovered that the Fly 
River cut the border, the river bed was made the 
boundary. But of course that gave a little more 
land to British New Guinea. The Dutch were 
compensated by shifting the border south of the Fly 
to the east. It is now on 141 degrees 1 minute and 
10 seconds east: the border is an arbitrary line 
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drawn with meticulous concern for an equal 
division of the colonial spoils. 
Dutch New Guinea was attacked by 
Indonesian troops, was nominally controlled by the 
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in 
1962-3 , and was confirmed as part of Indonesia by 
what was termed an 'act of self-determination' in 
1969. It is now Irian Jaya, a province of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The land boundary between 
Papua New Guinea and Indonesia is over 600 
kilometres long, one of the great arbitrary land 
borders. It cuts through people - particularly on 
the north coast, in the Bewani, and among the Ok 
peoples - who traded, married, hunted, gardened 
and fought across the border lands. Now as 
migrants come into Irian Jaya from other parts of 
Indonesia and Irian Jaya is pulled more to the west, 
what once registered a carve-up between colonial 
powers has become something more. 
It is where one lingua franca - Indonesian -
ends and others - English and Tok Pisin - begin. 
It is becoming where two of the world religions -
Islam and Christianity - meet. In the broadest 
terms it may become where Southeast Asia ends 
and Melanesia begins, a major eastward shift of a 
line demarking cultures and how peoples define 
themselves. 
Nearly every year there have been reports 
of violence along the border. One of the most 
dramatic incidents was in 1984 when over 10,000 
refugees crossed from west to east. But usually the 
Australian press gives just two or three column 
inches on an inside page - reporting an Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka (OPM) attack, or Indonesian troops 
crossing into Papua New Guinea, or a kidnapping, 
or an arrest. Papua New Guinea lives with 
refugees, minor sporadic violence and foreign troop 
incursions. 15 
Because it is a long land border, because 
it cuts diverse and difficult country, because it cuts 
people of one culture, because a guerrilla 
movement, the OPM, operates across it, because 
profound charges are taking place on either side of 
it, we can predict trouble - given the best will of 
the national governments. 
In 1886 Germany and Britain sorted out 
their border in the Solomons. All the northern 
Solomons - Bougainville, Choiseul and Y sabel -
went to Germany, and the south to Britain. In 
1899 they did another deal. Britain conceded 
Western Samoa to Germany, and Germany gave up 
some of the Solomons. Choiseul and Ysabel 
became British, and Germany retained only 
Bougainville. It became part of German New 
Guinea administered from Rabaul. When 
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Australian troops captured Rabaul in 1914, 
Bougainville was seen as part of 'Late German 
New Guinea' and was retained as a district of 
Australian New Guinea. From 1945 it was part of 
the combined Australian Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea. In 1975 Bougainville was included 
within the independent nation of Papua New 
Guinea. 
At various times the Bougainvilleans have 
asserted their sense of separateness. They did it at 
independence in 1975, and it was significant that 
they chose to change the name of their Province 
from Bougainville to the North Solomons. The 
sense of separateness of the Bougainvilleans is 
sustained by geography and by the distinctive 
physical appearance of the Bougainvilleans. It was 
stimulated, but not created, by the opening of the 
giant copper mine at Panguna in 1972. 
The current phase of violence began in 
1988 with the blowing up of the pylons carrying 
the electricity supply to the mine, and became of 
increased national importance with the closure of 
the mine in mid 1989. There has now been six 
years of violence. We do not know how many of 
the 140,000 people on Bougainville have died in 
violence or because they have been deprived of 
health services. Probably over a thousand. 16 And 
of course nearly all other services, such as schools, 
have been closed. The causes of the violence and 
why the violence has continued on Bougainville are 
complex, but one factor has certainly been that 
basic sense of difference from the rest of Papua 
New Guinea. 17 
Consider the recent history of 
Bougainville: from 1886 it was nominally German, 
in 1914 it was occupied by Australians, in 1942 it 
was captured by Japan, in 1943 the USA troops 
landed at Torokina on the west coast, in 1944 and 
45 the Australians returned, and in 1975 
Bougainville became a province of the independent 
nation of Papua New Guinea. All those changes 
could have taken place withinjust one life-time. It 
is probably reasonable to say that through all those 
changes Bougainvilleans have thought they were 
governed by foreigners. They have a sense of 
themselves as incidentals in other nations' histories. 
One issue now being contested on Bougainville is 
not whether Bougainville will be separate, but who 
will articulate and negotiate the degree of 
separateness. 
In 1879, before Britain and Germany had 
claimed eastern New Guinea, Queensland pushed 
its border north to include the Torres Strait Islands. 
And that began the struggle of the Torres Strait 
Islanders to establish their identity. They want us 
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to remember always that it is Australian Aborigines 
and Torres Strait Islanders. After Britain, then 
Australia, acquired southeast New Guinea there 
were several attempts to sort out the Torres Strait 
border. But a settlement was not reached until 
1978, and then it was between the independent 
nations of Papua New Guinea and Australia. 18 
For those ninety-nine years from 1879 to 
1978 the border that enclosed all of Torres Strait 
within Queensland and Australia was seen as 
temporary or unjust. The problem for the 
Australians was to share the area without conceding 
land or dividing the peoples of the Torres Strait, 
and to avoid a fight with Queensland over the 
power of the Australian government to dispose of 
state assets. The Torres Strait Treaty of 1978 was 
negotiated with goodwill on both sides. The result 
is a confusion of five different lines: a seabed 
resources line across the middle of the Strait, a 
swimming fishes line, lines enclosing the territorial 
seas of the northern islands, a Protected Zone 
delineation line, and lines marking the sea 
boundary between Papua New Guinea and the 
northern islands - Boigu and Saibai. It is now 
difficult to say where Australia ends and Papua 
New Guinea begins. It does not matter as long as 
the occasion does not arise where precision is 
needed. 
As it is now, the southern boundary of 
Papua New Guinea is a buffer zone of intersecting 
lines. The Torres Strait Islanders are within 
Australia, and they have clear historical and 
cultural connections to the Melanesians to their 
north, and they assert a separate identity. Perhaps 
the cartographic imprecision is appropriate. 
The boundaries inherited by any new 
nation are important: they are an obvious definition 
of nationhood. The boundaries bequeathed to 
Papua New Guinea make the definition of 
nationhood difficult. It is a half island attached to 
other islands, one of which is aberrant. Its 
nationalism must be learnt. On two of its borders 
Papua New Guinea has had to deploy troops for 
long periods; on two of its borders people have 
died; and the ramifications of having a young state 
dependent on the defence forces for its integrity 
will continue. 
The Australians have certainly not been 
exclusively responsible for the creation of the 
boundaries of Papua New Guinea. But Australians 
have had little experience in land borders and were 
not always alert to the difficulties that the borders 
would create, and they were not always the most 
proficient tutors in boundary administration. Was 
there ever an opportunity to adjust the boundaries? 
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There was a slight chance to change the Solomons 
border after First World War and again after the 
Second World War, and those slight chances were 
never seiz.ed, nor were they likely to have been 
seized, by the two powers then administering the 
Solomons, Australia and Great Britain. 
Proximity long confused Australians about 
whether policies in Papua New Guinea should be 
different from those in the other great 
Commonwealth possession, the Northern 
Territory. 19 Perhaps both were to be Australian 
states. From annexation many of the basic 
institutions ofBritish New Guinea were deliberately 
transferred from Australia. 20 Where in Fiji Dr 
(later Sir) William MacGregor had worked with Sir 
Arthur Gordon to integrate Fijian custom and 
organisation into the colonial order, in British New 
Guinea MacGregor often imposed Australian laws 
and practices. Among the first laws he enacted 
were the Queensland Criminal Code and 
Queensland mining law. Believing that British 
New Guinea would one day be part of the proposed 
federation of Australasian colonies, MacGregor was 
obliged to tie the area to Australian precedents. 
Fifty years later in 1939 Sir Hubert 
Murray wrote to his brother Gilbert: 
in Papua the ultimate fate of the 
natives is as part of an Australian 
State - in the Mandated Territory 
of New Guinea it is indepen­
dence. It may seem rather 
ridiculous that New Guinea 
should ever be independent - yet 
we contemplate the independence 
of the Philippines, and in a 
hundred years the New Guinea 
natives might easily be the equal 
of the Philippinos of to-day.21 
The same assumption about Papua's constitutional 
destiny was accepted by the committee of the 
Australian parliament enquiring into the possibility 
of amalgamating Papua and New Guinea. 22 If 
Australia's policy then was to prepare Papua to 
become an Australian state it follows that those 
charged with implementing that policy should be 
judged on how well they prepared Papua for 
integration into the Australian federation rather than 
on the extent to which they built for an independent 
nation. But in fact Australia was uncertain of its 
purpose in Papua for well over eighty of its ninety­
one years of rule. 
As the day when Papua might make the 
transition to state seemed so far away Australians 
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did not have to think about the contradictions 
inherent in the notion of adding half a million black 
people to a white Australia. They lived with 
ambiguity. Australians in Papua were not 
colonists: they were still in Australian Territory. 
But the Papuans were not Australians although they 
lived in the same place. The people of Papua had 
their own stamps, but used Australian coins. The 
Australians in Papua were on the Australian 
frontier - sometimes inside and sometimes beyond 
the Australian border. They expected the credit 
that Australians gave other pioneers, and were hurt 
when they were seen as exploiters, adventurers and 
colonisers. Yet they were likely at other times to 
see themselves as builders of points of civilisation 
in what was clearly another and different part of 
the British Empire. The Union Jack, rather than 
the Australian flag, was flown at Government 
House, Port Moresby, until the 1950s. 23 
In the Mandated Territory of New Guinea 
the uncertainty took a different form. New Guinea 
was a priz.e of war and part of the compensation 
paid for 60,000 Australians killed in the First 
World War; and those Australians who took up 
positions in the government and on plantations did 
not expect their reward to be temporary. In 1919 
William Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, 
told Woodrow Wilson, the American President, 
that northeast New Guinea was a 'frontier question' 
and Australia looked to its 'ultimate 
incorporation' . 24 But Australians were also 
conscious of obligations they had accepted under 
the Treaty of Versailles: Australians were 
guardians of 'peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modem world' . 25 There were gross inconsistencies 
between a 'sacred trust' and a 'prize of war' ; but 
they too could be left to a distant future. 
The uncertainty of Australia's intent 
persisted after the Second World War. The 
combined territories were said to be under the 
guidance of an 'Administering Authority' trying to 
bring [the people] as quickly as 
possible to the stage where they 
will be able to manage their own 
affairs and decide their political 
future as a people. 
That was repeated in the annual reports to the 
United Nations during the 1960s. If single terms 
were required then 'self-determination' and 'self­
govemment' were favoured.26 Australia seemed to 
be saying that Papua New Guineans could have 
what they wanted when they were at a stage to 
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decide for themselves. A policy so apparently 
generous and benign was difficult to oppose; but it 
was of course misleading. Papua New Guineans 
had to be on some constitutional road while they 
were being brought to the point of 'self­
determination' - the initial decisions could not be 
theirs. In 1968 the Minister for Territories, 
Charles Barnes, was still talking about something 
other than independence for an internally self­
goveming Papua New Guinea. It was not, he said, 
a practical possibility for the Territory to become 
as seventh state 'for the time being', although he 
could not rule out what might happen in the distant 
future. But there would be, he said, 'this closer 
association' with Australia: 'Our futures are 
destined to run parallel' .  'Z'1 His statement was not 
a reflection of the idiosyncrasies of a particular 
minister. His predecessor, Sir Paul Hasluck, had 
spoken in 1958 of 'a future time when the people 
of Papua and New Guinea will seek self­
govemment and some measure of independence' . 28 
His use of the qualification, 'some measure' , 
sustained the illusion of a lasting constitutional tie. 
If Australia had endured the tyranny of distance 
then Papua New Guinea suffered the confusion of 
proximity. 
Eventually Papua New Guineans were told 
that whatever way they went they would all go 
together. 'Self-determination' did not mean that 
some could make one choice while others made 
another. Nor could they choose to become an 
Australian state. And in the end independence was 
as much an Australian choice as it was Papua New 
Guinean. That clarifying and hardening of the 
Australian position was not expressed effectively 
until 1971 ,  just two and half years before self­
govemment and four years before independence. 29 
The lack of a clearly defined policy 
coupled with the misleading belief that Papua New 
Guinea would somehow continue to have a formal 
constitutional relationship with Australia stopped 
Australians from developing - or allowing to 
develop - institutions and procedures in law, 
politics, education and administration that were 
appropriate to a separate nation. The policy 
adopted by Macgregor had continued; and that was 
desirable if the territories were to become part of 
Australia or just 'run parallel ' .  The confusion of 
Australia's policy sprang easily from the confused 
Australian perceptions of New Guinea - it was 
sometimes on and within their frontier and 
sometimes it was overseas. The perception and 
policy in tum help explain why Papua New 
Guineans came so suddenly to power and at the 
same time struggled to define the basic institutions 
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of government. It was a fundamental deficit of 
Australian rule that Papua New Guineans took 
office so inexperienced in executive government, 
with so few defined polices, and with some organs 
of government either breaking down or being 
changed. 
The failure of Australians to clarify their 
policies towards Papua New Guinea also meant that 
in the years immediately before independence 
Papua New Guinean public debates were almost 
entirely concerned with what various groups within 
Papua New Guinea wanted, and when various steps 
towards self-government and independence should 
take place. For example, in mid 1971 the House 
of Assembly debated and passed a motion that the 
Australian parliament send to Papua New Guinea a 
delegation 'to determine the wishes of the Papuan 
people' . 30 The question of the timing of 
constitutional change was even more dominant in 
public discussion. As a result the more important 
long-term issues, such as what policies should be 
adopted by a self-governing Papua New Guinea, 
were rarely considered. The most important 
division between the parties in the House of 
Assembly in 1971 and 1972 was the speed of 
constitutional change; and that distinguishing 
characteristic disappeared in September 1975. 
Nothing of equal significance replaced it. 
The self-congratulations of Australians 
about the orderly transfer of power and the 
apparent rationality of the constitutional steps 
disguised the reality. In 1951 the Legislative 
Council was established with three nominated 
Papua New Guineans; in 1961 its membership was 
increased to include six elected Papua New 
Guineans; in 1964 the House of Assembly first met 
with full adult franchise for 44 open electorates; in 
1968 the House of Assembly was expanded and 
Papua New Guineans who met the required 
educational standard could stand for regional 
electorates; and in 1972 the House was again 
enlarged. At the same time as the House was 
shifting to increasing numbers of elected Papua 
New Guineans members, Papua New Guineans 
were being given experience in the executive as 
Under-Secretaries, then Ministerial Members, and 
as members of the Administrator's Council (later 
the Administrator's Executive Council). But when 
the Somare coalition government was formed in 
1972 only three members (Paul Lapun, John Guise 
and Kaibelt Diria) had had any experience of 
nominal executive government, and within twenty 
months the coalition ministry ruled a self-governing 
Papua New Guinea. The apparently orderly 
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constitutional changes of  twenty years had been 
effectively compressed into less than two. 
During the three years of Papuan New 
Guinean initiation into national government - from 
when Somare took office in 1972 to independence 
in 1975 - the executive faced successive crises 
while the Constitutional Planning Committee and 
the whole parliament considered the form of 
government to be adopted by an independent Papua 
New Guinea. The new nation then came into 
existence with an untried constitution and its new 
definitions of relations between the various levels 
of government and between officers and arms of 
government and of new procedures. For example, 
the method of securing a vote of no confidence in 
a prime minister, the powers of the ombudsman set 
out in the constitution and the notion of organic 
laws were all new to Papua New Guineans and 
alien to Australians. 
The second level of government, the 
provincial assemblies, were almost entirely new: 
they bore little resemblance to the old District 
Advisory Councils. It could be said that Papua 
New Guineans, having made the decision to 
establish the provincial assemblies, should accept 
responsibility for their creation and performance; 
but the provincial governments arose in part from 
regional feelings stimulated by Australian 
administration and they were created to contain 
secessionist forces that the Australians had been 
unable to moderate. 
At the level of the local councils Papua 
New Guineans inherited a system that had partly 
broken down. The councils had once been the 
great hope of Australians in their attempt to implant 
traditions of orderly western-style government. In 
1962 after a decade as Minister Hasluck wrote a 
minute stressing that each council was to be a 
'school of political advancement' .  31 Fifteen years 
after the war thirty-nine councils had been formed 
and they covered only fourteen per cent of the total 
population. From 1960 growth was rapid with the 
number of people in councils tripling in three years 
so that just under half the population were formally 
under council rule by 1964. As a result most 
people voted in the first general election for the 
House of Assembly before they had a local council, 
and another thirty per cent had only recently been 
included in a council. Rather than the councils 
being training grounds, most people were initiated 
into the mechanics of voting at a national election. 
In the early 1960s, when the councils 
were being spread rapidly, disillusioned villagers in 
the older council areas were already turning away. 
The councils had not given them what they wanted: 
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the dignity that went with understanding and 
controlling their own affairs, an entry into bisnis, 
and an effective means of settling disputes and 
curbing crime. In the 1960s, too , the councils 
were enlarged so that some forty or fifty 
councillors might be elected to administer 30,000 
people: it was no longer local and there was no 
effective village-level institution. This was the 
situation, then, inherited by a self-governing Papua 
New Guinea in 1973: a minority of the people were 
within the boundaries of vigorous local government 
councils, and the rest were in areas where either 
the council worked fitfully to carry out minor 
public works and public welfare projects or it had 
virtually ceased all effective operations. Even 
where the councils worked they tended to operate 
at a level that left many villages with no formal 
institutional ties to the national system. In the main 
towns local governments that covered squatters, 
suburbs, business districts and traditional villagers 
were new and in flux. To put the worst case: 
Australians relinquished power to inexperienced 
Papua New Guineans, and at neither the local, nor 
provincial nor national levels did they move into 
systems of government that were known, efficient 
and doing what Papua New Guineans wanted. 
Since the introduction of universal 
franchise in 1964 there have been seven general 
elections three since independence. 32 
Governments change at elections - as they did from 
Chan to Somare in 1982, and in 1992 from 
Namaliu to Wingti. The elections are boisterous, 
tough, free festivals of democracy. The Australian 
administration worked hard to devise an electoral 
system that was simple, efficient and just. Voting 
is not preferential: it is a simple first past the post 
system. Each person votes for two candidates: in 
a local electorate and in the larger provincial 
electorate. There is one house in the parliament. 
People are keen to stand - the general educational 
standard of candidates has been rising - and about 
seventy five per cent of the eligible voters tum up 
to vote. That is relatively high. 
But this is what happens in many 
electorates. In the Kundiawa Open electorate in 
1982 twenty-nine candidates stood . About 15,000 
people voted. Sixteen candidates got over 500 
votes, and the winner got just 1 ,244 votes. That 
was eight per cent of all votes caste, and five per 
cent of potential votes. In 1992 an average of 
fifteen candidates stood in each electorate, and half 
of those elected got less than twenty per cent of the 
vote. 
In an extreme and simplified case, the 
electorate is made up of extended families and 
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clans. 33 Each of these communities puts up its own 
candidate - each feels obliged to do so. The 
election then becomes a test of group siu and 
allegiance. Policies and party allegiance are 
irrelevant. Candidates may not campaign outside 
their home area. The winning candidate is not the 
choice of the majority, and is not seen as the 
representative of most people. If you ask some 
people, 'Who is your representative?' you might be 
told, 'We don't have one. Our man got beaten. ' In 
these circumstances the aim of parties, and of 
ambitious leaders in the parliament, is to recruit the 
candidate with the strongest group support in the 
electorate - either before of after the election. 
Particular candidates, not parties and not policies, 
are important after the election as well as before. 
It encourages a system of bidding to recruit 
successful candidates. It means that candidates in 
the election, and in allegiance to parties or loosely 
aligned groups within the parliament, are not 
committed to a policy. It makes for a volatile 
system held together by personal loyalties and 
favours. 
All this arises because of the imposition of 
an electoral system on small communities where 
group consciousness exceeds concern for, or 
knowledge of, parties or policies. The fact that the 
system does not work well is not necessarily 
because of any failure or delinquency of 
Australians - it illustrates the problems that arise 
when institutions are imposed on a new social 
environment. It would have been presumptive of 
Australians to think that they could devise a new 
system specifically for Papua New Guinea. There 
is at least one qualification to this. Had Australians 
given Papua New Guineans more experience of 
executive government, and had the debates before 
the 1972 election been concerned with matters of 
policy rather than when self-governing powers 
would be transferred to Papua New Guineans, then 
perhaps stronger parties based on policies might 
have developed. 
The political system need not matter all 
that much if the public service is efficient. The 
problem for Papua New Guinea is that government 
is very much dependent on the political system. 
High-ranked Papua New Guinean public servants, 
recognising the significance of the elected executive 
government, have shifted, or tried to shift, into the 
parliament. 
From the mid 1960s many Papua New 
Guineans public servants were doing training 
courses, acting as under-studies, shifting to the new 
glamour positions as they opened up - say in 
foreign affairs - but few of them were staying long 
NELSON - From ANZAC Day to Remembrance Day 
in important middle and upper level positions. In 
1968 there were no Papua New Guineans in the 
first division of the public service. In 1972 when 
the Somare government took office and was 
gathering the powers for self-government, there 
was just one Papua New Guinean head of 
department - Paulius Matane, Head of the 
Department of Business Development. At that time 
there were still over 6000 overseas officers 
employed under the Public Service Ordinance - one 
third of all public servants. 34 The Papua New 
Guinean public servants came as late and as quickly 
to power as the politicians. And perhaps that has 
been more significant. 
Unlike the hue that clouded their 
constitutional goals, the Australians expressed a 
precise educational target. J.K.Murray, the first 
postwar administrator, said in 1946, 'The first 
requirement in universal literacy' .  35 Changes in 
government in Canberra and in the administration 
in Port Moresby brought slight modification to the 
basic policy. Twenty years after the end of the 
Second World War the aim was 'mass literacy, 
i.e. , to teach all indigenous children to read and 
write in a common language' .36 Yet Australians 
maintained a policy in terms of teacher training, 
school curricula and buildings that made it 
impossible for them to come close to reaching their 
stated objective. On the eve of self-government 
only about half of the children of primary school 
age had a school to go to, and about one-third of 
those entering a primary school reached grade six. 
At independence two-thirds of adults were illiterate 
and just twelve per cent of appropriately aged 
males and seven per cent of females were in 
secondary schools. 37 
Clearly Australia should have either 
changed its aim or adopted radically different 
means of reaching it. The new Papua New Guinea 
government faced the handicap of an ill-educated 
population relative to other third world countries; 
an expanding population that meant even to keep 
the same per cent of children in schools there had 
to be a rapid expansion in the system; and complex 
issues about how to achieve an equitable and 
efficient distribution of government funds when for 
the next thirty years there was no chance of schools 
being provided for all. 
Apart from literacy there are other simple 
indices commonly used to measure nations. 38 Life 
expectancy at the time of independence was about 
forty. It is now about fifty-five. That is still low 
compared with other low income countries. Infant 
mortality per 1000 live births was over 130 in the 
1970s, again very high compared with low income 
33 
countries. The daily per capita calorie intake was 
low. In 1970 the total government revenue raised 
within Papua New Guinea was less than the money 
granted by the Australian government. By 1975 
the internal revenue was greater than the grant 
from Australia, but independent Papua New Guinea 
still had a dependent economy. By the early 1990s 
the grant money had fallen to less than twenty-five 
per cent of internal revenue. By these simple 
calibrations of the economy and welfare, at 
independence Papua New Guineans, compared to 
populations in other low income countries, were 
poorly educated, were poorly fed, had high death 
rates, low life expectancy, low per capita income 
and an economy with a high dependence on 
overseas aid. 
Australia left a daunting list of problems 
for Papua New Guineans, and gave them few 
efficient tools to use. But Papua New Guineans did 
have political and material advantages over many 
peoples made subservient at the height of western 
imperialism. Most natural resources remained to 
be exploited by Papua New Guineans; there was 
almost no tradition of political intimidation; free 
elections were accepted as way of changing 
governments; there was little corruption; there were 
no international enemies; a reserve of mutual 
goodwill remained in both Australia and Papua 
New Guinea; there was a free press; there was a 
tradition of frank, direct and generally benign 
contact between government officers and villagers; 
there was record of getting benefits to the 'bush'; 
the health service from 1945 was innovative and 
appropriate; the central courts were established as 
strong, independent institutions; and Australia had 
been served by many officers who were more 
talented and dedicated than their salaries or public 
estimation required. Many of the 'outside men' of 
the 1930s and later had a respect for their village 
subjects and formed personal relationships with 
them that allowed them to move easily between 
bantering and seriousness. Their attitudes have yet 
to be analysed and placed in the context of other 
Australian and imperial racial values of the time. 
If we assume that the irresponsible and intolerant 
Australians had an influence, then we must also 
accept that these other Australians had a lasting 
impact. 
In this survey of Australian remnants north 
of Torres Strait few intangible influences - such as 
the way Anzac Day seems to have influenced 
Remembrance Day - have been examined. But 
many other factors outside politics and economics -
such as sport, beer, radio and television, and art -
are worthy of consideration. A fundamental legacy 
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of colonialism is simply the map - the lines 
reflecting the arbitrary enclosing of space and 
people that Papua New Guineans must transform 
into a nation. That in itself is a formidable task. 
It would be possible (and exhausting) to make a 
careful evaluation of the basic political institutions 
inherited and created at independence; and there are 
standard social and economic indicators of national 
development. By any quantitative measure 
Australia left Papua New Guineans poor, sick, ill­
educated and with little effective infrastructure of 
government. But another measure is comparative. 
What was the Australian legacy to Papua New 
Guinea relative to that left other ex-colonial states -
relative to the ex-colonies of Africa? The 
comparison can be brought closer to home: to New 
Caledonia, to the Solomons, to Borneo - another 
great island with arbitrary divisions - to the 
Philippines. In a relative judgement Australia's 
legacy moves up the international league ladder. 
Perhaps not to the top, but getting a run in the 
elimination finals. 
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Managing Ethnicity in Colonial and Post-colonial Fiji 
Brij V. Lal. 
Politics in Fiji has been the subject much scholarly 
debate in recent years, inspired in no small part by 
the coups of 1987 and their aftermath. The role of 
ethnicity in the political process has often been at 
the centre of that debate. On the one hand there 
are scholars who argue that 'planned political 
change for development cannot succeed unless 
conceived through the prism of ethnicity. '  For 
them, the 'ethnic factor is integral to the 
environment; it is at once both the subject and 
object of change. 1 On the other hand there are 
scholars who locate the dynamics of Fijian politics 
not in ethnicity but in class and other such socially­
constructed phenomena.2 My purpose here is not 
to revisit the theoretical debate about the motive 
force in Fiji politics. Instead, it is to see how the 
state has attempted to manage the question of 
ethnicity and to assess its relevance for political 
behaviour in Fiji. The focus is on the post-colonial 
period, including the period since the coups of 
1987, but the roots of the problem are firmly 
embedded in Fiji's tortuous history. The 
foundations of post-colonial structures were laid in 
the colonial era, and they were maintained and 
nurtured in the post-colonial period. Continuity 
with past patterns of politics rather than change in 
new directions was the hallmark of Fiji's transition 
to independence. We begin, therefore, with a 
glance at the management of ethnicity in the 
colonial period. 
Fiji: Three-Legged Stool 
The colonial self-image of Fiji was as a three­
legged stool. The three legs of the stool were the 
Fijian, Indo-FijianandEuropean communities, each 
of which supposedly accepted their designated place 
in the colonial scheme of things and made their 
separate but equal contribution to society. 3 The 
Fijians provided the land, the Indo-Fijians labour 
and the Europeans capital and management. In this 
way, each group contributed to the maintenance of 
a harmonious colonial equilibrium. This was a 
comforting myth with some correspondence to 
reality. But the metaphor hid a far more complex, 
fluid picture of the colonial polity. To start with, 
none of the groups was socially homogenous or 
necessarily united in their diverse interests. There 
was no equality of power, privilege or status 
among them. Nor was there equality between 
Indo-Fijian labour on the one hand and European 
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power on the other. Nor, again, was the colonial 
state itself the neutral, benevolent, disinterested 
arbiter of conflict among the three groups. 
Benevolence was the rhetoric; the reality 
was different. Colonialism in Fiji, as elsewhere, 
was ultimately about control. And this was 
reflected powerfully in the institutions and 
processes of daily life in the colony. 4 All power 
was centralised in the hands of the governor and 
his small (advisory) executive council, which 
consisted of a majority of ex-officio members 
(heads of government departments) and a minority 
of nominated members representing the three main 
ethnic groups. The legislative council was a 
caricature of the westminster system where the 
government was always assured of majority votes. 
The colonial government took its orders from the 
Colonial Office in London to which alone it was 
answerable. The colonial state also intervened not 
only to control but also to define the social and 
cultural life of the colony. 5 Thus all those 
practices, rituals and ceremonies that were deemed 
threatening, offensive or otherwise unacceptable, 
were outlawed, and its practitioners punished. The 
education system, rudimentary though it was, 
encouraged the ethos of 'a deeper sense of 
patriotism, a stricter self-discipline, a harder 
endurance, a deeper respect for others and a strict 
obedience to lawful authority. '6 In short, colonial 
policies and practices kept the colony under tight 
reign. 
In the management of ethnicity, the 
strategy of compartmentalisation of the different 
ethnic groups was central to the larger goal of 
colonial control and consolidation. The three main 
ethnic groups, Fijians, lndo-Fijians and Europeans, 
were different from each other in terms of culture, 
social background and historical experience, 
though, of course, there were many conditions and 
interests which also united them. Nonetheless, the 
maintenance of the differences became the object 
and ration d'etre of government policy. 
The foundations of ethnic separation were 
laid at the time of cession in 1874. Sir Arthur 
Gordon, the first governor (1875-1880), adopted 
the policy of indirect rule as the principle of 
colonial government in Fiji, the 'general aim 
[being] the development of native society in such a 
way as to enable it to stand on its own feet in the 
strenuous conditions of the modem world. '7 To that 
end, the government prohibited the commercial 
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employment of  Fijian labour on European 
plantations, introduced a system of taxation which 
enabled Fijians to live in the villages and pay their 
tax in kind, and created a plethora of legislation 
that defined and regulated social and economic 
interaction with the other communities. An 
advisory body, the Great Council of Chiefs, was 
created to advise the government on matters 
pertaining to Fijian society. 8 
The imposition of a uniform code of laws 
and customs backed by the power of the state, 
distorted and froze at a particular moment in time 
a fluid and flexible situation. Those Fijians who 
felt marginalised or wanted a greater role in the 
affairs of their people, protested against the new 
neo-traditional order: one thinks of Apolosi Nawai 
or the Viti Caurvou, for example. 9 But often, their 
acts of resistance came to naught. In any event, a 
separate system ofFijian administration, dominated 
by chiefs and supported by the colonial 
government, kept the Fijian people close to their 
rural, subsistence moorings well into the 1960s, 
when it was abandoned in response to internal 
demands for change and external criticism. 10 
The second leg of the Fijian stool were the 
Indo-Fijians, whose roots went back to 1879 when 
the first group of Indian indentured labourers 
arrived in Fiji. By the time emigration ended in 
1916 (the indenture system itself was abolished in 
1920), some sixty thousand had arrived in the 
colony on a five year contract. 1 1  When their 
indenture ended, the majority decided to stay on in 
Fiji, encouraged by a colonial government keen to 
develop a local source of cheap labour, and for 
other personal and social reasons. Controlling the 
indentured population on the plantations was easy 
enough. The labourers were scattered throughout 
the colony, isolated and vulnerable to pressure from 
their employers. Their interests were represented 
in government by the Agent General of 
Immigration. In 1916, the Indo-Fijians were 
granted one nominated seat on the Legislative 
Council, though the choice of the person was 
contested. But problems arose when indenture 
ended. For once free, the Indo-Fijians began to 
demand political rights commensurate with their 
numbers and their contribution to the economic life 
of the colony. Their agitation for political equality, 
and specially for a common electoral roll (one 
person, one vote, one value) spawned the fear of 
'Indian dominance' which helped to forge a 
coalition between European and Fijian interests. 
Preventing the Inda-Fijians from gaining an equal 
political footing in the colony became an important 
part of the colonial endeavour. 
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Europeans constituted the third leg of the 
Fijian stool. Though numerically small, they were 
a powerful force in Fiji society and politics. They 
controlled the public service and the commercial 
life of the colony. As members of the privileged 
'British race,' they expected their interests and 
aspirations to be accorded first priority in colonial 
matters. 12 When these were not fully realised or 
thwarted, they championed other causes, including 
federation with New Zealand in the early years of 
this century. After the 1920s, they forged a 
coalition with the Fijian chiefs against the threat of 
Indian dominance. With minor variations, that 
coalition persisted well into the post-colonial era. 
The fear of Indian dominance was one 
important equation in colonial Fijian politics. 
Another, often invoked in conjunction, was the 
Deed of Cession by which the Fijian chiefs had 
ceded their islands to Great Britain. 13 That 
document was interpreted as the charter for the 
protection of Fijian rights-the paramountcy of 
Fijian interests--and the government, with the 
concurrence of chiefs, used it as a tool to subvert 
any change that it did not approve itself. The 
opportunity for inter-ethnic dialogue was thus 
restricted to the ornate chambers of the Legislative 
Council. Those individuals or groups which 
attempted to penetrate each others boundaries or 
sought to question the legitimacy of the policy of 
ethnic compartmentalisation faced the wrath of the 
colonial state. And powerful vested interests in the 
different groups used ethnicity to suppress internal 
dissidence and demand for the re-structuring of 
power. 14 
Independence: Race is a Fact of Life 
Key assumptions and values which underpinned the 
management of ethnicity in the colonial era were 
carried over into the post-colonial period, and 
enshrined in the 1970 independence constitution. 
These included paramountcy of Fijian interests, 
parity for Indo-Fijians and privilege for Europeans. 
The principle of parity between Fijian and Indo­
Fijian interests was recognised in the elected House 
of Representatives. Of the fifty two seats, twenty 
two each were reserved for Fijians (272,000 in 
1980) and Indo-Fijians (306,500). The privileged 
position of the General Electors15 (19,000) was 
recognised by giving them five seats. Twelve each 
of the Fijian and Indo-Fijian seats and three of the 
General seats were to be elected on purely 
communal rolls, and the remaining twenty five 
seats on multiracial cross-voting rolls. In the 
Senate, the principle of Fijian paramountcy was 
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recognised by giving the Great Council of Chiefs 
eight of the twenty two seats, the Prime Minister 7, 
the Leader of Opposition 6 and the Council of 
Rotuma one. Given that both the political leaders 
nominated Fijian members, more than half the 
senate at any given time consisted of Fijian 
members. But numbers by themselves were not as 
important. The GCC nominees had the power of 
veto over any legislation that touched, even 
remotely, on matters of Fijian interests. These 
included the Fijian Affairs Ordinance, Fijian 
Development Fund Ordinance, the Native Lands 
Ordinance and the Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenants Ordinance. Specifically, the constitution 
provided that legislation regarding 'Fijian land, 
custom and customary rights shall not be passed by 
the Senate unless it is supported at the final vote 
thereon in the House by no less than six of the 
Great Council of Chiefs nominees. ' 16 
The method of election and the 
composition of the House of Representatives was 
an 'interim solution' for the first parliament after 
independence. This compromise solution had been 
reached in the pre-independence talks in Suva and 
London because of the stalemate over the method 
of election to parliament. The National Federation 
Party pressed the principle of common roll, while 
the Alliance stood on the principle of communal 
roll. 17 To avert collapse of the talks, both parties 
agreed to defer the matter to a royal commission of 
inquiry at a later date. In 1975, Professor Harry 
Street headed that enquiry. He recommended, 
among other things, that while the communal seats 
with their existing weightage should be retained to 
allay ethnic fears, the remaining national seats 
should be converted to common roll seats in five 
constituencies 'with no restriction of race or 
religion for either voters or candidates' . He 
recommended further that the election for these 
seats should be on the basis of single transfer 
vote. 18• In this way, communal sentiments would 
be respected while at the same time the arena for 
multiracial competition and cooperation for votes 
would be increased. The Alliance rejected the 
recommendations, and the report remained 
undebated. 
Why? The interim solution had worked to 
the party's advantage. In the first post­
independence elections in 1972, the Alliance had 
won handily with over 80 percent of Fijian 
communal and 24 percent of Indian votes. The 
lesson was clear: the Alliance could remain in 
power indefinitely if it could only preserve its 
Fijian constituency and split enough Indo-Fijian 
votes to win a handful of the marginal national 
seats. That, Ratu Mara, the Alliance leader and 
prime minister, said on several occasion, had been 
the advice given to him by his political advisor 
David Butler of Nuffield College, Oxford. In fact, 
that formula worked well for the Alliance party 
except in the April 1977 elections, when a 25 
percent shift of Fijian votes away from the Alliance 
party resulted in its temporary defeat. The 
Alliance party remained in power from 1970 to 
1987. 19 
The logic of a communal electoral system 
produced its own problems. One was the growing 
disenchantment of the lndo-Fijian community with 
the Alliance government. It felt excluded and 
marginalised in national decision making. As a 
result, the leading lights of the Indian Alliance, Sir 
Vijay Singh, James Shankar Singh, MT Khan, 
among others, left the party, complaining of step­
brotherly treatment. James Shankar Singh, once an 
Alliance minister, was blunt: 'It is my sad 
experience throughout the existence of the party 
that Indian Alliance leaders and members have 
merely been made tools or vehicles of convenience 
by the party leader,and once the general election is 
over and Ratu Sir Kamisese [Mara] conveniently 
seated in the Prime Minister's chair, he treats them 
like a bunch of coolies. '20 
For its part, the Alliance party was not 
overly concerned with the departure of the Indo­
Fijians from its ranks. Hoping to manipulate the 
existing cultural and religious divisions in the lndo­
Fijian community to its advantage, the Alliance 
attempted instead to consolidate its Fijian base in 
the 1970s and the 1980s. That base was not as safe 
as it once had been. There was, for instance, the 
challenge to Alliance rule from Sakiasi Butadroka, 
whose overtly anti-Indian platform--Fiji for the 
Fijians, Indians go back to India cry-hid a 
powerful attack on the political hegemony of 
eastern chiefs. Mara, the paramount chief of Lau 
was Butadroka's principal target. 21 In western Viti 
Levu, dispute over the formula for sharing the 
proceeds of the lucrative pine industry between the 
government and the western landowners led to the 
formation of a regionalist political party, the 
Western United Front which sought to promote the 
interests and aspirations of the western Fijians. 22 
The carefully constructed edifice of Fijian polity 
was in the danger of being dismantled. This was 
evident in the results of the 1982 general elections 
in which the National Federation Party-Western 
United Front came within two seats of dislodging 
the Alliance from power. 
Why this Fijian dissidence against a Fijian­
dominated government? The main reason was the 
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feeling among many Fijians in Viti Levu, Fiji's 
largest island, that they were being neglected by a 
government which, as they saw it, was devoting its 
attention to improving the life of Fijians in eastern 
parts of Fiji, the bastion of Fijian establishment. 
They alleged that Lau, Mara's own province, was 
receiving a disproportionate share of development 
aid, scholarships, and hurricane relief money. 
Mara naturally denied the charge of favouritism, 
but statistics seemed to confirm the allegations. 
For example, between 1984 and 1986, Lau, one of 
the smallest Fijian provinces, received $528,000 in 
scholarships, 21 percent of all the money allocated 
for Fijian scholarships. The larger provinces 
received much less: Ba, $156,000 (6.2 percent), 
Tailevu, $364, 244 (14.5 percent), and Rewa, 
$221 ,638 (8.3  percent). 23 Commenting on this 
disparity, Timoci Bavadra, the leader of the Fiji 
Labour Party said: 
It is important to remind 
ourselves that the government 
resources poured into Lakeba are 
derived from wealth produced by 
others elsewhere in the country. 
It is time that the government 
stopped viewing the rest of Fiji 
as serving the interest of a few 
centres in the east. The people 
of Lakeba are entitled to a share 
in the national interest, but just a 
share. It is time we had a 
government that is more truly 
national in outlook. 24 
In other words, under the rhetoric of promoting the 
Fijian interest, Mara and his government were, in 
fact, promoting the interests of certain sections and 
regions of Fiji. 
Mara continued to cultivate and consolidate 
his ethnic constituency so crucial to his political 
survival. This he did through patronage, coercion 
and marginalisation of recalcitrant opponents. At 
the same time, he made overtures to the National 
Federation Party to form a government of national 
unity. Mara's paper was long on the analysis of 
problems of multiethnic states but short on 
solutions. 25 It proposed 'adequate participation by 
all communities in decision making process to 
obtain consensus for critical policies thereby 
nullifying the likelihood of a sense of alienation 
developing in any one or more ethnic groups 
through apparent or real exclusion. '  But precisely 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
how that was to be accomplished through a 
meaningful formula for power sharing, remained 
unclear. NFP leader Jai Ram Reddy said: 'What 
we need to do is to develop a creed which will 
require the privileged in our society, be they 
Indians, Fijians or Europeans, to help those who 
are the weakest in our community irrespective of 
race, colour or religion. '26 That went to the heart of 
the matter. Reddy proposed a more class-oriented 
approach; Mara saw the proposal more as an 
exercise in damage control: stopping the 
haemorrhaging of Indo-Fijian support by coopting 
the NFP as a junior partner in a government of 
national unity, and quelling internal Fijian dissent 
without sacrificing the basis tenets of communally­
based politics. So, unsurprisingly, the government 
of national unity floundered. 
Labour Coalition and Coup 
By the 1980s, the foundations of Fijian society 
were being changed in ways in which communalism 
appeared to have less relevance to the demands of 
daily living, certainly less meaning than before. 
Fully one third of the Fijian population was living 
in urban or peri-urban areas. v The drift toward 
urban areas brought its own problems such as 
unemployment, overcrowding in existing housing 
and ancillary facilities, breakdown of traditional 
family status patterns and conflict of values and 
aspirations, tensions between long-settled and newly 
arrived people, and the general problems associated 
in the transition to a wage earning and cash 
economy. Of course the break with the village was 
not sudden, but a gradual process of distancing, 
both physical as well as psychological, had begun. 28 
Another change of consequence was the growth of 
a wage earning labour force, from 51 ,000 in 1970 
to 80,000 in 1980, and an increase in the same 
period in the number of registered trade unions 
from 30 to 49. 29 
In the villages, too, important changes 
were afoot. The monetisation of the village 
economy emphasised the primacy of the nuclear 
family over the communal group. The increasing 
importance of cash crops--banana, ginger, sugar 
cane- and growing links to urban centres facilitated 
by improved communication emphasised the need 
for individual enterprise and initiative over 
traditional ways of doing things. R.G. Ward 
wrote: 
The combined introduction of 
new skills, new technology and 
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money have weakened the 
functional cement which binds the 
village society. This does not 
mean that the structure has 
collapsed, or will do so in the 
near future. It does mean the 
risk of disintegration exists if 
other factors shake the edifice. 30 
Natural calamities such as hurricanes, floods and 
droughts added their own complications. The net 
result of these changes, which required grappling 
with the forces of the modem world in all their 
bewildering complexity, was for a kind of politics 
that went beyond the anachronistic race-based 
politics. It was exemplified in the emergence of 
the Fiji Labour Party in 1985. 
Backed by the trade union movement, 
especially the powerful Fiji Public Service 
Association, the party committed itself to the values 
of democratic socialism, advocating social justice, 
balanced economic and regional development, 
public ownership of selected commercial ventures, 
nationalisation of certain industries such as gold 
mining, and improving the condition for the 
working class. 31 But realising that working alone 
it could not dislodge the Alliance from power, 
Labour, on the eve of the 1987 elections, formed a 
coalition with the National Federation Party. It 
won that election by four seats. It has often been 
argued that only some 10 percent of the Fijians 
voted for the Coalition, and as such, the new 
government did not reflect the true wishes of the 
Fijian people, that it was an Indian-dominated 
government. For that reason, it had to be removed 
from power, which was done through a military 
coup in May 1987. 
This is not the place to rehearse the 
various arguments on the causes of the coup. 32 
Essentially, there are two schools of thought on 
why the coup took place. At the one end of the 
spectrum are those, such as Deryck Scarr, who see 
the coup fundamentally as a racial conflict between 
indigenous Fijians and lndo-Fijians. The elections 
had brought forth a government which Fijians, 
especially Fijian chiefs, did not control; it had 
upset the 'balance of power' and tacit 
understandings of power sharing in Fiji, according 
to which the Fijians were to control the government 
and the Indo-Fijians and others commerce. 
Therefore, it had to go. The coup was thus 
inevitable. 33 
Most scholars reject the purely racial 
explanations of the coup. 34 Racial fears, of course, 
played a part; it could not have been otherwise in 
a racially compartmentalised society where cross­
cultural/ethnic cooperation was discouraged. My 
argument is that these deeply felt anxieties were 
exploited by politicians for their own ends, people 
who knew well that Fijian interests were securely 
entrenched in the constitution. This is not to say 
that the Coalition victory did not threaten the 
foundations upon which the edifice of post-colonial 
politics of Fiji had been built. That threat came not 
from Indo-Fijians but from other sources . The 
non-racial democratic socialist ideology of the 
Coalition posed problems for Alliance's philosophy 
of communal politics. The Fijian communal 
constituency was, for the first time, in danger of 
being fragmented. The process of crossing the 
boundaries had begun in a small way, and there 
was no telling where it might end. That was one 
danger the election of the Coalition posed. 
There were others as well that went to the 
core of indigenous Fijian politics. For the first 
time, a Fijian commoner, actually a minor chief, 
had been elected to the highest office in the land. 
Before then, national politics had been dominated 
by high chiefs (Ratu Mara, Ratu Sir Penaia 
Ganilau, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, for example). 
Bavadra was a self-made, middle class Fijian. All 
his other Fijian colleagues in the Coalition were 
from similar backgrounds: trade unionists, 
academics, senior public servants. Their success at 
the national level would have implicitly questioned 
the Fijian ideology that held that the privilege of 
leadership is the prerogative of chiefs. And 
Bavadra was adamant about drawing a distinction 
between the Fijians' traditional obligations and their 
political rights. As he put it: 
The chiefly system is a time­
honoured and sacred institution of 
the taukei. It is a system for 
which we have the deepest 
respect and which we will 
defend. But we also believe that 
a system of modem democracy is 
one which is quite separate from 
it. The individual's democratic 
right to vote in our political 
system does not mean that he has 
to vote for a chief. It is an 
absolutely free choice. 35 
Chiefs and their supporters thought otherwise. Said 
Sitiveni Rabuka: 'The chiefs are the wise men in 
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Fijian society. Take that power away and give it to 
the commoners, and you are asking for trouble. '36 
Bavadra wanted chiefs to revert to their traditional 
role as the leaders of their people. The chiefs, on 
the other hand, wanted to be the chiefs of the 
whole nation. 
Not only was Bavadra not Mara, a 
paramount chief, he came from the wrong side of 
Fiji, western Viti Levu, neglected both by the 
colonial as well as the Alliance governments and 
long the centre of dissent in Fijian society. 
Western Fijians had perennially complained, to use 
Apisai Tora's words, of being the victims of 
'nepotism and conspiracy' of eastern chiefs.37 For 
them, Bavadra's victory was the fulfilment of 
generations of western Fijians' struggle for dignity 
and a proper share of power in the national scheme 
of things. The Coalition victory seemed to send 
forth the message that those Fijians long consigned 
to the margins were now at the centre, and those 
who had monopolised power for so long were 
being shifted to the periphery. That perception of 
shift in the traditional balance of power generated 
a powerful momentum of its own. The fear of the 
eastern Fijians and others opposed to the Coalition, 
was not unfounded. As Prime Minister and 
Minister of Home Affairs, Bavadra had the power 
to appoint more 'non-establishment' Fijians to 
important positions in the public service and in 
statutory organisations. Whether he would have 
deliberately set out to do so will remain moot. 
My argument, to repeat, is not that race 
and racial fears were not important. Enough has 
been written on that to warrant detailed discussion 
here. My point, rather, is that there were other 
(non-racial) factors internal to the Fijian society 
itself that played a far larger role than has generally 
been acknowledged. 
1990 Constitution 
Five years after the coups and after several 
abortive attempts, a new constitution was decreed 
in July 1990. In promulgating it, President Ratu 
Sir Penaia Ganilau said: 
I want to assure you that it is the 
government's intention to lay a 
strong foundation for a republic 
with a stable, caring and 
productive society. We seek a 
new order of hope, of peace, 
reconciliation and progress in 
which the fundamental rights and 
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freedoms of all citiz.ens are 
guaranteed.  We seek 
understanding , trust and 
tolerance. 38 
These hopes remain unrealised as the constitution 
continues to be rejected by nearly half the 
population. 
The constitution is a self-avowed attempt 
to enshrine ethnicity and traditionalism as the core 
elements in Fiji's political system. There is no 
need here to subject the constitution to detailed 
scrutiny, 39 but several of its features need 
mentioning. The clear intent of the present 
constitution is to entrench Fijian (chiefly) control of 
the political process in Fiji and to 'exclude the Fiji 
Indians from any meaningful share of political 
power. '40 The real power in Fiji resides not in the 
elected House of Representatives but in the 
unelected Great Council of Chiefs, the Bose Levu 
Vakaturaga. It appoints the president, always to be 
a Fijian chief from one of the three existing 
confederacies (traditional power centres ofKubuna, 
Burebasaga, Tovata). The President's office is 
invested with wide ranging as opposed to nominal 
powers usually reposited in the office of an 
unelected Head of State. At the same time, the 
GCC dominates the Senate. Of its 34 members, 
the GCC nominates 24 members, the Council of 
Rotuma one, the rest being representatives of other 
communities chosen by the President. The Senate 
acts as a house of review. No bill affecting the 
Fijian Affairs Act, the Fijian Development Fund 
Act, the Native Lands Act, the Native Lands Trust 
Act, the Rotuma Act, the Rotuman Lands Act, the 
Banahan Land Act and the Banaba Settlement Act, 
can be passed without the assent of not less than 
eighteen of the twenty four GCC nominees in the 
Senate. 41 Clearly, then, the GCC remains the most 
important arbiter of power in Fiji. 
The enormous power enjoyed by the chiefs 
under the present constitution prompts questions 
about its structure and source of authority. The 
GCC was created by Fiji's first governor, Sir 
Arthur Gordon, soon after cession to advise the 
colonial government on matters relating specifically 
to Fijian society. 42 When Fijians were given 
representation in the Legislative Council, the GCC 
nominated the Fijian members; it was not until 
1963 that Fijians were given the right of universal 
franchise. So, the GCC became not only the 
cultural but also the political representative of the 
Fijian people to the outside world. Its role as the 
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guardian of Fijian interests was recognised in the 
1970 constitution, as noted above. 
Under that constitution, the GCC consisted 
of 154 members, including all Fijian members of 
parliament, appointees of the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Home Affairs, and the Governor 
General, and nominees of the various provincial 
councils. After the coups, the membership was 
reduced to 52, removing the automatic membership 
of all Fijian parliamentarians to that body. The 
new arrangement invests supreme decision making 
powers in the hands of a select group of chiefs, 
with the rest of the council playing an advisory 
role. The GCC has become a two-tiered body 
consisting of the Bose ni turaga and the Veivosaki 
ni Turaga. The Bose consists of ten representatives 
each from the existing three confederacies, two 
representatives from Rotuma, three nominees each 
of the President and the Fijian Affairs Board, and 
one representative from each of the fourteen 
provinces. The Veivosaki is the executive arm of 
the council made up of twelve high chiefs, four 
from each of the confederacies. 
This reversion to an explicitly chief­
dominated structure was justified by Ratu Sir 
Penaia Ganilau this way: 
A chief and his people are one. 
The turaga cannot be a turaga 
without the vanua, and the vanua 
cannot exist without the turaga. 
Chiefs have been mediators and 
conciliators between the Fijian 
people and the Indian community. 
They have used their authority to 
ease communal tension and 
enhance harmony. Chiefly 
leadership has done much to 
bring Fiji into the modem world 
and to spur our economic 
progress. 43 
Let us accept, for the sake of argument, the 
rhetoric about the progressive role chiefs have 
played in national life as mediators in and 
conciliators of contentious issues. 
But if the reversion to traditionalism is in 
the Fijian interest, why are sections of the Fijian 
society itself dissatisfied with the move. Why, for 
example, do many western Fijians insist on a 
separate confederacy of their own? How does one 
explain the submission of a twelve-member 
delegation to the Constitution Inquiry and Advisory 
Committee criticising the constitution for 
discriminating 
against the progressively 
productive, better educated, 
forward thinking Fiji citi.zens of 
all races in favour of that 
minority segment of the 
community that represents (and 
seeks to reserve for itself) the 
aristocratic ,  undemocratic , 
privileged pattern of colonial 
life. 44 
Why, again, have some prominent western Fijians 
launched a separate Viti Levu Council of Chiefs45 
if the Great Council of Chiefs is the representative 
organisation of all Fijians? If the coup was about 
giving Fijians greater control over their own 
resources , why has the call by western landowners 
and others for a more equitable distribution of the 
proceeds from their lands, been resisted by the 
government? The reason would appear to be that 
the reversion to traditionalism is an attempt to re­
entrench the status quo in Fijian society. In other 
words, the opportunity provided by the coups for a 
more equitable distribution of power in Fijian 
society, has been used for other purposes, including 
shoring up the position of chiefs. 
The same strategy is apparent in the 
distribution of seats in the House of 
Representatives. Of its 70 seats, Fijians have 37 
seats, Inda-Fijians 27, General Voters 5 and 
Rotumans one, all elected from racially prescribed 
constituencies, with no opportunity for voting 
across racial lines. But what is more important, in 
terms of the argument developed above, is the 
allocation of seats among the Fijians. Two things 
need to be noted. The first is that of the 37 Fijian 
seats, only five are allocated to urban Fijians, who 
make up fully one third of the indigenous 
population. Their under-representation in 
parliament is thus glaring. The other aspect of the 
present electoral arrangement is the under­
presentation of many areas not traditionally allied 
to the dominant regions in Fijian society. The 
province of Ba with a population of 55,000 
(according to the 1986 census) has three seats in 
parliament, the same as Lau with a population of 
14,000; Rewa with 48,000 Fijians will have the 
same number of seats, two, as Kadavu, with a 
population of 9,600. These iniquities will increase 
with time as more Fijians drift to towns and 
become more contentious as Viti Levu Fijians 
demand their share of power and resources. 
Elections and Ethnicity, 1992-1994 
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In June 1990, the Great Council of Chiefs launched 
a new political party for the tauk:ei, the Soqosoqo 
ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei 'to promote the unity of 
the Fijian people and the consolidation of their 
culture and tradition. '46 The party was expected to 
be an umbrella organisation for all Fijians, in the 
manner of the Fijian Association of the colonial 
days, united in purpose and working together 
towards a common goal. But the reality turned out 
to be different. The first hint of difference and 
disagreement came over the question of the 
leadership of the party. Since the SVT was 
sponsored by the chiefs, many Fijians expected and 
wanted the new party to be headed by a chief of 
relatively high status and above the political fray. 
Among the contestants was Adi Lady Lala Mara, 
the paramount of the Burebasaga confederacy. So 
also was Sitiveni Rabuk:a, of non-chiefly 
background, who defeated Mara for the post. A 
commoner defeating a high chief was an unsettling 
spectacle for many Fijians. Said Sakiasi 
Butadroka, leader of the Fiji Nationalist Party: 'If 
the SVT delegates can put a commoner before a 
chief, then I don't understand why a chiefs-backed 
party can do such a thing, putting a chief-in this 
case the highest ranking chief, Ro Lady Lala­
before a selection panel. '47 Even more ungainly was 
the sight of Rabuka's open verbal warfare with 
Ratu Mara who made no secret of his personal 
antipathy toward Rabuka. Mara went further. He 
backed Josefata Kamikamica as his preferred 
successor as prime minister. 48 This spectacle, too, 
dismayed Fijians. The rhetoric of unity appeared 
to be just that: rhetoric. 
The 1992 election results showed clearly 
just how illusive the goal of Fijian unity was. 
Although the SVT won thirty of the thirty seven 
Fijian seats, it won only 66.6 percent of the total 
Fijian votes cast (1 12,447). Its strongest support 
was in the small eastern constituencies of the Koro 
Sea where it won 89 percent of the total votes cast 
(27, 658), but in rural Viti Levu, it won only 49.7 
percent of the total Fijian votes (52,538) .  In the 
1994 snap election, the SVT won only 64 percent 
of the total Fijian votes, though it was able to 
improve its position in parts of Viti Levu. 49 But 
despite this electoral victory, Rabuka's hold on 
power remains tenuous. This is partly because of 
his own inexperience, but perhaps more 
importantly, it is also due to continued opposition 
to him personally by important sections of the 
Fijian population, including Mara loyalists. A 
constitution that was supposed to promote unity 
among the Fijians has ended up dividing them up as 
never before. It has produced audible murmurs of 
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social tensions and regional and provincial rivalries, 
distressing and confusing a people used to political 
unity at the national level. And the chiefs' 
sponsorship of a political party has proved to be a 
divisive, contested decision. 50 
Current developments will ensure the 
continuation of this trend. The evanescent fear of 
Indian domination has opened up space for more 
debate about matters internal to Fijian society, 
matters which would have remained hidden from 
public view before the coups. The disappearance 
(or imminent departure) from the political scene of 
the reassuring presence of paramount chiefs of 
national authority and prestige-Cakobau, Ganilau, 
Mara, to name the three most important ones-has 
opened up opportunities for other leaders not 
necessarily committed to the traditionalist ideology. 
'The Fijian people are now maturing politically; 
they are beginning to look more at issues [rather 
than the status of the contender] , '51 says Josefata 
Kamikamica. Sitiveni Rabuk:a himself 'believes 
that the dominance of customary chiefs in 
government is coming to an end and that the role of 
merit chiefs will eventually overcome those of 
traditional chiefs: the replacement of traditional 
aristocracy with meritocracy. '52 Taukei scholar 
Asesela Ravuvu agrees: 'The new political system 
emphasises equal opportunities and individual 
rights, which diminish the status and authority of 
chiefs. ' And although the chiefs 'are still the focus 
of many ceremonial functions and communal 
village activities, their roles and positions are 
increasingly of a ritualistic nature. '53 This at a time 
when the chiefly position is being entrenched in the 
political system. 
Ethnicity has played a central role in the 
organisation and functioning of Fiji's political 
system, distorting political discourse because it hid 
other cleavages in the society. Efforts to reinstate 
it are under way, as Fiji prepares to establish the 
mechanism to review the 1990 constitution. 
Sitiveni Rabuk:a has stated his position clearly: 'If 
we are to move forward with the review, it is 
absolutely essential that the government should first 
secure the full support and understanding of the 
Fijian and Rotuman communities through the Bose 
Levu Vakaturaga. '54 That, in effect, will mean the 
acceptance of the principle of the paramountcy of 
indigenous interests. The opposition is equally 
adamant. According to Jai Ram Reddy, the Leader 
of the Opposition, 
a government has to be 
responsive to the needs of all 
communities. Any future 
LAL - Managing Ethnicity in Colonial and Post-colonial Fiji 45 
constitution which does not aim 
for that objective will fail. The 
notion that one community alone 
should be able to be in 
government without the need for 
any support from the other 
communities is quite abhorrent 
and will create serious divisions 
in society. ss 
Therein lies the central issue in 
contemporary Fijian politics. Many Fijians, for 
reasons of their own, argue that democracy is a 
colonial imposition, a foreign flower unsuited to the 
Fijian soil. But so, too, are some of the most 
important institutions of Fijian society. The 
modern Fijian state itself is a colonial construct. 
Christianity is a flower foreign to the Fijian soil, 
having arrived in the islands in only 1835. The 
Great Council of Chiefs and the pattern of land 
tenure are also expedient inventions of colonialism. 
The list does not end here. It seems so futile to 
reject history to re-create a mythical past that never 
was. The danger inherent in such a project should 
by now be obvious. 
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Nauru's Post-Independence Struggles 
Nancy J. Pollock 
In 1968, Nauru achieved its independence. It was 
the second Pacific nation, after Western Samoa, to 
throw off the shackles of colonialism. For Nauru 
it meant gaining control of what was left of a 
natural resource, phosphate, that had been mined 
for sixty years for the benefit of the British 
Phosphate Commission with only minimal returns 
for Nauruans1 • The British Phosphate Commission 
(BPC) consisted of Australia and Great Britain with 
a 40 per cent share each, and New Zealand with a 
20 per cent share. This consortium established the 
mine, extracted and processed the phosphate and 
sold it to themselves at a beneficial rate. Australia 
was also the administering nation, first under a 
League of Nations Mandate in 1919, and later under 
a United Nations Trusteeship in 1945. Over that 60 
year period, Nauruans were constantly asking for 
a greater share of phosphate profits and a better 
deal. So independence in 1968 was a culmination 
of their persistent efforts. 
The post independence period has been a 
testing time for Nauru. It had to buy the mine 
from the BPC for $A20 million, and set up the 
Nauru Phosphate Corporation to run it, selling the 
phosphate at world market prices. These changes 
resulted in the need for Nauru to manage its own 
affairs, now made more complex by the new found 
wealth, and the vagaries of the world economy. 
All decisions were made in the knowledge that 
Nauru had a finite resource - 1996 was the date 
when the phosphate was predicted to run out. So 
independence led to a number of endeavours to 
accomplish in the short term all that was necessary 
to establish a viable future for the next generations 
of Nauruans. 
They were fortunate to have a viable 
political body, the Nauru Local Government 
Council, that had been their main means of 
conveying their dissatisfactions to Australia as the 
administering body and to the BPC. That Council 
had been set up in 1951 to replace a Council of 
Chiefs instituted by the BPC in 1927. The new 
body was a conscious step to democratize Nauru by 
setting up eight electorates, seven of which were to 
elect one Council member each, and the eighth, 
most populous district, was to elect two members. 
The same electorates were later used for electing 
Parliamentary members. This strong system of 
local government, funded through the Nauru 
Royalty Trust Fund, took on an insistent lobbying 
role, both for an increased share of the phosphate 
royalties as well as for more autonomy for 
Nauruans. 
Before independence the NLGC was the 
body which met regularly with the U.N. Visiting 
Missions and presented their dissatisfactions to 
them (for a transcript of one such meeting, see 
U.N. - The People Speaking 1965). The Council 
was headed first by Timothy Detudamo who had 
been the island's spokesperson since the 1920s, and 
later by Hammer deRoburt. 
The Nauru Local Government Council was 
a particularly significant establishment as it 
decentralized the power structure, 2 while also 
giving Nauruans a means to voice their frustrations 
to the administering authority, Australia. 
Paradoxically, it strengthened the power of its 
elected head, Detudamo who had been appointed as 
Head Chief in 1927 under the old chiefly system. 
But with a population of less than 2000 until the 
1950s, its impact was more structural than 
pragmatic. It provided Nauruans with an authentic 
channel of communication through which they 
could voice their concerns to the administering 
authority and ultimately to the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council. It was a strong base from 
which to build the infrastructure of self-rule. 
It served its purpose well as the people 
were agreed on the main issues. These included 
demands for more royalties from phosphate, and 
control of their own affairs. The issue of 
resettlement, proposed by Australia in 1961 ,  was 
considered carefully by the NLGC, but rejected on 
the grounds that Nauruans would have to share 
Curtis Island in the Gulf of Carpentaria with 
Australian Aborigines, which would mean a loss of 
their autonomy. They had seen what had happened 
to their Banahan cousins who were resettled from 
neighbouring Ocean Island in 1946 on Rabi island, 
off Vanua Levu in Fiji, and did not want the same 
to happen to themselves. There was general 
consensus about the steps necessary to achieve their 
goal of independence. 
NLGC was dissolved in 1992 and 
replaced by the Nauru Council comprising the 
Cabinet with the president as minister in charge. 
The NLGC had run up a series of debts from its 
wide range of activities, so the dissolution was 
aimed to curb its powers and reduce expenditure 
out of the Nauru Royalty Fund and the Nauru 
Development fund, both drawn from phosphate 
revenues3 
We will examine Nauru as a case study in 
the light of three themes that run through this book. 
Firstly the change in the nature of control after 
independence has lifted some restraints while also 
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imposing new ones. For Nauru, economic support 
whether in aid or loans was not the issue for 
post-colonial ties that it was for other small Pacific 
island states; for Nauru the concern was how to 
manage an already developed resource of 
international significance but one that had a finite 
lifespan. Nauru thus fell outside the league of 
Pacific nations seeking economic development 
strategies as their prime focus. But they shared the 
long term goal of seeking to manage their resource, 
phosphate, to ensure a viable future for Nauruans. 
A second theme is that of nationalism and 
establishing a clear identity. Nauruans were 
noticeably different because of their wealth, as 
journalists have delighted to headline them. 4 But 
they, like the other islands, wanted to establish a 
distinctive identity, with the right to build their 
future on their own terms. Each nation chose a 
distinctive flag and other characteristics that marked 
each nation as having a unique identity. Kastom in 
Vanuatu and Fa 'asamoa in Western Samoa are but 
two of the terms that appeared in local languages to 
represent these distinctive qualities, reasserting 
aspects of their distinctive cultural heritage. For 
some Melanesian states and provinces that has 
brought its own conflicts. For other island states, 
it has required compromises to their sovereignty, 
for example Federated States of Micronesia. 
Issues of identity can be most clearly seen 
in the new pan-Pacific associations. The South 
Pacific Forum as a political body representing the 
independent nations gives each island nation a voice 
- and up to now a chance to express the widely 
shared principle of generosity in hosting the annual 
conference. Nauru was the most recent nation to 
put on its display for Forum participants in August 
1993. South Pacific Arts Festivals and South 
Pacific Games are examples of other occasions 
where that new found identity, and nationalism, are 
vividly expressed. Nauruans are proud of their 
weightlifter, Marcus Stephen, who put them on the 
medal table at the Commonwealth Games in 1982 
and again in 1994. 
Internationalism is a third theme. The 
nations of the South Pacific were dragged into the 
international arena by events of World War II, and 
the subsequent growing interest in the Pacific 
Basin. The place of small island states remains 
unclear, as the larger nations around the Pacific 
basin form a strong politico-economic body. This 
is a subject of concern both for the small Pacific 
states, and for metropolitan nations such as New 
Zealand, Australia and the United States. Nauru is 
very small, but that size is belied by the importance 
of the phosphate resource. 
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Many island states have seized the 
opportunity to make new alliances beyond those 
that existed in the colonial era. For Nauru this 
internationalism has come mainly through trade and 
investment round the world - a matter of 
considerable interest both at home as well as by 
other nations. The islands of the Pacific are part of 
a world system that brings repercussions, both 
positive and negative, that are no longer cushioned 
by colonial protectionism. The inter-dependency 
issue is one which Nauru is well aware of, its own 
environmental situation being the subject of a court 
case before the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague, as discussed below. 
Control - Towards Autonomy 
Nauru's main aim in seeking independence from 
Australia and the Trusteeship status was to gain 
control of what was left of its own phosphate. 
Two thirds of the area containing phosphate, 
namely 'topside' or the interior of the island, had 
already been mined by BPC in 1968. The 
phosphate had been mined without the agreement of 
Nauruans, nor were they apprised of its full value. 
Land owners received a halfpenny per ton, or one 
seven hundredth of the price for which phosphate 
was being sold in 1908. That amount gradually 
rose to seventeen shillings and sixpence by the time 
of independence, due to the concerted demands of 
the Nauruans through the NLGC; but that was still 
only a miniscule proportion of the returns to the 
BPC members. 5 -
Under the terms of the independence 
agreement, Nauru was to buy the mine plant for 
$A20 million within six years. Australia was 
hoping they would not succeed, as they and the 
other two Commission members wanted to continue 
mining. They desperately needed the cheap 
phosphate to maintain their pastoralist economies. 
As Minister Talboys noted in 1968, 'The 
superphosphate that we manufacture locally from 
Nauru and Ocean islands accounts for 90% of the 
total fertilisers used in New Zealand' ; 6 a similar 
dependency on Nauru phosphate existed in 
Australia. Nauruans thus had potentially lucrative 
returns if only they could find that initial capital. 
Nauruans knew that they wanted to control 
for themselves the returns from phosphate, even 
though they had not been apprised of the value of 
the profits over the preceding twenty years. They 
knew that the phosphate had been sold on the world 
market providing a lucrative income to BPC, but 
they did not know just how much income had gone 
to the BPC. They also knew that they had been 
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rece1vmg only minimal returns to the Nauruans 
through royalty funds. After independence, the 
newly established Nauru Phosphate Corporation 
swiftly moved to sell all the phosphate at world 
market prices to the highest bidder. Australia and 
New Zealand had to buy fertilizer at world prices, 
a factor that had a strong onflow on to their 
economies in the 1970s. 
Nauruans had only ever received a very 
minor share in the value of phosphate exports 
before independence. 7 Despite their lobbying, by 
1966 they were still getting less than 30 per cent of 
the value of phosphate exports. Fourteen percent 
was directed by BPC toward the administrative 
costs of the island, a cost, Weeramantry argues, 
that should have been borne by the administering 
authority, not the administered. One point three 
per cent of the value was placed in the Nauru 
Royalty Trust Fund which was designed to provide 
Nauruans with new housing and other infrastructure 
support. Eight point one per cent was placed in a 
Nauru Community Long Term Investment Fund 
that was designated to support Nauruans once the 
phosphate ran out. And four point four per cent 
was paid as direct returns to those landowners as 
their land was mined out. 8 It is very clear that the 
British Phosphate Commissioners believed they 
were the owners of the phosphate deposits on 
Nauru, so they paid Nauruans on the principle that 
it was only according to needs rather than to the 
value of the phosphate sold. 9 
Under the terms of the Trusteeship in the 
1950s and 1960s, various U.N. Visiting Missions 
asked to see the books, in order to assess whether 
Nauruans were getting a fair return. But the 
figures were not revealed in total. A part of the 
picture became clearer when Nancy Viviani 
published figures on the payment to the various 
funds in the Appendices to her account of events 
leading up to independence. 10 The accounts proved 
difficult to obtain even in 1990 when the 
Commission for the Rehabilitation of Nauru under 
the leadership of Weeramantry sought to establish 
just what money had gone where. 
The proportion set aside for rehabilitation 
amounted to $599,325 in l968, which Weeramantry 
labels a 'meagre sum' . 1 1  By 1990 Nauruans' own 
investment towards rehabilitation had reached the 
total of $214 million. The question the 
Commission for Rehabilitation was examining was 
whether Australia and the British Phosphate 
Commissioners should have set more funds aside 
for rehabilitation. The 1990 Rehabilitation 
Commission found that the latter two bodies were 
responsible to the sum of $72 million. 
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The investment of those returns was 
another issue over which Nauruans wanted to assert 
their own control at independence. Until 1968 the 
sums had been very meagre, though just how 
meagre has been hard to establish as the British 
Phosphate Commissioners would not open the 
books for scrutiny by the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council. Since 1968 Nauru has 
invested its profits world-wide. It set up its own 
shipping line, Nauru Shipping, and its own airline, 
Air Nauru, as well as investing heavily in property, 
including Nauru House in Melbourne and a number 
of hotels around the world. 
Nauru, too, has kept the exact amount of 
its investments very private, even from most 
Nauruans. So it is unclear how or where reporters 
such as Alexander Frater for the Observer in 1982 
obtained figures. He reported that Nauru had a per 
capita income of about $20,000; the annual profit 
was $40 million; the Nauru Phosphate Royalties 
Trust was valued at $222 million. 12 Even the 
Commission for the Rehabilitation of Nauru, set up 
by the Nauruan Government to seek compensation 
from the former British Phosphate Commission, 
had difficulty in getting reliable figures on the exact 
value of the various funds. Today this issue is 
beginning to cause dissent in the community as 
Nauruans need money from these funds set aside 
on their behalf to meet the rising costs of living in 
the 1990s. Claims of mismanagement are being 
asserted. It is noteworthy that in August 1993 a 
group ofNauruan women brought this matter to the 
attention of the Pacific leaders attending the Forum 
meetings on Nauru by protesting on the airport 
runway. Their specific concerns were the expense 
of the Forum and the earlier financial loss of 
investment in a musical in London which was a 
flop. They consider the money needed to support 
future Nauruans is being spent unwisely. 
Rehabilitation 
At independence Nauruans inherited an island two 
thirds of whose interior had been rendered 
impassable and useless. They were left with a sea 
of coral pinnacles, some fifty feet high, around 
which the phosphate had been extracted, thereby 
removing the tracks they had formerly used to 
cross the island, and every vestige of vegetation 
which had also formed part of their daily life. The 
big tamano (Calophyllum inophyllum) trees which 
were very valuable as nesting sites for the noddy 
terns, which Nauruans used to catch for feasts, as 
well as providing valuable shade and leaf mould 
and carving material had been bulldozed to the 
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ground. And the bush which had a cooling effect 
on the climate, as well as providing medicines and 
foods, had all been removed. Nauruans had been 
paid one shilling for each coconut and pandanus 
tree destroyed by the mining operations. But those 
shillings were not sufficient to buy food from the 
stores. 
The large question facing the Nauruans 
was: what was to happen to the major part of their 
island rendered useless? They foresaw that with an 
increasing population the rim of their island would 
be too small to accommodate their needs, so they 
would need the interior for the use of future 
generations. Australia had already suggested 
relocating Nauruans off Nauru, a suggestion firmly 
rejected in the 1960s. And suggestions of bringing 
in soil (from Australia and New Zealand in the 
ships returning after delivering the phosphate) to 
fill in between the pinnacles had been deemed 
impracticable. 
The Commission for the Rehabilitation of 
Nauru was set up in 1986 by the Nauruan 
government to address this and associated issues. 
Based in Melbourne, it was headed by an 
international lawyer, Dr. Christopher 
Weeramantry, with Mr. Challen, an Australian 
engineer, Mr. Degidoa of the Nauruan Language 
Bureau as fellow Commissioners, and Dr. Barry 
Connell, another international lawyer, as the 
Secretary. It found that Nauru had been excluded 
from participation in and control of the phosphate 
industry, and that the partner governments had 
made substantial profits from Nauru phosphate 
without rehabilitating the mined land. In addition, 
during the period of administration by the British 
Phosphate Commissioners, their own interests took 
precedence over financial and political interests of 
Nauruans. This situation had led to a situation of 
conflict between the duties of a mandatory 
power/trustee and their own commercial interests. 13 
The former BPC members were being 
asked to make good the deficit in payments to 
Nauruans during their 62 years of mining as well 
as making good the damage caused by mining to 
the land. Nauru took their case to the International 
Court of Justice in the Hague seeking to have the 
court declare Australia responsible for mining 
damage before independence in 1967. In 1992 the 
Court accepted that Nauru had a case, finding that 
Australia did have to make reparations for that 
mining damage. The rulings were to be brought up 
for further clarification in 1993. However Australia 
agreed to settle the matter out of court with a 
payment of $Al07 million, and a compact of 
settlement that precludes Nauru making any further 
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claims, but does include some ongoing Australian 
support. The repercussions of this settlement on 
New Zealand and Great Britain are not yet clear. 
Nauru thus has achieved some assistance 
towards the reparation costs which were estimated 
in 1987 to be $A216 million. 14 That sum included 
the cost of rehabilitating the land Nauruans 
themselves had mined since independence as well 
as the costs of rehabilitating land mined before 
1968. The sum Nauruans set aside at independence 
will help with this immense task, but they will still 
need sympathetic treatment by the former 
Commissioners if they are not to join the other 
nations of the Pacific that are economically 
dependent on their former colonial powers. The 
base issue behind the rehabilitation claim was for 
Nauruan control over their own lives and the land 
they live on. 
Population Growth 
Only since independence have Nauruans achieved 
numerical supremacy on their own island. 
Previously they have been outnumbered by the 
labourers introduced to work the phosphate, plus 
the administrators. 15 Nauruans were reluctant to 
work in the mine. Labourers were brought from 
China and the Pacific islands, such as Kiribati and 
Tuvalu. The latter two were favoured by the 
British as a way to provide an income for their 
colony of densely populated, but economically 
impoverished atolls. More recently Filipinos have 
been brought in to supplement the numbers of 
Kiribati. And Nauruans have brought in Indians in 
the 1980s to assist in the administrative areas 
formerly handled by Australians and New 
Zealanders. 
Nauruans have been very conscious of the 
need to increase their population si:ze ever since the 
tum of the last century. When mining began the 
Nauruan population fell from 1550 to 1250 due to 
dysentery and infantile paralysis epidemics. 16 For 
the next 40 years Nauruans strove to make the 
magic figure of 1500 again. They achieved this in 
1932 only to be decimated again by the death of 
some 400 Nauruans while exiled by the Japanese 
on Truk. 17 By 1949 the population had reached 
1524 and has continued to grow since that time. 
According to the 1992 census the population of 
Nauruans is 6,83 1  (Nauru National Population 
Census). 
In part that 'need to gro'w philosophy can 
be attributed to a recognition that they were 
constantly dominated by others in their own land. 
From 1921 to 1968 Nauruans found themselves only 
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half the population of their island. With 
non-Nauruans so much in evidence, this factor 
served to warn them that they needed the numbers 
to gain some measure of control over their own 
affairs. By 1966 the situation was particularly 
threatening as there were 1,167 Chinese, 428 
Europeans, 1,532 non-Nauruan Pacific islanders for 
a total of 3 , 127 immigrants against 2,921 
Nauruans. A total population of 6,048 persons on 
a diminishing land area concerned the Nauruan 
leaders, at both a pragmatic level as well as at a 
philosophical level. 
Even though duplicate facilities had been 
established by the British Phosphate Commission 
with separate housing, and a separate hospital for 
the Gilbertese workers, Nauruans own access to 
housing, particularly land for setting up a house 
was becoming difficult. Land around the cantilever 
site in the southwest comer of the island in the 
Districts of Aiwo and Boe was mainly used by the 
phosphate corporation requiring not only new 
logistic arrangements for Nauruan uses of their 
land, but also new structural arrangements 
regarding their use of land in other districts. 18 
The 'need to grow' philosophy was also 
fuelled by a strong sense ofNauruan pride in being 
Nauruan. Relative to many other Pacific island 
societies, Nauruans have not married out, as one 
might expect with such a large non-Nauruan 
population in close proximity. They have tended to 
marry other Nauruans. Nor have they migrated 
away from their island permanently. There are 
pockets ofNauruans in and around Melbourne, and 
a few in England and New Zealand, but Nauruans 
prefer to maintain their close associations with their 
own island. Their own airline and shipping line 
have helped to make it possible to move away for 
a few weeks or months and return, and to obtain 
goods that might be more readily available in 
metropolitan countries. Investment in 
communications has thus served to support the 
population at home, and maintain a level of control 
over their own community. 
Matrilineality is still strong on Nauru, 
providing a strong motivation to maintain 
connections with 'home' . 19 A Nauruan belongs to 
Nauru through her or his ties to their mother, as 
well as by membership of a named clan. A child 
must be registered as its clan's offspring within 
seven weeks of birth or it is ineligible for the 
benefits of Nauruan citizenship. Births and deaths 
are still recorded in the weekly Nauruan gazette in 
terms of mother's name and clan name. This 
strong matrilineality not only provides a reinforcing 
bond between Nauruans, but also provides the main 
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avenue of access to land rights, hence to claims on 
. any money from mining that accrued to those land 
holders. Some of the rights are miniscule, but they 
do offer a reason for maintaining strong attachment 
to Nauruan identity. Whether matrilineality 
controls the land rights, or access to land (and thus 
phosphate money) has served to reinforce the 
importance of matrilineal bonds is hard for an 
outsider to argue. They are certainly mutually 
reinforcing issues. 
Health 
Another issue over which Nauruans found 
themselves to be lacking control was their health. 
Diabetes was found to be prevalent in the Nauruan 
population in 1976. There followed a large number 
of publications noting that the incidence of diabetes 
in Nauruans was the second highest in the world, 
and 65 per cent of the population were labelled as 
obese. These high rates were attributed to 'the 
effects of Westerniz.ation' .  31 Associated factors 
listed were high blood pressure, high blood fat 
levels, plus kidney and eye disease, peripheral 
nerve disease, infections and premature death, as 
well as increased numbers of stillbirths and 
miscarriages. The marvel is that with so many 
health problems the Nauruans survived in enough 
numbers to reclaim their independence. 
The cause of diabetes in Nauru and the 
eastern Pacific has been the subject of much 
scholarly research. Some researchers such as 
Zimmet have questioned whether the high incidence 
of diabetes is due to environmental or genetic 
factors. The early researchers lay the blame on a 
diet of imported foods, plus lack of exercise, and 
a 'Western ' style of living. Genes, held over from 
the days when the diet was irregular, and lifestyle 
more active, i.e. before mining, possibly played 
some part, but were not then considered a major 
factor. Ten years later the genetic factor is 
considered to be the major cause of what is now 
being called a 'diabetes epidemic' .  21 
While Nauruans are the subjects of all this 
research, they are not in control of it. The 
investigations were carried out as part of a larger 
WHO study of the incidences of diabetes in Pacific 
Island populations, and the results published in 
international journals. Only popularised versions of 
these findings reach Nauru in publications such as 
Time or New Scientist, or the Observer Magazine 
section. Nauruans thus had no control over the 
image of themselves that was being portrayed 
around · the world. The implied message is that 
Nauruans have let their wealth run away with them, 
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indulging in unrestrained consumption of the best 
the world can offer to the detriment of their health. 
Identity 
Nauruans wanted to assert their own identity and 
gained that chance with independence. Even 
shortly after mining began they maintained their 
case to Australia as the mandate administrator, and 
later as the United Nations trustee. When Australia 
began to make plans to relocate Nauruans on Curtis 
island off the coast of Australia, the Nauru Local 
Government Council asserted its opposition on the 
grounds that they would lose their rights of 
sovereignty. zi They have sought to construct a 
positive view of Nauru as a nation, and of 
Nauruans as contributors to Pacific leadership and 
community issues. 
Their identity as a nation is strongly 
embedded in the notion of their matrilineal social 
structure. Their ties to one another are founded on 
the basis that their mothers are recogni7.ed 
Nauruans, belonging to a named clan which goes 
back into Nauruans past. Those clans existed 
before mining and European take over of the island 
by Germans and then the British Phosphate 
Commissioners. And those clans persist to the 
present day as the fundamental groups to which all 
Nauruans belong. In times past new clans were 
created for women arriving on Nauru from the 
Gilberts, Ocean and other cognate islands. They 
were affiliated to a special clan, whose name meant 
flotsam, washed up by the sea. They could work 
land for a chief, but did not have their own rights 
to it. Their children however could be granted full 
rights by the chief, and would become Nauruans. 
Land was the essence of their identity. 23 
Loss of land through mining thus 
threatened the Nauman identity. Not only were the 
rocks representing their ancestors, and events in 
their past heritage annihilated by the processes of 
mining, but they were told by the British Phosphate 
Commissioners that that was not their land in the 
first place; rather it was said to belong to those 
who established mining rights over it. Not content 
with obliterating the very essence of their being, 
that carried strong symbolic notions that outsiders 
could not possibly appreciate, those same intruders 
were reluctant to grant Nauruans autonomy in their 
own island. 
Demographic problems that threatened 
Nauruans' existence in the past have largely been 
overcome as noted above. But in the post 
independence era population growth poses itS own 
problems. These have played a strong part in the 
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argument for the need to rehabilitate topside land. 
With a growing population of Nauruans alone, as 
well as the 2000 contract workers, pressure is 
already being felt on the small rim of the island. 
Nauruans need that interior rehabilitated so that 
structures that require large acreages such as the 
airport and the secondary school can be relocated. 
These would free up land for housing and other 
infrastructure facilities. 
Nauruans are not migrating away from 
their island permanently. Unlike other Pacific 
islands post independence, Nauru has lost only a 
very small proportion of its population to countries 
such as Australia, the United States and New 
Zealand. Those who do move away for 
employment maintain their ties with Nauru, and 
endeavour to have their children registered as 
Nauman even if they are born overseas. Marriage 
between Nauruans and non-Nauruans has also not 
increased. Nor has Nauru sought to limit its 
population growth, like Kiribati and the Republic of 
the Marshalls. Its positive population policy is thus 
a marked divergence from the policies of its 
neighbours. For this small central Pacific Island 
nation the aim is to strengthen the core of people 
calling themselves Nauruans. With almost 7000 
representatives of their island nation today, they are 
in a stronger position than they were in 1968. 
That very smallness, together with their 
isolation, has served to reinforce the unique identity 
of which Nauruans are very aware. A small group 
of people with very close bonds of kinship and 
neighbourliness to one another has a cohesion that 
is lacking in many very large populations, notably 
those of cities. Add to that smallness the Pacific 
values of generosity and sharing, particularly 
amongst relatives through a range of sibling ties, 
and we can see that there are strong cohesive 
factors that hold Nauruans together, and serve to 
reinforce their mutual identity. 
The adversities that Nauru suffered during 
the colonial period also strengthen its identity in 
post-colonial times. The shared memories of the 
older generation of the dreadful sufferings they 
endured during World War II when their population 
was divided and neither sector had food or the 
basics of life, endure. Those who survived those 
dreadful times when they cradled their relatives as 
they died in such hostile circumstances are not 
bitter; but those shared experiences provide strong 
bonds to the other survivors, and their descendants. 
They fought to live to be free. Now they are free 
they want to hold on to what they had struggled for 
in the past, so that a new generation of Nauruans 
can live a better life. 
POLLOCK - Nauru's Post-Independence Struggles 
International Relations 
Nauruans are concerned not only with their own 
internal well being , but also with the well-being of 
the Pacific societies of which they see themselves 
a part. Hammer deRoburt asserted this position 
most forcibly by becoming the Pro-Chancellor of 
the University of the South Pacific, and taking a 
leadership role in both the South Pacific 
Conference and the South Pacific Forum. Nauru 
established Air Nauru to serve the other nations of 
the Pacific as well as its own needs. It faced 
opposition from the major airlines, but supported 
the Air Pacific consortium during the big fight for 
what deRoburt called 'the South Pacific lake' . In 
his own words, 'I am moved to comment that at 
least so far as civil aviation is concerned, once the 
Trust relationship ended, goodwill from the airlines 
of our former Trust powers was apparently at an 
end. Why indeed should this be so? Gentlemen in 
a word it is jungle tactics of international 
aviation• .2A Air Nauru's problems continued long 
after 1980 but it is still in existence. Nauru, after 
deRoburt, has continued to assert its role in Pacific 
affairs. It has been an active and vocal participant 
in South Pacific Forum meetings. In August 1993 
it played its part in hosting the annual meeting, a 
role that is becoming increasingly costly. 
Those neighbourly ties are being 
formaliz.ed. Nauru under the leadership of 
Dowiyogo, and the Republic of the Marshalls under 
Amata Kabua have joined with Kiribati and Tuvalu 
to establish a bloc of small island states. This bloc 
is a formaliz.ed response to the Melanesian bloc 
which made a forceful stand on the two coups in 
Fiji in 1987. The similar ecology and location in 
the face of droughts and other Pacific hazards 
provide a basis for cooperation. This grouping of 
small atoll and low island states, representing some 
160,000 people is more powerful than any one of 
the individual islands on its own. It is likely to be 
a significant lobby group at the Forum and other 
pan-Pacific associations, as well as in negotiations 
with former colonial powers. 
Nauru's phosphate has put her into the 
international trade market. There she faces the 
competition of alternative fertili:zers, and the price 
wars as other nations fight to save their economies. 
Economic recession has hit Nauru as it has hit the 
rest of the world. But Nauru has less resilience. 
It has a finite resource in phosphates, and must 
invest today if the future population is to have 
anything to live on. If the books are ever opened 
to allow Nauruans to see exactly how much has 
been invested, they will understand just how 
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vulnerable they are in the world of international 
investments. That situation would open the way 
for even more consultants and advisers telling them 
how to spend or save that money. No nation is an 
island; each is involved in the international scene. 
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LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Tonga at Independence and Now 
Sione Lii.tukefu 
Tonga was unique during the colonial period in 
being the only country in the whole of the Pacific 
that escaped being formally colonised. Tonga 
evaded colonisation through a particular set of 
factors which included her small size and meagre 
resources1 , isolation from main trade routes, lack 
of strategic importance, Britain's policy of 
minimum intervention and the ascendancy of 
Tonga's remarkable ruler, King George Tupou I. 
Tonga's full independence was however slightly 
modified when Britain imposed on her a treaty of 
friendship and protection in 1900 (with a 
supplement in 1905). During the intervening years 
until full independence was regained in 1970, 
Tonga was allowed to manage its own internal 
affairs subject to the provisions of the treaty. The 
origins of what happened between 1970 and the 
present can therefore be traced directly to the 
foundations laid by King George Tupou I during 
the nineteenth century. Consequently, discussion 
of Tonga at independence and now will be 
unavoidably different to other Pacific countries 
which were former colonies. In the past twenty­
five years, Tonga has undergone major changes, 
both politically and socially. The process of 
modernization helped to create a new educated 
middle class, which has become vocal and openly 
questioning of the existing system, particularly 
through the recent 'Pro-Democracy Movement' . 
The British colonial policy of minimum 
intervention2 however, appears to have been a 
major factor in preserving Tonga's autonomy. The 
British government favoured and encouraged 
indigenous governments, supported and guided by 
missionaries and responsible settlers as long as no 
other world power exerted undue influence over 
these governments. The internal political events in 
Tonga in the 19th century enabled Britain to 
maintain this policy of minimum intervention. 
This was due to the rise to power and the eventual 
unification of Tonga in the 19th century under, 
King George Tupou I, who was unequalled as a 
warrior-statesman either in Tonga or elsewhere in 
the Pacific. 3 
King George was able to foresee the 
inevitability of the tidal wave of European impact, 
and he opted to ride the wave rather than go 
against it. He clearly perceived that the Tongan 
traditional cosmology was inadequate to explain the 
power, technology and wealth of European 
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intruders, and when the Methodist missionaries 
came, he quickly accepted their teachings and their 
world view, championing their cause. Most 
Tongans came to accept christianity and its moral 
values, represented by Methodism current at the 
time, in place of the traditional belief system. 
During his reign formal education was promoted, 
the country was unified under a central 
government, and the rule of law introduced, 
culminating in the promulgation of a written 
constitution in 1875 which validated the monarchy. 
Tonga thus gained the respect of the colonial 
powers operating in the Pacific, and treaties were 
successfully negotiated and signed with France, 
Germany, Britain and USA. These gave official 
recognition to King George's  rule, thereby ensuring 
the security of Tonga's independent sovereignty. 4 
Upon his death in 1 893, aged 96, King 
George Tupou I's great-grandson, crown Prince 
Tiufa'ihau, succeed  him as King George Tupou 
II. Unfortunately, the young King was ill prepared 
for the weighty responsibilities of the tasks before 
him. 5 Revelling in the privileges and glamour of 
his high office, he shirked its important 
responsibilities. His irresponsible and extravagant 
life-style led to near bankruptcy of the government 
forcing its premier, Siteki, to borrow heavily from 
the German trading firm, the Deutsche Handels-und 
Plantagen-Gesellschaft (D.H. & P.G.) during the 
late 1890s, thereby allowing the company to 
exercise undue influence over the government. 
This situation disturbed the British who wanted no 
potentially hostile power to exert stronger influence 
on Tonga than hers. Britain therefore sought a new 
treaty with Tonga which would safeguard her own 
interests. The opportunity arose after the 
settlement of disputes over Samoa between Britain, 
Germany and USA in 1899 in which Germany and 
the USA gave up their treaty rights to Tonga in 
favour of the British. In the following year, 1900, 
Britain negotiated and partly forced a treaty of 
friendship upon the reluctant King and his 
government, establishing a British protectorate over 
Tonga, and giving Britain complete control of its 
external relations. 6 It also gave the British 
Resident and Consul the right to advise on internal 
matters and Britain gained partial extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. 
The country's corrupt financial situation' 
continued however, prompting strong opposition 
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from the settler community and some educated 
Tongan chiefs. The then British Agent and Consul 
reported that the Tongan Government was 'corrupt 
from top to bottom' , 8 his advice on internal matters 
was never sought and his counsel ignored. In 
1904, the High Commissioner, Sir Everard im 
Thurn sailed to Tonga with strict instructions from 
the Colonial Office to purge the Tongan 
Government, and if the King resisted, to have him 
deported and the country annexed. Upon his 
arrival, im Thurn called a meeting of the Privy 
Council and informed the King and his ministers 
that the King of England had sent him to tell them 
'to turn away from their bad practices' .  9 In 
auditing the books his officers found a deficit of 
2,000 pounds and when Sateki refused to explain 
this, he and his son, Fotu, the Treasurer, were 
arrested and deported to Fiji. The investigations 
continued and the Government was found to have 
a deficit of 5,000 pounds. After offering them a 
British loan to cover the debt, he informed the 
King that he must appoint a new government, 
under the premiership of Sione Mateialona, a 
grandson of Tupou I. Early in 1905, the King was 
presented with a supplement to the 1900 treaty in 
which he was required to rule with and through the 
chiefs; to seek and take advice from the British 
Agent and Consul who was to be consulted on 
major government appointments and changes to 
existing ones and particularly on financial matters. 
The King tried to defer making a final decision, but 
the High Commissioner insisted that he must either 
sign or be deported. Reluctantly the King signed 
the document on 18  January 1905. 10 
This historic event had significant effects 
on Tonga's relations with Britain. It meant that the 
Treaty of 1900 and its 1905 Supplement had now 
overshadowed Tonga's laws and Constitution. 1 1 It 
continued to be the case for the remaining 13 years 
of Tupou Il's reign, and also throughout the long 
reign of his successor, Queen Salote Tupou ill who 
reigned till 1965. During her 47 year reign there 
were revisions to the 1900 Treaty and its 1905 
Supplement in 1958, 1965 and after her death, 
quite substantially in 1968, paving the way for the 
restoration of full independence to Tonga on 4 June 
1970. 12 
What has subsequently happened in Tonga 
since 1970 has been a culmination of the vision of 
Tupou I and his advisors in the second half of the 
19th century. The socio-economic, political and 
religious reforms that Tupou I had implemented 
were amazingly radical for their time and enabled 
Tonga to take advantage of development without 
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losing its cultural integrity. The following reforms 
were among the most significant: 
1 Limiting the powers of the chiefs and 
commoner emancipation 
In Tonga the traditional powers of a 
chief over his people had been absolute and 
arbitrary. King George decided soon after his 
conversion to Christianity to work towards limiting 
the powers of the chiefs and emancipating the 
commoners from their bondage. Using legislation 
to limit their powers, he undermined their 
traditional authority. 13 At the same time he tried to 
raise the status of the commoners, enabling them to 
gain education, own land and aspire to positions of 
influence in religion and politics that had previously 
been restricted to the chiefly classes. The gradual 
diminution of chiefly powers began as early as 
1839 in the first Code of Laws14 which prevented 
chiefs from forcibly taking commoners property 
and their powers were more explicitly stated in the 
1850 code and the 1862 Emancipation Edict which 
ended serfdom. These reforms were further 
developed and enshrined in the 1875 Constitution. 
2 Replacing the Traditional value­
system with Christianity 
The rapid and effective Christianiz.ation of Tonga 
by the Wesleyan Methodist missionaries within 
three decades of the re-establishment of the mission 
in 1826 brought about a transformation of 
traditional Tongan religion and society. They 
achieved religious conversion, introduced literacy, 
improved health and the quality of life. The 
replacement of traditional values that had supported 
the old order brought about radical change. 
Traditionally the commoners had no place in 
religion and lacking souls were believed to become 
vermin after death, unlike chiefs who had souls and 
went to paradise. Christianity treated commoners 
and chiefs as equals in the sight of God and offered 
everyone salvation. In this way Christian teachings 
became an important social leveller. 15 
3 Promoting Formal Universal Education and 
Health Services 
The missionaries used education as an essential 
means of converting the Tongans, and the King 
fully supported this aspect of their work, believing 
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that it was the key to the knowledge, power and 
wealth Europeans had, which Tongans too could 
acquire. Accordingly, primary education was made 
compulsory in the late 1 850s. He personally 
requested that an outstanding educationist, Rev J.E. 
Moulton (later Dr J.E. Moulton) should be sent to 
Tonga to establish Tupou College where, with the 
King's approval, chiefs and commoners were 
treated alike. For a long time this was the training 
institution for both state and church appointees. 16 
Health care too was an important arm of the 
Methodist missionaries' efforts to gain converts. 
The devastating effects of newly introduced 
diseases that came with European impact made it 
the more urgent to administer medicine in an 
endeavour to arrest rapid depopulation. Later, 
King George bequeathed the revenue from the lease 
of crown lands to provide his people with free 
education and health services. 17 
4 Democratising Political Decision Making 
Influenced by his adopted 
christian values King George decided to provide for 
commoner representation in the Parliament, equal 
in number to the nobles, in the 1875 constitution. 
It was the first time that commoners were allowed 
to share in political decision malcing - an important 
and radical step towards the democratisation of the 
Tongan system of government. 18 Educated 
commoners were elected to parliament and 
appointed to the public service and church 
positions. The whole country has now accepted 
and accommodated a new, educated, commoner 
dominated elite (ha 'a poto). 19 
S Modernising the Economy 
King George wholeheartedly 
accepted the Protestant work ethic which the 
Methodist missionaries had tried to instil. He 
urged his people to work hard, cultivate the land 
and plant their crops for their own use and for the 
maintenance of their obligations (fatongia) to their 
chiefs, their church and the government. To 
facilitate this he legislated to forbid alienation of 
land and to reform land tenure allowing commoners 
to enjoy individual land ownership for the first 
time. 211 For it's time, the kind of socio-economic, 
political and religious structures King George I and 
his foreign advisors and local supporters managed 
to establish, imperfect though they may have been, 
were indeed quite remarkable. 
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During the reign of his succesor King George 
Tupou II, much time and energy was spent 
confronting opponents, which inevitably brought 
political instability and social disunity. Initially, 
education, health services, the economy and land 
distribution provided for in the constitution, were 
imprudently neglected and allowed to deteriorate. 21 
Religious bigotry became rife, particularly between 
the Free Church of Tonga and the Wesleyans. 
Princess Silote succeeded her father upon his 
death in 1918.  She inevitably inherited many of 
the problems which had plagued her father's reign. 
During the first decade and a half of her eventful 
forty-seven years as queen, she devoted herself to 
trying to break down serious opposition to her 
reign and restore unity; repair the economy and 
usher in political stability and religious tolerance. 
By 1941,  these admirable objectives had generally 
been achieved. 
Her success seems to have been largely due to a 
combination of several important factors, namely: 
her innate intelligence and remarkable gifts of 
oratory; her strong, yet warm and attractive 
personality which won the hearts of both her 
subjects and outsiders and her image as a 
religiously devout, motherly and caring ruler. 22 
Besides these personal attributes was the 
unwavering and vigorous support of her high 
ranking consort, Prince Viliami Tupoulahi Tungi 
Mailefihi, 23 her able and unassuming Chaplain, 
Rev. Rodger Page, 24 a number of powerful chiefs 
and educated commoners and a succession of 
British officials who, unlike some of their rather 
hostile and paternalistic predecessors, were much 
more supportive and sympathetic and became 
trusted friends.25 Time was also on the Queen's 
side. Many of her powerful and determined early 
opponents being elderly, were gradually replaced 
by a new generation of younger leaders, chiefs and 
commoners, who came to appreciate, admire and 
respect the Queen's leadership and who enjoyed 
the warmth of her maturing personality as she grew 
in wisdom and stature. 
The first task was to restore unity. Many 
opposing chiefs believed that as a young woman, 
she would remain a figurehead and that Tungi 
would be the actual ruler. Tungi was a staunch 
Wesleyan and consequently was unpopular with the 
majority of his peers, despite his high chiefly rank. 
Many noble members of the legislature were Free 
Church of Tonga, and most of the people's 
representatives at the time were actually drawn 
from chiefly families who had failed to be selected 
as nobles by either Tupou I or his successor, and 
consequently felt resentful of the monarch. 26 As 
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well, there was opposition from some foreign 
public servants, particularly lawyers who 
disapproved of some of the reforms promoted by 
Silote and Tungi, and tried to create difficulties. n 
Because of the 1905 Amendment to the 1900 
Treaty with Britain, Siilote was unable to dismiss 
expatriate opponents, and consequently she longed 
for a time when Tongans would be sufficiently 
educated and professionally trained to ease the 
government's heavy reliance on foreign experts. 
Meanwhile, using her constitutional 
prerogative to appoint ministers to the Cabinet and 
the Privy Council, Siilote appointed able Tongans 
and foreigners, with the express purpose of lifting 
the performance of the executive. Her opponents, 
however, viewed this as a blatant political 
manoevre and hardened their opposition, 
particularly in the parliament where they at first 
had the numbers. 28 Siilote however managed to 
gradually and effectively ignore parliament and 
skilfully turned it into a willing tool of her 
administration, as younger supporters gradually 
replaced former opponents. 29 
One of the most serious causes of disunity 
had been the split between the numerically 
stronger, but unwieldy and disorganised Free 
Church of Tonga and its source, the better 
managed Wesleyan Mission. In the early 1920s 
Siilote decided to unite the two factions of the 
Wesleyan faith. This led to bitter conflicts and 
litigation in 1924 but in the end the Queen won, 
and a much stronger re-united Church emerged, as 
the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga. However, it 
was not the complete victory that had been hoped 
for, since the ageing president of the Free Church 
of Tonga, the Rev. J.B. Watkin, a few ministers 
and over three thousand followers refused to join 
the re-united Church. 30 Despite this, the Queen 
had gained in prestige and won the respect and 
affection of the great majority of her people. 
The economy also received attention from 
Siilote and Tungi, who as a keen and able farmer 
led through example. The plantation on his estate 
of Kauvai was a model for others to follow, though 
on a smaller scale. He and Siilote encouraged the 
nobles to follow Tungi's lead, and the commoners 
were urged to register their allotments and to plant 
crops for both domestic consumption and export. 31 
Believing as King George Tupou I had 
done, 32 that education provided the knowledge 
necessary for nation building, a new Education Act 
was passed in 1927 aimed at improving the quality 
of education and providing scholarships for able 
students to study overseas, at secondary schools in 
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Australia, New Zealand and at the Fiji Medical 
School. Since the Government College was to be 
given a more technical and agricultural orientation, 
Siilote and Tungi decided to improve the standard 
of education at Tupou College and Queen Siilote 
College. 33 Their efforts were readily facilitated by 
the presence of highly qualified and dedicated 
missionaries such as Dr E.E. V. Collocott and Dr 
A.H. Wood. The Queen sent her own sons to 
Tupou College and encouraged the enrolment of 
sons of some of the nobles, even giving assistance 
with fees, in the hope that these young men would 
eventually become better educated leaders, as well 
as loyal supporters. A select few were chosen for 
overseas scholarships and sent to Newington 
College, Sydney, which was where Tungi himself, 
and some others had been sent at the tum of the 
century. Among the new group of students to 
Newington were Crown Prince Tupouto'a (later 
Tungi, and now King Tiufa'iihau IV), and his 
younger brother Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake. 
Others were educated in New Zealand, such as the 
present Prime Minister, Noble Vaea and Noble 
Tuita (who is now a retired Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Lands). Prince Tu'ipelehake later 
studied agriculture in Queensland while the Crown 
Prince gained an Arts/Law degree from Sydney 
University in 1942, becoming the first Tongan with 
a university degree. The decision for the Crown 
Prince (and future King of Tonga) to study for a 
degree in Arts/Law was a direct result of the 
frustration that Siilote and Tungi had to endure at 
the hands of arrogant expatriate lawyers. 34 Silote's 
aspiration to ease the burden of relying heavily on 
overseas experts was now beginning to bear fruit, 
as the overseas scholarship holders gradually 
returned to become prominent in the government 
and the public service. Others were to follow a 
few years later, such as Dr Sione Tapa, who 
became the first university educated medical doctor 
(later the first Tongan Minister for Health) and 
Mahe 'Uli'uli Tupouniua, the first Tongan to 
qualify in commerce (later to become the first 
Tongan Minister for Finance). 
Siilote and Tungi also directed their attention to 
improving the health situation in the country. Soon 
after the 1918-19 influenza epidemic in which about 
eight per cent of the population died, a Department 
of Health was established35 to help, among other 
things, promote personal hygiene and sanitation in 
the villages, and medical orderlies and nurses were 
trained locally. Siilote gave her unqualified support 
to the Rockefeller Foundation's campaign against 
hookworm in 1924 and its efforts to build a 
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medical school for the Western Pacific in Suva in 
1929.36 Selected scholarship students were sent to 
study medicine in Suva where they qualified as 
Tongan Medical Practitioners. These together with 
qualified nurses, and other health workers, helped 
to improve the health services markedly. 
Queen Salote in later years turned her 
attention to formulating a clear development policy 
for her government - a policy in which the 
importance of Tongan customs and traditions was 
to be recognised and modified where necessary to 
meet the needs of modernisation in a way which 
would be most beneficial to the people. In 1950 a 
Traditions Committee was established to carry out 
research on Tongan culture, which was chaired by 
the Queen until her death. An anthropologist, Dr 
Eli:zabeth (Bott) Spillius, worked with the 
Committee and the linguist, Dr C.M. Churchward, 
produced a dictionary and grammar of the Tongan 
language. Queen Slilote wanted to ensure that the 
best of Tonga's customs and traditions were not 
destroyed through modernisation. 37 
Another of her deep concerns was the 
status of women in Tonga, and she was determined 
to improve their welfare and position in the society. 
She wanted to eradicate legal discrimination against 
women and fostered legislation to give women the 
right to inherit land. An Act to that effect was 
passed in 1922 and in 1951 the constitution was 
amended to give women the right to vote, which 
they did for the first time seven years later. 38 In 
1953 , the Queen established the Langa Fonua 'a e 
Fe.fine Tonga (Tongan Women's National 
Development Association), which aimed to promote 
traditional handicrafts, to ensure that these skills 
would not be lost. Classes were organised in the 
villages at which women with expertise taught 
others to sew, embroider and to cook nutritious 
meals. The Association fostered the general 
improvement of hygiene and nutrition in villages, .  
The handicrafts produced by the women were not 
only used in their homes but also presented at 
ceremonies and in traditional exchanges as well as 
sold in the markets, earning much needed cash for 
the villagers who were mainly subsistence 
farmers.39 
After the death ofTungi Mailefihi in 1941,  
the Princes returned from their studies in Australia 
in the following year, and took over the vitally 
important supporting role their father had played so 
effectively. The Crown Prince, Tupouto'a Tungi, 
was made Minister for Education in 1943; 
Minister for Health from 1944 to 1949 and Prime 
Minister from 1949 till 1965 when he succeeded his 
mother to the throne, as King Tliufa'ahau Tupou 
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IV. His brother, Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake 
became Minister for Lands and Agriculture and 
was made Prime Minister in 1965, until his 
retirement in 1991 .  Many of the major changes in 
education, health services, economic development 
and politics during the latter half of Queen Salote's 
reign were initiated by Prince Tungi between 1943 
and 1965.40 
From 1942 until her death in 1965, Queen Salote 
managed to build up an aura of reverence. With 
adroit manipulation of Tongan custom and 
tradition, combined with a warm charismatic 
personality, a deep sense of religious devotion, her 
inspired and undisputed leadership made most 
people of her generation and practically all younger 
ones, regard her as being sacrosanct. They gave 
her unquestioning loyalty, love and respect, and 
such was her stature, that any thought of criticism 
or refusal of anything she requested or demanded 
would have amounted to sacrilege. Her sons 
growing up within this atmosphere were both 
deeply affected in their thinking, actions, and 
attitudes to people. 
Crown Prince Tupouto'a Tungi, from the 
moment he took over office in 1943 determined to 
modernise Tonga. 41 He had opportunities to pursue 
this objective in the various ministerial positions he 
held in Education, Health and later as Prime 
Minister, giving special attention to upgrading the 
education system, health services and Tonga's 
economy, a continuation of what was started by 
Salote and Tungi. As Minister for Education, his 
policy was 'Education for Development' .  A 
Teachers' Training College was established in 
1944, modernising education in Tonga, aiming at 
improving standards of teaching in primary schools. 
Three years later in 1947, Tonga High School was 
established, in an effort to upgrade post-primary 
education and to enable the selection of the most 
able students for study overseas on scholarships. 42 
Special emphasis was placed on teaching English as 
a second language and vocational training. 
Promising students were picked from both 
government and church primary schools for 
placement, and those who excelled were selected 
for further study overseas, assisted by scholarships 
from Tongan and overseas governments to 
undertake academic, professional courses and 
technical training. From these beginnings in the 
late 1940s Tonga slowly built up its own skilled 
manpower, trained and educated to undertake the 
task of modernisation. The enthusiastic response to 
education by Tongans is shown by the fact that it 
now has the highest proportion of PhDs per head of 
population anywhere in the world. 43 
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After Tungi also became Minister for 
Health in 1944, he set about reforming Tonga's 
health services which were in need of significant 
reform and were described in 1945 as poor. 
Dietary deficiencies, hookworm, yaws as well as 
tuberculosis, typhoid and filaria were of serious 
concern. 44 For the whole population of about 
42,000 at the time, there was one European doctor, 
fifteen Tongan medical practitioners trained in Fiji 
and ten locally trained nurses and a few medical 
orderlies. The number of hospitals and clinics was 
quite inadequate and people living in the more 
remote areas had extreme difficulty in reaching 
medical services. To overcome many of these 
health problems, a New Zealand nursing specialist 
was hired to establish a mobile ante-natal and child 
welfare clinic, assisted by locally trained nurses, 
and mobile services made regular visits to health 
centres on the main island of Tongatapu. 45 
Working together with the Langa Fonua 
committees in the villages, hygiene, nutrition and 
clean water supplies improved the health situation 
throughout the country. 
Recognising the dangers of an economy 
totally reliant on a small number of agricultural 
export products and dominated by multi-national 
trading companies, Prince Tungi set about 
modernising and diversifying the economy, 
providing alternatives which would ensure 
significant local participation. He determined to 
change the economy from being basically 
subsistence with a few cash crops such as copra 
and bananas, into a predominantly market economy 
with a complimentary subsistence sector. A series 
of development plans were drawn up, the first 
being a Five Year Plan begun in 1965, which was 
followed in 1970 by a further four Five Year 
Plans. 46 The intention of these Plans was to 
promote commercial agriculture and fishing; 
marketing handicrafts; small industries; banking; 
co-operative societies; tourism; technical 
education; and communications, including shipping 
air-travel, telecommunications, newspaper, and 
broadcasting. Some encouragement was given to 
emigration in search of education, work or 
permanent residence overseas. 
As Crown Prince, and later His Majesty 
King Tiufa'ahau Tupou IV, Tungi was in a much 
stronger position than his predecessors to carry out 
reforms because he was of the highest ranking 
birth, derived from the combination in his person 
of the three Royal dynasties, as well as being the 
most highly educated person in Tonga. Silote and 
Tungi had helped tremendously to smooth the way 
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and create the right atmosphere for him. From 
1943 and for the next twenty-two years when he 
held the key portfolios in government, no one in 
Tonga was in a position to criticise him, or place 
any obstacle in his path. The people and the 
parliament were prepared to support whatever he 
wanted to do to facilitate his modernisation 
programme. 47 Led by his younger brother, Prince 
Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, the other ministers and 
parliamentarians gave their unqualified support. In 
general, there was high expectation and complete 
trust that the young Tiufa'ihau would equal if not 
surpass his illustrious namesake, the first 
Tiufa'ahau, King George Tupou I. 
In an article published in 1967 however, the 
present writer provided a critical analysis of some 
of Crown Prince Tungi's activities. 
Being the highest ranking and best informed 
Tongan, he felt little inclination to listen to or 
to seek advice from any quarter and differed 
markedly in this respect from his mother. 
During his term of office as Premier 
democratic institutions- Parliaments and 
Cabinet in particular- had become mere rubber 
stamps for his own policies. Perhaps the 
unfortunate failure of some of his schemes 
could have been avoided and money which 
Tonga could ill afford to waste have been 
saved, had he been prepared to seek expert 
advice on these matters. Nor did he consider 
it necessary to find out the feelings and 
aspirations of the people, being convinced that 
what he did was in their best interests and 
those of the country, and feeling equally 
confident of their loyalty, devotion and love. 
He had every reason to feel confident, for 
Tongans are proud of his scholastic and other 
achievements. . . .  He commanded the respect of 
the Tongan people, and he was revered by 
them; but he remained somewhat aloof from 
them both socially and intellectually.48 
Although the reforms and projects initiated by 
Prince Tungi were not all successful, his 
modernising efforts had wider ramifications. The 
Churches, for example, enthusiastically accepted 
places offered to them by the Government in its 
newly established Teachers' Training College, and 
made conscious efforts to improve standards in 
their denominational schools. Following the 
establishment of the Tonga High School and the 
expansion of government scholarships for overseas 
study, some churches established their own high 
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schools and began sending a few of their top 
students to overseas schools including universities. 49 
One church established an agricultural training 
college while others engaged in various agricultural 
and business ventures. Families and groups of 
individuals took up the challenge of development 
and began sending their sons and daughters 
overseas for education and training. 50 Others 
launched business ventures ranging from 
commercial farming to small industries and retail 
and wholesale businesses including small village 
trade stores; others took up communication 
services - local transport including buses, taxis and 
inter-island shipping as well as establishing 
independent newspapers and periodicals. Tourist 
related activities were also promoted by private and 
semi-official organisations and enterprising 
entrepreneurs. Many of these business ventures 
failed, but over time the more efficiently managed 
have survived. . Others sought opportunities for 
temporary work overseas or to emigrate, both 
legally and illegally, in search of permanent 
residency mainly in New Zealand, Australia and 
the United States of America. As they established 
themselves and found regular employment, they 
sent remittances to their families at home helping 
significantly to boost the local economy. 51 
By 1970 when full independence was 
restored, many positive signs of development were 
apparent from the policies initiated earlier by King 
Taufa'ihau Tupou IV, and there was greater 
material prosperity and growing aspirations among 
the wider population to share these benefits. At the 
same time, problems had followed the process of 
modernisation. The improvement in health had 
been followed by a sharp decline in infant 
mortality, lengthening of the adult life span and an 
inevitable population explosion. In the sixteen 
years between 1950 and 1966 the population grew 
from 43 ,388 to 76, 121, with a growth rate of more 
than three per cent per annum. 52 As early as the 
1950s, Prince Tungi had foreseen the possibility of 
overpopulation and its consequences for a small 
country like Tonga with its limited land-mass and 
resources. A family planning scheme had been 
established to try to check the trend, but it was not 
quite successful. From the 1970s on the increasing 
emigration of Tongans was a far more effective 
means of checking population growth. It is 
estimated that there are now between 60,000 and 
70,000 Tongans living overseas, while the total 
population of Tonga remains between 95,000 and 
100,000. 
Ironically, it was the very success of the 
present King's modernization efforts, which has 
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promoted the emergence of a relatively strong 
middle class of educated men and women, now 
liberated from fear and ignorance, more 
independent economically, who have a wider and 
clearer perspective of Tonga, its people and 
culture. They have become outspokenly critical of 
the Royal family, nobility, politicians, senior 
bureaucrats and churches. 53 The existence of radio 
broadcasting and independent newspapers has 
facilitated their activities. 
The recent development of a Pro­
DemocracyMovement in Tonga is a clear 
manifestation of this trend. In the late sixties and 
seventies, well educated and highly qualified church 
leaders such as Dr. Sione Amanaki Havea and the 
Revd. Siupeli Taliai of the Free Wesleyan Church 
of Tonga, and the late Bishop Patelesio Finau of 
the Roman Catholic Church, as well as Futa Helu, 
an educater and independent thinker, began to be 
openly and publicly critical of the Tongan 
monarchical system, and its corrupt and 
undemocratic nature. 
Others followed, including well educated and 
more independent minded, Parliamentary Peoples 
Representatives, particularly Akilisi Pohiva, a 
great-grandson of Finau Filimoe'ulie, a half brother 
of Tupou I on his father's side, and descended 
from the famous Tongan missionary in Fiji , Jioeli 
Bulu on his mother's side. After gaining an Arts 
Degree from U.S.P. , Pohiva returned to Tonga to 
lecture at Tonga Teachers College. He also took 
over a current affairs radio program, in which he 
was critical of the monarchical system, educational 
and economic system and exposed corruption in 
high places. It became popular, but was abruptly 
terminated in 1985 when Pohiva was transferred to 
another public service position and eventually 
dismiseed without notice or explanation. Unable to 
continue broadcasting, he and others produced a bi­
monthly political newsheet, Kele 'a, in 1986, which 
exposed unjust actions by government and corrupt 
practices. It told of parliamentarians collecting 
allowances for trips they never made, as well as 
detailing allowances and salaries the elite paid 
themselves. 54 Parliamentarians agreed to give 
themselves a full day's pay for every hour of 
overtime. It also exposed high levels of 
corruption, such as false claims for expenditure and 
allowances by some Ministers' of the Crown, most 
of whom were nobles. Kele 'a became so popular, 
that its circulation jumped from 1000, to 10,000 in 
three months. 55 
Another development which prompted strong 
reaction from the people was when Mahe'uli'uli 
Tupouniua, one of the most highly qualified and 
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respected Ministers for Finance in the Pacific 
region, was forced to resign his position in 
February 1986 for not immediately approving a 
request from the Palace Office to increase its travel 
funds. He was replaced by a younger economics 
graduate, Cecil Cocker, who immediately brought 
in a retail sales tax of 5 % , while reducing personal 
income tax to a flat rate of 10% ,  as well as 
reducing company tax substantially. This radical 
tax reform was immediately attacked by the Kele 'a, 
pointing out that the poor were being made to pay 
more tax, while the rich paid less. A petition 
against this sales tax, was organized by Laki Niu, 
a young law graduate and strong supporter of the 
Kele 'a, and signed by 11 ,000 people. The 
parliamentary representatives decided that members 
should go out and explain the new tax to the 
people. Their efforts were regarded as overtime 
and the members received unbelievably generous 
allowances, ranging from T$1 ,  218  to T$10, 391 
for twelve days' meetings. 56 The people showed 
their anger at the next election, in 1987, when they 
elected six new members out of nine, including, 
Laki Niu and 'Akilisi Pohiva as the number two 
and number three People's Representatives for the 
Tongatapu electorate. One historian rightly points 
out that 'this was not only the most educated 
Parliament ever elected [six were university 
graduates, including four of the newly elected]; it 
was also the first one in which issues rather than 
kinship and local loyalties determined voters' 
choices' . 51 Led by Pohiva, Niu and Teisina Fuko 
(one of the re-elected Ha'apai People's 
Representatives) , some of the People's 
Representatives continued both within and outside 
Parliament, to attack the sales tax ,  
parliamentarians' renumerations among other 
issues, and attempted unsuccessfully to impeach the 
Minister for Finance during the 1987-1989 
parliament. 
These members also uncovered and 
attacked the sale of Tongan passports to foreigners. 
In an endeavour to raise further government 
revenue, the King and his Ministers, had secretly 
decided to sell Tongan passports to foreigners, 
particularly Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Had this occurred in the 1950s or 1960s no 
parliamentarian would have raised an eyebrow, 
viewing it with gratitude as an act of selfless 
benevolence of their illustrious Crown Prince for 
the benefit of his people. Instead, this new breed 
of highly educated parliamentarians questioned the 
secrecy, the constitutionality and the accountability 
of the executive on this matter. They also wanted 
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to know how much had been collected, and the 
whereabouts of the funds. The public exposure of 
these matters through radio, newspapers and kava 
parties, created keen interest in politics among the 
people, as well as causing anger among the 
supporters of the establishment. Having got 
nowhere in parliament, Pohiva organised and 
presented on the November 1988 an unsuccessful 
petition signed by about 7 ,OOO people to His 
Majesty, for action to be taken on matters raised. 
In September 1989, Fuko frustrated, walked out of 
parliament and the rest of the People's 
Representatives spontaneously joined him and 
boycotted parliament for two weeks. In spite of 
intensive campaigning by the Government and their 
supporters to persuade the Tongatapu electorate to 
drop Pohiva in the 1990 election, the people re­
elected him with a record majority as the number 
one member for Tongatapu, Niu 1;tgain as number 
two and a new member, Willy Fukofuka, an Arts 
graduate, ex-public servant and editor of the 
Kele 'a, as number three, dropping the 
conservative, number one sitting member. 
On March 1991 ,  Dr. Havea, Bishop Finau and 
some of the People's Representatives, led a march 
of 2, 500 people to the palace to present His 
Majesty, with a petition requesting the dismissal of 
the Minister for Police, Hon. 'Akau'ola, for the 
unconstitutional sale of Tongan passports to 
foreigners. It also called for the revoking of the 
amendments to the constitution, passed in an 
emergency session of Parliament on 18 February 
1991 ,  to make legal the sale of passports 
retrospectively. They were not allowed to see the 
King. Later the Government explained that the 
unconstitutional sale of the passports, was an honest 
mistake and the only sensible and honourable thing 
to do had been to correct the mistake by amending 
the constitution. 
Meanwhile, the three new members for 
Tongatapu, one from Ha'apai and one from 
Va'vau, supported by Dr. Havea, Bishop Finau, 
Futa Helu and other prominent men and women, 
initiated the formation of the Tongan Pro­
Democracy Movement in 1991 ,  and organised a 
successful Pro-Democracy convention in November 
1992, on the 'Tongan Constitution and Democracy' 
just three months before the next election in 
February 1993 . Once again, in spite of hitter 
campaigning by Government, nobles and their 
supporters against Pohiva, the voters re-elected him 
number one, and Niu who had by then fallen out 
with Pohiva, was dropped, and the number two 
went to Fukofuka, while the number three went to 
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a former Accountant-General and Secretary for 
Finance and strong supporter of the Pro­
DemocracyMovement, 'Uhila Leava'a. The 
Ha'apai electors dropped their conservative member 
and elected a Pro-Democracy Movement supporter, 
Uliti Uata, a very prominent businessman and one 
Pro-Democracy Movement member from Vava'u, 
Masao Pa'asi. The present parliament therefore, 
has six committed Pro-Democracy members, two 
independents (one from Vava'u and one from the 
Niuas) and one conservative from 'Eua,58 who 
passed away quite recently. 
In the aftermath of the elections, the 
Minister for Police, alleged that the Pro-Democracy 
members of parliament had done absolutely nothing 
for the people. In a way, this is quite correct, for 
they have not been able to give people any tangible 
development or infrastructure, simply because they 
had no control over the public purse or influence in 
the decision making process. What they have 
achieved, has been to check irresponsible and 
excessive expenditure by parliamentarians, 
bringing in a greater measure of honesty and 
accountability. 59 
At present the Pro-Democracy 
Movement's effectiveness appears to have been 
undermined by several factors: the untimely and 
sudden death of Bishop Finau in October 1993 , the 
retirement of Dr. Havea and the abscence overseas 
of Fr. 'Akua'ola, the foundation chairman of the 
Pro-Democracy Movement; the conviction of 
Pohiva on libel charges brought against him by the 
speaker of parliament and the Crown Prince and his 
confession that as an untrained journalist, he had 
failed to check his facts properly; the lack of unity 
among the six professed Pro-Democracy members 
of parliament, and the recent establishment of a 
political party by the three Peoples Representatives 
of Tongatapu and the two from Ha'apai and 
Vava'u, which seems to have split the Pro­
Democracy Movement. Meanwhile the government 
and their supporters are consolidating their stand 
against the changes advocated by the Pro­
DemocracyMovement. 
In conclusion, through the absence of 
formal colonisation and the uninterrupted 
continuation of self government, Tonga was able to 
maintain gradual development and improvements in 
education, health services and the economy which 
were initiated from within rather than imposed by 
an outside colonial administration. This was 
already apparent during Queen Siilote's reign when 
she and Tungi Mailefihi aimed at significant 
involvement and participation by Tongans in the 
development process. Gradually, well educated 
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and skilled Tongans have replaced expatriate public 
servants and foreign experts were given shorter 
contracts rather than permanency. 60 In addition, 
the fact that land had not been alienated in Tonga 
resulting in the absence of a large foreign settler 
community, meant that the Tongan people as a 
rule, never became plantation labourers for 
foreigners nor did they develop the attitudes to 
Europeans found in colonised parts of the Pacific 
before independence (the 'Yes Masta' syndrome 
which was so often replaced later by intense hatred 
and racism). To Tongans, Tau 'ataina 
(independence), has always been their birthright. 
Most have been unaware that Tonga's complete 
independence had been compromised by the British 
interests from the early 1900s until its full 
restoration in 1970. They viewed the connection 
with the British as that of a benevolent and friendly 
protector of Tonga from potential foreign invaders, 
such as the Germans and the Japanese, and their 
attitudes towards other foreigners, the British in 
particular, remain favourable. Perhaps such an 
anglophile attitude comes from the fact that the two 
systems of government in both countries are so 
similar. 
Tonga differs from other countries of the Pacific 
which were formally colonised, in not having the 
often over-hasty preparations for self-government 
and independence imposed by a colonial power, 
which have led in later years to conflicts and 
problems within the region.61 Ironically, Tonga's 
modernization process was responsible for certain 
inevitable problems such as the population 
explosion; brain drain through overseas migration; 
urban drift with its resulting squatter settlements, 
increasing poverty and criminal activities; 
corruption in high places; and open criticism and 
questioning of those in authority which have caused 
serious concern and irritation among the leaders. 
Although some attempts have been made to address 
these problems, the tendency had been to ignore 
and even ridicule many of the advocates of reform. 
The general dissatisfaction and concern for honesty, 
social justice and accountability from political 
leaders have been evident in recent elections where 
candidates of the Pro-Democracy Movement have 
been given considerable voter support. 
Their vote appears mainly to 
reflect their desire to force 
politicians to restore justice, 
accountability and honesty to 
government, rather than a 
desire to see radical changes 
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to the system. 62 
In spite of all this, Tonga continues to be 
the most peaceful country in the Pacific, its 
government the most stable, and its people, in 
general, enjoy a relatively comfortable standard of 
living. However, the continuation of stability, 
peace and prosperity of Tonga will depend on how 
the modernizing monarch, King Tiiufa'ihau Tupou 
IV, responds to the legitimate demands for 
necessary reforms. He alone, under the present 
outdated constitutional parliamentary structure, 
could successfully initiate any move to facilitate 
such changes. 
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Why is Micronesian 'Independence' an Issue? 
Glenn Petersen 
The governments of Micronesia's freely associated 
states and representatives of the United States 
government now maintain that these Micronesian 
states are independent. Others, however, have 
argued that Micronesian free association does not 
constitute what is generally conceived to be 
independence. The simple fact that both the U.S.  
and the Micronesians find it  necessary to assert 
Micronesian independence signals some implicit 
acknowledgment that resolution of the issue is not 
an entirely straightforward matter. In this essay I 
ask why Micronesian independence is problematic. 
I do not intend to provide a solution to it. Indeed, 
my answer to the question of whether Micronesia's 
freely associated republics are independent is 
equivocal: it depends. Two issues must be raised 
immediately. Why, after nearly three decades of 
negotiations, does the issue remain so 
problematical? And of what relevance is the 
uncertain character of Micronesian political status 
to the rest of the Pacific and the world? 
Throughout its near half-century of 
trusteeship, the U.S. was determined to make 
Micronesian independence a non-issue. Though the 
U.S. government was at the time unwilling to admit 
openly that it would never consider Micronesian 
independence as a possible outcome of the 
negotiations to end trusteeship - it was nevertheless 
the case that all parties to the negotiations were 
aware that the U.S. would never countenance the 
possibility of a genuinely independent Micronesia. 
Given the Micronesians' opposition to anything that 
would impede Micronesian self-government, a 
stalemate was in the offing. It was initially avoided 
through mutual agreement upon a vague political 
status, termed 'free association' ,  the details of 
which could be worked out later. 
Throughout this period, free association 
was portrayed as an alternative to independence. 
Today, however, the two statuses are spoken of as 
co-existing simultaneously; that is, the FSM, the 
Marshalls, and eventually (it is assumed) Palau are 
both freely associated and independent. The often 
confusing and complex political status of 
Micronesia's freely associated republics must be 
approached not merely through adversary readings 
of international law and treaties, but in the 
historical context of the political battles fought to 
achieve that status. 
Though the history of Micronesian political 
status has its singularities - the area was organi7.ed 
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as the United Nations' only 'Strategic Trust 
Territory' - the ambiguity characterising its political 
status during the period of transition from outright 
colony to sovereign state is perhaps not unique. 
The actual degree of autonomy exercized by the 
freely associated governments may not significantly 
differ from that of many other Pacific island nation 
states. Examination of the Micronesian case may 
help raise issues that can eventually clarify some of 
the unresolved arguments concerning the question 
of just what constitutes independence. 
The Current Argument Over Micronesia's 
Political Status 
In a recent article, Edward Michal, a United States 
State Department Pacific islands specialist, has 
attempted to develop a 'theory' explaining why the 
FSM and the Marshalls are independent. He 
maintains 'that the term free association no longer 
accurately describes the relationships of the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands with the United States' . 
Although he argues that free association is no 
longer an applicable category, he nevertheless 
maintains 'that the implementation of the compact 
of free association served to constitute these polities 
as "protected states" ,  that is, sovereign nations that 
have delegated part of their inherent powers to 
another nation' . Therefore, he concludes, the FSM 
and the Marshalls 'are not only sovereign but 
independent, despite the seeming limitations of the 
compact and its subsidiary agreements'.  1 
Michal addresses his arguments 
particularly toward claims put forward by Firth 
(1989), Smith (1991), Ghai (1985), James (1986), 
and McKibben (1990), among others, that the 
compacts' subsidiary mutual security agreements 
impinge upon the Micronesians' autonomy 
substantially enough to call their sovereignty into 
question. He concludes that none of these positions 
is valid. 2 I will not explore here the array of legal 
arguments he brings forward; reasonable students 
of the issues will continue to disagree over the 
relative importance and impact of these points. 
What I do wish to call attention to is what he calls 
'the most telling argument against the hypothesis 
that neither nation is sovereign, . . .  the willingness of 
other nations to enter into normal diplomatic 
relations with and establish embassies in both 
countries' (1993 :3 14). Michal's position is that the 
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questions of Micronesian sovereignty and 
independence are best adjudged in the context of 
their current relations with other nation-states, 
rather than in the historical context of their 
relations with the United States. In choosing this 
approach, however, he generates much of the 
confusion I am attempting to unravel in this essay. 
Indeed, I would argue that the underlying point of 
Michal's article is to help direct the continuing 
evolution of Micronesia's relations with other 
nation-states. 
The crux of the issue is Michal' s insistence 
that the Micronesian governments' entry into free 
association was 'voluntarily agreed to' and that they 
'voluntarily accepted certain restrictions on their 
sovereign powers. '3 He does so because the legal 
argument on which he bases his 'theory' that these 
are protected states asserts that such a state 'has 
voluntarily chosen to restrict the exercise of its 
sovereign rights in a certain area' . 4 The historical 
material Michal has marshalled, however, casts 
doubt about the voluntary character ofMicronesian 
free association into doubt. He cites, for instance, 
the opening lines of the so-called Hilo Accords, 
which defined the key principles upon which free 
association would eventually be founded: 'During 
the life of the agreement the political status of the 
peoples of Micronesia shall remain that of free 
association as distinguished from independence' .  5 
Moreover, the United States Congress, in the 
process of deliberating over approval of the 
compacts, was told by the President's negotiating 
staff that 'in the view of the United States, the 
Freely Associated States, while having sovereignty 
and full self-government, will not possess the 
attributes of independence called for in the 
eligibility criteria of the United Nations Charter'. 6 
This is the reality of the historical 
situation. The United States had no intention of 
ever granting Micronesian independence, the 
Micronesians were fully aware of this, and the 
compacts of free association were negotiated while 
the Micronesians were forced to choose between 
two options: annexation and free association. 
Given the restricted range of choice open to them, 
it cannot be claimed that the Micronesians' entry 
into free association was voluntary. I will not 
pursue the rest of Michal's arguments further here. 
Suffice it to say that his article serves to lend 
credence to my overall point: the question of 
independence can only be addressed within specific 
contexts, not as a free-floating theoretical issue. 
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The Puerto Rican Prologue 
To provide a relevant historical perspective on free 
association, I begin with Puerto Rico. The 
American approach to resolution of the 
Micronesian political status question was in some 
measure shaped by the history of its dealings in 
Puerto Rico, where the local pre-occupation with 
the political status question is an obsession. Puerto 
Rico is an archetypical colonial society with little 
or no underlying strata of precolonial, indigenous 
sociopolitical or cultural organi7.lltion. All the 
island's original inhabitants, known as the Taino, 
had either perished or fled within 50 years of the 
initial Spanish occupation, 500 years ago. For the 
past two hundred years or so, since the winds of 
independence first swept the New World, Puerto 
Ricans have been organizing themselves around 
political positions that have been framed in terms of 
the island's status vis-a-vis the metropolitan powers 
that have ruled it. In the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the island's leadership reached an agreement 
with the United States, ratified by the Puerto 
Ricans in 1952, instituting a form of local self­
govemment known in English as 'Commonwealth' 
and in Spanish as 'Estado Libre Associado' (ELA), 
which translates as 'Free Associated State. ' An 
American version of free association, then, 
predates that of the Cook Islands and Niue 
relationships with New Zealand, which are 
frequently cited as the models for the Micronesian 
pattern. In 1967 by a substantial margin and again 
in November 1993 by a narrow margin, the Puerto 
Rican electorate voted to preserve this form of free 
association rather than to pursue full integration as 
a state within the Union. 
The Puerto Ricans have not been 
especially interested in independence, believing it 
to be far too costly and fearing loss of the easy 
entry into the United States that American 
citizenship now provides, but independence 
advocates (who have drawn between three and five 
percent of the vote in recent elections and the 1993 
political status referendum) have influenced the 
character of debate on the island, forcing the 
commonwealth and statehood parties to make issues 
of Puerto Rican nationality and culture, as well as 
use of the Spanish language, central to all political 
discussions and plans. Puerto Rican apprehensions 
about statehood stem from two different sources. 
The first is the murky projections about what it 
would mean for local economy and cultural life, 
and concerns about continued American 
discrimination against what is an essentially 
Hispanic - and therefore alien - society. The 
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second is the assertions that the only honourable 
alternative to statehood is independence. The 
overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans want a 
permanent union with the United States; at issue is 
simply the degree of local autonomy. Since the 
1967 plebiscite, no Puerto Rican party has managed 
to achieve a simple majority in gubernatorial 
elections, and it seems to have been clear to the 
United States government that the dynamics of the 
Puerto Rican status question tum on the hotly 
contested question of just how close - rather than 
how distant - the island's relationship with the 
United States should be. 
When the United States began political 
status negotiations with the Micronesians, it drew 
upon its relations with Puerto Rico, and assumed 
that Micronesians, like Puerto Ricans, would desire 
a closer relationship with the U.S. This view was 
reinforced by the fact that the Trust Territory's 
headquarters were located in Saipan, where the 
Chamorro society of the Marianas islands had 
many creole aspects resembling Puerto Rican 
culture, and where, for a variety of historical 
reasons, the local people did indeed want a closer 
relationship with the United States. Indeed, they 
fought for and achieved a political status named, 
if not entirely patterned, after Puerto Rico's 
Commonwealth. Moreover, the United States had 
been determined from the very outset to hold onto 
them permanently. The Navy had been preparing 
to seize the islands ever since its plans to annex 
them were thwarted in 1898,7 and the United States 
military agreed to the trusteeship only with the 
understanding that its special strategic provisions 
guaranteed permanent control over, if not 
permanent union with, the area. 
When the Congress of Micronesia was 
established in 1965, one of its earliest steps was 
creation of a committee to negotiate future political 
status, and it was this committee that first initiated 
the process of bringing trusteeship to a close. 
While the United States government's negotiators 
came to the early talks with the 1967 Puerto Rican 
situation in mind, expecting to bring the Trust 
Territory into permanent union with the United 
States, the majority of Micronesians were 
determined to avoid annexation at all costs. Over 
the years, the negotiations' abundant travails and 
delays were rooted in the very different sets of 
assumptions the two sides brought with them. 
Much of the ill will and mutual accusations of bad 
faith can be understood as products of these 
misunderstandings (though .the greater part of the 
difficulty certainly had more to with the substance 
of those differences). 
Negotiating Distinct Status Alternatives 
To demonstrate that free association was negotiated 
as a distinct alternative to independence, and not as 
a modified version of it, I now consider relevant 
aspects of the political status negotiations between 
the Micronesians and the U.S. The history of these 
negotiations is adequately treated in McHenry 
(1975), Smith (1991), and Michal (1993); my 
intention here is not to recount this history but to 
focus on certain key elements of the evolving 
relationship between free association and 
independence options. Although the U.S. position 
at the beginning of the status talks with the 
Congress of Micronesia was influenced by its 
experiences with Puerto Rico, the Americans could 
hardly offer a copy of the Puerto Rican 
commonwealth agreement, which was specific to 
Puerto Rico's history and recent political dynamics. 
Instead, U.S. negotiators presented the Micronesian 
representatives with a copy of Guam's Organic 
Act. 8 The Micronesian Congress had, for a variety 
of reasons, no interest in this status. In a series of 
talks between 1967 and 1972, the two sides agreed 
only on two major points: Micronesia was neither 
to be annexed nor independent. The vague residual 
or default alternative came to be called 'free 
association' ,  and the U.S. negotiators eventually 
believed that there was mutual agreement on its 
ultimate implementation, on terms largely to be 
defined by them. The American position has been 
documented by John Dorrance, who was at the time 
the U.S. State Department's Pacific islands 
specialist and a participant in most of these 
negotiations. 
U.S. political objectives through­
out the 1960s and early 1970s 
remained unchanged and were 
assumed to be consistent with the 
wishes of the Micronesian 
people: termination of the UN 
trusteeship and annexation of the 
Micronesian islands as a U.S. 
territory. Washington believed 
that the fundamental requirements 
of strategic denial and forward 
deployment could be protected by 
only that political course. That 
this objective was not consistent 
with the obligation to develop 
Micronesia toward self­
govemment or independence was 
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little understood or simply 
ignored.9 
A combination of tensions deriving from the 
American insistence on their rights of eminent 
domain, growing pressures for separate status talks 
in the Marianas, and Micronesian disenchantment 
with the Americans' cavalier attitude toward 
Micronesian rights general, among other things, led 
to a significant disruption in the course of the 
negotiations. 
In 1972 the Congress of Micronesia 
(which normally convened in Saipan, at Trust 
Territory headquarters) met in special session on 
Pohnpei. Frustrated with the progress of the status 
negotiations, on September 2 Congress passed 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 17 (S .D. 1 ,  9/2/72), 
which read in part, 'Be it resolved . . .  that the Joint 
Committee on Future Status is hereby authoriz.ed 
and directed to conduct negotiations with the U.S. 
regarding the establishment of Micronesia as an 
independent nation, while continuing negotiations 
toward Free Association. ' 
A few weeks later, during the sixth round 
of status talks at Barber's Point Naval Air Station 
in Hawaii (Sept. 28-0ct. 6, 1972), U.S. 
Ambassador F .H. Williams summarized the history 
of the negotiations, observing that the Micronesians 
had until that point been pursuing an interest in free 
association. 'The U.S. Government, in turn, after 
lengthy consideration, agreed not to pursue its 
preference for a commonwealth relationship, but 
rather agreed to work with the Joint Future Status 
Committee toward the Congress of Micronesia's 
stated and preferred objective. '  In response to the 
Congressional resolution instructing the 
Micronesian status representatives to begin 
negotiating independence, Williams fired a shot 
across their bow: 
I should say again, however, that 
the circumstances which led to 
the Trust Territory's designation 
as a strategic trust will continue 
to exist whatever your future 
status might be. I cannot 
imagine, for instance, that my 
Government would agree to 
termination of trusteeship on 
terms which would in any way 
threaten stability in the area and 
which would in the opinion of the 
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U.S. endanger international peace 
and security' .  10 
This diplomatic language is of course open 
to many interpretations. Some Micronesian leaders 
and scholars speak of it as being a ' smoking gun' -
it represents the point at which the U.S. came the 
closest, on paper, to telling Micronesian negotiators 
that Micronesia would never be permitted to 
achieve outright independence, in the generally 
accepted sense of the term. The implications of 
this pronouncement cannot be gauged simply on its 
own, prima facie terms, but must be studied in the 
larger context of the negotiations as a whole and in 
subsequent admissions by participants in them. 
In later years, Dorrance acknowledged that 
'U.S .  negotiators until the late 1970s also asserted 
that independence was not a political option 
available to Micronesia' (1992:83). His remarks in 
this context are, however, a bit disingenuous. 
Knowing its responsibilites under the Trusteeship 
Agreement, the American government had 
steadfastly refused to admit that it would never 
allow the Micronesians to achieve independence. 
More recently Felix Moos, an anthropologist who 
served with the U.S.  negotiating team, has not only 
acknowledged that the U.S. would not countenance 
Micronesian independence, but has also asserted 
that the Micronesians themselves did not perceive 
independence as an option. They were, he asserts, 
led astray by outside agitators, particularly another 
American anthropologist, Thomas Gladwin. 
Gladwin, who had been the first anthropologist 
employed by the Trust Territory government and 
who had originally been a staunch defender of the 
colonial administration, was in the late 1960s and 
early '70s speaking caustically against the 
American position in the islands, and may have 
influenced some Micronesian students at the 
University of Hawaii. Moos, whose testimony 
largely matches Dorrance's is certain that the 
Micronesians would not have otherwise ever 
considered the possibility of independence. 
Moreover, he argues, independence was considered 
a genuinely possible alternative by only a handful 
of Micronesian leaders influenced by American 
radicals. 1 1  
Twenty years later, we are at last able to 
document the Americans' entrenched opposition to 
Micronesian independence. Despite all the 
Americans' dissembling, the Micronesians 
understood the real American position as well as 
the U.S. negotiators did. Any attempt to analyze 
the historical relationship between free association 
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and independence options that does not take into 
account the fact that free association was the only 
status alternative short of annexation that the U.S. 
would permit the Micronesians to pursue cannot 
account for the confusing nature of the compacts 
that resulted from these negotiations. 
The 1975 Vote for Independence and Agaimt 
Free A�ation 
In 1975, the U.S . ,  through the Trust Territory 
administration, together with the Congress of 
Micronesia, called the Micronesian Constitutional 
Convention in Saipan, where, just weeks earlier, 
the population had voted overwhelmingly to enter 
into a 'Commonwealth' relationship with the U.S. 
To guide the delegates, the Micronesian Congress 
decided to hold a 'Referendum on Future Political 
Status. '  The notion was that the ConCon would 
better be able to design a new, self-governing 
Micronesian government if it had some idea of 
what sort of future political status most 
Micronesians were contemplating. It is not clear 
that the vote had any impact - indeed, it was 
largely ignored at the time and its import has 
subsequently been denied by Micronesian leaders, 
some of their American advisers, and negotiators 
for the U.S. This collective amnesia is a 
consequence of three factors. First, the format of 
the ballot was confusing, listing as it did a series of 
status alternatives and asking voters to cast a yes or 
no vote for each. In some areas voters simply 
voted 'yes' for the one status option they preferred 
and ignored the rest, while in other places some 
'no' votes were also cast. This makes it difficult to 
interpret the outcome. Second, the referendum was 
held just as the Northern Marianas were breaking 
away from the Trust Territory and as both Palau 
and the Marshalls had begun to consider holding 
their own separate status talks with the U.S. 
Third, voting in the Central and Eastern Carolines -
that is, the islands that eventually formed the 
Federated States of Micronesia - indicated that 
people were not especially keen on free association, 
the status Micronesia's leaders understood to be the 
only alternative (other than annexation) acceptable 
to the U.S. 
I analyzed the 1975 vote at the time, in 
one of the only two independent newspapers then 
published in the Trust Territory, 12 and subsequently 
explored it in greater depth. 13 Given recent 
developments, it seems to me that the episode calls 
for further clarification, but here I can do no more 
than draw upon my earlier analyses. On the ballot 
there appeared Independence, Free Association, 
Commonwealth, Statehood, and continued Trust 
Territory status; the only items of any interest to 
most voters were independence, free association, 
and continuation of the trusteeship. The following 
tables present the vote for the five Trust Territory 
districts that participated in the referendum and 
then for the districts that eventually came to 
comprise the FSM. 
Several points call for clarification. 
Because Palau and the Marshalls were considering 
separate negotiations with the U.S . ,  there were 
calls in both regions to boycott the referendum; 
voter turnout was low in these districts, as 
evidenced by the relatively small number of ballots 
cast. Because voters could vote affirmatively for as 
many alternatives as they wished, or abstain from 
voting affirmatively for all of them, the sum of all 
affirmative votes in any district does not necessarily 
equal the total number of votes cast. In the 
Marshalls, significantly more total ballots were cast 
than the sum of the votes for the three status 
alternatives I am discussing here, while in Palau 
the sum of the votes for these alternatives was 
significantly greater than the total number ofballots 
cast. Nevertheless, for both the entire Trust 
Territory and for the future FSM, the sums of the 
affirmative votes are not much different than the 
total ballots cast. For this reason, I conclude that 
most voters cast an affirmative vote for one and 
only one alternative, treating the ballot as a normal 
choice of a single selection from among a set of 
alternatives, rather than as an opportunity to note 
all the alternatives acceptable to them. These 
affirmative votes for each status alternative are 
what I am concerned with here. 
Within the five participating Trust 
Territory districts, free association received the 
fewest votes of the three alternatives, while 
continued trusteeship received the most. In both 
Palau and the Marshalls, continued trusteeship 
received large majorities of the votes. In the future 
FSM, independence received a plurality of the 
vote, with continued trusteeship getting the second 
largest total and free association receiving the 
fewest votes. In both Pohnpei and Chuuk districts, 
independence received a plurality, though the 
option was shunned in Yap. Dorrance's claim that 
'sentiment in Micronesia for independence' never 
'became a majority position' (1992: 83) is 
technically correct, but independence did in fact 
achieve a clear plurality among the five alternatives 
that appeared on the 1975 ballot. 
The totals in Tables 1 and 2 show that in 
aggregate, for both the entire participating Trust 
Territory and the future FSM states, free 
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association was in 1975 the least popular status 
alternative. In the future FSM states, in particular, 
free association was viewed as an alternative 
entirely distinct from independence, the most 
desired status. Had independence and free 
association been conceptually merged, the votes for 
them would have been closer, and would not have 
had the status quo option - continued trusteeship -
interposed between them. 14 In subsequent 
years I have encountered a rather consistent 
tendency to discount the obvious implications of the 
Table 1: 1975 TTPI Referendum on Political Status 
Vote By Districts 
District Marshalls Palau 
Totals 
Ballots Cast 3683 2279 
Independence 1 16 377 
Free Association 864 1 139 
Trust Territory 1596 2583 
Table 2: 1975 TTPI Referendum on Political Status 
Vote by Future FSM States* 
District Pohnpei Chuuk 
Ballots 5878 7405 
Independence 3415 3272 
Free Association 2086 1 139 
Trust Territory 1596 2583 
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arguments against the relevance or importance of 
the 1975 vote suggest that the FSM leadership has 
always recognized the very real distinctions 
between free association and independence. 
The 1983 Plebiscites and American Responses 
Following years of false starts and reversals, the 
Marshallese, FSM, Palauan, and American 
governments signed Compacts of Free Association 
in 1982-83 . As Dorrance phrases it, 'The U.S. 
Pohnpei Chuuk Yap 
5878 7405 295022195 
3415 3272 13573 15 
2086 1 139 17796850 
1596 2583 1 1098785 
Yap Totals 
2950 16233 
135 6822 
1779 5204 
1 109 5288 
... Kosrae was at that time included in Pohnpei District . 
1975 referendum on grounds that there were more 
'no' votes against independence than against any of 
the other status alternatives. This is interpreted to 
mean that a plurality of voters opposed 
independence. On Pohnpei, however, the 
overwhelming majority of voters simply marked 
'yes' for the single alternative they most preferred 
and ignored the rest of the items. The tallies from 
other areas suggest that in most cases voting 
patterns were similar. Because relatively few 
voters opted to vote against alternatives, only a 
count of affirmative votes seems to be relevant. 
This tendency to denigrate the vote makes it easier 
to ignore its implications and allows the FSM 
leadership to rationalize the fact that they pursued 
free association, the least favoured alternative, 
rather than independence, the most favoured. 
Given the U.S.  's adamant opposition to 
Micronesian independence, this rationalimtion 
hardly seems necessary now, but continuing 
ultimately accepted independence as a political 
option mandated by the UN trusteeship agreement. 
By the time that concession was made, the free 
association package was virtually complete' . 15 
Indeed, independence was acknowledged as a 
possibility only because the 'free association 
package' had been completed. At the time of the 
FSM plebiscite on the Compact, free association 
was being touted by American advisers to the FSM 
government as 'virtual independence. ' It was not 
represented as genuine independence, given all that 
had transpired during more than fifteen years of 
negotiations. 
The Compact was translated, disseminated, 
and discussed in educational programs and in 
innumerable informal discussions. The FSM 
government itself promoted an affirmative vote for 
the Compact, while the local Catholic Church 
offered a nonpartisan analysis of all status 
possibilities. Pohnpeian discussions of the 
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Compact, in particular, challenge any 
correspondence between free association and 
independence. Pohnpeians saw the Compact as an 
affront to their dignity, and many spoke of it as 
abrogation of their right to 'mana' (Pohnpeian 
manaman), sovereignty, over their island. Many 
saw it as a threat to their security, depriving the 
Micronesians of any right to ultimate control over 
their territory. Many Pohnpeian voters framed the 
choice they faced as between rice and breadfruit -
that is, between continuing American financial 
subsidies and regaining full autonomy. In their 
minds, nothing could have been clearer than the 
distinction between independence and free 
association. 16 
While a majority of the FSM's voters in 
three states approved the Compact, it was narrowly 
defeated in Pohnpei. 17 On a second, advisory part 
of the ballot, Pohnpeians called for independence. 
The Pohnpei State Legislature then proceeded to 
vote against free association as well. Because the 
Compact received majorities in the three other FSM 
states and was approved by their legislatures, it was 
put into effect. Pohnpeians have shown great 
forbearance in their willingness to live with a status 
which they rejected, but there should be no 
confusion about their views of the status options. 
At no point in the long history of 
Micronesia's political status negotiations is the 
official American view of the 'mutual security' 
treaties more clearly presented than in testimony 
before the U.S. Senate during hearings at which 
ratification of the compacts was considered. The 
notion that Congress perceived these compacts as 
bilateral agreements 'entered into by two co-equal 
sovereigns' 18 cannot be sustained in the context of 
the following exchange at the 1984 Senate Energy 
Committee hearings, between Senator J. Bennett 
Johnston and Fred Zeder, the U.S.  'Ambassador' 
to the Micronesian status negotiations. 
Senator Johnston: Ambassador Zeder, with 
respect to denial, the 
provisions say that if the 
Government of the U.S. 
determines that any third 
country seeks access to or 
use of the Marshall Islands 
[these provisions hold for 
the FSM and Palau as well] 
for military purposes, et 
cetera, then we can deny. 
[He then hypothesizes about 
Soviet fisheries.] Could we 
Mr. Zeder: 
Sen. Johnston: 
Mr. Zeder: 
Sen. Johnston: 
Mr. Zeder: 
Sen. Johnston: 
determine that these 
ostensibly civilian personnel 
and ostensibly trade 
missions have a military 
usefulness and, therefore, a 
military purpose? 
Yes sir, Senator, that's 
very clear and precise in 
the compact . . . .  
In other words, is it 
understood that we have 
full plenary power to say 
that any activity is military 
even though we may be 
wrong? 
Yes, we do, sir, and we 
intend to use it. 
Any activity whatsoever, 
we could determine to be 
military and prevent it? 
Yes, sir. 
All right, I think that's 
clear. 
In the American system of constitutional law, the 
Supreme Court studies Congressional records in 
order to determine the Congress's intent when it 
acted - in this case, when it ratified these compacts. 
Sen. Johnston was, for the historical record, 
making the Senate's position absolutely clear. In 
later hearings before the House of Representatives 
the FSM government would insist that this was not 
its understanding of the treaties, and the 
Department of State would then reiterate the U.S.  
government's insistence that these were indeed the 
terms to which the U.S.  was agreeing. Later 
events suggest that some in the FSM government 
accept this American interpretation. 
In the course of ratifying the compacts the 
U.S. Congress unilaterally proceed  to introduce 
a wide range of alterations to the agreements. 
Some of these made radical changes in the kinds of 
economic relationships the compacts were meant to 
establish. Resio Moses, then the Governor of 
Pohnpei, and now the FSM's Foreign Minister, 
wrote a letter decrying the nature of these 
modifications. He observed that 
The multitude of amendments 
offered by the House of 
Representatives of the U.S. 
Congress represent something 
much different than a recognition 
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of our inherent sovereignty and 
our dignity as a self-governing 
people. The amendments are 
patronizing in language , 
condescending in spirit, and 
meddlesome in fact. 
The problem lies much deeper 
than the language of the 
amendments offered by either the 
House or the Senate. The 
problem lies in a basic 
m isunderstanding within  
Congress of  the true nature of the 
Compact, of the true sense of our 
people as a nation, and of the 
true responsibilities of the U.S. 
in these closing years of the 
Trusteeship. Cosmetic or even 
substantive concessions attained 
in the next few weeks over 
amendments made by the House 
or Senate will not rectify the 
fundamental misconceptions 
which lie at the root of these 
amendments. 
Changes in attitude cannot be 
made overnight, but we firmly 
believe that a very definite and 
visible foothold, which truly and 
effectively mandates respect for 
ourselves as an independent, self­
governing people, must be 
attained within the U.S. Congress 
before we accept implementation 
of the Compact, in any form. 19 
Micronesia's leaders had gone through two 
decades of negotiations and struggle; they accepted 
a relationship that many never wanted in the first 
place; they compromised themselves in the eyes of 
many of their own people. Having finally 
convinced a majority of their people to agree to 
free association, they then found themselves once 
again confronting Congress over precisely the same 
questions that had plagued the negotiations from the 
outset: the nature of Micronesian sovereignty. 
There can be no doubt that at the time the 
Micronesians voted on the compacts and the U.S. 
Congress ratified them none of the parties to the 
agreements perceived them as independence. The 
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U.S. Congress was determined to prevent the 
Micronesians from achieving independence and the 
Micronesians believed that the status Congress was 
agreeing to provided them with far far less than 
they had voted for when they approved the 
compacts. 
The 1990 FSM Constitutional Convention 
After 1 1  years ofMicronesian self-government the 
United Nations had not yet terminated trusteeship, 
though in 1986 the U.S. unilaterally declared that 
the Trusteeship Agreement had ceased . In 1989 
the FSM' s voters called for the first Constitutional 
Convention since the original Constitution, which 
had been drafted in 1975 by representatives from 
all the Trust Territory's districts, been ratified in 
1978, and put into effect in 1979. I have described 
the ConCon at length elsewhere;20 my intention 
here is only to make reference to several episodes 
relevant to the political status question. 
When proposals to amend constitutional 
passages detailing the transition from trusteeship 
status to autonomy were considered in committee, 
a long and, by Micronesian standards, acrimonious 
debate ensued. 21 At least one delegate insisted that 
the constitution be amended to demonstrate that 
even though the United Nations had not yet 
terminated the trusteeship, the Micronesians were 
nevertheless sovereign and independent. Numerous 
arguments were raised in opposition. Some were 
rooted in a desire to preserve the original wording, 
to record for posterity language that demonstrated 
the peaceful nature of the transfer of power in the 
islands, and other objections concerned the issue of 
whether the FSM was indeed recognized as either 
sovereign or independent by any other powers. 
The delegate who proposed these amendments told 
the committee, 'Ifwe don't do this, it may call into 
question our sovereignty. It may affect the powers 
of the national and state governments with respect 
to the U.S. It is a step declaring that the 
Trusteeship Agreement is terminated and the FSM 
is a sovereign and independent nation. ' One of the 
staunchest opponents of the proposed changes 
responded, 'the thrust of your testimony is that by 
deleting a sentence [from the constitution] we are 
exercising our sovereignty. '  Came the reply, 'No, 
we are sovereign right now. ' Another delegate, 
one of the FSM's most revered, and articulate, 
leaders, then argued, 'It doesn't matter whether we 
think we are sovereign; the issue is whether others 
believe we are. I would like to be sovereign, but 
that's not enough - someone has to recognize that. 
Then we'll be sovereign. We want everyone to 
PETERSEN - Why is Micronesian 'Independence' an Issue? 77 
recognize us as sovereign, so we have to 
compromise to get them to do so. ' 
In studying the entire debate before this 
committee, in the contexts both of the ConCon as 
a whole and the full history of the status 
negotiations, no straightforward conclusions can be 
drawn about the ConCon delegates' views 
concerning Micronesian sovereignty and 
independence. But my point is not that there is, or 
was, any straightforward view, rather, that even the 
Micronesian leaders could not agree upon their 
country's political status as recently as mid-1990. 
At several critical junctures in the 
ConCon, during committee meetings, delegates 
were reminded that the compact allowed the U.S. 
to cut off the FSM's funding if the agreement were 
broached. Regarding provisions concerning the 
storage of nuclear (or other hazardous) materials 
within the islands, and again with respect to the 
possibility of providing a constitutional means for 
the secession of FSM states, the FSM's acting 
Secretary of External Affairs (i.e. , Foreign 
Minister), who was also a ConCon delegate, 
explained to committee members that passage of 
these provisions would immediately provoke the 
U.S. government, which would in tum call him in 
for 'consultations. '  Another delegate - a state 
governor - then explained how this would probably 
lead to the curtailment of scheduled payments under 
the compact and thus to immediate financial 
disaster. In each of the episodes committee leaders 
pulled back from further consideration of the 
issues, much to chagrin of delegates less concerned 
with mollifying the U.S.  
The FSM, whatever its status, still cannot 
govern itself without interference from the U.S. 
All legal arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, 
it is clear that the freely associated states are not 
operating as independent states. This is not to 
suggest that other countries, whose political status 
may not be in question, are not subject to similar 
constraints. But such constraints ordinarily are 
imposed at the level of policy, while in Micronesia 
these issues operate at the very fundamental level 
of interpreting and even modifying the constitution. 
At the 1990 ConCon all the states shared 
a common desire to shift power and financial 
controls away from the national government to the 
states. There were many reasons for this, not all 
of them shared by all the states. But one of the 
most salient factors explaining overall consensus on 
the larger point was the belief that the central 
government was serving as a proxy for U.S. 
interests - that is, the U.S. continued to wield far 
more influence within the FSM than most 
Micronesians were comfortable with. As one 
delegate put it, 'We don't need two drivers any 
more. ' A thoroughly revised constitution (104 
amendments to it were proposed), it was hoped, 
would indeed shift control over a wide range of 
issues to the states and thereby thwart U.S. 
attempts to shape FSM policy to its own devices. 22 
I am not prepared to consider the accuracy of this 
perception, but merely to report that the 1990 FSM 
ConCon cannot be understood outside the context 
of the delegates' sense that the FSM was in fact, if 
not in name, unable to operate independently of the 
U.S. government. 
Thus, at no point during the negotiations 
on Micronesia's future political status did either the 
Micronesians or the Americans ever openly suggest 
that free association was anything other than the 
only viable alternative to independence. This is 
equally true of pronouncements preceding both the 
1983 plebiscites and the 1986 declaration that 
trusteeship was no longer in force. By mid-1990 
there were Micronesians arguing that the Marshalls 
and the FSM were sovereign and independent, but 
these claims were contested within the islands and 
not recognized by the U.S. 
Some Reflections on Colonialism 
In his opening address to the Colonial Inheritance 
conference, the Hon Andrew Peacock observed of 
Australia's relations with Papua New Guinea that 
the manner in which a country leaves a colonial 
situation where it has been the governing authority 
is extremely important; it is likely to shape the 
character of subsequent relations between the two 
states. In this light, the American departure from 
Micronesia has been especially problematic and 
may result in lingering discord of a sort that goes 
beyond the ordinary tensions between ex-colonies 
and their former administering powers. Much, 
though by no means all, of the friction underlying 
this relationship can perhaps be traced to the ways 
in which the U.S. established its rule in the area. 
Never having acknowledged that its status in 
Micronesia was in fact that of a colonial power, the 
U.S. has seemed unprepared to decoloni:ze the 
area. 
This American disposition is by no means 
peculiar to the U.S. presence in Micronesia. In 
'!he Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1972), 
William Appleman Williams outlines the history 
and character of the 'Open Door' Policy that has 
long defined U.S. foreign relations. While there is 
considerable debate over the nature of the forces 
that shape this policy, as well as some of the 
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particulars of its implementation, 23 few have 
disputed Williams' basic thesis: it has suited U.S. 
purposes to open and maintain access to markets 
abroad while engaging in as little outright 
annexationist empire-building as possible (at least 
once the great binge of 1898 had subsided). Henry 
Stimson, one of the leading architects of the Open 
Door policy in the first half of the twentieth 
century, was a key participant in the 1945 
negotiations at Yalta, where the Allies' plans for 
post-war territorial SU7.erainty were thrashed out 
(though hardly resolved). In the course of the 
Yalta talks then Secretary of War Stimson 
addressed a memorandum to U.S. Secretary of 
State Stetinnius, communicating his views on the 
disposition of the Micronesian islands. 
Acquisition of them by the 
United States does not represent 
an attempt at colonization or 
exploitation. Instead, it is merely 
the acquisition by the United 
States of the necessary bases for 
the defence of the security of the 
Pacific for the future world. To 
serve such a purpose they must 
belong to the United States with 
absolute power to rule and fortify 
them. They are not colonies; 
they are outposts, and their 
acquisition is appropriate under 
the general doctrine of self­
defence by the power which 
guarantees the safety of that area 
of the world. 24 
Stimson's views were entirely in keeping with the 
Open Door outlook: the U.S. did not see itself as 
a colonial power and was not, therefore, engaged 
in acquiring colonies. Never having admitted to 
themselves that they had indeed established the 
U.S. as a colonial power in Micronesia, American 
leaders could not bring themselves to believe that 
the U.S. needed to decoloniz.e - that is, grant the 
islands outright, uncompromised independence. 
For this reason, if for no other, current 
American rhetoric should not be taken at face 
value. The U.S. State Department is now engaged 
in putting 'spin' on Micronesian status, and it 
appears to be succeeding. In his review of Gary 
Smith's workon Micronesian decolonization,25 T.J. 
Johnson, a retired U.S. Navy admiral who served 
for three years in Micronesia as 'the Representative 
of the Commander, US Pacific Command, ' finds 
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that 'Smith's assertions that the freely associated 
states are not truly independent do not pass muster 
on several accounts. '  Citing precisely the same 
arguments regarding international recognition 
marshalled by Michal, Johnson concludes that this 
evidence 'demonstrates that the international 
community has recogniz.ed and accepted the concept 
of free association in which an independent state, 
the United States, has assumed an obligation to 
ensure the political independence and territorial 
integrity of two other equally independent states'. 26 
And a current textbook in political geography 
makes the leap from noting that the compacts of 
free association 'provided for considerable self­
govemment but not independence' to asserting that 
'eventually both Micronesia and the Marshall 
Islands became independent' . Z1 In neither case is 
there any discussion of how a status that the U.S. 
Congress approved as an explicit alternative to 
independence can be transformed into independence 
without Congressional action. Given the way 
things seem to be going, the notion that the 
Micronesian republics are independent may in fact 
not be at issue much longer. But it is not yet a 
moot point. 
Attempts to recast histories of 
decolonization in immediately subsequent years, or 
even as they are still unfolding, are hardly isolated 
cases . Basil Davidson, in his discussion of modem 
African political dilemmas, warns against 'a certain 
historical hindsight which has liked to suggest that 
the British and the French were amiably ready to 
pack and go . . . .  There was not much in those last 
years of colonial rule that was amiable about the 
attitudes and actions of colonial officialdom' 
(1992: 105). And in 1960 C.L.R. James, a brilliant 
chronicler of the Caribbean, African, and African­
American colonial inheritance, wrote of the British 
Colonial Office, 
The idea that they trained the 
people of the Gold Coast for self­
govemment and independence is 
the literal reverse of the truth. 
Here again is the paradox. It is 
the people of the Gold Coast who 
trained, bludgeoned, the Colonial 
Office into the meaning of self­
govemment and independence. 28 
Nor is the issue merely one of 
interpretation; the recasting of colonial history can 
have very real consequences. Regarding 
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contemporary Russian imperial tendencies, Marie 
Katz argues that 
When the Western European 
powers withdrew from their 
colonies in the third world, they 
retained significant influence in 
some (notably the French in sub­
Saharan Africa) and little or none 
in others. None of the former 
powers, however, attempted to 
rebuild their colonial empires 
after having given them up. 
Powerful forces in Russia, 
though, appear determined to do 
just that. 29 
It is worth considering the possibility that 
the U.S. might find it expedient to pursue a similar 
strategy. American political leaders formulated the 
Open Door policy and the military set their sights 
on Micronesia well before communism and Cold 
War appeared on the horizon. There are few good 
reasons to think American interests in the western 
Pacific are likely to change much in the early years 
of the twenty-first century. The problem of 
Micronesian independence remains vital precisely 
because so many aspects of America's global 
interests and power relationships continue to be 
played out among Russia, China, Japan, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and the region's other nation-states. To 
put it simply, Micronesia continues to occupy a key 
strategic location; indeed its importance is likely to 
increase in ways that Smith (1991), in his analysis 
of the area's strategic role, may have overlooked. 
As long as the U.S. government - and the Congress 
in particular - are unwilling to revise the treaties 
that compromise Micronesian independence, 
Micronesian independence must remain an issue. 
Conclusion: The Distinction Between 
Micronesian and American Positions on 
Micronesian Independence 
Today, Resio Moses, the FSM Foreign Minister, 
states that the FSM is an independent nation-state 
and that free association is a 'bilateral pact' 
between two independent states. The U.S. 
Department of State likewise refers to the freely 
associated Micronesian states as independent, but 
protected, states. 30 The turning point of course, 
was the end of the Cold War and the Soviet 
Union's eventual collapse, which led it, in 
December 1990, following receipt of more than one 
billion dollars in food credits from the U.S. , to 
vote in the UN Security Council to terminate the 
Trusteeship Agreement as it applied to the Northern 
Marianas, the FSM, and the Marshalls. This in 
tum led to the admission of the FSM and the 
Marshalls into the United Nations and their more 
general diplomatic recognition as independent 
states, a condition which serves as Michal's main 
criterion for arguing that the freely associated states 
are indeed independent. Whether they are or are 
not independent, in my opinion, depends entirely 
upon the context in which the issue is raised. 
Because both the Micronesian governments and the 
U.S. have recently been asserting Micronesian 
independence, I have tried here to show why the 
matter is in doubt. 
The character of free association, as 
ultimately accepted by both the Micronesians and 
the U.S. , was shaped under conditions which made 
genuine independence for the Micronesians 
impossible. In short, the Micronesians did not 
enter voluntarily into free association - they were 
coerced into accepting it. These agreements - the 
Compacts of Free Association - remain in force, 
and no matter what the agreements are called they 
will remain in force as written. To give the name 
'independence' to something which was specifically 
designed to be something other than independence 
simply because of changes in the attitudes or 
perspectives of third parties challenges our means 
of interpreting history. It mocks what is known as 
a realist perspective because it ignores the fact that 
the power arrangements between the U.S. and the 
Micronesians remain unchanged, both in their legal 
framework and in the harsh realities of cash flows 
and control over them. It mocks an idealist or 
utopian perspective because it ignores the fact that 
a great many Micronesians were long rebuffed in 
their insistence that the terms of free association 
were inequitable and insulting to their right to 
reclaim sovereignty over their islands; it equally 
ignores their recognition that the negotiations were 
essentially one-sided, without, a well-grounded 
moral standing.31 To claim that what had long 
been framed as two distinct alternatives - free 
association and independence - are now one and the 
same, verges on the borders of Newspeak. 
I believe that a good many Micronesian 
leaders agrOOd to implement free association not 
because they were interested in achieving freely 
associated status for their islands, but because it 
was the only way they could stave off annexation 
and successfully preserve opportunities for ultimate 
independence. Having achieved a legal agreement, 
the Micronesian governments were eager to assume 
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full self-government, so they acquiesced in the 
U.S. declaration that the trusteeship was no longer 
in force, even while the U.S. was blatantly insisting 
that free association provided it with powers over 
internal Micronesian affairs that the Micronesians 
did not acknowledge. Now, with UN . Security 
Council termination of trusteeship and admission of 
the freely associated states into the United Nations 
accomplished, the Micronesian governments can at 
last reclaim that which had evaded them through a 
quarter-century of negotiations. They boldly assert 
their independence. 
The U.S. ,  on the other hand, refused to 
contemplate any possibility of Micronesian 
independence. It did its best to thwart aspirations 
toward it, and denied that any such sentiments 
existed, even when they were expressed in a well­
supervised referendum. In the context of the Cold 
War, the U.S. denied, abrogated, or ignored nearly 
every principle it claimed to stand for. It was 
ultimately forced to agree to virtually full 
Micronesian self-government. But the U.S. 
government made sure that it retained a legal right 
to interfere with the internal affairs of the freely 
associated states at any point it chose to. The 
existence of this residual caveat seives to 
demonstrate the American government's ultimate 
denial that it has ever granted the Micronesians 
independence in any generally accepted sense of the 
term. 
For the freely associated Micronesian 
states, it makes sense to assert their independence. 
It is what they have always felt was theirs by right. 
One can hardly deny them recognition as 
independent states. On the other hand, the U.S. is 
attempting to claim by fiat that it has granted 
something that it in fact never intended to grant, 
has not in fact granted, and does not in fact intend 
to grant. 
I began this essay by referring to Puerto 
Rico, and I now return briefly to it. There is a 
movement among Puerto Ricans opposed to 
annexation and assimilation into the U.S. to modify 
Commonwealth into a new form of free 
association, consciously borrowing from the 
Micronesian model. In May 1993 , at the second 
national conference on American insular territories 
(organiz.ed by the University of the Virgin Islands 
but convened in Washington, DC), it was asserted 
by a number of participants - particularly by 
Howard Hills, now an attorney in private practice 
but formerly a member of the U.S. team that 
negotiated Micronesian status - that Micronesian 
'independence' is the model Puerto Ricans should 
be pursuing. Advocates of this position believe that 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
the Micronesians exercise far more local autonomy 
under their compacts than do the Puerto Ricans 
under theirs. On the one hand, many Puerto Rican 
leaders favouring this position have begun to speak 
of the existing Commonwealth agreement as a 
'bilateral pact' between equals, drawing upon 
exactly the language now used in Micronesia to 
describe the co-existence of free association and 
independence. On the other, those who advocate 
statehood argue that as citi7.ens of a freely 
associated republic, Puerto Ricans would lose their 
American citi7.el1Ship. As the Micronesian case 
demonstrates, nothing in this realm is certain, no 
matter how well documented it may be. The 
Micronesians, I think, learned from Puerto Rico 
(among other examples) that the more quickly they 
attempted to get out from under U.S.  rule the more 
successful they would be. Puerto Ricans in tum, 
may be learning the possibilities of pursuing, and 
achieving, two apparently contradictory goals at the 
same time. 
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The End of History for the Edge of Paradise? Economic Development 
and the Compacts of Free Association in American Micronesia 
David Hanlon 
In this essay, I argue for a reconceptualiz.ation of 
economic development in the Caroline, Mariana 
and Marshall Islands, until recently known as the 
United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
I work from the assumption that the decades-old 
program of economic development in American 
Micronesia bas been part of a larger agenda to 
make or remake the islands in ways that reflected, 
served and affirmed the national ideology of the 
United States. 1 'Making them like US' would be 
another way of phrasing it. Recent changes in the 
political status of the islands and the emergence of 
four self-governing entities from the former Trust 
Territory do not alter substantially the patterns of 
American rule. The Compact of Free Association, 
implemented on 3 November 1986 for the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands and on 1 October 
1994 for the Republic of Palau, might appear as the 
culminating phase of a process that disguises 
continued American control of the area with 
rhetorical gestures toward local sovereignty and 
economic development. Francis Fukuyama would 
identify this larger process as the end of history. 
I examine the compact, then, in light of 
Fukuyama's thesis and offer readers a tour of 
'compacted Micronesia' through a critical reading 
of P. F. Kluge's book, 1he Edge of Paradise. I 
close with some reflections on how economic 
development in American Micronesia might be 
calculated differently from the ways and means 
advanced by Fukuyama, Kluge and others. 
Ending History? 
The phrase, 'the end of history' ,  comes 
from a book written by Francis Fukuyama, The 
End of History and the Last Man. 2 Fukuyama 
argues that liberal democracy constitutes the 
endpoint of ideological evolution and the final, 
most nearly perfect form of government; as such, 
the triumph of liberal democracy throughout the 
globe represents the end of history. Fukuyama's 
thesis draws heavily from the work of Hegel who 
understood history as a single, coherent, 
evolutionary process. Hegel saw human history as 
working its way from simple tribal societies based 
on slavery and subsistence agriculture through 
various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal 
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aristocracies, and ultimately to modem liberal 
democracy based on technologically driven 
capitalism. In Fukuyama's analysis, the inevitable 
triumph of liberal democracy results from the 
interplay of pragmatic economics, rational science, 
and a primordial human drive for recognition. 
From this interplay emerges a mature capitalist 
economy capable of meeting the needs of all. The 
end of history brings too the appearance of a 
universal 'last man', content, democratic, free, 
prosperous, productive, and globally conscious. 
Marx, as Fukuyama notes, also wrote of 
the inevitable march of history, but a history whose 
end was the socialist state, not liberal capitalist 
democracy. For Fukuyama, the events of the late 
1980s and early 1990s have proved Hegel right and 
Marx wrong. The demise of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union leave the United States as the most perfect 
example of a liberal capitalist democracy. The 
world, according to Fukuyama, is becoming like 
'US'.  Not surprisingly, conservatives within the 
American political arena have responded 
enthusiastically to Fukuyama's thesis and to the 
recent political events in the world that would seem 
to validate it. 
Fukuyama' s work pays little attention to 
matters of culture, colonialism and the politics of 
development. Colonialism comes under what 
Fukuyama would describe as history with a small 
'h' ; events in time that are negative, destructive 
and seemingly regressive, but that are ultimately 
overcome by History with a capital 'H' . 3 Big 
History works as a single progressive movement 
leading to a universal and homogenous global 
economic system. Culture for Fukuyama 
constitutes only a series of obstacles to economic 
development that include religion, national, racial 
and ethnic loyalties, highly stratified social systems, 
and rigidly centralized forms of power and 
government that limit free association among 
people.4 
Fukuyama's The End of History and the 
Last Man is interesting not because it represents a 
particularly salient treatise on political economy, 
but because it reflects what some observers believe 
or even fear to be the outcome of American 
colonialism in the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall 
Islands. Fukuyama presents a vision of a world 
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order that is not about independent national entities 
but a simple universal state. The end of history for 
Micronesia, then, means the incorporation of these 
islands by the United States. In the Northern 
Marianas, that eventuality might already appear 
accomplished through the commonwealth agreement 
that makes those islands an American territory. In 
the Caroline and Marshall Islands, the political 
status of free association with the United States 
looks to be an intermediate status ultimately leading 
to a closer, more permanent affiliation with the 
United States. 
The Compact of Free Association as 
'Mechanism' 
Fukuyama writes of a uniform 'Mechanism' , 
fuelled by modem natural science, that directs 
human social organi:zation toward liberal 
democracy. 5 In this sense, one could view the 
Compact of Free Association between the United 
States and the governments of the Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, and the Republic of Palau as being a part 
of the 'mechanism' that moves the islands toward 
the end of history. I would like, then, to consider 
the Compact of Free Association as a 'mechanism' 
that seeks to overcome what might be different and 
distinctive about the people of the Micronesia. In 
short, the compact can be read as preface to the 
attempted subsumption of an area into a global 
American-dominated economic order. Of course 
the Compact of Free Association does not mark the 
end of history or anything close to it. What it does 
invite is a more careful, cross-culturally nuanced 
consideration of attempts to transform island 
peoples into productive workers and responsible 
consumers, and of local understandings and 
responses to those attempts. 
The result of seventeen years of 
negotiations through four separate American 
presidencies, the compact has been viewed by its 
supporters as satisfying American security interests, 
while recognizing the integrity of Micronesian 
governments. 6 The compact provides funding to 
maintain existing governmental operations and to 
develop self-sustaining economies for the three 
Micronesian states. In outline form, the Compact 
of Free Association with the three Micronesian 
governments recogniz.es their sovereignty, their 
right to complete control over all domestic and 
internal matters, and their authority to conduct their 
own foreign affairs though in consultation with the 
United States. 7 The United States, assuming 
responsibility for defence and security matters, 
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pledges to defend the freely associated states 'as if 
they were a part of the United States' .  8 
For the FSM and the Marshalls, the 
compact has a fifteen-year life; the agreement with 
Palau is longer, extending over a fifty-year time 
period.9 The Micronesian governments' promise 
not to engage in any activity deemed incompatible 
with the U.S.  commitment to insure the security of 
the area and agree, essentially to close their lands 
and waters to the military forces of other nations 
unless otherwise requested by the United States. 
Separate agreements with the Marshalls and Palau 
grant the United States military continued operation 
of the Kwajalein Missile Range, and use options to 
lands on Babelthuap and to parts of Koror's 
Malakal Harbor. The compact may be terminated 
either by mutual agreement between the freely 
associated state in question and the United States, 
or unilaterally by either of them. Under Title IV 
of the compact, certain provisions relating to 
economic assistance and security matters would 
remain in force in the event of early termination. 
Finally, the compact provides that on the thirteenth 
anniversary of the enactment of the compact, the 
United States and the freely associated states will 
begin negotiations to renew, revise or end the 
Compact of Free Association. 
The financial terms of the Compact of 
Free Association provide the FSM with an annual 
block grant of $59.06 million, while the Marshalls 
receives a yearly average allotment of $37 .06 
million. 10 Estimates for the just-implemented 
compact with the Republic of Palau project a yearly 
assistance level of roughly $24 million. Forty per 
cent of this block grant money is earmarked for 
infrastructure development and revenue generating 
projects. The remaining 60 % of the block grants 
is to meet the administrative costs of government 
and related services. The compact's funding 
scheme provides for the reduction of United States 
grant assistance to the FSM and the Marshalls after 
the fifth and tenth years. While the terms of the 
compact with Palau extend over a fifty-year period, 
most of the financial assistance offered by the 
United States is 'front-loaded' during the first 
fifteen years of the agreement. The interest and 
investment income earned from a first-year, lump 
sum payment of $66 million comprises the principle 
source of United States funding for Palau between 
the sixteenth and fiftieth years of the compact. 
The compact also specifies a first year 
appropriation of $ 150 million to cover United 
States liabilities incurred by its nuclear testing 
program in the Marshalls. In addition, the people 
of irradiated atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, 
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and Utirik are guaranteed a total of $183,750,000 
in quarterly payments, while another $45.75 
million has been set aside to handle outstanding or 
additional claims filed before a claims tribunal. 
Total compensation for American nuclear testing in 
the Marshalls comes to about $420 million. 
The compact and its subsidiary agreements 
also commit the United States to provide at no cost 
to the Micronesian governments an extensive 
international telecommunications network, airline 
and airport safety services, a regulatory system for 
commercial air traffic, natural disaster relief, 
weather forecasting services, and use of the United 
States Postal Service's international facilities. 
Other subsidiary agreements address marine space 
jurisdiction, military use and operating rights 
agreements, and legal matters involving extradition, 
liability, prosecution, and immunity. 
During the course of congressional 
hearings, representatives of other American 
territories complained about the special tax and 
trade incentives denied them but granted to the 
Micronesian governments under the terms of the 
compact. 1 1  The complaints led to the dropping of 
these special incentives from the final version of 
the compact. As compensation, the Micronesian 
governments receive access to the domestic 
assistance programs of a number of federal 
agencies including the Federal Deposit Corporation, 
the Small Business Administration, the Economic 
Development Administration , the Rural 
Electrification Administration, the Job Partnership 
Training Act, the Job Corps, and the Department 
of Commerce's programs in the areas of tourism 
and marine resources development. Such additional 
access to United States federal programs 
supplements significantly the continuing and 
nonreimbursable technical assistance already 
committed in the compact from the United States 
Forest Service, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, the United States Coast Guard, and the 
Department of Interior's Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation. The actual dollar amounts 
provided for by the compact are difficult to 
calculate because of provisions for inflation, the 
contributions of U. S .  federal programs whose 
services are authorized but not specified in dollar 
amounts , and unspecified compensatory 
adjustments, in health, education and environment. 
Best estimates put the total cost of the compact with 
the three Micronesian governments at roughly $2. 7 
billion. 12 
In Fukuyama's vision of the end of 
history, national sovereignty and independence 
ultimately count for little in a universal, triumphant 
structure of liberal capitalist democracy. 
Sovereignty and independence, however, proved 
key concerns in the negotiations between the 
American and different Micronesian governments 
over the Compact of Free Association. At the 
outset of those negotiations in 1969, the Congress 
ofMicronesia endorsed four fundamental principles 
to guide formal deliberations on the termination of 
the Trusteeship Agreement and the establishment of 
a future self-governing political status for the 
islands. 13 The first identified the sovereignty of 
Micronesia as residing in the people of the islands 
and their duly constituted governments; the second 
asserted that Micronesians possessed the right of 
self-determination and with it the power to choose 
between independence and a status of free 
association with any other nation or organiz.ation of 
nations; the third endorsed the right of 
Micronesians to adopt a constitution and to amend, 
change or revoke that constitution at any time; and 
the fourth principle stipulated that any agreement to 
associate freely with another nation should be 
expressed in the form of a revocable compact 
terminable unilaterally by either party. 
Just how effectively these four principles 
are honoured in the Compact of Free Association 
remains a matter for intense debate. 
Representatives of the Micronesian governments all 
spoke positively and enthusiastically about the 
Compact of Free Association, at least in public. 
As early as 1983 , the FSM Congress' Committee 
on External Affairs had endorsed the compact 
initialled at Hilo, Hawai'i on 1 October 1982 as 
recognizing the Federated States of Micronesia as 
a 'sovereign nation, established under a constitution 
adopted by its people, with full control over its 
internal and foreign affairs' .  14 Speaking before a 
subcommittee of the United States House of 
Representatives' Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, then Vice President Bailey Olter of the 
Federated States of Micronesia described the 
Compact of Free Association as offering both the 
United States and the FSM the opportunity to 
replace the Trusteeship agreement with a 'healthy 
and solid relationship' designed for the future. 15 
Olter went on to affirm that his own people 
understood the terms of the Compact of Free 
Association and favoured the close relationship with 
the United States under that compact. Before a 
similar congressional hearing, Oscar DeBrum, 
Chief Secretary for the government of the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, called the compact a less 
than perfect document of compromises that 
nonetheless allowed a fair and equitable relationship 
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between the United States and the Marshall 
Islands. 16 
Representatives from the United States also 
spoke in support of the compact. Among these 
many commentators was a consciousness that an 
end was at hand; comments, testimonies, and 
opening and closing remarks employed words such 
as 'culmination' , 'conclusion' , 'termination' , and 
'finaliution' in assessing the negotiations over the 
Compact of Free Association. Those words, I 
believe, related not only to the end of protracted 
negotiations over the dissolution of the Trusteeship, 
but reflected as well a sense that the differences 
between Micronesians and Americans had been 
overcome. The compact and its subsidiary 
agreements sought to make the islands compatible 
with American notions of life and government; it 
promised to complete Micronesians' transformation 
from backward island peoples into productive, 
responsible, hard-working near-Americans in close 
association with the world's leading capitalist 
democracy. 
Outside, and even sometimes within the 
arenas of official comment, could be heard 
dissident voices that had a decidedly different 
understanding of the compact, and its effects and 
purposes. Men like Andohn Amarich and Lazarus 
Salii, the chief negotiators for the Federated States 
of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau 
respectively, conceded with an air of resignation 
that the Compact of Free Association with the 
United States was the best deal under the 
circumstances. 17 Much more pointedly, Dwight 
Heine called 'free association' nothing more than a 
term; the approval of the Compact of Free 
Association, he said, would only increase the 
Marshalls' dependency on the United States; 
'Who are we kidding? The fact 
of the matter is that for forty 
years, U. S. administrations have 
conditioned us to be dependent on 
the U. S. mentally, socially and 
economically. The Marshalls 
will have no choice but to renew 
the compact . . . making the 
region even more dependent on 
the U. S . ' 18 
The Pohnpei State Legislature expressed its 
reservations about the compact, especially those 
sections that specified the overriding paramountcy 
of American security interests and allowed for 
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American review of all financial accounts and 
records at every level of government within 
Micronesia. 19 The Pohnpeian legislators saw these 
latter powers as a serious disruptive incursion on 
the autonomy and integrity of both the national and 
state governments of the FSM. 
During the course of the United States 
Congress' review of the document, a host of 
witnesses from legal, academic and church 
communities voiced their concern or opposition to 
the compact. Dr. Mark Roberts of Harvard 
University described the compact as hundreds of 
pages long, written by a very clever bunch of 
American lawyers with a very convoluted, 
ultimately self-serving system of cross 
referencing,20 and difficult for even a trained 
professional to comprehend. Roberts's assessment 
was seconded by Senator Johnson Toribong of the 
Palau Legislature who characteri:zed the compact as 
a 'masterpiece of cross-referencing . . . difficult to 
read, written in English by attorneys, full of 
ambiguities. '21 Prof. Roger Clark of Rutgers 
University Law School, a consultant to different 
Micronesian governments during the negotiations, 
likened the document to something designed by an 
unscrupulous insurance company. Speaking before 
the United Nations Trusteeship Council on 1 
December 1982, Clark pointed out that what is 
given on the first page may be taken away by the 
small print in one of the eleven subsidiary 
agreements. 22 Arnold Leibowitz, in his 1989 book 
Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of 
United States Territorial Relations, characteri:zed 
the various subsidiary agreements as often 
containing provisions too difficult politically to be 
placed in the text of the compact itself. 23 
This was especially true in matters 
involving the deployment of nuclear weapons and 
radioactive materials through Micronesian land, 
seas, and airspace. With direct reference to section 
324 of the Compact of Free Association with 
Palau, Roberts pointed to how the restrictions on 
the use, test, storage, or disposal of nuclear, toxic, 
chemical, gas or biological weapons by the United 
States could be circumvented by provisions in the 
Mutual Security Pact and Military Use and 
Operating Rights Agreements. 24 These provisions 
distinguish between armed and unarmed nuclear 
weapons; they also designate the United States as 
the ultimate determiner of crisis situations that 
might necessitate the presence of nuclear weapons 
within Micronesian territory. Roberts concluded 
that the subsidiary agreements concerning security 
issues and military operations in the islands 
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ultimately permit the United States to do whatever 
it wants whenever it wants. 
For many critics of the American presence 
in Micronesia, the compact does little more than 
insure the primacy of American defence and 
security interests in the area. Catherine Lutz, 
writing in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 
in June, 1986,  charged that the United States was 
buying out Micronesia not with the prospects of 
genuine economic development but with 'imported 
food, tobacco, alcohol, and government payroll 
checks' that only insured the continued dependence 
of the area on the United States. 25 Addressing the 
plebiscites on the Compact ofFree Association that 
were held in June of 1983 , she likened the 'free' 
choice of Micronesian voters to 'those of boat 
passengers who have been taken far from their 
shore by a pilot whose interests and itinerary are 
not their own and who are then given the choice of 
remaining on the boat or swimming the 200 miles 
back to shore. '26 An anthropologist with extensive 
field experience in the central Carolines, Lutz 
argued that the statements of American support of 
the compact evidenced the language of a paternal 
colonialism; Micronesians were said to have 'come 
of age' under the 'guidance and tutelage' of the 
United States. In Lutz's estimation, the compact 
simply disguised the annexation of Micronesia. 
Henry Schwalbenberg, the assistant 
director of the Micronesian Seminar on Moen in 
Chuuk, undertook an extensive, analysis of the 
Compact of Free Association between December of 
1981 and April of 1984. Schwalbenberg expressed 
particular concern about the mutual security pacts 
between the United States and the Micronesian 
governments. 27 In agreeing in perpetuity to the 
principle of strategic denial the FSM, the Marshalls 
and Palau were depriving themselves of their most 
crucial bargaining chip in any future political 
negotiations with the United States. All things 
considered, the Jesuit brother concluded that the 
compact was 'more association than free. '28 
Those concerned about how free the 
Micronesian governments really were under the 
compact would find much to be concerned about in 
a letter written to three very conservative members 
of Congress on 4 June 1981 ,  by James L. Buckley, 
then Under Secretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Science and Technology. 29 In that 
letter, Buckley noted that moderniz.ation and 
development in Micronesia were being imperiled by 
what he called 'traditionalism' . Buckley believed 
that until governing elites could overcome the 
impediments inherent to their culture, gross social 
and economic inequities would continue within the 
Micronesian communities, adding that Micronesian 
sovereignty was not innate, as the compact seemed 
to acknowledge, but was rather a matter of United 
States congressional discretion. United States 
responsibilities toward the area and its people 
transcended the limitations and concerns of 
international law; solid proof of local Micronesian 
governments' ability to insure the welfare of their 
citizens was required before absolute sovereignty 
could be granted. Buckley expressed his own view 
that free association in Micronesia would most 
likely lead toward a closer, more permanent 
relationship with the United States. Buckley 
envisioned some form of commonwealth status for 
the FSM, the Marshalls and Palau, or a union with 
other Pacific territories that might eventually evolve 
into statheood. 
Buckley's comments on the restrictions and 
conditions of Micronesian sovereignty seem to be 
mirrored in those provisions of the compact that 
permit United States' intervention and involvement 
in the process of local government. Section 102 of 
Title I of Public Law 99-239 approving the 
compact between the United States and the FSM 
and Marshalls governments stipulates the 
submission of economic development plans by both 
Micronesian governments. Section 23 1 of Article 
II of the compact with Palau also calls for the 
submission and review of a national development 
plan. These national development plans, revised 
submitted at five-year intervals over the life of the 
compact, are to be reviewed by the President who 
then reports to Congress within sixty days of 
receiving the documents. In making his 
assessment, the President is required to solicit the 
views of the Secretary of the Interior, the 
Administrator of the Agency for International 
Development, and the heads of appropriate 
executive departments. 
In testimony before a House 
Subcommittee, Ambassador Fred Zeder, the 
President's personal representative to the 
Micronesian status talks between 1981 and 1986, 
said the purpose of this requirement was to ensure 
the success of a mutually appropriate, desirable set 
of economic goals and objectives involving the 
American and Micronesian governments. 30 For 
him, this system of monitoring and control was 
sufficiently rigorous to ensure the prudent 
allocation of compact funds, and flexible enough to 
be consistent with the self-governing status of the 
Micronesian governments. 31 Zeder further justified 
this requirement as a remedy for the chronic lack 
of long term economic planning in the Trust 
Territory. Thinking it rather ironic that the world's 
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leading capitalist economy would be insisting upon 
a national development plan, representatives of the 
Federated States of Micronesia, during the course 
of negotiations over the compact, asked their 
American counterparts for a copy of the United 
States' national development plan or, if that were 
unavailable, a copy of the development plan for 
New York City!32 They received neither. 
If free association is understood to be 
more about association than sovereignty, the 
provisions of the compact to promote the 
economies of the islands might be construed to be 
more about control than development. Section 233 
of Title II of the compact authorizes the conduct of 
audits on all monies extended as economic 
assistance and identified in section 21 1 of the same 
Title II. Even more sweeping, however, are the 
provisions in Section 102.c. 1 of Public Law 99-239 
implementing the compact. This section gives the 
Comptroller General of the United States and his 
General Accounting Office the authority to audit all 
grants, program assistance, and other forms of aid 
provided to the FSM. In pursuing this duty, the 
Comptroller General is given access ' to such 
personnel and to such records, documents, working 
papers, automated data and files, and other 
information relevant to such a review' . 
These extensive powers are enhanced 
further by other legal requirements in the 
legislation approving the Compact. Under section 
102.c.4, the Government ofthe Federated States of 
Micronesia is required to provide financial 
statements which account for the use of all funds 
provided by the United States under the compact. 
The submission of such financial statements is 
required within 180 days after the end of the fiscal 
year in the United States. Section 103 .m. 1  of 
Public Law 99-239 makes similar requirements for 
audits and the submission of annual financial 
statements by the Republic of the Marshalls. 33 In 
addition, supplemental provisions to section 177 of 
the compact providing money for validated claims 
against damage, loss and suffering as a result of the 
American nuclear testing in the Marshalls require 
the services of a fund manager to supervise the 
expenditure and recording of all monies in 
connection with this authorization. Similar 
requirements are placed upon the lump sum 
payment of $66 million to the government of Palau 
during the first year of the compact; section 21 1 ,  
Article II o f  the compact's Title II calls for a 
separate agreement on the monitoring and review of 
all investment income earned form this money. In 
short, a scrutiny of the Compact of Free 
Association, particularly those areas dealing with 
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economic assistance and with the management and 
supervision of that assistance, suggests that 
economic development remains subordinate and 
subservient as it always has in American 
Micronesia to the dictates of strategic politics. 34 If 
the history of the islands called 'Micronesia' were 
only about American colonialism and compacts of 
free association, the future would look a great deal 
like the past. 
Touring the Edge of Paradise 
What of American Micronesia in the years 
immediately following the implementation of the 
Compact of Free Association? P. F.  Kluge, in his 
book The Edge of Paradise, provides a very 
personal and particular vision of the islands. Kluge 
writes of the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall 
Islands in 1989, three years after the 
implementation of the compact in the FSM and the 
Marshalls, and four years after the inauguration of 
the commonwealth agreement in the Northern 
Marianas. A former Peace Corps volunteer, author 
of what ultimately became the preamble to the 
constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 
and now professor of creative writing, Kluge 
details a trip he took to Micronesia in search of the 
meaning behind the suicide of his close friend and 
second President of the Republic of Palau, Lazarus 
Salii. Kluge's text is deeply affected by grief, 
angst, a consciousness of aging, a sense of loss, 
and a feeling of powerlessness. Shattered hopes 
and failed dreams provide the metaphors that 
organire Kluge's narrative and shape the meaning 
he finds in Salii' s death. 
Kluge had once looked at a younger, more 
idealistic, charismatic Salii as the one who would 
take a group of conquered, colonired, 
misadministered islands and transform them into 
proud, bustling island communities that stood at the 
center of the Pacific. For Kluge, the contemporary 
situation in the islands now mirrors Salii 's fate. 
Kluge sees the islands as possessing the same kind 
of dilapidated quality that characterired their 
physical infrastructure in the immediate post-World 
War II years. Almost fifty years after America's 
initial occupation, Koror in Palau, like most of 
Micronesia, still exudes the ambience of a 'ruined 
estate, abandoned by owners and overseers, 
inherited by local workers, newly liberated and 
somewhat at a loss'. 35 Concrete houses, air 
conditioners, sewers, paved roads and shopping 
malls are all products of the American presence; 
they do not change, however, the town's essential 
nature which is ' .  . . ramshackle and nondescript, 
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a disappointment to visitors who expected thatch 
roofs, breezy porches, and raffish charm. '36 
Kluge chronicles a Micronesia in which 
the different island groups have settled their fates 
and made their deals with the Americans. He 
counts a total population of less than one-hundred 
thousand, speaking nine mutually unintelligible 
languages and surviving on 'a shaky, artificial 
lopsided economy based on scrap metal, copra, fish 
and government subsidy in an area • . • so far, so 
small and located off the edge of the world. '37 The 
net effect of five decades of American bumbling 
and mismanagement is the creation of a welfare 
state that resembles more an urban ghetto or a 
North American Indian reservation than a Pacific 
Island. Kluge comments that those, like himself, 
who had once rooted for Micronesians now find 
themselves confronted with the prospect that island 
leaders are using their new powers to trash the 
place and each other. 
Based on his travels, Kluge writes of 
opportunities turning into opportunism, of leaders 
gone bad, of corruption, nepotism, conflicts of 
interest,  privileges abused ,  cronyism, 
carpetbaggers, extravagant finders' fees, and 
sweetheart deals. Majuro, the atoll capital for the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, presents itself to 
Kluge as a ' feast of ironies, a warren of houses and 
warehouses and shacks that feels like a slovenly 
picnic in the mid-Pacific, like Central Park after 
one of those Puerto Rican holidays, all trashed and 
pissed on. '38 Majuro suffers from a plethora of 
'Third World' problems that include unplanned 
urbanization, rising expectations, rapid population 
increase, polluted lagoons, and poisoned reefs. 
Assaulting the physical senses are 'the smell of 
rotting wood, the sight of rusty roofs, the mid-day 
heat, the flies and mosquitos, potholes and puddles, 
ghetto crowding, and bus terminal torpor. ·� 
Moving further west on the Air Micronesia 
island hopper from Honolulu, Kluge reaches 
Pohnpei where he comments on the proclivity 
toward excessive drinking there and on the 'beer 
tumours' of Micronesian males that give them the 
look of a life-long pregnancy. Meanwhile, 
American expatriates sit in local bars and speak of 
the island in renal, anal and crude sexual metaphors 
that underscore their alienation, ignorance, and 
racism. Chuuk, for Kluge, remains 'dreaded 
Hogoleu' with too many people, so many 
problems, and not enough land. Moen Island, the 
site of Chuuk state's district government, exists as 
a dusty, crowded dead-end place, all shacks and 
wash lines, plastic buckets, dying dogs, dead cars, 
idling people, and monotonous Chuukese music. 
With the exception of Yap which is small, 
conservative, careful, prudent, free of major 
population pressures, and lead by an effective 
collaboration of traditional chiefs and elected local 
officials, the islands of the Caroline group that 
comprise the Federated States of Micronesia 
struggle on as troubled places; they flounder some 
days, 'floating and drifting the rest; less like 
islands than lifeboats, left behind by a large ship's 
sinking, paddling in circles, waiting for something 
to show up on the horimn, a continent they can 
land on or a rescue vessel that will toss them a 
line. •«> 
Saipan, benefiting from Japanese tourism 
and the lucrative terms of its recent commonwealth 
status, is described as looking like an American 
suburban fantasy land and as being the most 
corrupt place on earth. Prosperity has brought 
complaint as well as wealth to the Chamorros of 
the island. There is, writes Kluge, considerable 
fear and distrust of alien workers from as far away 
as Sri Lanka who crowd the garment factories and 
work in the hotels, and of Chinese and Korean 
merchants who outwork and undercut local 
merchants. Upon reaching Palau, his ultimate 
destination, Kluge proceeds to indict that island 
group for its pride, malice, opportunism, and 
mystery. Kluge cites one expatriate observer's 
comments that Palauans are 'just as fouled up as 
the other Micronesians are. '41 Government 
provides the first refuge of employment, the 
religion and opiate of the people. Kluge suggests 
that Palau with its layers of national, state and local 
governmental institutions, may be both the most 
over-governed and the most ungovernable place in 
the world. Palauans' penchant for bickering with 
one another is manifest in their modem-day 
proclivity to sue, and in their use of outside 
agencies and experts for advantage against local 
rivals. Even the most promising and carefully 
planned development projects fall victim to disputes 
among different groups of Palauans over land use 
and ownership. Kluge sees the future of the 
Caroline and Marshall islands as a source of 
intense local anxiety. He quotes an expatriate 
resident of Pohnpei who understands well the 
intimate, long-standing relationship between global 
strategic politics and American levels of funding 
for the islands; 
. . . there's no god damned 
source of funding to run the 
fucking place. What source of 
money is going to take the place 
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of the millions they're getting 
now? They're supposed to lose 
four or, five federal programs 
next year, and they' re talking like 
its the end of the world . . . if 
Gorbachev winds down the 
fucking cold war, we're fucked. 
Anybody who goes to bed here 
and prays for peace ought to be 
shot.42 
For Kluge, Micronesia represents a once 
gallant, well intentioned exercise in trusteeship 
gone tedious and corrupt. Trying to worlc through 
his affection, nostalgia and longing for the islands 
of his youth, Kluge acknowledges that his great 
hope was that the islands would remain stable and 
stationary. Instead, they became something else, 
he writes, 'something . . .  loose and drifting, 
small-feeling places to escape from, not to. '43 With 
direct reference to the pressures that caused his 
friend Lazarus Salii to take his own life, Kluge 
comments that no man is an island and that no 
island is an island either. If the Compact of Free 
Association has brought the end of history to 
American Micronesia, it is a bad end to read 
Kluge's vision of it. 
Beyond Ends and Edges: Recalculating 
Economic Development 
Kluge's The EJ.ge of Paradise does not stand alone; 
it is the most recent example of a fairly extensive 
body of both popular and academic literature that 
addresses the failure of economic development in 
American Micronesia. Like Kluge, most critics of 
the American presence in Micronesia point to the 
long-standing primacy of strategic interests in the 
area and the consequent need to bind the islands 
closely to the United States through some long-term 
political arrangement. 44 Given this line of analysis, 
economic development never amounted to little 
more than a charade; political absorption, not the 
promotion of self-sufficient viable economies, 
constituted the United States' ultimate objective in 
the islands. I am more concerned, however, with 
economic development not as a casualty of 
essentially strategic politics but rather as a strategy 
of domination, itself. A seemingly more 
benevolent strategy of rule, the promotion of 
economic development in American Micronesia 
represents, I believe, a process of change no less 
disruptive and destructive than other colonial 
initiatives in its effects upon the peoples, places, 
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and cultures of the area. While most criticisms of 
American colonialism in Micronesia have focused 
on more overtly political methods of control, I see 
in the plans for economic development a somewhat 
disguised but nonetheless insidious effort to better 
possess Micronesians by remaking them in an 
image and likeness that was distinctively reflective 
of and submissive to the dominant values and 
interests in American society. 
There exists, I think, another way to read 
the history of economic development in American 
Micronesia and perhaps elsewhere. We need to 
take economic development both a little more and 
a little less seriously. We need to understand that 
the issues at stake in the transformation that is 
economic development cannot be measured in terms 
of gross national products, per capita income, 
import-export ratios, capital gains, or even 
employment statistics. We need to consider too 
economic development as a transformative process 
that aspires to be near total in its reach and effects 
and that is resisted in ways that can be subtle, 
masked, confounding, and even contradictory. 
In offering these thoughts on calculating or 
figuring economic development differently in 
American Micronesia, I do not mean to portray 
American colonialism as a monolithic force -
focused, directed and efficient in its program of 
rule, administration and change. Nicholas Thomas, 
in his Colonialism 's Culture, defines colonialism 
as a deep, penetrating program of change operating 
on almost all levels of a colonized society, but a 
process that is also complex, varied and sometimes 
self-defeating in its workings.45 Thomas advocates 
a realization of colonialism's particular features in 
a given locale and time, and a recognition too of 
the diverse, conflicting agenda and strategies 
employed by different groups of people from a 
single colonizing nation. In the case of American 
Micronesia, there exist substantive and critical 
differences that separate international bureaucrats, 
federal officials, local administrators, development 
planners, expatriate businessmen and entrepreneurs, 
missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers, professional 
researchers, and media people. These need to be 
kept in mind as well. 
The issues with which I deal are 
essentially conceptual. The Compact of Free 
Association does not mark the end of history for 
the Marshalls, Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia. The making of history will go on in 
ways that are very much culturally ordered and 
locally significant. The islands of the former Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands have not been made 
over into liberal democracies. The land owners of 
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Kwajalein atoll wrestle with the Marshallese 
government over compensation and representation 
as do the citizens of the irradiated atolls of Bikini, 
Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik. 46 The group 
known as the Voice of the Marshalls, representing 
those islands and atolls to the south, continue to 
resist the dominance of the north and the Kabua 
family. In the Federated States of Micronesia, 
individual states and various factions grapple with 
each other in ways that may lead to the eventual 
dissolution of the entity. 47 Pohnpei contests for 
advantage with Chuuk, while within Chuuk itself, 
the Faichuk area struggles for recognition as a 
separate and fifth state. Political divisions within 
Palau, a major contributing factor in the decade-old 
battle over the approval of the compact, will not 
cease now that Palau is formally in free association 
with the United States. The patterns of the Palauan 
past are too strong, deep and alive to allow for an 
end to local history. In the Commonwealth of the 
Mariana Islands, territorial incorporation into the 
United States has created not new or near­
Americans, but issues around local autonomy and 
control that will serve as the stuff of history for 
decades to come. 
I suspect, too , that the Compact of Free 
Association will not bring what most of us 
understand to be economic development to the 
Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Islands. The 
people of Micronesia struggle to be more and other 
than simply productive workers or responsible 
consumers in 'free association' with one of the 
worlds' major capitalist democracies. At the same 
time, negotiations that begin in 1998 over the 
renewal of the compact may well result in a drive 
toward commonwealth status for the FSM, the 
Marshalls and Palau. Just what commonwealth 
status might mean for these island entities and how 
the attendant notion of dependency is to be 
understood in its cross-cultural adjustments 
constitute vital issues in reassessing economic 
development for the area. On the other hand, the 
most important part of the existing compact may 
well be Article IV of Title I that allows citi:zens of 
the different Micronesian nations to enter, work 
and establish residence as nonimmigrants in the 
United States and its territories. It may well be 
that future histories of the people of the greater 
Micronesian area will include places such as Guam 
and Hawaii. 
Those of us who like our development 
quantifiable, and our heroes clearly identifiable, 
rooted in place and time, and engaged in what we 
perceive to be overt acts of resistance against 
forces of exploitation and control may find it 
difficult to keep up with the movement of people 
and the changing character of life in Micronesia. 
We may need to develop a greater sense of nuance 
and subtlety that admits to both the polyvocality 
and polylocality of a Micronesian diaspora to other 
areas of the Pacific and the world. Such a journey 
for those who undertake it will involve extensive, 
complicated, intensely personal and wrenching 
negotiations over meaning and identity in distant, 
alien, sometimes hostile settings within the 
parameters of a global economic order. It may be 
a world of degradation, suffering, mimicry, 
violence, discrimination and suffering. It may also 
prove a world in which there results something 
creative, resistant and syncretic; something, to 
paraphrase James Clifford, that is more ambiguous 
and more historically complex, and that requires 
that we perceive both the fading of certain orders 
of diversity and distinction, and the creation or 
reformulation of others. 48 The future history of 
Micronesia and more particularly of economic 
development may occur in ways and places that we 
have yet to recogni:ze or anticipate. 
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Decentralisation and the Postcolonial State in Solomon Islands 
Ian Frazer 
There has been a lot of interest in 
decentralisation and ethnicity in Melanesia since 
countries in that region became independent. 1 The 
reasons for this are by now quite familiar. 
Imperial rivalry in the late nineteenth century led 
to the formation of centralised states in the 
Western Pacific where they bad never existed 
before. These states encompassed extreme cultural 
and linguistic diversity. The different forces that 
came with colonialism laid the foundation for a new 
social and economic order. During colonial rule 
that order remained relatively secure, and the 
territorial integrity of those states remained intact, 
through the coercive power that was available to 
the colonialists. There was little concern with 
building legitimacy and internal cohesion. As 
colonial rule came to an end, political leaders 
confronted the task of building modem states. It 
was a situation in which regional identity and local 
loyalties outweighed any sense of national identity 
or commitment to the newly installed national 
government. Micronationalist activity was common 
and threatened postcolonial stability . 2 
Decentralisation of government provided one way 
of accommodating regional aspirations and national 
unity. 
Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands 
both adopted systems of provincial government 
within a period of six years of each other. In both 
cases, the decision to proceed along this path arose 
out of recommendations made by government 
committees especially set up to investigate possible 
systems of government for those countries. In 
Papua New Guinea it was the Constitutional 
Planning Committee which was set up in 1972, and 
in Solomon Islands, the Special Committee on 
Provincial Government, set up in 1977. 3 
The main reason for continuing interest in 
decentralisation in Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands especially, is because until now, provincial 
government bas failed to live up to the claims that 
were made for it when it was introduced. It bas 
not prevented new attempts at secession and other 
outbreaks of regional unrest, and it has not 
brought the anticipated improved performance and 
effectiveness to government. In many parts of the 
Solomons, for example, government services have 
deteriorated since provincial government was 
introduced. It bas contributed to political 
integration but more at the regional level rather 
than the national level. It has also been the basis 
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for further divisiveness, both inter-provincial and 
intra-provincial. One observer of decentralisation, 
and formerly a supporter of it, bas gone so far as 
to describe the system of provincial government in 
Papua New Guinea as destroying the nation. 4 In 
both countries there have been attempts at 
different times to abolish provincial government, 
the most recent attempt being that started by the 
Wingti Government in Papua New Guinea in 
October 1992 and which still bas not been 
resolved.s 
The poor record of provincial government 
and the attempts to abolish it must be set against 
strong continuing demand for decentralisation. In 
Solomon Islands, political parties supporting 
greater regional autonomy gained the ascendancy in 
the 1980s over the main centralist party, the 
Solomon Island United Party. Provincial 
government survived and became more deeply 
entrenched. Set against the failures and 
shortcomings that have been revealed so far, this 
rather paradoxical situation raises important 
questions about the nature of postcolonial politics 
and the way in which decentralisation and ethnicity 
have been used as political issues. It also raises 
questions about the postcolonial state and the 
inability to command greater legitimacy and 
feelings of national identity. 
The roots of this situation lie in the history 
of colonial rule. Here I propose to discuss this 
from two main perspectives, one dealing with the 
changing form of ethnicity under colonialism, and 
the other looking at the role of the state in the 
economy. I show that colonialism gave rise to new 
ethnic categories and ethnic formations. These 
became the basis for emergent patterns of ethnic 
consciousness and mobilisation which gradually 
intensified in the 1930s and 1940s and posed 
serious challenges to the colonial state. In the post­
war period these challenges were largely contained 
through the introduction of local government and 
through carefully controlled participation in 
central government. 
The growth of political consciousness in 
the three decades leading-up to independence was 
uneven. Participation in government set the stage 
for new patterns of ethnic rivalry. This did not 
diminish as government institutions were upgraded 
and reformed, it only took new forms. The 
colonial administration believed that political 
consciousness and experience could be built in 
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stages, ending up finally with a strong national 
consciousness. At the time of independence that 
final stage had not yet been reached. Regional 
consciousness was still far stronger than any feeling 
of national identity or commitment to national 
institutions. This gap provided the opening for 
more intensive ethnic rivalry, now conducted on a 
regional basis, and now waged around demands for 
decentralisation. Partial devolution of power to the 
regions in the form of provincial government was 
the concession that central government had to make 
to maintain a unitary state. 
Since the introduction of provincial 
government, arguments over decentralisation have 
continued. At one level this has been a fight over 
further political devolution and how that should be 
controlled. At another, it has been a fight over the 
kind of influence which ethnicity should be 
allowed in the postcolonial state. Opponents of 
decentralisation and supporters of a unitary state, 
have argued that ethnicity needs to be transcended. 
They are committed to building nationalism and 
shaping a state which will stand above ethnic 
demands. Against them there are those who defend 
decentralisation, want to see it taken further, and 
use ethnicity to support their case. It is the latter 
group which gained ascendancy in the 1980s and by 
this ensured that the state would be opened up to 
ethnic pressure in a way that it had never been 
under colonial rule. The consequence of this is that 
ethnicity has come to have an ever increasing 
influence on many different aspects of national life, 
from economic and social policy through to the 
organi:zation and running of key national 
institutions. In the last four years, during the 
course of the Bougainville crisis it has also come to 
influence the conduct of foreign affairs. 
The other factor to consider is the role that 
has been played by the state, particularly during 
late colonialism and after independence. Colonial 
rule set a precedent for a high level of state 
intervention, more so after the war when it was 
assumed that the best way in which to stimulate 
growth and development in the territory was to rely 
on government assistance and direction. 6 This gave 
rise to a large and expanding bureaucracy. Since 
independence the bureaucracy has continued to 
expand as 'statist' policies have been continued. 
Post-independence governments have been inclined 
to give 'preference to bureaucracy over market as 
the principal mechanism of assigning resources and 
income in society' .  7 Reliance on the state was 
reinforced in the Solomons at the time of 
independence by the formation of several public 
enterprise corporations and by state participation in 
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a number of large joint ventures. Much of this 
activity was co-ordinated through the formation of 
the Government Shareholding Agency (since 
changed to Investment Corporation of Solomon 
Islands).8 
The political consequences of relying on a 
statist development policy were that the state 
become the most important site for the pursuit of 
economic advantage and for the various conflicts 
arising out of that. The state is where the most 
intensive struggles are taking place for access to 
scarce resources. Those taking part include 
individuals, political parties, trade unions, 
provinces and other regional groups, and the 
emerging local bourgeoisie. At the centre of these 
struggles, and with an advantage over everyone 
else, are the political and administrative elite. As 
Fitzpatrick has pointed out, in this situation where 
'the state is immediately and closely involved in 
production, in the extraction and redistribution of 
surplus, and in class and inter-group struggles' its 
autonomy and legitimacy are in doubt. 9 Moreover 
the distribution of surplus depends on pre-capitalist 
relations of a patron-client form. These relations 
then come to 'penetrate and shape the very 
institutions of the state' . 10 
Decentralisation, and the sanction it has 
given to ethnic demands, has provided a legitimate 
basis for clientialist relations and the politics of 
patronage. The political and administrative elite 
have become the key players here. 1 1  They are the 
ones who must attempt to manage and allocate the 
resources over which conflict is taking place. As 
Fitzpatrick says this is the 'politics of stalemate' 
trying to shape and adjust state distribution to a 
multitude of diffuse, particularistic demands' . 12 
Colonial Rule 
The annexation of the Solomons was largely the 
outcome of international rivalry in the Western 
Pacific. 13 Fearful of German and French intentions, 
the British moved to consolidate their control over 
islands which, by the late nineteenth century, had 
become strategically and economically important to 
Australia. The present boundaries of Solomon 
Islands came into effect between 1893 and 1899. 
Annexation started with the southern Solomons -
New Georgia, Guadalcanal, Nggela, Malaita and 
Makira. Rennell, Bellona and Sikaiana were added 
in 1897, the Santa Cruz Group in 1898, and 
Choiseul, the Shortlands, Santa Isabel and Ontong 
Java in 1899, after being acquired from Germany 
under the Samoan Tripartite Convention. 14 These 
moves took no account of cultural and linguistic 
FRAZER - Decentralisation and the Postcolonial State in Solomon Islands 97 
boundaries. Indeed, the British barely understood 
the kind of diversity which existed there and which 
was being incorporated within a single state. They 
did know that the people lived in small isolated 
communities and there was no widely recognized 
political authority through which they could 
negotiate their occupation of the area. 
Colonialism. set the international 
boundaries of the present state, opened the 
territory to plantation capital, introduced a highly 
centralised administrative structure through which 
it would exercise control, and created a totally 
foreign social and political order within which new 
patterns of differentiation and achievement would 
emerge. Ethnicity and class were the two main 
forms of differentiation to appear under the new 
order. They were closely inter-related and became 
apparent from very early on, under the combined 
influence of the plantation industry, missionaries 
and the administration. The colonial order was 
characteri7.ed by an ethnic hierarchy, with a clear 
horizontal division between Europeans and 
Solomon Islanders. Within this hierarchy, the 
multiple languages and local cultures were the basis 
for further vertical divisions among Solomon 
Islanders. These divisions were subject to a 
continuing process of redefinition as new ethnic 
names were used, new ethnic boundaries were 
formed, and new ethnic groupings appeared under 
the influence of the colonialists. 
The main interest here is in the history of 
these ethnic divisions and what they meant for the 
administration of the territory and the preparations 
that were made for independence. As Howard 
points out, ethnic differences lent themselves to the 
deployment of a 'divide and rule' strategy during 
colonial times and were used to maintain control 
and to ensure a labOur supply for capitalist 
enterprise. 15 This began in the Solomon Islands 
when pacification was the main concern, and 
continued thereafter. I argue that while this was 
convenient for the colonial administration it became 
extremely problematic during the lead-up to 
independence when ethnic differences became a 
threat to the maintenance of a unitary state. 
Colonial officials found that what had been a 
convenient tool of administration was no longer 
appropriate for a potentially self-governing 
territory. 
One of the first steps that was taken after 
the British established a resident administration in 
the Solomons, was to set up regional stations 
with their own district staff and then to use them 
to secure and subordinate the immediate hinterland. 
This included Gi:m (1899), the Shortlands (1906), 
Malaita (1909), Guadalcanal (1914), Makira and 
Isabel (1918).16 Below the level of these district 
stations, attempts were made to work through 
local leaders and set up a form of indirect 
administration. This had very limited success and 
sometimes brought the reverse of what it was 
meant to achieve, fermenting local unrest rather 
than ensuring stability. Even so, we see local 
communities gradually being incorporated within a 
larger regionally organized structure, in 
accordance with the demands of a centralised 
administration. These efforts were greatly aided by 
mission activity . Eventually the territory came to 
be divided into eight administrative districts, which 
were then divided into sub-districts, around 80 in 
total, with their own locally appointed headmen. 17 
The setting up of an administrative 
structure was carried out with minimal disruption 
to the traditional economic base of local 
communities. Considerable resettlement took 
place, often under the influence of missions more 
than the administration. This included movement 
from inland areas to the coast, and the formation of 
larger, more centralised communities. Despite this 
the majority of Solomon Islanders retained their 
land and continued to depend on subsistence 
production. Allegiance to kin-based communities 
and the territories which they controlled, continued 
to be the main basis for group loyalty and 
affiliation. As much as new ethnic identities began 
to emerge, representing the larger units within 
which people were being organized, they were still 
identities with a strong basis in land and the local 
environment. A major feature of ethnic 
differentiation was wide variation in the size and 
cultural distinctiveness of different language 
groups. 
The history of colonial rule divides readily 
into two separate periods. Prior to World War 
Two, the territory was largely administered for the 
benefit of the European-controlled copra industry. 
There was little interest in Solomon Islanders 
except as indentured labourers and rescued souls. 
They were denied any participation in the formal 
administration of the territory. After World War 
Two, there was recognition of the need for social 
and political development. Participation in 
government was now something to be actively 
encouraged, albeit under the control of the colonial 
authorities. 18 
Colonial rule created a unitary state and 
once preparations for self-government were begun, 
there was no question that it would continue to 
remain as such. For the British that meant having 
a strong central government that was committed to 
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national unity, supported by a second tier system 
of local government. Except for some experiments 
with sub-district councils, Solomon Islanders did 
not have any experience of either kind of 
government before 1950. In making up for this, 
much greater emphasis was put on developing local 
government, but in 1950, four Solomon Islanders 
were nominated to the Advisory Council, and from 
then on there was participation at both levels. In 
some cases the same people were involved as when 
local council presidents were nominated to the 
Advisory Council or, in later years, to the 
Legislative Council. Both kinds of experience 
contributed to the growth of regionally based 
ethnic consciousness. 
The British assumed that local government 
would work best if it was started in a small way 
among people who shared a common language and 
culture. The first councils and courts were tried in 
sub-districts on a trial basis with the aim of 
building political awareness and responsibility 
through local experience. Larger councils would 
be formed, covering a wider area and larger 
population, once leaders were able to show that 
they could overcome their 'excessive 
parochialism' . 19 There was the idea that this would 
slowly lead to the growth of national political 
consciousness. 20 
There were some places in which sub­
district councils did perform reasonably well but 
the policy had to be modified not long after it was 
introduced as a result of events in the most heavily 
populated district of the territory. 21 On the island 
of Malaita sub-district councils were either 
subverted or completely taken over by the Maasina 
Rule movement which started in 1944 and soon 
became a major political force on the island. 22 The 
movement formed its own island-wide political 
structure, encompassing the majority of the 
population. The only way in which the 
administration was able to bring it to an end was by 
abandoning the plan for sub-district councils and 
instead, negotiating the formation of an island­
wide council. 
Maasina Rule grew out of a number of 
different influences including in particular, 
Malaita's role as the main source of indentured 
labour in the protectorate. Malaita was a large 
island with around 12 different language and dialect 
groups. An island identity had grown through the 
experience of labour migration and mission 
activity. Now the island represented a larger ethnic 
formation, making a claim against the colonial 
state. With the formation of the Malaita Council 
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this claim was effectively contained in the routine 
of restricted local government. 
Malaita was not only the first district 
council to be formed, it was also the largest. It 
set a pattern for the continuing development of 
local government. It also set the stage for the 
growth of ethnic rivalry as other regions began to 
organire and establish a relationship with the state. 
The process of amalgamation by which this came 
about, took place partly through local initiative, 
and partly through the intervention of the 
administration. There were twenty-four councils in 
1963 , by 1977 this had been reduced to eight, 
seven rural and one urban. In this process it was 
the larger islands that amalgamated first - Malaita, 
Isabel, Makira, Guadalcanal - and the Western 
District. It was the smaller islands, which also had 
the most to lose, that were the last to amalgamate. 
In some cases (Anuta and Tikopia) amalgamation 
continued to remain uncertain. 
Amalgamation in its final form represented 
the last step in a long process of arriving at 
regional units sufficiently large to provide a 
practical and economic basis for local government 
administration. The process was facilitated by the 
growth of new ethnic/island identities but 
sometimes the amalgamations went far beyond this 
and it was administrative convenience that 
prevailed. The main problem with the final 
structure is that it was quite uneven. There was a 
substantial difference in the population of council 
areas, with the largest being nearly six times the 
sire of the smallest. Also big differences exist in 
the land area and in the other resources in each 
council area. The councils varied in the degree of 
cohesiveness being shown and the strength of 
common identity. These factors would have 
implications for their treatment at the national 
level, and their effectiveness and efficiency at the 
local level. The council structure set the stage for 
continuing ethno-regional rivalry; it also ensured 
that this would be a highly uneven contest. 
In all the years that local government was 
developed, including the last three years of reform 
between 1974 and 1977, there was the idea that it 
would operate under the same principles as local 
government in Britain. The only powers exercised 
by local councils would be powers devolved to 
them by central government. They would always 
be subject to the monitoring and control of central 
government. In deciding what responsibilities 
would be undertaken at each level of government, 
it was decided that local government 'should 
undertake all activities except those which, because 
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of the wider effects of the issues or nature of the 
resources involved, cannot in practice be devolved 
to the local level' .  23 In practice local councils 
were encouraged to take responsibility for basic 
services, such as education and health, and to 
undertake to collect some of the revenue required 
for providing these services. 
In parallel with the changes in local 
government, we also see steadily increasing 
participation by Solomon Islanders in central 
government. 
This also contributed to the growth of regional 
consciousness, except that there was a reverse trend 
to what took place at the local level. Whereas the 
number of local government councils was steadily 
reduced and the political units they represented got 
larger, the number of central government 
politicians was increased and the siz.e of the units 
which they represented slowly reduced. 
The constitutional changes and the general 
trends that accompanied them are well known. 24 
Executive and Legislative Councils made up of 
wholly appointed members were established in 
1960. In 1964 the Constitution was altered to 
provide for the election of eight of the ten 
unofficial members of the Legislative Council. In 
1967, the number of unofficial members was 
increased from 10 to 14, all of them directly 
elected according to universal adult franchise. 
Official members still outnumbered unofficial 
members but in 1970, when the Executive and 
Legislative Councils were replaced with a single 
Governing Council, and the number of elected 
members increased to 17, they then outnumbered 
the official members. In 1974 the number of 
elected members was increased to 24 . In that year 
a new Constitution was enacted and there was a 
return to the traditional division between the 
legislative and executive branches of government 
and a ministerial system of government. In 
January 1976 under an Order in Council made in 
November 1975, the 1974 Constitution was 
amended and self government was conferred on the 
Solomon Islands. Later that year another election 
was held for the Legislative Assembly at which 
point the Assembly had 38 seats. 
The constitutional changes between 1960 
and 1974 might be described as carefully 
controlled preparation for the ultimate transfer of 
power at independence, they are referred to as 
laying the foundation for the working of a Western 
democracy based on the Westminster model. 25 It is 
also the case that a foundation was being laid for 
the continuation of a unitary state after the transfer 
of power. The only precedent set for that was 
colonial rule which up until then had been 
bureaucratic and authoritarian in nature. 26 It was 
quite apparent in the early 1970s that Solomon 
Islanders had very little commitment to national 
institutions and very little interest in national 
issues. 'IT The one institution in which this was 
critically important if there was going to be a 
unitary state was the legislature itself. To ensure 
legitimacy this had to be representative. One 
condition for this was introducing universal adult 
suffrage. But Solomon Islands was also a multi­
ethnic state and we need to look at the kind of 
measures taken to ensure representativeness on an 
ethnic basis. 
It becomes clear that these measures, at 
least in the early period when members were 
nominated, were largely based on regional divisions 
and regionally-based local councils. As the number 
of nominated members was increased, the numbers 
representing each region were adjusted according to 
their siz.e. This did more to reinforce regional 
consciousness than promote the growth of national 
consciousness as the administration was trying to 
do. 
During the time of the Legislative Council 
the number of unofficial Solomon Island members 
was increased twice in 1964 and 1967, and regional 
concerns were a major influence on the numbers 
chosen and the way in which they were elected. 
Out of the eight elected members in 1964, 
Malaita had three, Central had two, and Eastern, 
Western and Honiara had one each. There were 
complaints from the Western District that one 
member was not enough. When it was decided 
they should get two members in 1967, the number 
allocated to other regions was increased 
proportionately. Hence the jump from eight to 14 
at that time. Further increases in 1970, 1973 and 
1976 meant that representation was extended to 
minority island groups such as Rennell and Bellona 
and Ontong Java (Malaita Outer Islands), even 
though on a population basis they were much 
smaller than the average siz.e electorate. In 1976, 
with 38 seats, the Legislative Assembly reached 
the siz.e it would be at independence when it 
became the National Parliament, and the siz.e it 
would stay until 1993 . 
The colonial administration found it could 
not allocate seats solely on the basis of population. 
The way in which ethnicity came to be used owed 
a lot to the history of local government. This is 
shown especially by the case of Malaita. It was a 
special case not just because it was the largest 
council but because it was the first to amalgamate 
and also because of the circumstances in which it 
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amalgamated. This meant that in the early stages 
of constitutional advance Malaita was singled out 
for special attention. By the time other councils 
achieved their final form, one in particular, 
Western Council, was demanding equality with the 
rest. Being unable to achieve that in national 
institutions it sought equality through regional 
autonomy. The demand for equality might be seen 
as legitimate on an ethnic basis although historical 
precedent precluded that from being considered. 
This will be taken up in more detail in the next 
section. 
In presenting the history of local 
government it has been shown that this was the 
basis for growth in regional consciousness. It has 
also been argued that by the time of independence 
regional consciousness was far stronger than 
national consciousness. It was inevitable then that 
there would be ethnic rivalry in the national 
legislature particularly when there was some 
imbalance in the relative strength of the regions on 
which ethnic calculations were based. 
Independence - Decentralisation and Ethnicity 
become National mues 
Solomon Islands became independent in July 1978. 
A number of national institutions had been put in 
place to lay the basis for authority in the new state, 
and to ensure that it would remain unitary. These 
included a public service, judiciary, and a police 
force. The most important national institution was 
a written constitution which had been developed 
over more than two years of negotiation and 
consultation. 28 This made the Queen the head of 
state, represented by a governor general, 
appointed on the recommendation of the legislature 
every five years. The Constitution also provided 
for a single-chamber, parliamentary form of 
government based on Westminster principles with 
separation of the executive and the legislature. The 
main modification to the Westminster system was 
an enhancement of the role of the legislature, most 
noticeably in its power to appoint and dismiss the 
prime minister. Executive power was in the hands 
of a cabinet headed by the prime minister. The 
Constitution provided for 30 to 50 constituencies 
for the purposes of election of members of 
Parliament (S. 54). At independence there were 
38 and this was not increased until 1993 when the 
number was raised to 47. 
Not everyone supported independence in 
1978 or the institutions on which it was based. 
The opposition party in the National Parliament, 
the National Democratic Party (NADEPA), argued 
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to have independence delayed so there would be 
more time to examine the issues. 29 One of the 
leading provinces, Western Province, boycotted 
the celebrations. Their protest was directed at the 
Independence Constitution. They wanted a 
guarantee that there would be devolution of power 
to the provinces. Ultimately they wanted a more 
federal political structure. 30 The Western 
Breakaway Movement was active between 1974 and 
1979 during the critical period of constitution­
making and finalising the shape of the post­
independence state. Some of its leaders called for 
secession but this did not have total support. 31 The 
movement was centred at Western Council 
headquarters where it had a collective leadership 
made up of national parliamentarians, council 
leaders, chiefs and various community leaders. 32 
The Western Council was formed in 1972 through 
voluntary amalgamation of five local councils, 
fulfilling the intentions of the colonial 
administration for the rationalisation of local 
government. The Western region comprised a 
large number of islands and many different 
language groups but had long been administered as 
a single district. This, and the influence of the 
Methodist Mission, had contributed to the 
emergence of a new ethnic formation, characterized 
by a very strong regional consciousness. 
Western demands for greater regional 
autonomy started some years before independence. 
In 1975, a submission was made by the Western 
Council in support of federal government to the 
committee that was formed to recommend a 
constitution for the Solomons. It was rejected. 
The Committee invoked its terms of reference 
which required it to take account of the ability of 
the country to pay 'from its own resources' .  33 The 
Committee felt that devolution should take place 
through local government and recommended that 
there should be a 'simple statement of principle to 
that effect' in the Constitution.34 They also 
indicated ways in which local government 
legislation might be amended in order to increase 
the autonomy of local government councils. This 
did not satisfy the opponents of a unitary 
constitution. Circulation of the report led to 
renewed calls for 'effective and full devolution' 
from members of local government councils in 
Western, Isabel, Eastern and Guadalcanal 
Provinces. 35 Another strong supporter of federal 
government was NADEPA led by Bartholomew 
Ulufa'alu. 36 The national government remained 
firmly committed to a unitary system but did make 
two concessions to those demanding greater 
regional autonomy. First was a statement 
FRAZER - Decentralisation and the Postcolonial State in Solomon Islands 101 
guaranteeing a degree of autonomy to the provinces 
and secondly, agreeing to the setting up of a special 
committee to look into provincial government. 37 
Between 1977 and 1979 the Special 
Committee on Provincial Government chaired by 
the experienced politician, David Kausimae, 
became the main focus for those who were seeking 
greater provincial autonomy. When it reported in 
May 1979, it identified a large number of powers 
and functions that could be transferred to provincial 
government from the national government. 38 The 
Committee argued on the basis of cultural 
differences and geographical separation that 
decentralisation was necessary for national unity. 
It also stipulated that it would be possible to do this 
and also maintain a unitary state. 39 One observer 
was more sceptical. Herlihy pointed to a number 
of problems that the committee overlooked in its 
recommendations, including increased costs, 
administrative difficulties, reduced government 
capacity for economic management, a 'strong bias 
in favour of the better-developed provinces' and a 
'high potential for disunity' . 40 The Kausimae 
Committee played an important role in keeping up 
the momentum for decentralisation. In doing so, it 
took the side of the provinces, many of whose 
leaders were on the Committee. With them it set 
itself against the central bureaucracy and many 
national politicians. The political and 
administrative elite were primarily interested in 
maintaining and consolidating the power of the 
state. This resistance to decentralisation meant 
there was another two years and a change of 
government before provincial government was 
finally introduced. In one of the first moves that 
they made after coming to power in August, 1981 ,  
the coalition government of  Solomon Mamaloni, 
introduced and passed the Provincial Government 
Bill 1981 ,  41 setting in operation the system which is 
still in place now. 
The Western Breakaway Movement died 
out in 1979 with part of its leadership co-opted by 
central government, and its main demand in the 
hands of the Kausimae Committee. 42 The 
immediate threat of secession or separation was 
averted but the interest in greater regional 
autonomy remained and would remain even after 
provincial government was introduced. The 
Western protest was directed specifically at the 
concept of a unitary state as it was constructed by 
the colonial administration during the years leading 
up to independence. As we have seen this was 
based on a limited number of ethnic formations, of 
unequal siz.e, gradually formalised under a 
system of local government, given representation 
in national government according to their siz.e. 
Under this policy, there would always be unequal 
representation at the national level. 
In a sense, demanding greater political 
autonomy was the Western Council's way of 
protesting against this inequality. They were 
seeking the kind of equality offered by the United 
Nations, the equality commanded by sovereign 
states, irrespective of their siz.e. They might have 
sought this equality in the national legislature and 
argued that ethnicity or regionalism take priority 
over population. In looking at the allocation of 
seats in the legislature it is noticeable that some 
allowance has been made for ethnic minorities, 
such as smaller Polynesian islands in the country, 
but there has been less a tendency to equalise 
representation among the larger ethnic regions. 
The proposal for federal government put 
forward by the Western Council proved to be one 
of the most durable and potent ideas in postcolonial 
politics. It is one of the key ideas around which 
ethnic rivalry has continued. The idea has been 
largely opposed by Malaita, and supported by 
nearly every other province in the country. 
Provincial Government and Decentralisation in 
the 1980s 
The era of provincial government was launched on 
lst February 1982, when seven provinces were all 
formerly established throughout the country on 
their 'first appointed day' .  43 The number of 
provinces and their boundaries were the same as 
had been brought into existence under the last 
phase of local government reform between 1974 
and 1977. Provincial government is modelled 
closely on the same lines as national government. 
In each province there is a legislature (Provincial 
Assembly) and an executive (Provincial Executive) 
which is responsible for the administration of the 
province. Provincial executives are accountable to 
their assemblies in the same way as the National 
Executive (Cabinet) is accountable to Parliament. 
The assembly has the power to elect and dismiss 
the premier. The executive is chosen by the 
premier from among members of the assembly. 
Creating places for another 158 salaried 
politicians, in addition to the 3 8  at the national 
level, has greatly extended the arena for political 
competition. 
The transfer of powers and functions from 
central government to the provinces was not 
automatic, but depended on the negotiation of 
devolution orders with the respective provincial 
ministry. The first devolution order that had to be 
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negotiated was that providing for the exercise of 
legislative powers and financial powers set out in 
the Act. The day on which these powers were 
taken up was described as the 'second appointed 
day' .  44 All provinces reached their second 
appointed days by August 1984. Since then the 
negotiation of devolution orders has continued, with 
each province setting its own pace and its own 
aspirations for the transfer of power. By putting 
devolution on an individual basis like this, the 
legislation has provided continued scope for the 
'divide and rule' approach used in the colonial past. 
Provincial government has provided wide 
scope for the enhancement of regional identity. 
New ceremonies have been created marking 
important steps on the road to provincial status, and 
these have become opportunities for affirming 
regionalism through speech-making and cultural 
display. The most important ceremony now is the 
annual anniversary of the second appointed day. 
Provincial executives have used their powers to 
declare this a public holiday and organi:ze major 
celebrations at provincial headquarters. 45 Here 
there are close similarities with the celebrations 
marking the anniversary of independence which are 
held every year in the capital, Honiara. Both 
ceremonies include 'traditional ' cultural 
performances, using the past to try and give 
legitimacy to the nation and to each region. 46 
The introduction of provincial government 
immediately increased the si:ze and cost of 
government generally. It was estimated in 1988 
that national and provincial governments together 
accounted for one-third of the workforce and had 
operating budgets (excluding investment programs) 
equivalent to 50 per cent of cash national income. 47 
Reliable information on provincial government 
financial performance has not been available for 
some years, suggesting that the expansion in si:ze 
and cost of government has not been accompanied 
by improved efficiency and accountability. 
One of the most important arrangements 
that is used by central government to try and 
manage its relations with the provinces is the 
annual Premiers' Conference. 48 The meeting is not 
a requirement that is written into the Act. It is 
organi:zed and financed by central government 
through the Ministry of Home Affairs. No other 
form of co-operation or consultation between 
Premiers has yet emerged. Since these meetings 
started they have been used by provinces to exert 
pressure on central government over the pace and 
terms under which powers and resources have 
been transferred to them. There have been 
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frequent complaints about the lack of finance and 
inadequate staffing. There has also been 
opposition to the way in which powers are 
devolved, especially the use of agency agreements. 
What provinces resented but could not escape was 
their continuing dependency on central government. 
This only added to the larger struggle for greater 
regional autonomy. 
By the late 1980s, provincial governments 
had come to take responsibility for the basic 
services which are most in demand from village 
communities: primary and provincial secondary 
schools, hospitals and clinics, roads, water 
supplies, agricultural extension, and local 
government. They were also finding that the 
funds they received were insufficient to maintain 
these services let alone expand and improve them 
as they needed to do. One consequence of this has 
been a deterioration in services in many provinces 
including schools closing before the end of the 
academic year, hospitals and clinics running out of 
drugs and equipment, agricultural extension staff 
unable to tour, roads and other infrastructure no 
longer maintained. 
In the face of these difficulties and a 
national government which from 1985 had steadily 
increasing external and domestic deficits, 
provinces came under constant pressure to 
generate more of their own revenue. 49 Among 
other things that has meant most provinces 
forming their own business arms, such as the Isabel 
Development Authority, the Malcira Economic 
Development Authority, Malaita Shipping 
Company, and the Western Province Investment 
Secretariat. These business arms are now 
involved in managing plantations, running shipping 
services, and a range of other commercial 
activities. This activity took a new tum in 1989 
when provincial governments started entering into 
large loans with the backing of national 
government. Western Province borrowed $3.5 
million from the National Provident Fund to build 
a housing estate at the new industrial town of Noro, 
to provide rented accommodation for employees of 
Solomon Taiyo Limited, and Guadalcanal Province 
borrowed $5 million from a commercial bank to 
purchase a plantation and property in Honiara. 50 
More recently, Malaita Province has made a $3.5 
million loan from the National Provident Fund for 
the purchase of a passenger ship. The political 
fighting that took place in this case shows the 
leverage which provinces have with central 
government in their attempts to play a bigger 
economic role. Originally the National Provident 
Fund Board refused this loan application. This led 
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to the Directors being removed and replaced with 
a Board that then approved the loan. 51 
The main area in which provinces are 
constantly reminded of their clientalist relationship 
with national government is funding. Provinces 
continued to depend on central government for the 
greater proportion of their revenue. Between 1980 
and 1987 grants (mostly from central government) 
comprised 75 to 83 per cent of total provincial 
government revenue. 52 The rest was raised by 
provincial governments themselves through various 
rates, licences, fees and services. 
The money received from central 
government comes in the form of grants. The 
number of grants has slowly increased since 1977, 
so that by 1988 there were ten different grants 
altogether. 53 These included a Fixed Service Grant 
to cover those services devolved under devolution 
orders, a Revenue Sharing Grant paid out of fish 
exports, a Productive Resource Grant based on 
export production within each province and 
representing ten per cent of income from the total 
gross exports produced by provinces, and a number 
of tied grants covering services such as education, 
road maintenance and health. 
Provincial governments are always seeking 
to increase their grants. Apart from this, what has 
been particularly contentious about funding has 
been the criteria used to determine the relative si7.e 
of grants. Ever since local government came under 
a separate ministry in 1974, population has been 
one of the main factors used to determine 
distribution of funds. This was a continual 
reminder of the difference in si7.e of each 
council/province. As regions gained more power 
and responsibility this came to be opposed, 
especially by the smaller provinces. 54 There were 
attempts to use other criteria but they had limited 
success and population still represented the main 
principle used . The matter was taken up by the 
Kausimae Committee. They felt that there should 
be more encouragement for what provinces were 
able to achieve in production, especially in the 
extraction of natural resources . There was the idea 
that grants should be seen as incentives rather 
than handouts. 55 This idea has come up frequently 
in the debates over decentralisation and came to 
represent one of the points used by those arguing 
for more regional autonomy. The history of 
provincial grants shows that central government did 
start to make a move in this direction in 1978 with 
the introduction of derivation grants based on the 
principle of returning revenue to those provinces 
in which it was derived. 56 This was at the time of 
the Western breakaway movement and was a 
response to that. Since then there has always been 
some funding allocated on this principle. In 1988 
it was the Productive Resource Grant. This has 
gone some way to appeasing those provinces in 
which export production is highest, especially 
Guadalcanal, W estem and Central Provinces but it 
has not stopped their demands. The issue is still 
used by certain political parties (the People's 
Alliance Party and more recently the Group for 
National Unity and Reconciliation), and by certain 
politicians (Solomon Mamaloni) as an election 
issue. Given that in all areas of export production 
there are large differences between provinces in the 
volumes produced, if funding should take this 
path, it will only increase existing inequalities and 
the divisiveness associated with it. 
In the four years between 1989 and 1993 
when Mamaloni was in power, there were further 
changes in provincial funding. These changes were 
not directed at improving the financial position of 
provinces and their services (although that was 
given some attention), so much as attempting to do 
something about what was argued as a shortage of 
capital in rural areas. What this meant in reality 
is that the number of hand-<>uts was increased, 
there was an attempt to distribute them more 
widely, and this inevitably added to the 
particularistic and personalised nature of 
provincial funding. However ineffectual and 
inadequate this has been for the further 
development of the provinces and for meeting their 
real needs, as a continuation of the clientalism 
started under provincial government it was a 
political winner. Contesting the 1993 election as 
the Solomon Islands Group for National Unity 
and Reconciliation, members of the Mamaloni 
Government won an unprecedented number of seats 
for a sitting government in the election, and only 
missed returning to power by one vote in the 
election for prime minister. 
The Mamaloni Government set up the 
Provincial Government Funding System as the 
main vehicle for injecting private capital into the 
provinces. It was intended that this would also 
work in conjunction with external financing such as 
aid and loans. One set of grants described as 
Small Community and Provinces Special 
Assistance (SICOPSA) were channelled directly 
(on a population basis) to Area Councils with a 
smaller proportion going to Provincial 
Governments. Another source of funds has been 
the Provincial Development Unit which gets its 
funds from bilateral aid donors. Since 1988 it has 
been channelling its funds specifically towards 
community -based 'income generating projects' . A 
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third source of funds which came to prominence 
during this period was a special constituency 
discretionary fund made available to national 
parliamentarians for use in their electorates. 
Between 1992 and 1993 (during the lead-up to the 
1993 election) the value of this fund was 
increased from $27,000 to $100,000. 
Ever since decentralisation became a major 
issue in the 1970s it has been closely linked to 
ideas about development. Starting with the moves 
that were made to introduce local government 
reform, and continuing thereafter in the demands 
that were made for greater regional autonomy, we 
see the argument being put forward that 
decentralisation would help to promote rural 
development. Originally the idea was that by 
strengthening local government, giving it more 
power and resources, this would increase 
participation in development, and bring the 
economic growth necessary for national economic 
self-sufficiency. 51 AB demands for greater regional 
autonomy increased it came to be argued that 
provincial governments should be allowed to 'run 
their own economic development' and make 
themselves independent of central government. 58 
Mamaloni continued to push this argument through 
the 1980s in association with his support for federal 
or state government. 
Speaking in Parliament in 1985 in the course of 
moving a motion for a constitutional review he 
said: 
It is time that provincial 
governments be given the rights 
to control their own resources, 
land, forests and seas. It is now 
time to pay back to provinces 
what is due to them in terms of 
produce and commodity 
derivations. In other words 
provinces have been supporting 
the central bureaucracy for many 
many years with some very 
nonsense expenses. Now is a 
tum of the central government to 
give back what is due to the 
provinces. Sir, let us give (to) 
provinces, let the provincial 
government generate more 
revenues directly for themselves, 
so they can be invested for their 
people.59 
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Similar arguments to this can be traced back to the 
1970s. It is significant that these arguments have 
been put forward over a period when there has 
been increasing emphasis on the exploitation of 
natural resources, especially timber and fish. 
One of the issues here is sharing of the 
benefits from these resources, with Mamaloni 
arguing that more of the revenue from them should 
be going to provinces, and ultimately the 'owners' 
of the resources. fiO The extraction of these 
resources has depended on foreign investors and 
they have got most of the benefits so far, to the 
disadvantage of national and provincial 
government, and resource owners. The record of 
commercial logging since the early 1980s has 
shown this more starkly than anything else. After 
1977, when forestry legislation was amended to 
allow logging companies to negotiate directly for 
the acquisition of timber rights with private owners, 
there was a marked increase in the number of 
foreign logging companies working in the Solomons 
and in the volume of output. Despite the 
continuation oflicensing procedures supervised by 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, that expansion 
coincided with decentralisation and did not have 
the controls and protection needed . to ensure that 
government and landowners alike got a fair deal 
from logging companies. 61 
There could now be a similar situation 
unfolding in the Solomon Island tuna industry. In 
the last three years, three provinces have entered 
into joint venture fishing agreements with 
companies from the Philippines and Singapore. 62 
The last two agreements have drawn strong 
criticism from the Forum Fisheries Agency. The 
details of one of these agreements between 
Choiseul Province and Marrissco (PTE) Ltd. , of 
Singapore, which has seen the formation of Lauru 
Marrissco Ltd, shows a deal in which all the 
advantages go to the joint venture partner. The 
company has been given a maximum catch quota of 
15,000 metric tonnes per annum for 15 years, with 
the right to renew for another 15 years. The 
royalty paid to the province represents an estimated 
0.05 per cent of the value of the catch. 63 
In relation to this kind of economic activity 
provinces are being encouraged to regard 
themselves as sovereign states with the power to do 
whatever they like with the resources they have 
within their boundaries. In the case of deep sea 
fishing, it seems likely that boundary disputes will 
develop between provinces as more of these joint 
ventures are established. 64 
One of the main arguments for devolution 
of power from central government to the provinces 
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has been that it would bring government closer to 
the people and in that way improve the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of government 
overall. This has not happened. Instead, 
provincial capitals have become mini-Honiaras, and 
provinces have become mini versions of the larger 
nation, replicating on a smaller scale the same 
kind of inequality and uneven development that is 
found nationally. Provincial government might 
have brought some modifications to the highly 
centralised government system that existed under 
colonialism but it has not escaped the same 
problems of centralisation and elitism at the 
provincial level. 
At the time of local government reforms, 
when larger regional units were being created by 
amalgamation, the colonial administration created 
a third tier of government immediately below the 
level of district councils. This three level structure 
has been maintained ever since. There were 
changes in the name given to third level units each 
time local government was reformed and changes 
in their responsibilities and functions. This level 
of organization in government, is the same level at 
which cultural and linguistic differences are 
recogniz.ed, and one of the factors which has made 
government at this level important historically has 
been the need to recognize the kind of role these 
differences play in local communities and in local 
economies. A case in point is customary land 
tenure. Between 85 and 90 per cent of land in 
Solomon Islands is still under customary tenure and 
more than 80 per cent of the population still live on 
customary land. The rules and conventions 
relating to land, and patterns of ownership and 
usage, all vary from one local district to the next. 
Any matter affecting customary land, has to be 
resolved at the local level. This has been one of 
the responsibilities that has been dealt with by Area 
Councils. 
The third level of government has always 
been the most neglected and ignored. When 
provincial government was introduced, the third 
level became known as local government. The 
Kausimae Committee had recommended that the 
powers and functions of local governments be set 
by an Act of Parliament. Under the Provincial 
Government Act 1981 provision is made for the 
transfer of all powers relating to local government 
to provincial assemblies. Since provincial 
government was introduced there has been a 
noticeable difference between provinces in the 
support that has been given to local government. 
In some provinces their situation has worsened to 
the point where Area Councils have sometimes 
broken down completely. The main problem has 
been lack of staff and lack of adequate funding. 
Area Councils are expected to raise some of their 
own revenue through local taxes and fees but that 
has not been very successful. 
By neglecting local government and 
allowing uneven development to worsen, provinces 
have had trouble in maintaining unity and 
preventing threats of separatism from within their 
boundaries. There has always been a risk that the 
accommodations and compromises that were made 
when local council amalgamation first took place, 
would not hold and there would be renewed claims 
for separate political status from sub-regional 
groups. This has happened under the provincial 
government system, and has led to the formation of 
two new provinces as a result. The island of 
Choiseul gained provincial status in 1990 through 
separating from Western Province, and Rennell and 
Bellona gained provincial status at the beginning of 
1993 after separating from Central Province. One 
province which has not split up yet but which bas 
faced threats of separatism from within is Malaita. 
There are long-standing divisions within this 
province which have been worsened by big 
differences in the level of development throughout 
the island. There have been several protests by 
different sub-regional groups against the authority 
of the province and threats of separation. 65 
There has been one attempt to abolish 
provincial government and to replace it with a 
structure based on Area Councils. This arose out 
of a review of the provincial government system 
which was set up by the Kenilorea Government in 
1986. The Minister responsible for the review was 
the Minister for Home Affairs and Provincial 
Government, Andrew Nori, a politician 
representing the West •Are'are electorate of 
Malaita. Nori first entered parliament in 1985 
after winning a by-election. He entered parliament 
as a member of the People's Alliance Party (PAP) 
which at the time was the main opposition party in 
parliament. Nori left PAP soon after and formed 
his own party, the Nationalists' Front for Progress 
(NFP). By then he was a an outspoken critic of 
provincial government arguing for its abolition. 
The review committee reported in 1987 but Nori 
did not release the report. Instead he appointed a 
new in-house committee to examine its 
recommendations. This led to the preparation of 
the Provincial Government Review Mite Paper in 
which the main recommendation was that the 
system of provincial government established under 
the Provincial Government Act 198 1 ,  be 
abolished. 66 It was proposed instead that Area 
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Councils should be upgraded and called Area 
Assemblies, and that they become the second tier 
of government with legislative and policy making 
powers, and responsibility for services in their 
area. 
The Provincial Government Review White 
Paper was tabled in the National Parliament and 
debated but that was as far as this attempt to 
abolish provincial government reached. 67 The 
proposal was put to a meeting of provincial 
premiers in August, 1988. Only two provinces 
expressed a clear opinion about it. Western 
Province opposed it, Malaita Province supported it. 
Two provinces were not represented at the meeting, 
and the rest did not come out with a clear 
preference. Cl8 Another major problem for Nori was 
that the Constitutional Review Committee, which 
had been set up in 1987, also submitted its report 
in 1988 with two recommendations quite different 
from his own. One was a detailed proposal for 
federal government in which provinces would 
become states with much more autonomy than 
provided for them under the provincial government 
system. The other recommendation proposed a 
continuation of the unitary state and the provincial 
system. 
The defeat of the Alebua Government in 
the February 1989 general election and the return 
to power of Mamaloni and the People's Alliance 
Party brought an end to threats against provincial 
government and put decentralisation back on the 
agenda. Throughout the 1980s, national politics 
was dominated by two main parties, the Solomon 
Islands United Party led by Kenilorea and Alebua, 
and the People's Alliance Party led by Solomon 
Mamaloni. The United Party stood for strong 
central government much in keeping with the 
colonial state. It was committed to national 
planning, and central control of all major policy 
decisions. The Alliance Party, on the other hand, 
was a firm advocate of decentralisation. It was not 
content with provincial government but pushed for 
the introduction of federal or state government. 
The election results of 1980, 1984 and 1989, show 
both parties running very close in 1980 and 1984, 
and then the Alliance Party clearly in front by 
1989. The United Party was reduced to four seats 
in 1989 and only two in the 1993 election. Its 
demise might be seen as a final break with the 
colonial order. 
After ten years of provincial government, 
support for decentralisation is still as strong as 
ever. Factors which gave rise to this at 
independence are still relevant today. The 
postcolonial state has remained weak and fragile; 
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regionalism continues to be much stronger than 
nationalism. One issue which has not diminished 
is demand for federal government. This has the 
support of at least two political parties (PAP and 
the Solomon Islands Labour Party), and some 
provinces. It was widely expected that there would 
be a move in that direction after the 1989 general 
election. The People's Alliance Party, which won 
the election outright, had pledged during the 
election campaign that it would act on the 
recommendations of the Constitutional Review 
Committee within 12 months of the election if it 
came to power. Once in office Mamaloni failed 
to meet that promise. It was explained in late 1989 
that the poor state of the economy prevented them 
from going ahead at that time. This was a major 
backdown for Mamaloni after campaigning for 
constitutional change for nearly ten years. 
In 1990, under the threat of a motion of 
no confidence from the party on his style of 
leadership, Mamaloni resigned from PAP and 
formed a new government. This was a major 
development in Solomon Island politics as it was 
the first time, since independence, that government 
comprised a personal coalition rather than a party 
coalition. In putting himself outside party influence 
or control, Mamaloni only continued a trend which 
had been apparent for some time of relying on 
strong personal rule. There was a lot of other 
evidence for this during his last four years in 
office, including his unconventional style of 
economic management, his approach to foreign 
affairs, control of the public service, control of the 
media and, in particular, his handling of the 
Bougainville crisis and the support that was given 
to the Bougainville secessionists in the Solomons. 
Mamaloni has been able to build his 
influence through his support for decentralisation, 
and by playing a leading role in the implementation 
of provincial government and the fight for greater 
regional autonomy. Under his influence the 
postcolonial state has come to represent more of a 
neo-patrimonial state.(/} The problem with this is 
that there has not been any improvement in 
government overall, only the reverse. So the state 
is no closer to the kind of legitimacy required for 
stability and unity in the future. 
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1 10 LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Health Care in Gware - Did We Miss the Omens? 
Ian Maddocks 
Around the time I left Papua in 1974, I wrote a 
paper entitled 'Medicine and Colonialism' , 1 using 
episodes in the colonial history of Papua New 
Guinea to suggest that health care was as much an 
instrument of colonial control as any other 
Australian initiative. I cited, for example, the 
venereal disease campaigns of the early 1900s, 
when medical assistants left no lap-lap unturned in 
their endeavours to locate the unsightly condition 
granuloma inguinale, and incarcerated sufferers in 
'Lock Hospitals' ;  I noted the intrusive imperatives 
of malaria control, the insistence by itinerant 
patrols on hospitalisation for sickness, the efforts to 
deter the people of Hanuabada burying their the 
dead in the traditional beach location by cutting off 
the village water supply. 
In this paper I have sought to examine our 
efforts at medical training, and how they fitted into 
that model. We, who established and taught in the 
Papuan Medical College when it was the leading 
tertiary institution in the country, and who staffed 
the first Faculty ofMedicine within the University, 
thought we were sensitive to the real health needs 
of the country, and we tried in our curriculum to 
make a medical graduate who was different. 
Paradoxically, the graduates, it now appears, strove 
to be like us. There was a cognitive dissonance 
operating here. 
We brought, or in our earnest discussions 
we evolved, a vision of health care for Papua New 
Guinea: one in which many rurally-based graduates 
concentrated on disease prevention and health 
promotion, supervised effective measures of disease 
control, and provided frugal but effective curative 
care for common diseases. This was a planned and 
centrally-controlled health system, very different 
from what we knew in Australia, where health care 
had grown of itself, higgledy-piggledy. We 
recognised the diversity of Papua New Guinea, but 
we saw it as a whole, and the network of young 
Australians scattered across its folded face, united 
in the adventurism of this exotic and rapidly 
changing situation, made it seem manageable, even 
tidy. The first editorial I wrote for the Papua New 
Guinean Medical Journal in 1965 was entitled 'The 
Search for a National Character' , 2 and health care 
was going to contribute to that. 
I have scanned documents which 
accompanied me on my somewhat regretful return 
to Australia in 1974; regretful because, like many 
Australians who shared experience in PNG with 
1 1 1  
me, I had enjoyed my time immensely, had 
become used to accepting responsibility and 
authority far greater than I could reasonably have 
achieved in Australia, had become known in 
medicine in Australia for what I was doing and was 
told I was doing good. 
The documents include my personal 
correspondence for the period 1969-1972, the 
minutes of the Faculty Board of the Papuan 
Medical College and Faculty of Medicine from 
1965 to 1970, the transcripts of papers delivered at 
Annual Symposia of the Medical Society in 1969, 
1973 and 1974, Annual Reports of the Department 
of Public Health for 1971-72 and 1973-4, the 
Second Papua New Guinea Health plan 1986-1990, 
and issues of the Papua New Guinea Medical 
Journal up to 1980. This is a highly selective set 
of references; it happened to be all I could find in 
the boxes lined along the top of my bookshelves at 
home. So I am an imposter at a meeting of 
distinguished historians; my message is personal, 
intuitive and inadequately researched, and my 
material is colonial rather than post-colonial. 
'Gware' is a Motu word for an omen, an 
event which offers a warning or a premonition. I 
have set out to ask whether in this material and in 
my memories from that time there were signs 
which we, who were the last generation of 
colonialists, might have discerned and taken 
warning from, signs that our assumptions were 
misplaced, our idealism uncritical, our optimism 
unjustified. 
Because, clearly, things did not work out 
as we planned: 
1. Student Numbers 
The Papuan Medical College was founded in 1960 
with encouragement from Drs. John Gunther and 
Roy Scragg, and under the leadership of Eric 
Wright, a man greatly influenced by Walter Strong 
when Wright was a medical assistant in pre-war 
Papua, and keen to show the same confidence in 
medical training for natives as Strong had shown in 
his initiative of sending young Papuans to Sydney 
for medical training in the early 1930s. In an 
editorial in the Papua New Guinea Medical Journal 
in 1960, 3 Wright envisaged the need for 50 medical 
graduates per year, and a teaching hospital complex 
in Port Moresby of 1 ,000 beds. He concluded: 
'Nobody can say what the economic or political 
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future of the Territory will be, but we should not 
underestimate the ability of the people to adjust to 
change and, at least, we cannot be accused of 
regarding third-class standards as being good 
enough' .  
In its beginnings, the Papuan Medical 
College was the most prestigious educational 
institution in the country; almost the only 
government institution to pretend to the status of 
tertiary education. 
Numerous projections of the future output 
of medical graduates were made during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Figures 1 and 2 are estimates from 
19654 and 1966, 5 compared with the actual annual 
graduations from the Papuan Medical College and 
Faculty of Medicine. 
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compared with actual 
A chart illustrating cumulative totals of 
graduates over the same period shows an increasing 
divergence of actual and expected national medical 
manpower.6  
0 
Figure 3. Cumulative Totals for actual and 
expected graduates in medicine 
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Predicting the future was a favourite 
fantasy indulged in by all of us through the 1960s. 
One needed to be very bold to foresee a rate of 
change anything like what eventuated. About 1956, 
Gunther, then Director of Public Health, wrote a 
document in which he predicted the appointment of 
the first Papua New Guinean Director of Public 
Health in 1984 (which, as those whose memories 
go back to Orwellian times will recall, appeared to 
carry a particular eschatological significance). This 
was kept under lock and key, marked 'Confidential, 
never to leave this office' . In the manner of things 
in those relaxed times, I came across it on a shelf 
in Konedobu and held it in my own office for some 
years, so radical and exciting did it seem at the 
time. Gunther did not predict a time for 
independence, nor, if I recall the document 
correctly, did he envisage the establishment of the 
University in any way comparable with what 
actually occurred. But at a time when most 
Australians in New Guinea were predicting that 
Australian leadership would be required well into 
the next century, Gunther was clearly ahead of his 
time. 
The reasons for the failure to reach the 
target number, some 30-35 graduates per year, 
seemed to lie partly in disappointing recruitment of 
national students into medicine, and partly to a 
formidable drop-out rate. 
a) Recruitment 
In 1966, it was anticipated that by 1968 
there would be 25 students/year entering 
the course, and by 1970, 30 students 
entering preliminary year, with some 
additional students coming into the first 
year program. By 1976, hopes were 
expressed for a cohort of 40 students 
entering second year from the University. 
Neither of those predictions were 
achieved. In the 1960s, the Medical 
College conducted its own recruitment 
campaigns, and used a film about medical 
training which several staff took to show 
at distant high schools to attract students 
into medicine. However, the University, 
which graduated its first students in 
August 1970, appears to have exercised 
significant competition. In the first few 
years it was difficult to fill quotas in either 
institution, and there was a status attaching 
to the Waigani University campus which 
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weighed against the attraction of the 
medical course. 
Visiting Mission high schools, I 
discerned staff encouragement for students 
to take up the healing work of Jesus, but 
relatively few achieved the necessary 
grades, and for those who did the 
attraction was mainly travel to Port 
Moresby and obtain a degree, a magic 
passport to status. 
High-school students may have 
been impressed by the fact that it took 
seven years to emerge from the health 
training system, whereas a University 
degree took only three years. Certainly, 
when I spoke to high-school students they 
asked about this difference, and while I 
hoped that the long course might be 
interpreted as indicating higher status, they 
more often may have seen that the medical 
course was harder to pass. Professor Isi 
Kevau has suggested to me that the 
knowledge that several of the first 
graduates from the University were 
rapidly accelerated into positions of 
influence, and became closely associated 
with Government Ministers, wielding 
political influence, did not go unnoticed by 
those applying for a tertiary eduction. 
Further, it was known that doctors were 
posted to rural areas after graduation, and 
the riots of the eady 70s did not reassure 
students that it would be good to work in 
a strange part of the country. There were 
few entrants into medicine from the 
highlands and few highlands graduates in 
the 1970s. 
A number of overseas students 
passed through the course in those early 
years, and successful applications were 
received from Tonga, New Hebrides, 
Solomon Islands, Micronesia, Africa and 
Australia, with others from Iran, Hong 
Kong failing to be effected. It was felt 
that overseas students assisted in 
maintaining academic standards, and 
allowed classes to be of reasonable size. 
But most of these graduates left Papua 
New Guinea either immediately on 
graduation or after completing a period of 
resident training, and did not become 
available to the National Health Plan. 
Even by 1978, we had achieved relatively 
few highlands graduates. 
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2. 
a) 
Failure Rates 
These were impressive. In 1966, the 
Faculty heard that in first year 10 students 
had passed, one had been awarded a supp. 
and nine had been failed. It was thought 
that they might be considered for entry to 
the University in another F acuity. In spite 
of this, the forward projections that year 
assumed almost no drop-out. 
Career on Graduation 
Public or Private 
Figure 3 shows the estimated numbers of 
doctors in various areas of employment in 
the two years 1974 and 1984. 8 
In 1974 there were a total of 43 
local graduates post-residency training, in 
1984, 145. Of these, 19 had moved away 
from government employment into private 
practice, 13 to the University, eight to 
missions, and 12 to some other 
employment, e.g. army, red cross, ornon­
medical work. Only 64 of all the possible 
graduates were available for government 
work, a far cry from the 400-500 
anticipated back in 1966. 
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Geographical Distribution of Graduates 
Figure 5 shows where doctors were 
deployed in 1979. 9 Only a tiny proportion 
were working in rural situations, in spite 
of the many firm commitments of the 
Faculty at the time of its formation that it 
would not resemble Africa or other former 
colonies, but would insist on preparing 
graduates for preventive and health 
promotion activity in rural areas. The 
most remarkable finding, harking back to 
Gunther's 1950s plan, was the 
predominance of local graduates in 
headquarters and administration posts, and 
the significant number who had entered 
specialist training. 
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I suggest that two factors were at 
work here: 
a) a bewildering speed of 
localisation of administrative positions, 
forced by the retirement of expatriate 
officers from the Australian administration 
around the time of independence and by a 
persuasive ideology that this was an 
essential component of that change, 
b) an innovative post-graduate 
program, the Master of Medicine, which 
involved application for a registrar post in 
Port Moresby (this allowed training plus 
assessment for later opportunity), a period 
of placement overseas in a specialist 
training post, and an examination, written 
and clinical, conducted in Port Moresby 
with the assistance of external examiners 
from the relevant discipline, 
Specialist or generalist 
In 1966, it was proposed to the Faculty 
Board of the Papuan Medical College that 
a local Diploma in Anaesthetics be 
established to allow recognition of the 
experience and ability of Dr, Rimson 
Mulas, a graduate of the Fiji School of 
Medicine then working in anaesthetics in 
Port Moresby, 10 Mulas could not sit for 
3. 
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an Australian Diploma because he did not 
have a registrable primary qualification, 
Discussion concluded that a post-graduate 
diploma awarded by the Medical College 
would have no outside recognition and 
would only lead to further frustration, 
By 1973 , however, a local Master 
of Medicine qualification had been 
approved by the University, and 
_
this 
became the pathway for entry mto 
specialist status in PNG, There is little 
doubt that the Master's program, with its 
invitation to time in Port Moresby, 
experience overseas and the promise of 
specialist status at the end, has been 
particularly attractive to graduates, For 
1994, I am told, there are 10 applications 
for 3 registrar posts in Medicine in Port 
Moresby , 1 1  It has been instrumental in 
developing a teaching Faculty in Medicine 
which is entirely local, and must be 
regarded as highly competent; it has 
equipped the provincial hospitals with 
recognised national specialists in all the 
major clinical disciplines, while freeing 
them from the need to undertake overseas 
specialist examinations which are 
notoriously and deliberately difficult, and 
of marginal relevance to practice in Papua 
New Guinea. 
There have been opportunities for 
students to undertake Master of Medicine 
training in public health and preventive 
medicine, but these disciplines have failed 
to attract students in the same way as have 
the clinical disciplines. In vain have 
idealistic teachers and specialists from 
overseas or from centres outside Port 
Moresby preached the priority of 
preventive and rural medicine, as they had 
did throughout the 1960s. 
The Medical Curricuhun 
The aim of the medical curriculum, from the 
beginnings of the Papuan Medical College, was to 
equip students for practice in rural �· Initia�ly, 
graduates were to be AMO's (Assistant Medical 
Officers) or AMPs (Assistant Medical Practitioners) 
with authority over districts and responsibility for 
administration of preventive and public health 
campaigns. The fact that this stated intentio� was 
not being achieved in the placement and practice of 
graduates was a constant source of frustration 
. 
to 
many expatriate observers. It was seen as essential 
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to give students a sufficiently prolonged and 
intensive experience in rural areas to make them 
both confident and effective there. In 1967 it was 
proposed that second year students spend· a period 
of two months in rural training, studying district 
geography, history, anthropometry, sociology and 
physiology. The fourth year period of training 
(some two months at Saiho in the Northern District 
of Papua) was to be transferred to Kainantu in the 
Eastern Highlands, and be of six month's duration, 
and this would require at least two additional full­
time staff, plus staff housing, offices and a 
laboratory, accommodation for 30 students and 
three long-wheel based landrovers, capital cost at 
least $120,000. 12 
In that year, Professor Macdonald, 
Consultant in Child Health reported to the Faculty: 
I agreed with the lecturers in 
Surgery and Obstetrics that it was 
essential for certain fundamentals 
of these two subjects to be taught 
along with appropriate practical 
experience related to the 
requirements of a medical 
diplomate in remote parts of the 
Territory. There is no reason 
why this cannot be done in a 
rural setting provided that the 
staff is available. . . I formed 
the opinion that because of time­
tabling and logistic reasons a six 
month period in a rural training 
centre solved many problems. 
Richard Lovell, Professor of Medicine in 
Melbourne wrote: 
My impression is that their short 
time living in strange villages in 
4th year during their rural 
training helps them greatly. 
Some acknowledged that this is 
initially a frightening experience 
. . I would judge that this rural 
practice experience is admirable 
as a means of inculcating self­
confidence. 
In the time of the Papuan Medical College, an 
emphasis on community medicine and public health 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
may have been more effective than it later became 
within the University. In 1969, I wrote: 
The spread of behavioural science 
teaching through four years of 
the medical course , the 
community health practice 
experience for senior students, 
the two-year intern program prior 
to registration are all well­
established. Further, being a 
small closely-knit unit, the 
Faculty have remained flexible 
and agreed changes at all levels 
of the course proceed year by 
year. Most impressive, perhaps, 
is the interest and involvement 
which all staff have demonstrated 
in making their teaching 
appropriate to the work which 
graduates will be called upon to 
do, and the involvement of nearly 
all teaching staff in the 
community health teaching 
program. ' 13 
In later years, however, that optimistic 
appraisal seemed to have been replaced. 
Frank Shann, for example, a highlands­
based paediatrician, in 1979, at a seminar on 
Medical Training: 
Somehow medical students have 
to be convinced of the central 
role of public health - its 
challenge, its importance. At 
present the prestige lies with 
clinical medicine. 14 
Michael Alpers (Director of the Institute ofMedical 
Research) also: 
My greatest concern is that we 
will continue as we are now, with 
new ideas bobbing up here and 
there, being tried out and 
evaluated or not, as the case may 
be, and with voices from the 
bush and the provinces 
occasionally being heard in 
outbursts of  anger and 
frustration, but with very little 
change from the centre. 15 
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Professor Gordon Cook on the other hand, a 
clinician, was defensive and hostile to itinerant 
preachers of prevention: 
I regard 'medical tourists' to be 
here to do a job and not indulge 
in idealistic and farcical debates; 
their feet must be firmly on the 
ground, and they must realise 
that doctors cannot be trained in 
rural areas. 16 
In the end, while the postgraduate training 
produced many excellent clinicians, those who 
espoused preventive medicine were more often the 
failures from the clinical courses; students did not 
wish to emulate them, students did not demand 
rural experience but rather resented it taking them 
away from the clinical work, staff were difficult to 
recruit for rural teaching, vision and money for 
support of rural programs was lacking, and in 
recent years rural experience has been limited to a 
trip of just two-three weeks. 
Were there signs which we might have 
discerned? 
1. We expected too much of our students. 
There was scant recognition of such factors as 
personal problems, isolation from family supports, 
and family pressures arising from traditional 
expectations. The Medical College seemed to us to 
have its own very intimate family atmosphere, with 
time set apart in June for the staff-student sports 
day, the participation of several staff in the College 
Aussie rules team, the yearly 'Island Night' revue, 
to which staff and students contributed skits and 
songs. The problem of dropping-out was not 
unique to the medical course. All students on the 
Boroko campus - medical students, medical 
assistants and male nurses - were tightly packed in 
four-to-a-room bedrooms in the back wing of 
accommodation which also housed the female 
nurses, and the nurse drop-out rate was very high 
also. To meet this problem the Mission 
representatives proposed to build a chapel between 
the two blocks. 17 A minute of the Slst meeting of 
the Faculty Board records: 'The Dean said that he 
did not feel that marriage by students during the 
course was a good thing, and that by providing 
accommodation this would encourage students to 
marry . '  
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Australian consultants usually were 
generous in their assessments. Professor 
Blackbum, I recall, gave a pass to Amelia Homba 
in her final viva in 1964, even though Amelia, in 
a state of severe shock, was unable to speak a word 
over the course of twenty minutes. Fortunately she 
had, at my suggestion, written down her findings 
on the case, and was able to mutely push the pages 
across the table to him. Howard Eddy, consultant 
in surgery in 1966, noted an 'outstanding' 
performance from Adrians Dedda, in a final 
surgical examination 'conducted in an exactly 
similar manner to that in Melbourne in adhering 
strictly to time, and in the extent and depth of the 
subject matter discussed and the assessment of 
results. ' 18 (4) 
In all the projections it was assumed that 
once a student had achieved third year there would 
be an eventual graduation of that student, so 
opportunity to repeat a year was often allowed. 
Numerous students whose subsequent careers 
revealed surprising inadequacies in knowledge and 
practice were allowed to repeat almost every year 
of the course. Occasionally other opportunity in 
business or administration was preferred to fronting 
up once again with the prospect of failure. It must 
have been hard being so different, singled out from 
many others to climb through a long series of 
educational barriers and taxing experiences. Not 
all retained their poise or sanity. Adrians, he who 
was outstanding in his final surgery examination, 
soon afterwards demonstrated evidence of 
schizophrenia, responded poorly to treatment and 
was sent back to West Papua, where some years 
earlier the Indonesians had shot his brother. 
The first students in Medicine had 
certainly had very uneven preparations. Ilomo 
Batton, a confident Napoleonic figure dominating 
the student body in the early 1960s, and later a 
vigorous public proponent of 'Paradesia' as the best 
name for an independent nation, did not attend 
school until he was 12 years old. This may have 
explained some interesting gaps in Homo's 
knowledge and several recognisable idiosyncrasies: 
in his final paper he ordered the investigation of 
electro-convulsive cardiograph, and later, at a 
provincial hospital was reported to have ordered 
intravenous milk. 
Even Isi Kevau, now Dean of Medicine 
and the only Papuan Fellow of the Royal 
Australasian College of Physicians, was schooled in 
Motu by an LMS pastor for the first four years of 
school, a less than rigorous preparation for later 
academic life, and characterised by authoritarian 
discipline and rote learning from the blackboard not 
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much different from what his uncle Tau Legu 
recalled from the 1930s: 'A badina, a maragina: B 
badina b maragina' (Big A, little A etc). It was 
quite uncommon for a student to enjoy reading 
outside of set texts, and comprehension was poor. 
2. We preached rather than practised. 
We promoted rural practice, but of course we did 
not demonstrate it. Like staff everywhere in 
teaching hospitals who have never left the teaching 
hospital but who prepare the next generation of 
general practitioners, we proposed hypothetical 
situations for student response: 'This patient comes 
to you at Green River . . . ' Trips to rural areas 
were, for us, exciting diversions, opportunities to 
collect publishable data and photographs to bemuse 
the folks at home. For young graduates a rural 
placement more often meant isolation, awesome 
responsibility, and very little professional support. 
One of the consultants to the Medical 
College, when discussing rural training in 1966, 
reported that the students told him they had felt 
themselves regarded by the villagers as superior 
people, 'they treated us like Europeans' .  
Robert Black, Professor of  Tropical 
Medicine in Sydney, noted in 1965 the use of the 
word primitive by students in referring to rural 
populations: ' I noted some attitudes of the medical 
students which should be kept in mind. They 
appear to have seized upon the word primitive in 
anthropology, and apply it in a depreciatory way to 
their fellow-countrymen. . . it is an indication of 
the amount of social distance which develops 
between the medical students and the general 
population . .  and this distance may become so 
great that they are unable to function in the 
community because they are only comfortable in 
the hospital environment. ' 19 
This was not a warning we could readily 
hear. It was the sort of thing which we knew had 
happened in Africa, but Papua New Guinea was 
going to be different. Yet our students were very 
aware of, and concerned for, their status in world 
terms. In 1969 I suggested that there be no final 
examination, explaining that the students had been 
through such an extraordinary and progressive 
selection process since high school that they must 
surely be fit to graduate. There was a very sharp 
reaction from the students; I was clearly trying to 
depict their course as inferior, second-rate. 
Everyone knew that Australian schools bad final 
examinations, so we must have them too. The 
various aspects of the course in which there was 
innovation for which we were applauded in 
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Australia were constantly under pressure from 
within the students body to conform to their ideas 
of what was a 'proper' course. 
In reviewing the vigorous arguments which 
we mounted in the late 1960s to advocate 
University faculty status for the Medical College it 
is interesting that two arguments were going on 
simultaneously, one directed at maintaining the 
highest professional standards, and the other at 
ensuring maximal relevance and commitment to 
preventive medicine and community and rural 
health. We saw no conflict here; our students 
clearly did. 
3. Did we teach Medical Ethics? 
I have the program for the 1969 graduation; six 
students graduated, one from West New Guinea, 
one from the Solomons, four from Papua New 
Guinea. Prizes were awarded, his Honour the 
Administrator presented these and an address, and 
the students joined in reciting the Declaration of 
Geneva, the latter day Hippocratic Oath. It 
includes the pledge: 'I will not permit consideration 
of religion, nationality, party politics or social 
standing to intervene between my duty and my 
patient' ,  but it contains no direct prohibition of 
sexual contact with a patient. 
As far as I can recall, ethics was not 
taught as a formal course in the Medical College 
nor in the Faculty. I do remember inviting Dr. 
Tony Tonakie to speak with a class about his 
experience in general practice in Port Moresby, 
suggesting that perhaps one day some graduates of 
the College would take up general practice (little 
did we know). Tony described his work from 
different perspectives completing his account with: 
'Then there's ethics. Ethics is easy: leave the 
sbeilas alone and don't rubbish your mates. That's 
all you need to know about ethics' .  
When, therefore, a patient complained that 
one of our most senior and respected graduates had 
invited her to his room, and be was charged with a 
misdemeanour, his defence was that no one had 
ever told him it was wrong. We could find no 
indication that this had ever been spelt out. A 
report of the Medical Board for 1968 states that a 
registered medical practitioner was found guilty of 
professional misconduct in having had sexual 
intercourse with a married female patient in his 
hospital office and he was suspended for three 
months. 20 A report for 1969 charges that a medical 
practitioner took a female patient from the hospital 
and had sexual intercourse with her. He was asked 
to pay a fine of one hundred dollars. 21 
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I think that we assumed that the dedication 
which was apparent in the staff of the institution, 
their commitment to teaching and to good medical 
practice, even their commitment to Papua New 
Guinea's future, would somehow be transmitted 
and absorbed into the life of the graduates without 
being written down. So we did not speak out about 
abuse of narcotic drugs, about sexual relations with 
patients, about stealing or selling government 
supplies. We strove to give a good example. 
4. One Country? 
We saw Papua New Guinea as one country, but 
clearly our students did not. Perhaps we should 
not have been surprised by the reluctance of 
doctors to be posted outside their home districts. 
A young man living beside us in Pari village Gust 
outside of Port Moresby) was posted in 1973 to a 
small school near Kainantu. He was back in three 
weeks. ' It was terrible' ,  he said. The pupils 
knew nothing; their fathers stood around the 
classroom with bows and arrows and I was not 
allowed to punish their children; and at night the 
girls kept coming to my house asking to come in, 
saying they wanted to marry me. They were 
covered in pig grease, they were horrible' .  A 
more telling message may have come from the 
murder of Dr. Luke Rovin near Goroka following 
a vehicle accident in 1972. Today, Dr. Kevau tells 
me, leading Papuans summoned to meetings in the 
Highlands do not stay around for the festivities; 
they head for home as soon as possible. 
We did not anticipate, of course, the 
establishment of the provincial governments and the 
decentralised health bureaucracy which exaggerated 
the loss of focus and central control which we had 
assumed. I am told that one of the consequences of 
this has been an opportunity for provincial leaders 
to recruit medical staff themselves from overseas , 
often without good advice. There was a warning of 
this in the early seventies, when Dr. Toua went to 
Manila, and selected some 17 Filipino doctors to 
build up staff numbers in Papua New Guinea. 
They were almost all unsuited and ill-prepared for 
the work they faced, and most survived only 
briefly. 
S. Private Practice 
We did not anticipate the rush of graduates into 
private practice. What was its attraction? Money 
was important, since the increasing fees charged by 
the international schools in the major centres 
required considerably higher incomes than those 
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available in the government. Avoidance of 
arbitrary re-location may also have been a factor, 
since that would also interfere with children's 
education, and might cause frank apprehension for 
family safety. Some who went into private practice 
had failed in government service (eg. had made 
dismal attempts at a Master's examination) and 
faced re-location to rural work; some are said to 
have avoided a.ctive disciplinary action for 
misdemeanours by resigning from the service. 
It was well known that in Africa health 
staff made money on the side, selling their services 
in the hospital, stealing drugs to sell outside the 
hospital. We felt that Papua New Guinea had a 
stronger mission influence, and that the example of 
selfless practice which we demonstrated would 
prevail. But we might have seen a message in the 
examples of careful exchange so common in Papua 
New Guinea. I remember asking a physiology 
class to recruit some children around the wards or 
among the staff families who lived on site at the 
hospital, and make some measurements on them. 
Few were able to produce results; only the 
redoubtable Ilomo, who admitted that he had paid 
the children to cooperate. 
Then there was the famous graduation 
feast on the occasion of the award of the first 
University degrees in medicine. Isi Kevau, the 
only national graduate in a class of five, was to 
make the speech on behalf of the graduands, and it 
seemed proper to invite his village, Pari, to provide 
entertainment at the ceremony, which was an 
important occasion graced by Australian Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam and by all the Vice­
Chancellors of Australia. Following the ceremony, 
supper was served in the adjacent refectory, but 
when the distinguished guests entered they found 
Pari village had arrived first; the men lined up at 
the bar imbibing spirits with speed and enthusiasm, 
the women moving down the tables shifting 
haunches of pork, plates of vegetables and fruit into 
their kiapas (string bags) . Very soon the boards 
were bare. One bemused Vice-Chancellor sighted 
a plate of biscuits and cheese emerging from the 
kitchen and headed hopefully towards it; only to 
see a broad-hipped Papuan woman cut across his 
path, and sweep the contents skilfully straight into 
her kiapa. 
It is, of course, customary to feed the 
group who has danced for you, and the string 
'doggy bag' is the order of the day. From the 
point of view of Pari village, the University's 
generosity was exceptional, but expected. We 
might have realised that exchanges involving health 
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care could not expect to be entirely free from such 
expectations. 
6. Personality or Science? 
Much of the success for which we early medical 
teachers were congratulated sprang from our 
cohesion: a common background, a shared spirit of 
adventure and a shared vision of breaking new 
ground. We were all Australians, many of us had 
worked in other parts of the Territory and we 
shared a commitment to the development of the 
country as a whole; we were friends, we shared 
many social as well as work occasions. 
But perhaps that small closely-knit faculty 
was counter-productive in that it inhibited 
opportunity for students to capture a vision of the 
broader dimensions of medicine and science. They 
often seemed passive participants in the exercise, 
waiting to be told, seeking to please when they 
could. This is suggested by the study shared with 
faculty staff in 1967 by Professor of Education, 
Ernest Roe, who offered several examples of 
difficulties in concept among high school students. 
One I remember clearly was an excuse for late 
attendance: 'The bus missed me' . 22 
Perhaps our students worked for !:!§, rather 
than for careers which they could only dimly 
perceive. They did not study to attain knowledge, 
or to participate in the great brotherhood of 
medicine. They accepted our paternalism as part of 
the deal. Morris Wainetti, in an open student 
forum, complained rather ruefully that when a 
student delegation came to meet me, as Dean, with 
firm ideas for change, they usually left with 
completely different ideas, swayed by my 
persuasive argument. 
In the village, I treated persons with 
tuberculosis. The regimen demanded attendance 
three times a week over many months to receive 
painful injections. In most instances, attendance 
was regular, but I formed the impression that the 
patients came because they knew that if they did 
not I might be cross with them, and anger was 
recognised as leading to bad luck and ill-health. 
The students watched us carefully, and 
knew us well. In the short history I prepared 
concerning Pari Village, 23 I referred to the 
memories among the older men of the pre-war 
times, when the administration of central Papua 
was similarly intimate and effected through known 
personalities. W.R. Humphries, for example, 
Resident Magistrate, was remembered as 'Misi 
Umpress' ;  he spoke Motu fluently, with a definite 
'l' for that sound in Motu which lies between 'l' 
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and 'r' - so they liked to mimic him and his 
vigorous Motuan oaths. The 'Gavana' , Hubert 
Murray, would sometimes ride his horse to Pari in 
the late afternoon, occasionally dismounting to talk 
with the constable or councillors, but usually 
staying on his horse, and handing down a stick or 
two of tobacco, then, as he spurred away, reaching 
into a saddle-bag to throw small fragments of 
tobacco or sweets into the air for the people to 
jump for - 'Moale herea! ' (great fun). The 
villagers kept cheerful memories of this benevolent 
paternalism, and perhaps there is similar nostalgia 
for the first close-knit Faculty. 
Conclusion 
The health transition in Papua New Guinea 
continues. The diseases which indigenous 
graduates are treating in the towns are less often 
malaria and diarrhoeal disease, and more often, 
especially among the politicians and senior public 
servants, the diseases of affluence and obesity -
diabetes, hypertension, coronary artery disease, 
gout. Those whom we thought to train for rural 
practice, specialising in tropical diseases and public 
health, are well versed in these diseases through 
their urban training and their overseas 
secondments. 
Perhaps we did not get it so wrong after 
all? 
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Continuities and Discontinuities in Papua New Guinea Agriculture 
Scott Mac William 
Agriculture in Papua New Guinea seems to have 
changed little since Independence in 1975. The 
major export crops remain coffee, cocoa, palm oil 
and copra. Only in copra has there been a 
substantial reduction in export tonnages. For 
coffee, cocoa and palm oil, there have been 
important increases, although in each case 
quantities exported have fluctuated considerably 
around a rising trend line. All four crops are 
produced principally for export, with domestic 
consumption small. 
While it is harder to make precise 
statements about aggregate levels of crops produced 
for local consumption, whether after being 
marketed or not, the impression remains that there 
continues to be increases in amounts as well as in 
the adoption of higher yielding and more readily 
marketed varieties. The absence of substantial 
nation-wide data collection undoubtedly makes such 
a claim difficult to substantiate but equally hard to 
rebut. 
For any assessment of the Australian 
colonial presence, the continued vitality of 
agriculture in PNG may provide considerable 
satisfaction to anyone anxious for positive 
indicators of that heritage. Of course, the same 
statistics and situation can also be used to argue 
that production could and should be even better, if 
only the colonial power and its officials had 
behaved differently. The literature arguing the 
latter case has explained the unsatisfactory 
condition by the absence of a development plan, 
racism, neglect and the powerful position of the 
European settler large farmers who supposedly 
gained preferential treatment to the detriment of 
indigenous (ie.smallholding) farmers. The settlers 
have had their own defenders, who use a form of 
'trickle-down economics' to propose that 
indigenous small farmers benefited by the 
largeholder introduction of crops not previously 
cultivated. 
The concern here is not to pursue directly 
the question of whether Australian colonialism 
benefited agriculture, or whether since 1975 PNG 
has made the most of that legacy or battled against 
it. Instead I will try to show the limits of focussing 
principally on Independence as the point of 
division. It will be argued that the continuities, 
already established in the first ten years after World 
War II, remain more substantial than the 
discontinuities that arose from the political-legal 
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changes of the late 1960s and 1970s. The current 
decade, however, contains the possibility of a 
comprehensive break. 
A serious weakness of many studies of 
PNG is that the country is rarely given a 
satisfactory location in global changes. In the case 
of agriculture, I have in mind how a specific type 
of agricultural production, based upon households 
attached to smallholdings, became and remained 
central to the idea of development which has 
informed state practices throughout the twentieth 
century. The fact that most agricultural produce 
comes from smallholdings in a large number of 
countries is intimately connected to the spread, 
since the late nineteenth century, of a particular 
idea of development. 1 PNG is one of a number of 
locations where the idea of development and state 
practices informed by the idea have been joined to 
secure the predominance of smallholder agriculture. 
The principal element of the idea of 
development was that state power could be 
constructed and directed to reduce the threat to 
social order posed by the advance of capitalism. 
Deleterious effects arising out of the development 
of capitalism, in particular its tendency to produce 
disorder in the form of unemployment and poverty, 
could be contained and social order maintained by 
state action to re-attach labour separated from the 
means of production by the anarchy of capitalist 
competition. In some locations, including colonial 
Victoria in Australia and Quebec in Canada, this 
meant state schemes for expanding manufacturing 
to soak up pools of unemployed workers. In 
primarily rural countries, particularly the colonies 
of the British Empire, state action was designed to 
check in advance the separation of labour from the 
means of production by giving primacy to 
smallholder agriculture. 
In recent research in the Australian 
Archives, I have been struck by the very close 
connection between the colonial welfare plans and 
policies of British governments, during and after 
World War II, and Australian officials' thinking 
about post-war PNG. The central element of the 
connection is the mutual regard for this particular 
idea of development. 2 
Throughout the late colonial period the 
primacy of smallholder agriculture continued as a 
principal element of development plans. Even the 
nuclear estate ventures, for oil palm especially, 
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which became important in the last decade of 
colonial rule, sought to extend household family 
labour processes through forms of centralised 
coordination and supervision applied to resettled 
smallholders. In the autobiography of Australia's 
long-serving Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck, 
as much as in the 1960s plans of international 
agencies, such as the World Bank, development 
was closely associated with increased export and 
domestic food crop production by households. The 
stated purposes of such a form of development 
were twofold: the first, to raise living standards, 
including improved nutrition, health and education. 
The second object was to secure the continued 
attachment of labour to land. The principal 
purpose of joining households to smallholdings was 
to block the formation of a landless, particularly 
urban, proletariat invariably seen by authorities as 
the principal threat to social order. 3 
Although important elements of the earlier 
idea of development have been under challenge in 
post-colonial PNG, as discussed below, 
nevertheless the primacy of smallholder agriculture 
has remained at the forefront of state plans. Two 
instances, a decade apart, will suffice to make the 
point although it would be possible to add many 
more from official reports, whether of international 
agencies such as the World Bank, or domestic state 
branches. In 1983, Primary Industry Minister 
Denis Young made a ministerial statement which 
represented his own views, and those of key 
advisers. That statement proclaimed a preference 
for future expansion to take place in the 
smallholder form, and for barriers to be 
strengthened against further growth in 
largeholdings. 4 More recently Prime Minister 
Paias Wingti repeated his well-known belief in the 
need to strength.en 'village life' through state 
supported growth in smallholdings. 5 Mr Wingti 
specifically coupled an enlarged flow of state 
revenues directed toward rural households with the 
battle against the breakdown of social order. 
In contemporary PNG, there is no doubt 
about the predominance of smallholding 
agriculture. Whether the smallholders are 
described as subsistence farmers, petty commodity 
producers or a semi-proletariat, in all of the major 
export and domestically consumed crops households 
produce most of the annual output. 
Even in the downturn of the late 1980s­
early 1990s, when both large and small holdings 
have reduced outputs, the smallholder 
predominance continues. In the case of coffee, the 
largest agricultural export crop, smallholders 
produced between 72 and 78 per cent of total 
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output in peak as well as trough years. 6 There is a 
similar predominance of the total produced by 
smallholders in cocoa and copra. In palm oil and 
sugar output figures are kept confidential 
precluding definitive statements about the respective 
proportions produced on large and small holdings. 
However, sugar is largely a plantation crop, grown 
by Ramu Sugar, but the position with palm oil is 
especially difficult to ascertain. When there is a 
very small amount of largeholding production 
aimed at domestic food markets, and when 
smallholders produce large quantities of non­
marketed crops, the predominance of the latter is 
even greater than what simply pointing to the 
characteristics of export crop production would 
suggest. 
It is important to recognise that this 
predominance was not established as a consequence 
of greater attention being paid to smallholder 
agriculture by the post-colonial state, at the 
direction of indigenous politicians forced to respond 
by the weight of rural voters. The primacy of 
smallholders was imbedded in state plans, and the 
practices of colonial officials, at least since the end 
of World War II. While the relative importance of 
PNG-located and Australian-based personnel, as 
well as the role of internationally generated 
policies, is as yet poorly understood, the outcome 
is not in doubt. 
If the proposition, of the centrality of 
indigenous agriculture for colonial state practices 
and policies, is at all controversial it is partly 
because of the lingering misconception of the place 
of largeholdings, including those owned by the 
settlers who established estates from the late 1940s. 
Certainly this misconception informs many of the 
accounts constructed from the late 1960s until the 
mid-1980s, by settler protagonists as well as their 
critics. In brief, the preeminence of settlers and 
international plantation-operating firms has been 
confused with the predominance of households. 
This is not simply an empirical matter, of 
correctly identifying the moment when smallholder 
production of a particular crop began to exceed 
output from largeholdings. (In the case of coffee, 
cocoa and copra, the moments are the 1963/64, 
1978179 and 1979/80 crop years respectively.) Nor 
is it defined by other empirical questions, such as 
the greater land area utilised by householders 
growing these crops, or the relative numbers of 
workers employed cultivating plants and harvesting 
bushes in the two production forms. The 
significant point is instead that PNG was one 
location where a specific idea of development drove 
a state sponsored scheme of smallholder 
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agriculture. Post-World War II state power was 
constructed to secure expanded household 
production. 
The scheme was comprehensive, involving 
the erection of barriers against other forms of 
commercial and industrial capital, as well as the 
provision of a range of state services intended to 
increase the capacity to labour of households in 
occupation of smallholdings. Marketing authorities 
overseeing producer prices restrained any tendency 
of trading firms to impoverish smallholders, 7 and 
accelerate the separation of households from land. 8 
Whether the services were medical, educational or 
communications (roads, bridges, air and sea}, their 
principal objects were informed by the idea of 
development discussed above. 
It is necessary to deal here with one 
objection to the description that a state sponsored 
scheme of smallholder production was predominant 
during the late colonial period. The objection is 
that the smallholder expansion occurred in spite of 
state neglect, even opposition. 9 Certainly there are 
important instances where indigenous growers 
spontaneously adopted crops, and did so at a rate 
which left state officials scrambling to provide 
extension services and other facilities. The mid-
1940s smallholder adoption of coffee in the Eastern 
Highlands10 turned out to be a forerunner of the 
very rapid spread of bush plantings from the mid-
1950s into neighbouring Chimbu and Western 
Highlands. While administration officials tried to 
keep control of the explosion in plantings, reports 
indicate that often households acted beyond the 
direction of agricultural extension and other 
officers. There also were moments when, and 
locations where, state officials discouraged the 
planting of crops, including in the 1960s coffee in 
the Highlands, but households continued to extend 
coffee holdings. 
However in the case of coffee, and also 
the very rapid adoption of cocoa from the early to 
mid-1950s by households on the Gamlle Peninsula, 
spontaneity never transcended the limits of the state 
scheme, nor its purpose, to advance accumulation 
(of capital). Households did not produce either 
crop in order to increase consumption levels of 
non-marketed produce, but to raise living standards 
through commodity production and consumption. 
Where households increased production 
against declining and/or rapidly fluctuating 
international prices, the colonial state searched for 
ways to cushion producers from the full effect of 
reductions or variations. The Coffee Marketing 
Board (CMB}, for instance, was established after 
the 1950s coffee boom had subsided and there was 
a danger that low prices would discourage 
smallholders from growing a crop which had been 
so recently adopted. The colonial administration, 
and the Australian Government, supported the 
adoption of a preferential tariff for imports of PNG 
coffee into Australia in order to maintain prices to 
growers. Because the measures also assisted settler 
growers should not be allowed to conceal that the 
adoption of the tariff coincided with smallholder 
output exceeding that from largeholdings. With 
settlers constrained from planting more bushes, and 
the household plantings yet to reach a peak-either 
in area or output-the tariff, and the other activities 
of the CMB, were principally driven by the need to 
secure smallholdings against international pressures 
to further lower prices. 
Subsequently the CMB adopted a policy of 
reducing the number of settler companies that 
exported coffee from largeholdings, and gave 
priority in quotas to the firms that endeavoured to 
increase the amount of coffee sold to countries 
other than Australia. This policy was made 
necessary because PNG production rapidly 
exceeded the amount consumed in the metropolitan 
country. If the policy of reducing the numbers of 
trading firms in the domestic market appears, from 
the intellectual fashions of the last decade, to be a 
restriction of competition as well as antithetical to 
individual and national advance, its purpose 
nevertheless is intelligible in the context of the 
prevailing scheme of smallholder agriculture. 
Enlarging the international consumption of the crop 
which had become integral to the living standards 
of a large proportion of Highland households 
conformed with the contemporary development of 
capitalism and the creation of social order through 
the state. 
It is important to recognise to what extent 
the post-colonial independent state adopted 
measures, including agricultural price stabilization 
schemes, to link national objectives with the 
established primacy of smallholder agriculture. As 
international markets entered a period of rapid 
price fluctuations and then longer-term decline, 
from the mid- to late-1970s until the present, state 
officials have been forced to deal with the possible 
effects of the changes on smallholder output. 1 1  The 
fact that the output had become central to not only 
the living standards of many households but also to 
the health of the national accounts ensured that for 
most of the post-colonial period domestic 
opposition could be over-ridden. As well, when 
conditions such as coffee rust primarily threatened 
smallholders, specific immediate measures were 
adopted to ensure that household predominance was 
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not undercut. 12 
However in the1980s and early 1990s, 
important international and domestic, economic and 
political, changes have acted upon the scheme of 
smallholder agriculture. These changes, which 
give increasing urgency to the policies and 
practices of state officials in contemporary PNG, 
have the potential to either dismantle the previously 
established scheme or force a very substantial 
reformulation of it. 
The fundamental tension between the 
anarchy of capitalist competition and social order is 
widely recognised in political thought, including 
that described as liberal. As already suggested, 
dealing with the tension played an important part in 
the formation of the idea of development, which 
inserted a major role for the state. At particular 
moments over the last two hundred years, specific 
conditions in the development of capitalism have 
forced the tension to the fore, including periods 
when large numbers of unemployed emerged and 
private property faced threats from the 
propertyless. Whether the location is PNG, 
Australia or anywhere else on the globe, such a 
period is occurring once again. The important 
question is why the renewed appearance of the 
tension has taken the forms it does in contemporary 
PNG. 
The short answer is not the most 
commonly given responses, such as the lingering 
legacy of colonial neglect or a return to pre­
colonial barbarism. 13 It is that specific features of 
the contemporary development of capitalism are in 
the process of dismantling the previously 
established form in which social order was 
constructed through the late and post-colonial state. 
The central element of that form has been the 
scheme of smallholder agriculture, which is under 
increasing strain. 
The strains have emerged from a number 
of principal sources. The first is the breakdown of 
a series of international arrangements, which 
underpinned the expanded production and 
consumption of PNG's major agricultural exports. 
Probably the most prominent of the arrangements 
to collapse was the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA). The 1989 suspension of the ICA, framed 
since the early 1960s to deal with a condition of 
permanent global overproduction quite different to 
the more limited forms of supply exceeding demand 
which previously had appeared, has been associated 
with real prices not experienced by growers, at 
least since the 1930s. A similar point could be 
made for commodity markets in the other major 
export crops. 
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Attempting to maintain prices to growers 
through various forms of state support has collided 
with the second source of strain, the drive by 
nearly all post-Independence governments to reduce 
expenditures. Whether one locates the source of 
the drive internationally, in what has been termed 
the 'fiscal crisis of the state' and the global 
ascendacy of neo-liberalism, or domestically, PNG 
governments have acted in line with the prevailing 
wisdom. (By at least one account, they have done 
so more successfully than most. 14) The drive not 
only has led to continuing attacks against various 
forms of price stabilisation/support, but also to 
moves to reduce expenditures on health, education 
and transportation. When price supports as well as 
these expenditures have been central to the scheme 
of smallholder agriculture, reduction diminishes 
state practices that were important for both 
elements of the idea of development. 
The third source of strain has been the 
growing economic and political ascendancy of the 
indigenous capitalist class, Papua New Guineans 
who accumulate through the ownership and control 
of the means of production and exchange. 15 The 
class's presence initially was felt in the takeover of 
many of the largeholdings and commercial 
operations previously owned by the settlers and 
international firms. Since the late 1970s there has 
been a continuing push to extend the class's 
activities, including into the expanding areas of 
mining, logging and manufacturing. As has been 
pointed out, 16 in the case of PNG the international 
fashion of privatization of state agencies effectively 
refers to what has been termed nationalization, that 
is indigenisation. State financial agencies, 
including the Investment Corporation, have sold off 
their holdings to local businesses, while the 
commercial and other operations of national and 
provincial governments have been moved into the 
hands of private owners and operators. 
The indigenous push also has extended to 
efforts to remove the barriers placed in the way of 
domestic capital (ie.settler and indigenous) by the 
late colonial administration. Independence brought 
a greatly increased measure of political power to 
the local, primarily indigenous, capitalist class, 
power which has been exercised to try to enlarge 
the land area occupied by largeholdings and in 
other ways undercut the smallholder predominance. 
There has been a continuing tussle over funds 
advanced by international agencies through PNG 
state branches, including the Development 
Bank/ Agbank. The tussle centres on whether the 
funds are to increase household production or fuel 
concentrated largeholding land ownership. In 
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marketing authorities, where the colonial state acted 
to hold domestic and international capitals at bay, 
the tide has been turned by reforms which 'free up 
the market' , that is enable trading capitals to 
operate less encumbered by a range of 
restrictions. 17 
However the international price reductions, 
as well as specific domestic conditions, including 
the revolt on Bougainville, also have acted against 
largeholding operations. State coordinated cuts in 
wages, for both rural and urban workers, have 
been joined with increasing lawlessness. In East 
New Britain and the Highlands, security constitutes 
a major component of the cost of operating 
largeholdings. In the North Solomons, only a 
settlement of what commenced as a revolt at one 
mine site will show how many plantations have 
been carved up by local households as a means of 
extending their ownership of land and export crop 
plantings. The major downturn of the current 
period has weakened considerably the largeholding 
section of local capital. 
This weakening is of considerable 
importance for PNG politics, for the relative 
strengths of sections of indigenous capital are being 
rearranged. As economic power shifted to the 
capitalists who engage in the more profitable areas, 
including mining, the earlier political ascendancy of 
the owners oflargeholdings and export crop trading 
firms has been challenged. Whether 
representatives of the latter can arrange a 
compromise which would maintain some political 
power for the agricultural bourgeoisie while 
recognising the economic superiority of the former 
remains to be seen. 
What is not yet clear is whether the 
growing importance of mining will further 
undermine the predominance of smallholder 
agriculture or provide the basis of reconstructing 
the scheme. The usual and commonsensical 
argument is that mining is detrimental to 
agriculture, since it keeps the price of the currency 
high and reduces any international price advantage 
which would accrue to producers of export crops 
produced under lower domestic costs of production. 
However, as the previously cited position of Prime 
Minister Wingti suggests, 18 there is a view that a 
considerable portion of the substantially increased 
state revenues extracted from the mining boom can 
be used to reinforce smallholding agriculture. If 
this occurs, it will involve a reassertion of one 
element of the idea of development, of creating 
social order through the state, over another. In as 
much as Wingti is the inheritor of traditions from 
the past, his emphasis upon rebuilding 'village life' 
through revitali7.ed state practices places him firmly 
in the same lineage as many Australian officials, 
including Hasluck. 
The odds, however, currently are against 
state power being arranged to support the direction 
advocated by the prime minister. Without a major 
international boom for the agricultural commodities 
PNG currently exports, or a heavily state directed 
and supported move into the production of other 
crops, reform of the earlier scheme will be 
constrained. Further land redistribution, as one 
element of reform, without either price increases 
for existing crops or the widespread adoption of 
new crops would only result in further 
impoverishment as households found production 
from smallholdings an inadequate basis for 
purchasing commodities previously inserted into 
domestic consumption. Increased state action also 
would require ditching of the current fashion, that 
markets operating unencumbered by state 
restrictions instead ensure a more rapid 
development of capitalism. This form of 
development, runs the contemporary argument, 
constitutes the desired form of social order. It 
seems likely that the present fragmented revolt of 
the dispossessed will have to take a more 
systematic form, in PNG as well as in other 
countries, before ditching will occur. 
References 
1 .  Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development 
(London) forthcoming. 
2. Scott MacWtlliam, 'Imperialism, Nationalism 
and Colonialism: Britain, Australia and Papua New 
Guinea after World War II' (Paper presented to the 
Australia and the End of Overseas Empires 1945-1975 
Conference, Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian 
Studies, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University 
of London, April 29-30) 1994. 
3. P. M. C. Hasluck, A Tune for Building: 
Australian .Administration in Papua & New Guinea 1951-
1963 (Melbourne, 1976) p. 131 .  
4. See D. Young, Policy Guidelines for 
Agriculture: A Discussion Paper (Port Moresby, mimeo, 
1983); Scott MacWtlliam, 'The Politics of Privatiz.ation: 
The Case of the Coffee Industry Corporation in Papua 
New Guinea' ,  Australian Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 28 , No . 3, November 1993 , pp. 481-498. 
5. The Weekend Australian November 13-14, p. 
24. 
128 
6. PNG Coffee Industry Corporation Report No. 
28 October 1992, p. 1 1 ,  Table 2. 
7. H. M. Thompson and S. MacWtlliam, The 
Political Economy of Papua New Guinea: Critical Essays 
(Manilla, 1992) eh. 4. 
8. Scott Mac William, 'Smallholdings,  Land Law 
and the Politics of Land Tenure in Papua New Guinea' ,  
The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 16 ,  No. 1 (1988) 
pp. 77-109; 'Smallholder Production, the State and Land 
Tenure' in P. Larmour (ed) Customary Land Tenure: 
Registration and Decentralisation in PNG, Monograph 
29 (Port Moresby, 1991)  pp. 51-72. 
9. M. Turner, Papua New Guinea: The Challenge 
of Independence - A Nation in Turmoil (Ringwood, 
Victoria, 1990) P. 5 1 .  
10. C f.  R .  M .  Bourke, 'Village Coffee in the 
Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea: Early 
Beginnings' ,  Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 21 , Nos. 1 
& 2, (1986) pp. 100-103;  B. Finney, Big-Men and 
Business: Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the 
New Guinea Highlands (Honolulu, 1973) Chs.2 and 3 .  
1 1 .  Scott MacWtlliam, ' "Just Like Working for the 
Dole" : Export Crops and Rural Households in Papua 
New Guinea' (forthcoming). 
12. Scott MacWtlliam, 'The Politics of an 
Agricultural Disease in Papua New Guinea' ,  Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1990) pp. 291-3 1 1 .  
13 . P .  McGuiness, The Australian. June6,1989; B.  
A.  Santamaria, The Australian, August 9 and 16, 1988. 
14. A. Elek and R. Garnaut, 'Notes on Papua New 
Guinea's evolution since Independence' ,  Submission to 
the Inquiry on Papua New Guinea by the Foreign Affairs 
Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade (Canberra, 1991).  
15. Thompson and MacWtlliam, 1992, Ch.3. 
16. J .  Millett, 'Economic Nationalism in Papua 
New Guinea: Institutions and Instruments' ,  Policy, Vol. 
6, No. 3 (Spring 1990) pp. 30-33 . 
17. MacWtlliam 1993 . 
18.  The Weekend Australian November 13-14,1993, 
p. 24. 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Socio-Economic Performance in Post-Colonial Papua New Guinea 
Desh Gupta 
There is the issue of when the colonial phase ended 
and the post-colonial era began. Though PNG 
gained independence in mid-September 1975, the 
colonial period effectively ended and the post­
colonial phase began when Michael Somare became 
Chief Minister following the 1972 elections. Even 
though Canberra had the final say, until 
independence decisions by the Somare government 
during the self-government period were never 
substantially challenged. 
The exceedingly small share of productive 
assets and incomes for Papua New Guineans during 
the sixties led the then Somare-led government to 
emphasise redistribution rather than growth. 
Essentially the aim here was to redistribute assets 
and income fromnon-nationals (mainly Australians) 
to nationals. This paper demonstrates that Papua 
New Guinea has been fairly successful in this 
respect. But despite having been bequeathed (by 
nature) an extremely rich natural resource base, 
PNG's economic growth has been sluggish and the 
changes in its economic structure have been 
relatively small. Part of the reason for PNG's poor 
economic performance is tied up with the need to 
wind-back the high budgetary aid overhang with 
which it was saddled at self-government. PNG has 
continued its steady march towards fiscal self­
reliance. The restraint in economic growth 
imposed by the restraint on government expenditure 
and certain structural characteristics of the PNG 
economy, have impacted in tum on the slow 
improvements in the health and education 
indicators. 
At independence PNG was also bequeathed 
a high cost-structure (Baldwin Report, 1978) and an 
expensive bureaucracy of around 50,000. It 
inherited a wage and salary structure and terms and 
conditions of employment (of a short working year) 
which were suitable for a high income Australia, 
but were totally out of kilter with a low income and 
low productivity economy that PNG has. PNG's 
high cost structure has meant that despite a high 
outlay on education of 6 % to 7 % of GDP, the dent 
in illiteracy in the post-colonial period has been 
relatively small. 
Foreign ownership (excluding non­
monetary and small holder agriculture) was 
probably at the end of the sixties around 90 % of 
the total, with Australian ownership in most sectors 
exceeding 70 % of the total (National Investment 
Development Authority, Notification Census, 
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December 1974). Since then, there has been a 
dilution of foreign ownership in a number of 
sectors: 
(i) small-scale transport has passed almost 
wholly into the hands of nationals - this 
has been achieved through the licensing 
policy, restricting foreign entry into this 
sector; 
(ii) Air Niugini has been wholly nationalised; 
in the colonial period, Qantas, Australian 
Airlines and Ansett Airlines shared in its 
ownership; 
(iii) Bums Philp and Steamships, two out of 
the three large trading companies 
operating in PNG (the third being 
Carpenters) have had a steady dilution in 
foreign ownership. The PNG Investment 
Corporation and the Superannuation Board 
have bought shares in them. Nationals 
have made inroads in retail trading 
through increased access to funds and 
training and the share of the 'big three' 
has fallen, probably to around 9 % of the 
total retail trade. 
(iv) Burns Philp has withdrawn from estate 
agriculture, where it was quite a 
significant player in the colonial period. 
In cash cropping, there has been an 
increase in the share of small holder 
production. The combination of these two 
developments has increased the share of 
agricultural production going to nationals. 
(v) The establishment of the government­
owned PNG Shipping Corporation as well 
as Niugini Insurance has reduced 
somewhat the hold in shipping and 
insurance of foreign operators. 
(vi) The more significant developments have 
been in the banking industry. The 
Australian-owned Commonwealth Bank 
was passed to PNG ownership under the 
name of the PNG Banking Corporation. 
Other commercial banks have also made 
available their shares to the PNG public. 
The Bank of South Pacific (a subsidiary of 
the National Australia Bank) was in 1993 
sold to a Church-based group in PNG. 
(vii) The financial sector has responded to the 
aspirations of nationals to acquire an 
increasing proportion of the assets located 
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in the country. Steadily through the credit 
guarantee scheme, under which the PNG 
State assumed eighty percent of the risk of 
lending to Papua New Guinea businesses 
and through a steady shift - by moral 
suasion - in the volume of commercial 
bank lending to nationals, the proportion 
of assets owned by Papua New Guineans 
has been increased. From a situation in 
the early seventies when some 10% of the 
commercial bank lending was allocated to 
nationals, by 1990, around 60% of such 
lending was made available to them. 
(viii) At self-government, there was only one 
major mine operated by BCL at Panguna 
in the North Solomon's. The PNG 
Government had 20 % of its equity. The 
PNG Government has somewhat larger 
equity holding in Kutubu Oil (22.5 % )  and 
from 1993 in Porgera gold (25 %),  and 
in OK Tedi gold/copper (30 %) but 20 % in 
Misima gold and silver. But such equity 
holding has required large-scale finance 
from the multi-national banks. Therefore, 
in the mining sector since most of the 
revenue generated during the production 
phase ends up in loan and interest 
payments to the banks, equity ownership 
on its own inadequately determines foreign 
ownership and control. 
(ix) Dependence on foreign labour has 
declined with increased output from the 
educational institutions within PNG and 
through technical aid, mostly from 
Australia, but also from New Zealand and 
USA. All the key line departments, 
including in the Bank of PNG, have been 
localised. In 1971 the non-indigenous 
population was 54,526 while in 1990 it 
had dropped to 27 ,SOO. PNG continues to 
remain dependent on foreign technical 
labour in electricity, telecommunications 
and in mining. 
The sixth of the eight aims proclaimed by the 
Somare government in 1972 was concerned with 
meeting government spending needs from locally 
raised revenue. But PNG at self-government was 
highly dependent upon foreign (Australian) aid 
flows. The fiscal self-reliance index i.e. the share 
of internal revenue in total government expenditure 
in 1971/72 was 36.4 % (Table 3). In the same year 
real Australian aid flows at (1966/67 prices) were 
more than A$1 1 1m (Table 2). They peaked in 
1973174 at A$121m. Through several agreements 
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between Australia and PNG, such real aid flows 
have been reduced at an average annual rate of 3 % 
per annum between 1973/74 and 199 1 .  From 1985 
following the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Australia and PNG, there 
has been a gradual shift to project/program aid 
(through a 2 %  per annum increase in the latter). 
In 1992/93 such aid was A$46m. and for 1993/94 
it is (budgeted) unchanged, but from then on for 
every year it is planned to increase by $36.3m. and 
in 2000/1 to reach A$300m. The budgetary aid 
component for 1992/93 was A$259m. and for 
1993/94 it has been budgeted at A$249m. and from 
then it is planned to decline every year by 
A$35.6m. and by the year 2000/1 it is eliminated 
totally. These changes to aid arrangements have in 
turn forced a number of changes on Papua New 
Guinea. There was a sharp increase in company 
tax in the early seventies. The Company Tax rate 
was raised to 25 % in the 1971-72 budget; the 
Dividend Withholding Tax of 15 % was introduced 
in the same budget, while in 1974, the Company 
Tax Rate was further raised to 331/a % .  There were 
similar successive increases in individual income 
tax rates; sharp increases in excise and import 
taxes on luxury goods. Export taxes were, also, 
introduced from 1974-75 onwards. The 
Bougainville Mining Agreement was renegotiated 
and the Company became liable to Income Tax in 
1974. In 1973-74 tax revenue formed 16.7 % of 
Market Gross Domestic Product, but this ratio 
jumped to 22 % by 1975-76. It stagnated 
subsequently rising with the upturn in commodity 
prices, particularly of gold and copper and falling 
again later. In 1989 following the 1988 rise in 
copper and gold prices it was estimated at 22.S % 
of GDP. In 1990 (following the Bougainville crisis 
of 1989 and the closure of the BCL mine in May 
1989) with a recessed economy, it was less than 
1 8 %  of GDP. The Bougainville (1989 to date) 
crisis and the revenue imperative explains the 
speeding up of the push towards further mineral 
resource exploitation and the renegotiation of the 
Porgera Agreement under which the PNG 
government has increased its holding from 10 % to 
25 % . There was much greater bunching of the 
Misima, Porgera, Hides (Gas) and Kutubu 
(Petroleum) mines than previously. Similarly, 
there are pressures on RTZ/Kennocott, the lead 
company for the Lihir mine (potentially the largest 
gold mine outside South Africa) to bring the project 
into the construction/production stages more 
speedily. Construction is planned to begin towards 
the end of 1994 and production is to commence at 
the end of 1996. At the time of writing (early 
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October 1994) the equity issue was still unclear. 
Given the security problems around the mine area 
and the continued operation of the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army, the future of the BCL 
(Panguna) mine is uncertain. 
Since the fiscal self-reliance index has 
continued to improve, it has involved some other 
adjustments. There has been a reduction in the 
share of capital expenditure in total government 
expenditure (see Table 1) and a restraint in 
government consumption, through a restraint in 
public sector employment in the period after 1975. 
Given constraints on government expenditure, it is 
not surprising that improvements in social 
indicators in the post-colonial period have been 
somewhat slow (Table 12). At the same time the 
budgetary situation has continued to deteriorate 
over the 1989-1992 period. The budget deficit as 
a proportion of GDP rose from 1 .2  % in 1989 to 
5.5 % in 1992. It has tended to stabilise over the 
1993 and 1994 periods at around 5 % of GDP (The 
Papua New Guinea Handbook Update, Feb. 1994, 
p.3). The more serious problem is connected to 
the failure of PNG to utilise concessionary loans; 
this has meant lost development opportunities and 
heavier pressures on foreign exchange reserves 
OJlliL. p.6). 
Before independence, PNG was a part of 
the Australian monetary system. Therefore, though 
independence gave the country the power to 
determine its own currency and priorities, it also 
created a balance of payments or foreign exchange 
problem which was not there before. The question 
that had to be answered in 1975 was whether or not 
the balance of payments problem which had 
emerged with independence could be resolved by 
kina devaluation. PNG authorities with a highly 
open economy and an import propensity of around 
0.7 and with the Minimum Wages Board deciding 
on full indexation, felt that devaluation would lead 
to a price-wage spiral. Since PNG lacked flexible 
and diversified production structures, import 
substitution was not expected to follow from a 
devaluation. It was also expected that low supply 
elasticities of exports and the rising cost of 
imported plant and machinery and of consumer 
goods would mean that exports would not be 
stimulated. In addition, since the bulk of the 
wealth holders were foreigners, there was a need to 
build confidence in the currency. PNG, therefore, 
went in for a hard kina policy. The kina gained in 
value against the A$. From1976 to 1986 the 
appreciation of the kina was reflected in the A$ 
falling in value from an exchange rate of 1 :  1 
against the kina in 1976 to 1 :0.6 by August 1986 
(Table 13) For this period and in order to ensure 
the broad stability of the kina against the major 
currencies and to ensure the success of the hard 
kina policy, PNG used fiscal policy to target the 
balance of current account. This meant that, if 
there was a tendency for the current account to 
deteriorate, PNG had to cut Government 
Expenditure (see Table 4). 
This policy came under enormous stress 
with the onset of the Bougainville crisis in 1989 as 
the Panguna mine closed and the government 
suffered substantial losses in revenue and faced an 
increase in defence and police expenditure. A 
strategy of bringing into being new mines and of 
curtailing expenditure was set in place. In addition 
the appreciation of the kina over the 1987-89 
period (see Table 13) was reversed through a 10% 
devaluation in 1990. 
In 1994, the PNG authorities found the 
hard kina policy under threat through unstable 
speculation in the context of a fiscal policy which 
was seen to be lax and which as we have seen 
above deteriorated over the 1989-92 period. On 12 
September 1994, the kina was devalued by 12 % 
and it was floated on 10 October 1994 following 
which it depreciated by a further 10 % .  The hard 
kina policy was only sustainable as long as the 
expenditure policy was targeted at it. Nevertheless, 
it is worth observing that despite the 
September/October 1994 depreciation, the kina's 
value remains greater than the A$. 
With around 40% of PNG's GDP taken up 
by Government Expenditure, Government was a 
leading sector. Given the agreement between the 
PNG and Australian governments to wind back 
budgetary aid, the peaking of the real flows from 
the Pauguna (BCL) mine in 1974 and the OK Tedi 
fiasco (PNG Government faced large outlays for its 
20% equity without any dividends for twelve 
years), it was not surprising that Government 
expenditure has remained constrained. In tum, it 
has constrained the growth of GDP (Table 5). 
Given the rate of increase in population of around 
2.3 % per annum, per capita income has not 
changed in the post colonial period. 
The constraints faced by Government 
outlays have in tum limited improvements in health 
and education. Health and education are 
notoriously labour-intensive activities and, 
therefore, for expansion require an increase in 
government outlay (assuming that real wages and 
staff: student ratios remain unaltered). Despite such 
constraints, enrolments in primary schools have 
increased at around 4 % per annum, while those in 
secondary schools have increased at an even faster 
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rate (Table 6). Nevertheless enrolment rates in 
PNG are considerably below those of the average 
for developing countries as a whole (Table 7). In 
addition, it is important to distinguish between 
actual attendance rates and enrolment rates reported 
by the Education Department. Against the 
enrolment rate of 60% (reported by the latter), the 
1980 census put the actual proportion of students 
attending primary schools at 38 % . Recorded 
figures may have to be discounted substantially and 
the dent in illiteracy is likely to be much slower 
than the current enrolment rate of 70 % implies. 
The adult literacy figures for 1989 are placed at 
around 47 % , up from 32 % in 1975 (1992 Budget 
Papers, Volume 1 : 1) .  Nevertheless, one important 
achievement has been the reduction in inter­
provincial and gender educational inequality (Tables 
8 and 9). One-fifth of the government budget goes 
on education (Table 10) and around 6 % to 7 % of 
the GDP is expended on education. 
The infant mortality rate declined shatply 
between 1966 and 1980, but has stagnated at that 
level in the eighties (Table 12). Improvements in 
life expectancy have, consequently been slow in the 
eighties (Table 12) .  One reason is that malaria has 
been on the increase (Post-Courier, August 1993). 
The Highlanders who until 1950 had little exposure 
to malaria, had by 1990 around 80% of the 
population exposed to it. Modem diseases, with 
changing food habits (coke, lolly water, meat pies, 
hamburgers and fried foods) are, also, on the rise. 
Unlike education, the share of the government 
budget going on health has been cut-back somewhat 
since 1978 (Table 10). 
Average per capita food production is 
tending to fall and an increase in the rate of 
population growth will quicken the rate of fall. 
The drop in average per capita food production is 
confirmed by an increase in dependence on food 
imports. The UNDP Food Import Dependency 
Ratio, which measures the proportion of food 
imports to total food available for internal 
distribution, has risen from 19.6 in 1969-71 to 25.5 
in 1986-88 (1992 Budget Papers, Volume 1 :27); 
though daily calorie supply per head was reported 
at 2,236 up from around 2,000 at independence 
(World Development Report 1991 ,  Table 28). 
As Table 1 1  shows, there has been an 
increased importance of mining and to some extent 
of manufacturing during the seventies. But during 
the eighties the structure of the PNG economy has 
remained unaltered. Essentially in the cash 
cropping sector, apart from oil-palm, there has 
been stagnation in the production of such crops. 
There is, also, a reduction in food production per 
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head in the eighties (Table 12) .  In the nineties, the 
expansion of mining, may give some stimulus to 
manufacturing. In addition, the competitive 
position of the commercial agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors has been enhanced somewhat 
by the September/October 1994depreciations of the 
Kina, the 1993 jettisoning of the urban minimum 
wage and the 1994 freezing of public sector wages. 
The effects of these developments have still to 
show through in the data on changes in the 
structure of production. 
PNG's socio-economic performance in the 
post-colonial period has been severely constrained 
by a number of factors. At independence, it 
inherited a high cost-structure and an expensive 
bureaucracy, which was bolstered by a high level 
of Australian aid and large revenue flows from the 
Panguna mine. As real Australian aid flows were 
wound back and real revenue flows from the BCL 
mine fell, Government expenditure had to be 
adjusted. There were cuts in Government 
investment; options for the use of concessionary 
aid flows though available were often not utilised. 
The Government's equity investment in OK Tedi 
was a drain on government resources. Panguna 
mine's closure in 1989 cut into government revenue 
and the Bougainville crisis forced an increase in 
unproductive government expenditure. Government 
deficit increased raising the cost of servicing 
government debt. Government expenditure has, 
therefore, failed to provide a stimulus to the PNG 
economy and in tum the sluggish growth of the 
economy has failed to provide revenue growth and 
thus enable growth in government expenditure in a 
virtuous circle. Despite constraints in government 
expenditure, there has been some, though slow, 
improvement in educational enrolments and in the 
socio-economic indicators, including reductions in 
regional and gender educational inequality. 
The Bougainville crisis has led the 
government to allow a speedier development of 
new mines. This has kept the relative importance 
of the mining sector unchanged. It has also led to 
the jettisoning of an urban wages minimum in 1993 
and of the substantial softening of the hard kina 
policy in 1994. 
The share of money income going to 
Papua New Guineans has substantially increased. 
There has been an increase in fiscal self-reliance 
and PNG's dependence on Australian budgetary aid 
has been substantially reduced. PNG's capacity to 
absorb project aid remains low, which explains the 
lack of utilisation of concessionary non-budgetary 
aid. 
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Table 1:  
Sources: 
Share of Capital Expenditure in Total Government* - Expenditure 
Fiscal Year 
1950/51 
1954155 
1956/57 
1959/60 
1962/63 
1965/66 
1967/68 
1970171 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974175 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Calculated from: 
Capital Expenditure as a % offotal Government 
Expenditure 
29.6 
42.4 
36.9 
28.6 
28.9 
3 1 .7  
32.7 
20.6 
17.2 
14.6 
9.9 
8 .8  
1 1 .0 
13 .0 
16.7 
15.2 
18.4 
15.9 
16.6 
12. 8 
15.3 
6.7 
10.9 
10.0 
10. 1 
13 .9 
1)  I. Downs, The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945-1975 (Canberra, 
1980) Table 9. 1 
2) World Banlc (Baldwin Report), Papua New Guinea: Its Economic Situation and 
Prospects for Development (Washington, 1978) Table 6. 1 
3) R. Garnaut, P. Baxter in consultation with A. Kruger, Exchange Rate and Macro­
economic Policy in Independent Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby, 1983) Table 
7.2 
4) Department of Finance 
* Definition of capital expenditure varied, therefore, figures may be used only to compare broad trends. 
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Table 2: 
Year 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973174 
1974175 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977178 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
Source: 1) 
2) 
3) 
Real Australian Aid Flows to PNG (At 1966/67 Prices) 
AJnount at 1966/67 
Australian Prices 
A$'000 
84,321 
89,321 
95, 122 
106,260 
109,627 
1 1 1 ,549 
1 1 1 , 173 
120,789 
98,676 
109,638 
102,899 
91 ,054 
90,984 
82,042 
78,008 
72,908 
71 ,074 
72,495 
71 ,770 
68, 1 82 
64,773 
55,051 
52,855 
52,536 
49,710 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
%Increase (+)/ 
%Decrease (-) 
6 . 1 
6 .3 
1 1 .7 
3 .2  
1 . 8  
-0.3 
8 .6 
-18 .3  
1 1 . 1  
-6 . 1  
-1 1 .5  
-0. 1 
-9. 8  
-4.9 
-6.5 
-2.5 
2.0 
-1 .0  
-5.0 
-5.0 
-15.0 
-4.0 
-1 .0 
-5.0 
Up to 1982/83 recalculated from D. Gupta, 'The 1984 Jackson Report, comparative 
Advantage, the Dutch disease and Fiscal Self-Reliance in Papua New Guinea' ,  Yag l­
Ambu, 1 1 ,  3 (1984) Table 2 
Figures for 1983/84-88/89 calculated from AIDAB's Submission to the Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into Australia's Relations with Papua New 
Guinea (August 1989) Table 2 
Figures for the latest years calculated from Australian Government Budget Paper No.4 
(1991) Table 3 
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Table 3: FISCal Self-Reliance Index 
Fiscal Year Fiscal Self-Reliance Index ( % ) 
1967/68 33.4 
1970171 36.2 
1971/72 36.4 
1972/73 37.2 
1973/74 44.4 
1974/75 48.0 
1975176 53 .5 
1976177 55 
1978 59.3 
1979 54.7 
1980 57.4 
1981 58.6 
1982 55 
1983 52 
1984 52 
1985 61 
1986 63 
1987 67 
1988 66 
1989 69 
Source: 1) World Bank (1978) Table 6 . 1  
2) PNG Budget Papers, Vol.2, Economic Policies (1991) Table 1 
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Table 4: Exchange Rate and Increase in Real Government Current Expenditure 
Year Effective Exchange Rate Index# Real Increase in Govt. Exp.# 
Nominal Real % 
1971 89 75 
1972 101 86 12 
1973 118  104 2 
1974 105 103 6 
1975 100 100 12 
1976 101 103 
1977 97 98 -9 
1978 96 96 3 
1979 98 98 3 
1980 105 102 7 
1981 109 105 1 
1982 1 12 105 -5 
1983 1 10 106 -8 
1984 1 12 106 4 
1985 107 97 2 
1986 107 97 3 
1987 108 92 -1 
1988 1 12 91  2 
1989 121 95 8 
1990 1 10 90 -5 
1991  � 
# Figures have been rounded. 
Source: 1) Exchange rates calculated from IMF and World Bank Data by the author. 
2) Government current expenditure figures from BaldwinReport (1978), GLM (1985) 
and PNG Budget paper 1991 and 1992, Gamaut et al (1983). 
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Table S: Average Annual Rates of Growth in Government Expenditure and Gross Domestic 
Product: 
Period Average Growth rate in Government Average Growth Rate in GDP 
Expenditure 
Nominal Real Nominal 
1960/61-1969/70 18.0 16.55 9.5 
1969/70-1980 1 1 . 3  2.55 1 1 .95 
1979-1984 6.2 -1 . 1  5.9 
1985-1990 4.5 0.4 6.0 
Source: Calculated by the author from various PNG Government sources. 
Table 6: Growth of Educational Enrolments, by Level Papua New Guinea 
Community Provincial Sec. National 
Schools Schools High Schools 
1960 92,029 1 ,947 
1967 204,509 1 1 ,864 
1972 220, 193 23 ,523 
1975 238,267 28,916 846 
1977 258,608 3 1 ,486 1 ,094 
1979 277,301 34,626 1 ,521 
1981 299,588 37,987 1,63 1  
1983 322,254 41 ,702 1 ,610 
1985 351 , 171  46,317 1 ,639 
1987 373,999 49,766 1 ,648 
1989 407,748 53,494 1 ,986 
# (415,974) (54, 161) 
Av. Annual 
Growth Rate 
1975-89( %) 3 .9 4.5 6.3 
Real 
8.0 
3 .2 
-1 .4 
1 .9  
Vocational 
Centres 
576 
3 ,208 
5,998 
5,415 
4,704 
4,299 
4,691 
5,451 
6 ,843 
6,651 
6,064 
0.8 
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Notes: Figures without brackets apply to the National Education System. #Figures in brackets are 
for 1989 and include national students in International and SDA schools. 
Source: Department of Education. 
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Table 7: Community and Secondary School Enrolment Rates 1975-89 
* 
Community School Secondary School 
(A) 
(%) 
1975 56.4 
1977 56.3 
1979 59.1 
1981 59.9 
1983 60. 8 
1985 63 .4 
1987 64.7 
1989 61.5 
1990*(A) 65(68.5) 
(B) 99 
PNG figures; figures in brackets are excluding North Solomons 
Population of relevant school age. 
(B) Average Gross Enrolment Rates for Developing Country; figures 
extracted from UNESCO data. 
(%)  
12.7 
13 .3  
13 .4  
13 .0 
13 .6 
14. 1 
14.7 
15. 1 
14(15.5) 
44 
Source: Calculated using 1980 census, 1990 Preliminary census and Department of Education figures. 
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Table 8: 
Province 
Western 
Gulf 
NCD 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Oro 
S. Highlands 
E. Highlands 
Simbu 
W. Highlands 
Eng a 
Morobe 
Madang 
West Sepik 
East Sepik 
Manus 
New Ireland 
Community and High School Enrolment Rates, by Province (including SDA Schools) 
(%) 
--- Grades 1 - 6 -- -- Grades 7 - 10 ---
1972 1982 1990 1972 1982 1990 
68.6 68.6 74.4 14. l 17. 1 14.5 
67.5  70.6 70.5 7.2 14.3 15.5 
82.2 84.5 29.4 32.5 
72.5 16.7 
72.2 74.5 21.3 21 .2 
67.6  70. 1 70. 1 15. 8 13.9 12.5 
67.6 64.7 66.7 12.9 12.9 15.5 
35.7 49.4 52.5 3.0 9.3 1 1 .5 
29.9 59.5 59.5 6.6 12.4 16.5 
52.5 56.4 59.5 6.7 12.4 16.5 
53 . 8  60.5 1 1 .4 13.5 
33.6 4. 8 
48.2 54.5 8.5 10.3 
46. 1 61 . 1 63 .5 7 .8  10.3 12.5 
57.2  55.9 57.3  12. 1 10.5 10.9 
47. 1  64.4 69.2 6.5 12.0 12.0 
56. 1 65.6 62.5 1 1 . 3  10.3 10.7 
89.6 94.2 90.5 27.7 26. 1  28.2 
90.6 81 .8  79. 8  19.3 29.9 26.6 
East New Britain 1 12.7 87.6 88.5 34.4 3 1 .0 29.5 
West New Britain 76. 1  78.5 75.5 3 .9 15.9 16. 1 
North Solomons 90.0 75.4 n.a. 13. 1 17.2 n.a. 
PNG 53.9 63.1 68.5 13.1  13.4 15.5 
Coefficient of 0.42 0.19 0.17 0.62 0.54 0.42 
Variation 
Notes: (i) Figures for 1972 are based on 1971 census, figures for 1982 on 1980 census and figures 
for 1990 are estimates based on the 1990 preliminary census. Western Highlands and 
Enga and National Capital District and Central Province were not separated in 1972; this 
explains the single figure for both of them. 
(ii) All enrolment rates are gross enrolment rates and are subject to error because of under-age 
and over-age children being included. They should be used with caution, because of the 
discrepancy between enrolment and attendance data and other data problems. 
Source: Calculated by the author from Department of Education data. 
140 LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Table 9: Percentage of Enrolments who are Females: 
Province - - Grades 1 - 6 -- -- Grades 7 - 10 --
1972 1982 1990 1972 1982 1990 
Western 37. 8  43.4 47.3  25.3 3 1 . 3  39.3  
Gulf 39. 1 40.8 41 . 8  35.6 36.7 37.2 
NCO 46.3 46.5  43 . 8  48.7 
41.4 36. 8  
Central 44.2 44.6 37.0 41.6 
Milne Bay 41 .4 45.3  47.6 48.7 50.5 57.4  
Oro 40.0  43.3  44.9 15.7 20.8 31 .6  
S.  Highlands 24.2 41 .6 44. 8  18 .3 32.3 35. 8 
E. Highlands 22. 8  42.2 44.7 24.4 25.0 3 1 . 8  
Simbu 23 .6 39.3 39.9 14. 1 26.7 30.6 
W. Highlands 43 .7 42.7 32.0 34. 1 
16.7 25.6 
Enga 36.5 44.6 25.3  32.4 
Morobe 33.6 42. 8 43 .5  22.7 32.2 36.2 
Madang 37. 1 39.4 42.6 26.7 28.4 35. 8 
West Sepik 33 . 8  35.9 40. 1 20.3  25.5 33.2 
East Sepik 32.2 41 .7 45. 8  30.4 39.6 40.7 
Manus 43 . 8  46.9 48. 1 46.0 40. 1 47.0 
New Ireland 46.6 46. 1 47.2 41 .4 41 .7 45.6 
East New Britain 44.7 47. 1  46.2 33.4 54.2 44.7 
West New Britain 43. 8  45.0 44.0 20. 8  34.0 42. 1 
North Solomons# 45.7  46.6 48.3 32.3 39.2 44.2 
PNG 35.3 42.8 45.5 30.8 35.8 39.0 
Note: Figures refer to the National Education system Only. 
# North Solomons did not report any figures for 1990; figures shown in that column against it 
are for 1989. 
Source: Calculated by the author from Department of Education data. 
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Table 10: Health as a Proportion of Government Expenditure 
Year Total Budget 
Goods & Services 
('000) Health 
1951 12,773 20. 8 
1954 16,670 16.3 
1957 27,453 16. 1 
1960 38,665 12.2 
1963 59,873 1 1 .4 
1966 103 ,577 9. 1 
1969 152,860 8.0 
1978 441 ,700 10.2 
1982 615,000 9.4 
1988 851 ,000 9.0 
Source: Calculated by the author from various PNG Government sources. 
Table 11: (Distribution of GDP by Broad Sectors) % 
% on 
Sector/Year 1969 1980 1985 
Agriculture 
Forestry & Fisheries:Cash Cropping 
and Subsistence 44 33 
Subsistence only 27 15 
Mining 1 13 
Manufacturing 5 10 
Construction 12 4 
Rest. (Services) 38  40 
Source: (1) World Bank (Baldwin Report) 1978 : Table 3 .2. 
32 
14 
12 
1 1 
5 
40 
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Education 
6.2 
5.6 
6.4 
8.0 
10.5 
10.9 
10. 8 
20.9 
20. 8 
20.5 
1988 1990 
32 33 
13 14 
15 10 
10 1 1  
6 7 
37 39 
(2) Calculated by the author from various publications PNG's National Statistical 
Office. 
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Table 12: Change in Social (Health) Indicators 
1946 1966 1980 1988 
Total Fertility Rate n.a. 6.2 5.9 5.7 
Crude Birth Rate (%) n.a. 4.2 4.0 3 .9  
Infant Mortality Rate 250 160.0 72.0  70.0 
Life Expectancy at Birth 31  45.0 51 .0 54.0 
Food Production Index per Capita (79-
81 = 100) n.a. 105.0 100.0 93 .0 
Source: World Bank Statistics. 
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Table 13: Kina Value Against AS and US$ 
Date AS : PNG Kina 
(1) 
6/8/84 .768 
5/8/85 .69 
1/8/86 .595 
4/8/87 .64 
29/8/88 .703 
4/8/89 .662 
1/8/90 .769 
1/8/91 .747 
1/8/92 .716 
3/8/93 .667 
30/9/93 .641 
2/8/94 .697 
12/9/94 .713 
14/9/94 * . 806 
30/9/94 . 805 
12/10/94 " . 894 
14/10/94 .926 
* Kina devalued by 12 % on 12/9/94. 
0 Kina floated on 10/10/94. 
Source: o Australian Financial Review, Various 
0 (3) = (2) + (1) 
AS : USS 
(2) 
. 837 
.71 
.606 
.69 
.819 
.76 
.791 
.779 
.745 
.682 
.646 
.737 
.746 
.744 
.739 
.740 
.737 
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PNG Kina : USS 
(3) 
1 .09 
1 .03 
1 .0 
1 .0  
1 . 16 
1 . 16 
1 .03 
1 .04 
1 .04 
1 .02 
1 .01 
1 .06 
1 .05 
0.92 
0.92 
0. 828 
0.796 
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Pathway to Modernization: Fiji's Garment Revolution1 
R. T. Robertson 
In February 1990 Navitilai Naisoro, the Permanent 
Secretary to the Fiji Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce, outlined to students at the University of 
the South Pacific in Suva his vision for Fiji's 
future. 'My hope' , he said, 'is that one day instead 
of seeing the greenery of sugar cane fields, we see 
the greenery of well engineered factory 
complexes' . 2 In 1990 he had every reason to 
believe that his dream was well on its way to 
fruition. As one of the self-proclaimed 'New 
Fijian' economic managers appointed following the 
1987 military coups,3 Naisoro had been at the 
forefront of a radical redirection in Fiji's economic 
policies. The coups had precipitated a massive 
currency devaluation of 35 per cent, 12 per cent 
inflation (unofficial estimates placed inflation at 26 
per cent), a new wage freez.e, an upsurge in 
unemployment, and growing levels of poverty and 
destitution. Investment capital had dried up and the 
economy contracted, affecting Fiji's predominant 
import substitution industries in a way that high 
protective barriers could not assist. 
Claimed Naisoro, 'We reali7.ed that if we 
were to survive in the long term, the solution lay 
with the export sector. [And] we needed an 
unequivocal signal from government to 
businessmen: now is the day you're really going to 
make money. '4 That signal came in December 
1987 - Tax Free Zones (TFZs). Since TFZs were 
costly to establish and could not be introduced 
overnight, the government permitted individual 
workshops to be declared Tax Free Factories 
(TFFs). Such status permitted industries exporting 
95 per cent of their production, 13  years holiday 
from company tax, as well as duty free entry of 
raw materials and equipment. Some government 
ministers gloated at the supposed opportunities 
TFFs offered foreign investors. Apisai Tora, Fiji's 
Minister for Public Utilities, reportedly bragged to 
an Australian businessperson: 'This place is ripe 
for carpetbaggers. You better get your guys in 
here if you want a slice of the action, as it were. 
Where else have you heard of thirteen years tax­
free, man'.5 
The TFFs were declared an instant 
success . In early 1989 Finance Minister Josefata 
Kamikamica anticipated that they would lift exports 
by 25 per cent or F$100 million by the end of that 
year. Employment in the new factories was 
expected to rise from 4000 to over 6000.6 
Although initially optimistic, the projections were 
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achieved in the following year when garment 
exports alone grossed $161 million (22 % of all 
exports by value). 7 By 1991  Tax Free Factory 
employment exceeded 9,300 ( 10.4 per cent of total 
paid employment), a far cry from the situation five 
years earlier when garment exports only just topped 
the $2 million mark and employment approximated 
2,500. Little wonder that Naisoro described the 
rate of change as 'breathless' :  
Now people are thinking of take­
off again. But the really 
important  i n g redient  i s  
devaluation plus the fact that we 
don't have a democratic 
government. . .  Businessmen 
don't care about the voting 
structure. . .  We go for 
businessmen who want to find a 
place where it is profitable to 
make money. What he makes is 
his own business. 8 
Devaluation, deregulation, privat-ization, 
and foreign investment quickly became the catch 
words of the postcoup regime. According to 
Kamikamica, Fiji had become too reliant on 
government, on state enteiprises and state-oriented 
development. The coups had the advantage of 
permitting Fiji to 'sever the apron strings which 
tied us to inherited colonial characteristics' .9 By 
means of the corporatization of selected 
government enteiprises (for example Post and 
Telecommunications, the shipping fleet, and ship 
yards), the abolition of import licensing, tariff and 
excise reductions, and an expansion in TFFs, 
Kamikamica hoped to raise employment by 6 per 
cent and economic growth by 7 per cent during 
1989. Such expectations were largely dependent 
upon the continued expansion of production in 
TFFs. 10 
At the beginning of 1989 there were 46 
TFFs, expected to produce over $100 million in 
their first year of operation, over half from food 
processing and 32 per cent from garment 
production. The Fiji Trade and Investment Board 
(FTIB) was bullish, expecting production in the 
TFFs to double that figure and to increase 
employment from 5027 to some 16,000 by 
December 1989. 1 1  In fact by early 1991 there were 
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104 TFFs employing 9 ,327 people. Of these 78 
per cent were employed in garment factories and 
13 per cent in food and related factories. 12 
Tax Free Factories, in particular those of 
the garment sector, became the show piece of 
postcoup Fiji's economic planning. Many 
publications, including Islands Business, reinforced 
the regime's desire to distance itself from the past 
by regularly referring to the events of 1987 as 'the 
Fijian revolution' and to its architects as 'the new 
kind of Fijians . . .  coming to the fore' to transform 
Fiji into a new entrepot centre, the South Pacific's 
version of South Korea, Singapore or Taiwan. 13 
The irony is that these initiatives by so­
called 'New Fijians' did not place the Fiji economy 
on a new trajectory. 14 Nor of course did they owe 
much to the coups' declared objectives for Fijian 
people. Such objectives were largely abandoned on 
5 December 1987 when coup leader Brigadier 
General Rabuka dismissed his own Taukeist 
military government and reinstated the former 
Alliance Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. 
The Taukeist regime had planned to introduce 
radical new land legislation and to transform the 
distribution of land rents. Both goals threatened 
the privileges of many chiefs and bureaucrats, the 
retention of which some would argue had been the 
real motive for the coups. Since December 1987 
efforts to promote Fijian economic activities have 
rarely addressed commoner aspirations and focused 
instead on measures which strengthen the activities 
of the Fijian elite. This point is occasionally 
lamented by Rabuka. On 23 June 1991  he declared 
that his objectives in the 1987 coups were different 
from those of the interim regime, and added: 'I am 
disillusioned by what is going on but [it] is too late; 
we'd sort of handed power over and they are 
running the country now' . 15 Even as Prime 
Minister after 1992, Rabuka found his Taukeist 
past catching up with him. On a trip to New 
Zealand in April 1993 , he advised investors against 
manufacturing and instead urged investment in 
'Fijian' companies. Two months later he argued, 
'I think we are doing well with local investors. 
Who needs overseas investors?' .  16 Rabuka's 
confusion distracted government; it did not reorient 
policies. 
Contrary to Kamikamica's assertion above, 
the coups did not mark a fundamental break with 
colonial characteristics. Rather they reaffirmed 
neocolonial principles particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the coups. 
Fijians were deemed too 
immature or too self-seeking to 
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handle democracy and required 
the attention of a strong 'neutral' 
force such as the military to 
guide them and to protect their 
country's supposed traditional 
systems and values. This 
essentially meant reinforcing the 
very policies found wanting in 
the past: a greater emphasis on 
production for export markets, 
calls for austerity and sacrifice 
(the army - now consisting of 
over 5000 soldiers is 
conveniently excluded from such 
calls even though it might be 
reasonable to suggest that its 
huge expenditure contributes to 
the need for such calls), and 
additional foreign investor access 
to the country's resources and 
labour. 17 
In addition, these policies were deemed 
imperative to counter the growing economic crisis 
generated by the coups. Yet, despite expansion in 
exports, investment and building activity remained 
relatively depressed, and much of the country's 
increased production came from the utilization of 
existing capacity rather than the creation of new 
capacity. Nor did the TFFs guarantee substantial 
foreign investment. Most garment industries 
require little initial outlay, one reason they are 
traditionally the most mobile of all transnational 
manufacturing activities. Since 75 per cent of 
1988's garment TFFs were joint ventures or fully 
foreign owned, 18 28 per cent in existence before 
becoming TFFs, foreign investors have been able 
to borrow much of their capital locally, thus 
potentially removing capital needed for other 
domestic investments. David Ogilvie, the British 
Executive Service Overseas consultant to the FTIB, 
noted in 1989 that foreign investors were not 
buying land or buildings and that most of their 
investments (in only 39 per cent of TFFs) were in 
plant and equipment, representing in effect a 
foreign exchange loss to the country of some $22.5 
million in 1988. 19 
During the immediate postcoup years, 
tighter economic controls, reduced imports, and a 
low demand for funds, left Fiji's banks awash with 
money. The Reserve Bank attempted to mop up 
the excess with two special issues at 5 per cent 
interest. Such was the demand, that the issues 
were quickly over-subscribed. But vast sums were 
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still sitting idle. Surplus liquidity and low interest 
rates, as the former Governor of the Reserve Bank 
- Savenaca Siwatibau - noted at the time, merely 
attracts fly-by-night investors. They did not 
necessarily produce foreign investment. 20 
Postcoup economic initiatives were also 
designed to entrench the power of the Fijian 
establishment. The premises behind their specific 
programs remain rooted in the class project of their 
Alliance predecessor and its clientelist strategies 
and rentier complex. They did not address the 
very structural problems (for example, urban and 
transnational biases) or distributional problems 
(rents, wages, etc) facing the country which had 
assisted the Coalition's electoral victory in April 
1987 and which are still the underlying cause of 
continued political instability. 
The garment TFFs bear this out. Despite 
all the hype of heralding a revolutionary era of 
prosperity for Fiji and creating a new pathway to 
moderniz.ation, the industry continues to offer Fiji 
labour little more than poorly paid wages under less 
than perfect working conditions. The government 
turns a blind eye to this industrial reality even 
when, as in May 1989, its own officials reported 
that nearly 70 per cent of garment factories were 
grossly overcrowded and lacking hygiene, 
ventilation and safety provisions. On this occasion, 
the government recommended only that companies 
be given more time to effect the necessary 
improvements. 21 Even this most gentle of nudges, 
proved too much for some garment employers who 
responded by threatening to lay off workers; one 
company dismissed a fifth of its workforce of SOO 
for two weeks in protest at allegations of 
overcrowding. Ironically, this was Classic Apparel 
of Suva, the country's first TFF. 22 
'Who is benefiting from this so-called 
boom in the garment industry?' asked Mahendra 
Chaudhry, National Secretary of the Fiji  Trades 
Union Congress (FTUC). 'It is obviously not those 
poor women who toil long hours in squalid 
conditions for a pittance. '23 Even Ogilvie argued 
that 'the garment industry as a whole (with some 
notable exceptions) is not a particularly good 
showpiece for Fiji's TFZ/TFF Scheme. '24 Yet it 
already employs over 80 per cent of the TFF 
workforce and does not appear likely to lose its 
dominance within the scheme. 
The government could have ensured 
greater national benefits from its TFFs, but the 
rapidity with which it launched the scheme made 
such results more difficult. Since no local value 
added preconditions are stipulated, and little in the 
way of local raw materials are utilized, much 
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needed backward linkages to the rest of the 
economy are unlikely to develop. Further, the 
poor renumeration its predominantly female 
workforce receives ensures that few benefits spill 
over to the community beyond the injection of 
subsistence wages. The government has established 
a special training school to upgrade the skills of 
garment workers, and believes that increased skills 
will eventually drive up garment industry wages. 
But, given the vast number of people seeking paid 
employment, this may not occur. 
The government has committed itself to 
establishing a TFZ at Navutu in Lautoka and at 
Kalabu in Suva. Indeed, in March 1989 300 
squatters, some of whom had lived at Kalabu for 
15 years, were evicted from the Suva site. Since 
then high costs of development (estimated at over 
$13 million)25 have slowed its development. So too 
have Fijian perceptions of its value, at least in 
terms of indigenous rhetoric. Most local investors 
are Gujeratis, but 90 per cent of the workforce are 
women, now almost equally composed of poor 
Fijians and Indians whose wages seem designed to 
lock them into poverty. Ema Druavesi, whose 
formation in mid 1989 of a Fiji Garment Workers' 
Association received less than enthusiastic 
endorsement from the interim regime, maintained 
that Fijians were becoming aware of how the plight 
of exploited garment workers is merely a mirror to 
the wider society. 'The social implications of 
domestic violence, marriage break-ups, neglected 
children of the urban drift, and the neglected and 
overcrowded homes has never been looked at by 
the government' ,  she argued during a spate of 
factory strikes in late 1990. '[And yet] our 
workers are just expected to slave away. '26 Clearly 
few benefits accrue to Fijians, unless they happen -
like Navi Naisoro's family - to hold shares in 
garment factories. 
With the return to democracy in 1992, the 
new Rabuka government has been forced to 
acknowledge that there are political dangers 
inherent in policies which promote sweatshops and 
employ Fijians, and not just Indians. Consequently 
in 1994 it signalled greater tolerance for import 
substitution strategies which permit higher local 
wages. 27 However some export manufacturers 
view the problem differently. Fiji's reliance on the 
cheap cut, make and trim activity leaves it wide 
open to Asian competition. They believe Fiji 
should change its focus from volume to exclusive 
upmarket production. 28 
Unfortunately, Fiji economist Roman 
Grynberg argues, the government 'does not have 
the will to experience the necessary pain' such a 
148 
transformation would entail, 29 even though its new 
Minister of Finance, Bemado Vunibobo, concedes 
that the only real potential for job expansion lies in 
exploiting external markets.30 With 13,000 new 
entrants in the workforce each year, the 
government knows job creation must assume 
greater and greater importance, more so perhaps 
since recession and trade liberaliz.ation in Fiji's 
main markets have dramatically reduced the 
usefulness of its low valued garment exports. 
Exports fell from $131 million in 1991  to $105 
million in 1992, thereafter recovering slowly to 
record $129 million in 1993.  However, initial 
returns for 1994 are not encouraging, with exports 
down 26 per cent in the first quarter. 31 
Exports alone have not absorbed the 
growing workforce. In fact, aside from a brief 
flirtation with a wholly inadequate poverty 
alleviation scheme, the government has given the 
urban poor little attention. Politically marginaliz.ed 
by the 1990 Constitution, the urban poor are 
occasionally referred to by politicians as a weapon 
to enforce the racial divide. Rabuka warned 
Parliament in June 1994 that poor urban Fijians 
were a destabilizing force. 
They feel disadvantaged. They 
feel they are starving. They may 
look well but their very soul is 
starving. As long as this 
happens, I cannot guarantee nor 
can anyone guarantee that there 
will not be another coup in this 
land.32 
A red herring perhaps, but undoubtedly a 
convenient one. It reinforces Indian responsibility 
for the coups and blames them for Fijian poverty. 
Yet, no one race has a monopoly on poverty, even 
if the policies put in place since the coups have 
seen poverty among Fijians grow rapidly. The real 
issue facing the poor is not race but their exclusion 
from meaningful participation in the economy. 
Some 50,000 school-aged children are not educated 
every year because their parents cannot afford 
school fees. Over 70 per cent of the labour force 
earn less than $5000 per annum or $96 per week. 33 
As far as the director of Fiji's Council of 
Social Services, Nassan Khan, is concerned, the 
recent decline in exports merely reinforces his view 
that the focus on export production as a strategy for 
development is simply not working. He wants the 
poor to be included in the economy, to be involved 
in buying and selling, 'not [to] be isolated through 
poverty alleviation schemes' .  34 The mass 
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production of export garments cannot achieve this, 
since it depends on sweat shop conditions (ie. 
poverty) for its survival. Nor can import 
substitution industrialization provide a solution. 
Once the darling of an independence generation 
seeking to distance itself from its colonial past, 
import substitution has far too narrow a base to 
overcome the poverty and unemployment which 
reinforces its limited capacity. Fixated by its own 
communal logic, the government has no ability to 
resolve this dilemma. Indeed, Rabuka sees himself 
as only a Fijian prime minister, not a prime 
minister for all of Fiji. He argues that his Fijian 
heritage makes it impossible for him to 'tum on the 
universal Prime Minister picture'. 35 In terms of 
economic development and communal interaction 
this attitude may well prove disastrous. Yet as 
long as the Constitution permits a government to 
represent only Fijians, Rabuka will inevitably focus 
on those communal interests which will win him 
electoral support. Strangely, even in this very 
narrow regard, postcoup governments demonstrate 
little imagination. 
There is a familiar pattern to most efforts 
to assist Fijians. Those who benefit most are 
establishment Fijians. During the period of the 
Alliance government, the Fijian elite used access to 
the state to enrich itself. It also utilized traditional 
relationships and obligations to gain access to the 
finances of state corporations. In this respect 
nothing has changed. One early and much 
publicized initiative by the Rabuka-Mara regime 
was a special $20 million allocation in 1989 to help 
Fijian business people and enable Fijians to control 
30 per cent of the corporate sector by the year 
2000. In reality this was an extension of an 
existing plan for provincial councils to obtain 
shares in the Great Council of Chiefs' Fijian 
Holdings Ltd whose capital is invested in existing 
profitable and often transnational businesses such as 
Carlton United Brewery, Bums Philp, Carpenters, 
and British Petroleum joint ventures. Ratu Mara 
supported a similar but apparently abortive 
initiative in July 1987 when he reportedly assisted 
in negotiating an American loan to enable the Great 
Council of Chiefs to acquire shares in the Bums 
Philp and Carpenter transnationals.36 In 1991 the 
Great Council of Chiefs approved the sale of shares 
to Fijian individuals but the change received little 
publicity. It was later claimed that only people 
with access to loan facilities or who possessed 
'insider' knowledge benefited. 37 Even if it expands 
a dependent Fijian middle class, participation 
through passive shareholding will not create Fijian 
economic development. 
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Nor necessarily is continued reliance on 
rents to generate income. In 1988 land rentals 
earned $8,628,000, nearly half of it generated in 
the Western Division. But without changes in the 
distribution and utilization of such monies, land 
rentals are unlikely to promote active Fijian 
economic participation. Income earned from 
economic activity must be productively utiliz.ed, not 
squandered on personal fortunes, if it is to have a 
self-generating impact. 38 Part of the problem is 
that government still wants the bulk of Fijians to 
remain subservient to old structures of power. 
Hence its efforts to strengthen the power of chiefs 
in the Constitution and to create new Fijian laws to 
maintain the authority and role of villages. In 
short, it wants economic change but without social 
and political consequences. This is why Fijian 
investor companies linked with transnationals prove 
so seductive. 
Since the coups no major reorientation of 
economic strategy has occurred. Despite a massive 
increase in commercial loans to Fijians ($80 million 
from 1989 until 1993 compared with $26.5 million 
for the 14 year period 1975-88), Fijians are still 
encouraged to invest in areas such as commerce 
and transportation where competition from 
established companies is stiffest, rather than in 'real 
productive activities' .  Of Fiji Development Bank 
(FOB) loans to Fijians from 1980 to 1985, 49 per 
cent went into commerce, 29 per cent into 
transport, but only 12 per cent into manufacturing, 
6 per cent into the timber sector, and 1 per cent 
into tourism. 39 During 1989 and 1990 little 
changed: 32 per cent of investments went into the 
transport sector, and 25 per cent into commerce 
with a large 3 1  per cent into associated real estate 
purchases or refinancing schemes. As before, 
actively productive investments in manufacturing, 
tourism or forestry are extremely low. 40 
Rabuka's own novel economic intervention 
took the form of an Army Auxiliary Unit, justified 
on the grounds that it enabled the military to reduce 
its burden on the economy ( 7 per cent of the 1990 
Budget), generate greater economic activity in outer 
islands, and retail food at below market prices. 'A 
military force dedicated solely to internal security 
and defence is a luxury which only developed 
nations can afford' ,  Rabuka argued in 1988. 'This 
would mean an army controlled economy, for the 
time being, until we recovered. At the moment we 
are working on a 10 year plan. '41 
The Auxiliary Unit formed part of 
Rabuka's attempt - albeit short-lived - to develop an 
independent power base. But like other postcoup 
initiatives, it did nothing to address the nation's 
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structural problems. It failed to alter the pattern of 
internal trade for outer islanders, only substituting 
one group of traders for another, and thereby 
restricting further the possibility for local initiative. 
Its own agricultural activities had a similar effect 
by undercutting the value of goods produced by 
many villagers for sale in the Suva market. By 
1991  the Unit had collapsed, allegedly leaving a 
trail of debt. 
Despite Naisoro's claims to the contrary, 
Fiji's lack of stability is regarded by many 
economic commentators as a major cause of its 
present problems. In 1988 Westpac's Pacific 
general manager, John Stone, argued that local 
growth would always remain frustrated until such 
time as people saw 'a democratically elected 
government in place. '42 For Saveneca Siwatibau, 
the absence of democracy spelt instability, already 
evidenced by the failure of the postcoup regime to 
produce an acceptable constitution, to enforce the 
law equally with regards to the Sunday Observance 
Decree, or to provide firm details on deregulation 
and a proposed general services or value added tax. 
Investor confidence suffered accordingly43 and Fiji 
soon found itself in deregulated limbo without 
financial stability, without an equitable distribution 
of income and wealth, and without restructured 
rural relations. Nevertheless, following the first 
postcoup election, the FTIB went of its way to 
publicize Fiji's return to democracy and even cited 
Rabuka's abortive government of National Unity 
proposal as a step towards creating a better 
business climate. However, Vunibobo remains 
unconvinced. 'Businessmen are normally more 
concerned about business prospects than political 
nicities' ,44 he claims, despite evidence that pressing 
political issues such as the Constitution and ALTA 
do impede investment, especially local investment 
which has always been more significant in its long 
term impact on the mass of Fiji's people than 
foreign investment. 
Disregard for reality is not new, according 
to sociologist Satendra Prasad. He maintains that 
Fiji's decision to implement the TFF strategy was 
not the result of serious economic planning. The 
coups threw up a new cadre of planners, many of 
whom lacked academic training and public service 
rigour. 45 They believed they needed a sufficiently 
high profile policy to attract foreign investors, who 
could then be utilized to compensate for their own 
obvious lack of success in retaining support at 
home. As Naisoro admits, that policy was lifted 
from the Alliance's Ninth Five Year Plan (1986), 
itself heavily based on World Bank 
recommendations. The planners appropriated its 
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tax free mnes, deregulation, and abolition of 
protection for local industries46 and paid. little 
attention to issues concerning 'the availability of 
land. . .  mechanisms for policing customs 
regulations, regulations for labour relations, 
identification of priority sectors for investment, 
environmental and ecological regulations and other 
issues. '47 
Nonetheless, the bureaucrats' decision to 
implement a tax free scheme by utilizing existing 
companies certainly contributed to the TFFs' rapid 
growth profile. So too at another level did the 
FfIB's shift to new premises at Civic House 
(formerly the site of the British High Commission) 
on the Suva waterfront, a move designed to project 
through its office 'an image of the country that is 
very appealing indeed. '48 What Fiji  got, to quote 
Naisoro, was 'breathless' accelerated action, 49 or -
in Prasad's words - 'the long term stability of the 
national economy . . .  sacrificed for short-term 
gains. '50 
But that sacrifice was not initiated by 
postcoup bureaucrats. They accelerated the 
process, yet its origins lay in decisions taken by 
earlier Alliance governments of Ratu Mara, often 
in response to pressures from international lending 
agencies, like the IMF, to boost manufacturing 
through export processing. This is the argument of 
a precoup analysis of the garment industry by Fiji 
political scientist Claire Slatter. She outlined the 
dual pressures on the Alliance government to attract 
fresh foreign investment and to increase urban 
employment. 51 The problem for the Alliance 
government lay in Fiji's relatively high wages. 
Hence export processing could 'only be feasible if 
wages were kept competitively low . . .  [suggesting] 
an intention to preserve a low wage segment within 
the labour market. . .  consist[ing] primarily of 
women workers. '52 For Slatter, 1986 was the most 
crucial year, consolidating what still remains the 
industry's most controversial aspects and long term 
weaknesses: growth built on female exploitation 
and dependent upon insecure markets. 
Since 1983 the government had deferred 
introducing a Wages Council Order to provide 
minimum wages for garment workers. But in 1986 
the Order was finally released, guaranteeing 
workers a minimum of 90 cents per hour and 
learners 70 cents. Garment manufacturers 
immediately protested. Garment Manufacturers 
Association president, Padam Lala of Lotus 
Garments, argued that unless the government 
accepted an hourly rate of 50c some 100 factories 
employing nearly 3000 workers would close in 
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protest. 53 The government quickly withdrew the 
Order. 
Industry pressure was not difficult to apply 
because the government had already accepted that 
the garment industry deserved special treatment. 
Its proposed rate of 90c was 23c lower than the 
minimum rate for other forms of manufacturing. 
This, according to Slatter, was the 'hidden 
dimension of the Alliance government's 
industrialisation strategy' .  
It would appear that the growth 
of a low wage sector in Fiji was, 
in the eyes of that government, 
not a problem but rather an 
advantage and one it intended to 
preserve. . .  The Alliance 
government's support for the 
garment manufacturers in 1986 
clearly legitimated what . . . had 
been a conscious practice among 
local companies of employing 
women, especially from poor 
households, at appallingly low 
wages. . .  In the name of national 
development, women workers 
from poor urban and rural 
households were to be sacrificed, 
it seemed, on the altar of 
industrialisation. 54 
Given that the garment industry was far 
from the fledgling sector its owners claimed, 
gender prejudice or disregard and sacrifice were 
the only possible explanations for the decisions of 
1986. Garment export sales had already risen 
rapidly from $250,000 to over $2 million within 3 
years. But such promising expansion, together 
with the wages controversy, brought the industry 
under close public scrutiny for the first time. The 
unwanted exposure irked manufacturers, 
particularly those who found themselves accused of 
some of the worse forms of exploitation possible, 
and in a political environment considerably less 
conducive to exploitation than that which would be 
established in the following year. 
Their clothing workshops, many of which 
had begun to service the local community in the 
mid-1970s, were characteristic of the new wave of 
entrepreneurial activity which swept postcolonial 
Fiji. Employing a small workforce, sometimes 
initially made up exclusively of family members, 
these new enterprises tapped into a growing and 
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now protected home market. They survived 
internal competition with transnationals like 
Carpenters and Burns Philp because their 
workforce remained nonunionized and poorly paid. 
Consequently, by the 1980s the foreign-owned 
gil!llts divested themselves of many manufacturing 
activities, such as furniture production, and 
contracted work to the new factories instead. 
Conditions in these small factories were 
far from satisfactory. Even the chairman of a 
specially appointed garment industry tribunal, 
Raman Nair, felt compelled to call upon factory 
owners to humanire the workplace. In 1986 he 
cited many cases of substandard conditions: 
In one instance a factory which 
employs 189 workers had one 
toilet and that too was locked. 
The workers had to seek 
permission to go to the toilet. 
The proprietor said the women 
did not know how to use the 
facility. 
Other factories lacked clean environments and 
proper ventilation; few possessed tea room 
facilities. Because inspectors of the Ministry of 
Employment and Industrial Relations rarely visited 
factory premises, garment workers 'have no means 
of seeking orderly redress for their ills and 
complaints' ,  Nair noted. 
In some factories the workers 
were completely disorganized, 
mentally and physically frustrated 
by the owners and bosses. 55 
But the tribunal's findings were far from new. In 
1985 the local press reported one factory owner 
paying 'a girl in a wheel chair three times more 
because she doesn't have to move away from the 
machine' .SC> In 1984 police raided a sweatshop for 
employing women after hours and sustaining them 
during nights with pep pills. 51 
Yet despite compelling evidence of 
exploitation, the tribunal chairman did not believe 
that workers were poorly treated. Nair declared 
the proposed minimum manufacturing wage 
($49. 72 for a 44 hour week) unacceptable for the 
garment industry, and suggested instead $28.60 or 
65 cents per hour. In short 'female' occupations 
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justified low wages; women were deemed to be 
'simply supplementary earners in male-headed 
families' . 58 Yet this was not the case; solo 
parenthood and destitution drove women into 
exploitation and silence. 59 Although the Fiji Food 
and Nutrition Committee declared $35 the absolute 
minimum for providing basic needs to a Suva 
family of five [in 1989 $70, in 1991 $1 15] ,60 that 
counted for nought when the industry itself saw 
discrimination as a major advantage when seeking 
export markets or foreign partners. 
A five man Australian team representing 
the American Farah Manufacturing, Bonds Coats 
Patons, Salco Manufacturing, and Waltons Bond 
companies toured Fiji in June 1986 and concurred. 
It proclaimed low wages a major factor for 
attracting Australian investment. Machinists in Fiji 
might earn just over $20 a week but in Australia 
$230 was the norm. Said David Enfield of Farah 
Manufacturing Ltd, 'I've walked through some of 
the factories and seen very happy staff . . . and they 
seem very pleased and proud of their employers. '61 
But a passive workforce is not necessarily 
a contented one. Absenteeism was high and many 
factories experienced rapid staff turnover. 62 Then 
Assistant National Secretary of the FTUC, 
Mahendra Chaudhry, argued that workers not only 
faced severe economic problems but were also 
demoralized and often sexually harassed. He 
believed the industry could afford to pay more; 
indeed it had increased rates to 50c per hour so as 
to frustrate implementation of minimum wage 
legislation, recognizing that it could no longer get 
away with rates as low as 18 to 23 cents. 63 
The picture constructed for the public in 
1986 was of a rapidly growing industry in which 
half the workforce belonged to the country's 
poorest 7 per cent of wage earners. Ironically they 
were also the country's most productive workforce, 
adding - as economist Wadan Narsey's 1985 study 
of the industry showed - three times the amount of 
value per dollar of capital stock compared with 
other manufacturing workers. But they were paid 
only half the latter's wage. In addition, their 
wages had increased only 7 per cent between 1980 
and 1984; wages for manufacturing workers rose 
26 per cent. Both were well below the 34 per cent 
increase in the consumer price index. It was not 
surprising then that relative profits in the garments 
sector were 3 times higher than in manufacturing64 
although little of that seemed to be ploughed back 
into the industry. Owners invested little in modem 
machinery, $367 per employee compared with 
$8412 per employee in manufacturing. A visiting 
South Korean garment expert, Dong Jin Hu, argued 
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that the industry was desperately lacking in quality 
control and modem production methods. 65 
These matters did not deter the 
government. Employer protest was sufficient to 
have the minimum wage legislation for garment 
workers dropped, although - as critics later alleged 
- not without favours being sought in return. 66 
Henceforth, the government toed the industry line 
on wages. Asian competition made low wages a 
necessary evil. 67 Then Minister for Economic 
Planning and Development, Peter Stinson, noted 
that 'While the government abhorred the wage rate 
of 20 to 25 cents an hour, it [the clothing industry] 
was one of the greatest hopes for employment in 
the medium term. '68 
In reality the question of wages - then 
whether the industry could afford a rise to 90 cents 
per hour in the face of potential competition from 
cheaper Asian producers - was misleading. By 
1986 the Fiji clothing industry was on the brink of 
a major boom. Export values had already jumped 
from $2. 1 million in 1985 to $4.7 million in 1986. 
[In 1987 they were to rise to $5. 7 million and 
during 1988 to well over $15 million.m:J The 
phenomenal growth was due to two factors: first, 
Fiji was producing high quality and reliable 
merchandise according to deadlines set by overseas 
buyers,'° and second, Fiji had access to Australian 
and New Zealand markets through the 1980 South 
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (SP ARTECA). 
SP ARTECA is the key to the garment 
industry's remarkable expansion. Signed at Tarawa 
in 1980, it became the South Pacific's equivalent of 
the Lome Convention. Its goal was to redress 
unequal trade relationships between the island states 
and the two Australasian countries. 71 The unequal 
relationships remain a decade or more later, despite 
phenomenal growth in Fiji's garment exports. 
SP ARTECA - with its total emphasis on trade - has 
not by itself promoted national economic and social 
well-being. Indeed it has frustrated it. 
SPARTECA permitted duty-free and 
unrestricted access to Australasia for a wide range 
of commodities, but garments still faced 
restrictions. Fifty per cent of the value of a 
finished product had to originate in the exporting 
country and/or in Australia and New Zealand. 72 
Australia's quota system provided further 
restrictions. Initially Australia's imports from the 
South Pacific were restricted to 66,000 units, those 
from Fiji being between 34,000 and 45,000 units. 73 
This imposed severe limitations. Potential access 
was one thing; convincing quota holders to switch 
from traditional suppliers to the largely untested 
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and smaller Fiji producers was quite another. In 
the event what saved the Fiji garment industry was 
not SP ARTECA per se, but an arrangement 
decided upon by the Fraser government in Australia 
to permit unlimited access through a special 
sampling quota of 400,000 units from the Pacific, 
although importers had still to operate within the 
country's international quota system. Once Fiji's 
standards improved and were accepted by 
Australian distributors (a process began in 1985), 
the way was open for a major expansion in exports. 
During 1988 nearly A$10 million of Fiji garments 
entered Australia; in 1989 approximately $18 
million, and $55 million in 199374 • 
Similar factors enabled an expansion in 
exports to New Zealand, with one exception: New 
Zealand dismantled its import licensing regime in 
January 1988 and Fiji gained the kind of access it 
had always hoped for in the Australian market. 
Garment exports rapidly rose thereafter, reaching 
approximately $20 million in 1989.75 By 1990 17 
of the 29 wholly foreign owned garment TFFs 
were New Zealand companies and more than 45 
per cent of garment exports went to New 
Zealand. 76 Access and acceptability in the two 
Australasian markets provided their own dividends 
- $100.7 million of garment exports in 1989, 
$161.2 million in 1990.77 For a regime battling to 
maintain stability and economic credibility 
following the coups, the garment industry was the 
success story. Its promoters saw it as the logical 
outcome of their new deregulation, privatiz.ation, 
and export oriented strategies and promoted it as 
such. But the issue they always disregarded - the 
role of the garment industry as a basis for national 
economic expansion and Fijian economic equality -
soon returned to haunt them. 
TFFs are clearly an extremely vulnerable 
form of economic promotion. Economists Rodney 
Cole and Helen Hughes acknowledge that 
Tax holidays are typically 'give 
away' incentives that encourage 
foreign investors interested in 
quick profi t s ,  not  the 
establishment of  long term 
business. Once tax holidays are 
exhausted such 'fly-by-night' 
operators leave. If tax holidays 
are successful they become very 
costly, resulting in loss of 
revenue for education, health and 
the physical infrastructural 
investment that investors need. 78 
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Given the very mobile character of the garment 
trade, such comments are far from idle speculation. 
There is nothing to prevent other Pacific producers 
utilizing SP ARTECA and attracting foreign 
investment with tax incentives and low wages. The 
Solomons, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Tonga 
have established clothing industries, although at this 
stage they do not threaten Fiji operations. But their 
mere existence is a reminder that what Fiji has 
achieved can also be achieved by others. And if 
SPARTECA is the vehicle for Fiji's achievement, 
it might also be for others as well. 
SP ARTECA's value therefore is simply as 
a window of opportunity. But it provides no long 
term guarantees. Structural adjustments in 
Australia and New Zealand - in particular lower 
import tariffs - have reduced the advantages it once 
bestowed on the Forum island countries. In 
addition rising textile and export costs make it 
difficult to invest in new technology and labour­
saving devices and at the same time meet the 
stringent local content regulations on which 
preferential access to Australasia depend. Since 
1992 Fiji has tried to make SPARTECA more user 
friendly. But only in 1994 did New Zealand agree 
to reduce local content from 50 per cent to 45 per 
cent and Australia to include more manufacturing 
costs as part of local content. Ultimately Fiji 
wishes to replace SP ARTECA with bilateral 
agreements and to move into the production of 
electronics, white goods and computers - the high­
tech dreams of Naisoro's 'well engineered factory 
complexes' .  Meanwhile recessions in both New 
Zealand and Australia have emphasized the export 
strategy's major weakness - market dependency. 
Their impact on the clothing industry has been 
immediate. Exports in 1992 and 1993 fell 
dramatically, forcing the government to seek new 
preferential markets in North America, Europe and 
Japan. 79 But market diversification alone provides 
no panacea. 
During 1989 Fiji garment exports to the 
United States rose five fold. These were all largely 
night wear garments and they immediately 
disrupted the local market. The US reacted swiftly 
and forced Fiji to self regulate its exports.• The 
European C ommunity p roved more  
accommodating. In 1991 it waived rules of origin 
to enable Fiji to export duty free fixed amounts of 
tuna and garments. 81 The Fiji regime hoped that 
this breathing space would be sufficient to interest 
EC investors in Fiji, although it is difficult to see 
how any reimposition of rules of origin or duties 
would allow Fiji products to remain competitive, 
with or without European investment, unless it 
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moved rapidly into niche production. The same 
will undoubtedly apply to the FTIB's next target, 
the already over supplied Japanese market. The 
imposition of compulsory International Labour 
Organization employment standards might well 
complicate matters further. 
The latter is a sore point for the 
government. While it feels helpless to counter calls 
for voluntary export restraint from foreign 
businesses affected by their exports, it has no such 
qualms concerning union objections. Fiji's former 
Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, 
Taniela Veitata, regarded union protests as 
constituting 'direct interference in the sovereignty 
of the nation' . 82 Nonetheless Fiji unions held their 
ground on the need for the insertion into 
SP ARTECA of a social clause to guarantee 
freedom of union activities and minimum wages 
and conditions. Indeed Ema Druavesi approached 
the International Garment and Textile Union in 
Brussells for assistance in getting a similar clause 
inserted into Fiji's agreement with the EC.83 She 
also attacked the Australian intention to cut back 
Fiji imports in favour of other Pacific imports, 
saying that it missed the point. A new wave of 
cheap garments into Australia would do nothing to 
improve conditions in the clothing industry 
wherever it might be sited, but it would quite 
specifically reduce the beneficial industrial impact 
of unions in Fiji. 84 For unions it is an uphill 
struggle at the best of times. Only 6 of 1 13 
factories were unionized in 1993 , and while the Fiji 
Garment Textile Workers Union claims 1000 
members it is probably far less. Certainly the 
union has had little success in obtaining either 
voluntary or compulsory recognition orders from 
individual factories. 85 
For the Fiji government there are two 
possible lessons; the first, that no advantage will 
ever be permanent. SPARTECA is unlikely to 
provide many new advantages or guarantees. Fiji's 
Multi Fibre Agreement access to North America 
will eventually be phased out under the new 
GAIT. Already a new international tax regime 
deprives New Zealand capitalists of any tax 
advantages gained from investment in Fiji's TFFs. 
The United States currently withdraws trade 
preferences from countries which fail to observe 
minimum labour standards, the base line of which 
is whether workers are permitted to organize or 
bargain collectively. Cheap labour is held to be an 
unfair trade practice like dumping or subsidies. US 
efforts to incorporate such a mechanism into GAIT 
may well eventually impact upon Fiji, particularly 
if it seeks to expand further the export of garments 
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to the US as a way to sustain garment growth once 
Australasian markets are saturated. 86 As late as 
1994 US authorities were threatening to withdraw 
Fiji's preferential access unless basic human rights 
were restored. 87 At least since May 1992 the Fiji 
government has recognised the Garment Union, 
although its regulations and inspection facilities 
make difficult union effectiveness. In any case 
without a firm and consistent government 
commitment to closer industrial cooperation, there 
is no guarantee that highly mobile foreign investors 
would agree to employ a strongly unionized 
workforce. With newer markets harder to find, 
whatever dilemma the government faces in this 
regard will certainly be of its own making. 
The second lesson is that Fiji's focus on 
tax free activities brings little income for the 
country beyond that of low wages for its 
employees. (Ogilvie claimed a total of$25 million 
in wages for 1988, but made no reference to its 
distribution.� It provides no minimum local 
content, it restricts the development of local design 
expertise, and it ensures that the bulk of income 
from garment manufacturing leaves the country as 
payment for its duty-free inputs or as repatriated 
profit. The removal of customs duties alone cost 
the country revenue of over $3 .5 million on 
imported equipment in 1988. A report prepared in 
1991 for the FTIB by a United Nations Industrial 
Development Organiz.ation adviser, Bjorn Eidsvig, 
recommended a complete revision of the TFF 
strategy. It proposed slashing the tax holiday from 
13 years to 5, retaining minimum wage rates, and 
enforcing local working conditions. Wages and 
employment were the main benefits of the scheme 
to the country, the report argued. 'If employees 
are not paid decent wages and salaries, the TFFs 
may even become more of a burden than an 
asset' . 89 Despite the promise of economic 
redirection which accompanied the launching of 
TFFs, it would appear that their reliance on the 
exploitation of cheap labour makes them little more 
than a new manifestation of colonial and 
postcolonial strategies. 
TFFs are a form of protection which have 
replaced the postcolonial strategy of import 
substitution protection, itself the successor to 
colonial enclave protection. According to Hazel 
Brown of Trinidad's Price Commission, 'Free 
Trade Zones import everything they need and 
export everything they produce. In effect, they 
remain protected parasitical enclaves within the 
domestic economy' .  90 She believes there is little 
evidence that they can act as catalysts for 
industrializ.ation, contrary to the expectations of 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Peter Stinson, now Ambassador to Australia, who 
regards the garment industry as the beginning of 
Fiji's industrialization. Yet the Fiji experience 
appears to bear out Brown's prognosis. TFFs do 
not direct Fiji towards new international demands 
for greater investment in education and for new 
work practices and organiz.ation that promote 
worker initiatives. 'Human capital' ,  one writer 
recently noted, 'is becoming the key to economic 
growth and the ability to compete at home and 
abroad. '91 With an education system still reeling 
from neglect, and with a growth strategy bent on 
denying skills and creativity, Fiji seems determined 
to exclude these increasingly important long term 
growth factors. Nor can its technocrats claim that 
labour intensive industrializ.ation generates rapid 
returns able to be reinvested in more capital 
intensive growth areas. The very nature of their 
TFFs deny this possibility. 
There are other costs as well. Fiji wishes 
for a manufacturing-led boom based upon an Asian 
export model, but it has none of the aid or market­
access advantages which proved so important for 
initial Taiwanese and Korean growth. Indeed 
market vulnerability has reinforced in Fiji 
characteristics common to all cheap labour 
economies - political authoritarianism and labour 
repression. Prior to 1992, decrees periodically 
restricted union activities and intimidated union 
leaders. Even today workers confront new 
government-sanctioned forms of exploitation: 
extended working hours without additional or 
overtime pay, body searches, reduced lunch breaks, 
payment in kind, and illegal night work. 9'2 In 
addition government has permitted companies to 
import labour. Between 1987 and 1993, 17,014 
work permits have been issued to Asians, 93 with 
disastrous consequences for local building and 
construction as well as garment employment. In 
some factories Asians are a majority of the 
workforce; in others they occupy supervisory or 
skilled machinist positions. 94 
The government's ability to compensate 
workers by income distribution has also diminished 
with deregulation and privatiz.ation. Even a 
doubling of social welfare expenditure in 1991 
represented less than one per cent of the 
government budget and was hardly adequate for a 
nation in which close to 40 per cent of urban 
households live in varying degrees of poverty. 95 In 
1992 $7 million was put into a special Poverty 
Alleviation Fund, as part of a VAT compensation 
package, but only a small proportion was spent as 
originally envisaged and the Fund was discontinued 
at the end of 1993 . Value Added Tax, introduced 
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in July 1992, further disadvantaged the poor across 
the country. In addition the government has all but 
abandoned its former regional strategies. The 
result is the centralization of wealth and 
employment. Suva, which contains 20 per cent of 
the population, now controls close to 55 per cent of 
paid employment. 96 
Finally, there are political costs. 
Deteriorating labour conditions and rising levels of 
poverty have accelerated popular discontent and 
impacted on the country's still unstable politics. In 
June 1991 Rabuka declared the then interim 
government 'reactionary' and called upon it to 
resign. 97 Rumblings are also evident among the 
very influential private interests which prospered 
under import protection and which now find 
deregulation a threat to their continued influence 
and prosperity. They received unexpected support 
in the UN TFF report which argued that 'the time 
is not right to cut duties on imports of finished 
goods' unless the government wished to see all 
import substitution industries close down entirely. 98 
Discontent reactivated the struggle between 
establishment and radical Fijians. Although 
supportive of economic restructuring, many of the 
former view the rapidity of change under the new 
economic managers with disquiet, particularly since 
rising social unrest presents as much threat to their 
future after the 1992 General Election as it did 
back in 1987. That some new managers openly 
identified with the Taukeist coup against the 
establishment in September 1987 has not been 
forgotten. Certainly it motivated Navi Naisoro's 
hasty departure from the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce in late 1990. It is likely, therefore, that 
the future of his vision for a Fiji dominated by 'the 
greenery of well engineered factory complexes' 
may be settled, perhaps no less dramatically, by the 
social impact of TFFs and economic restructuring 
on already unstable Fijian groupings. Certainly the 
Fijian elite view with concern the rise of an urban 
working class whose loyalty after the 1987 disaster 
is suspect. 'The political logic' ,  Grynberg asserts, 
'is that a nation of barmen and chambermaids is to 
be preferred over that of factory workers. 99 At 
least it postpones resolving the place of Fijians in 
the economy and strengthens the role of traditional 
power structures, the goal of many postcoup 
initiatives. And it sets aside the urgency for 
constitutional review, thereby invalidating the 
criticism of many political opponents. Hence the 
way forward is by muddled retreat. Indeed since 
1987 Fiji has been at the crossroads and has yet to 
deviate from the well worn neocolonial path. 
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Does Independence Make a Difference? Land Policy in PNG, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji 
Peter Lannour 
By comparing land policies in four countries before 
and after independence I will try to answer the 
question, does independence make a difference? 
By 'independence' I mean the formal transfer of 
authority from a colonial government to a local 
successor (recognising that various other forms of 
dependence may continue, and new ones be 
created). The differences I am looking for are in 
the outputs of government (land legislation and 
other activity), and their impact on the pattern of 
land ownership in society. 
Nationalists, almost by definition, expect 
that independence will make a difference, and allow 
the expression of national, rather than foreign, 
ideas, and the satisfaction of national interests. 
Others look for more structural reasons for 
continuity. Perhaps persistent class conflict made 
constitutional changes superficial. Maybe 
underlying resource constraints, or the country's 
subordinate location in the international system, 
reduced the room for manoeuvre. But it may be 
that independence was never meant to make a 
difference, as in the principle of the 'through train' 
that governed British agreements with China over 
the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong. Or 
it made a difference to state structures, without 
affecting particular policies, or the wider economy 
and society. 
To ask if independence made a difference 
may be the wrong question. It may be better 
understood as a symbolic or expressive event, than 
as something that would lead to changes in 
particular government policies, or something as 
fundamental as land tenure relationships, at least in 
the short term. 'Independence' was quite a 
different thing in each country: it reflected local 
circumstances, and so cannot be talked about in a 
general way. Or it may simply be too soon to tell. 
Fiji, for example, only started registering 
customary land in 191 1 ,  after false starts that went 
back to 1880, but took decades to complete. 
I am particularly interested in land and 
independence for the light it might shed on the role 
and character of the state, and its relationship to the 
local society. Liberals typically believe state and 
society can and should be kept distinct. There is a 
long running debate among Marxist scholars about 
the 'relative autonomy' of the capitalist state in 
general, 1 and in the third world particularly. 2 
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Scholars in a Weberian tradition have recovered the 
idea of the state as an actor, with its own distinct 
interests, relating sideways to other states as well 
as downwards to the society it governs. 3 
Independence may change the relationship between 
state' and society, by making state elites more, or 
less, able to achieve their purposes against local 
resistance. 4 
These classical social scientific 
perspectives need to be supplemented with others 
that have arisen in response to them, or from 
different intellectual traditions. Rather than 
liberalism's separation of state from society, 
nationalists tend to invoke a more organic or 
expressive relationship between the two. Outside 
the European tradition, paternalistic or familial 
models of state-society relations are often invoked. 
What Manor5 calls the 'theatrical and imaginary 
dimensions' of the state-society relationship are 
particularly significant at independence, which is -
if nothing else - a moment of high political drama. 
Land policy was a salient issue during 
colonial rule and at independence in Melanesia. 
Marxist and liberal political economy agree that the 
creation and destruction of property rights are a 
profound form of state intervention in society. 
Weberians like Migdal see customary land tenure 
as a site of resistance to state elites. Nationalists 
see land as the site of conflict between indigenous 
and foreign interests. Land also involves kinship, 
and symbolism - 'the mother of the people' . Hence 
it is a policy area in which we might expect 
independence to have made a difference, and it 
would be significant if it did not. 
In each of the four countries, colonial 
policy had created three broad categories of land: 
customary or native land; freehold; and land owned 
by the government. Alienated land had been 
bought or taken from customary , traditional or 
native ownership, and was now held according to 
statute. However, intermediate arrangements, such 
as leases of customary land, or trust boards in 
dealing in land on behalf of traditional owners, tend 
to blur the distinction between custom and statute. 
Kamikamica, for example, describes the process 
whereby Fiji's Native Land Trust Board leases 
native land as a process of 'alienation of land from 
customary tenure for leasing' ,  6 and so Table 3 
shows two figures for land alienation in Fiji, 
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including and excluding the NLTB leases . 
Registration of native land, most extensively in 
Fiji, also blurred the distinction between custom 
and statute. Meanwhile, some alienated land is 
now owned by Melanesians, but they are not 
necessarily related to the traditional owners, and do 
not hold it according to custom. 
The comparative method uses countries as 
cases in several ways. It can illuminate a particular 
country, by reference to others. Or it can show 
how the case is an instance of a general tendency, 
such as 'development' ,  or the effect of an 
encompassing system ('colonialism' or 'the world 
economy'). Or - most difficult - it can use a 
number of cases to look for patterns of variation 
among their characteristics. Thus for example we 
can understand land alienation in country X by 
comparing it with its neighbours, but our main 
interest remains country X. Or we can see land 
alienation in country X as the instance of a more 
general tendency (displacement of indigenous 
people) or as an effect of a more encompassing 
system (the British and French empires). Finally 
we can treat country X as just one of a number of 
cases in which land alienation may be causally 
linked with other factors within that country, such 
as the type of political system. We would be 
interested in the relationship between these factors, 
rather than country X as such. 
The evidence in Tables 1- 5 allows us to 
use comparison in each of these ways. It helps to 
make sense of what happened in Vanuatu, for 
example, by comparing it with Fiji or Solomon 
Islands. We can also explain what happened as 
instance of a general tendency ('development' or 
'indigenous revival') by reference to more 
encompassing systems - 'the French empire' , or 
'the world economy'.  Or we can treat Vanuatu as 
one of a set of cases that allows us to test 
propositions like 'independence makes a 
difference' ,  but any correlations we find need some 
theory of independence to explain them. 
Table 1 shows whether and when 
particular policies were adopted in each country. 
Policies adopted after independence are shown in 
bold. Table 2 shows the proportion of land 
alienated in each country, and Table 3 the 
proportion of native or customary land that was 
registered. Table 4 shows the distribution of 
ownership of alienated land in three periods: 
colonial, just before independence, and just after 
(the precise dates were determined by the 
availability of data). Table 5 presents the data in 
Table 4 as 'winners' and 'losers' from the 
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redistributions of ownership between these three 
periods. 
The categories 'Melanesian' and 'foreign' 
in Table 4 are adaptations of earlier, racist, 
official distinctions between natives and Europeans 
which were enforced in land policy. Colonial land 
policy in Fiji similarly distinguished between 
indigenous Fijians and others. Official statistics 
also do not generally allow us to make distinctions 
of equal political or theoretical importance, as for 
example between the class position of owners, the 
region they come from, their chiefly rank or their 
gender. Generally, Table 1 deals with the 
outputs of government - policies adopted and laws 
passed. Tables 2-5 deal with the impact of these 
policies on the ownership of land, but other 
factors, such as commodity prices, bank lending 
policies, would affect the outcome. Policies were 
sometimes quite irrelevant to what was happening 
on the ground, particularly at independence. 
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Some alienated land in each country was simply taken directly by Melanesians, in PNG, Solomon Islands and 
particularly in Vanuatu, in spite of government policy. 
Table 1: Late Colonial and Independent Land Policies 
Papua New Solomon Islands Vanuatu Fiji 
Guinea 
Registration of YES YES NO YES 
Customary Land from 1950s 1959 - 1970s since 1 880 
Surrenders YES YES YES NO? 
undeveloped alienated from 1970s 
land 
Subdivision conlrols 1 case YES YES NO? 
on freeholds (Wuvulu) from 1972 from 1971 
Trust Boards NO YES YES YES 
(1962-5) (1974-80) from 1940 
Compulsory YES YES NO NO 
Acquisition of native (Bougainville) (Rennell & 
land for mining etc Guadalcanal) 
Plantation YES YES 1 case few cases 
Repurchases for from 1974 from 1971 (Bonkovia) (eg Lovoni) 
Traditional owners 
Plantation Distribution YES YES NO NO 
to Smallholders (eg Popondetta) (eg Fiu 
Kelakwai) 
Prohibition on foreign YES YES YES NO 
ownership of freehold for new 1977 1980 
purchasers 
after 1974 
Compensation to YES NO NO NO 
Traditional Owners from 1970s 
and by law 
after 19n 
Substitute leases for YES YES YES NO 
Freeholders OD dealing automatic in but 
after 1976 19n only automatic 
in towns 
Compensation for YES NO YES YES 
Freeholders but not for but very strong legal 
conversion to limited by protections 
� law after 1982 
New leases from NO YES YES YES 
Traditional Owners from 1970s (eg cocoa on through 
Malakula) NLTB 
(eg Ulusaivou, 
Y alavou,Pine 
Scheme) 
Source: P. I.armour, 'The return of Alienated Land in Independent Melanesia' in H. Reynolds and R. Nile, (eds) Indigenous Rights 
in the Pacific and Northe America: Race and Nalion in the Lale Twentieth Century (London, 1992) p .  1 8 1 ;  Kamikamica 
1987. 
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Table 2: Alienated Land Before and After Independence 
Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands 
Vanuatu 
Fiji 
(a) not including NLTB leases 
(b) including NLTB leases 
before 
( %  total) 
3 
12 
41 
17 
34 
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after 
( %  total) 
3 
13 
0 
18  
35  
Sources: I.armour 1992, p.  1 82; Kamibmica 1987, p.  226; R .  Ward, 'Land, La nd  U se  and Land Availability i n  Fiji' in H. C .  
Brookfield et al Land Cane and Coconuts: Papers on rhe Rural Economy of Fiji (Canberra, 1985) p.  29. 
Table 3: Registration of Native or Customary Land 
Number of Titles Registered land 
Registered as % of Native Land 
PNG 737 less than 1 % 
Solomon Islands 576 less than 1 % 
Vanuatu none none 
Fiji na nearly 100% 
Source: Lannour , 'Customary Land Registration in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuani' Occasional Paper 86/4 (Port 
Moresby, 1986); Kamibmica 1987 
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Table 4: Ownership of Alienated Land (as percentage of total alienated) 
Colonial Before After 
Independence Independence 
Papua New Guinea 
Foreign 
(1965) (1973) 
17 
(1978) 
1 1  7 
------------------------------------------------
Melanesian 0 0 3 
State 83 89 90 
Solomon Islands (1956) (1974) (1980) 
Vanuatu 
Fiji 
Foreign 71 14 0 
-------------------------------------------------
Melanesian 0 19 33 
State 
(1968) 
29 67 67 
(1976) (1981) 
Foreign 88 82 0 
-------------------------------------------------
Melanesian 1 4 100 
State 
Foreign 
ethnic Fijian 
ethnic Indian 
State 
1 1  13 0 
(1981) 
na na ( . . . . -------------------------------------------------
na na ( 46 
-----------------------------------------------
na na ( . . . .  
na na 53 
Sources: I.armour 1983 : 183 ;  Ward 1985, p. 29 . 
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Table S: Winners and Losers of Alienated Land 
Late Colonial Independence 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
Papua New Foreign Foreign 
Guinea (-6) (-4) 
Melanesian 
(+ 3) 
State (+6) State 
(+ 1) 
Solomon Foreign Foreign 
Islands (-57) (-14) 
Melanesian Melanesian 
( + 19) (+ 14) 
State 
(+ 38) 
Vanuatu Foreign Foreign 
(-6) (-82) 
Melanesian Melanesian 
( + 3) (+96) 
State State 
(+2) (-13) 
Fiji na na na na 
Source: Table 3 .  Some percentages do not total 1 00  because of rounding 
Table 1 shows quite a limited repertoire of policies. 
Of the 12 policies identified only one (retrospective 
compensation to traditional owners) was not tried in 
at least one other country. Some of this similarity 
is explainable by borrowing or contagion of ideas, 
or the countries' relation to an overarching system 
of British colonial rule, with its own orthodoxies. 
Once the pattern was set by early colonial land 
alienation, and official attempts to restrain it, state 
elites seem to have been presented with a relatively 
narrow range of possibilities. Possibilities 
exhausted before independence were not available 
afterwards. 
Fiji shows the narrowest range of policies 
adopted (ie the most 'NO's), and the fewest 
changes associated with independence itself. 
Vanuatu also had a fairly minimal colonial policy 
of protecting freehold rights and (unlike Fiji) 
ignoring customary land. But Vanuatu broke 
absolutely with its past at independence, when the 
government deliberately interpreted the 
constitutional provision that 'all land belongs to the 
indigenous custom owners' as if it abolished all 
precolonial titles. It left former freeholders with 
the tenuous right to be first in the queue to 
negotiate substitute leases with the custom owners, 
if they could be identified, and the ultimate right to 
limited compensation for improvements, if 
negotiations failed. The Vanuatu government's 
approach was largely determined by urgent political 
circumstances: widespread, irreversible occupations 
of plantations on the one hand, and settler backed 
secession on the other. 
PNG and Solomon Islands fell between 
these two extremes. In PNG there was 
considerable conflict over land legislation, and 
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violent confrontations around Rabaul. Settler 
interests were still powerful. In Solomon Islands 
the state reached an accommodation with the largest 
foreign freeholder, Unilever, that essentially 
exchanged loss of freehold rights for government 
investment in a joint venture project to rehabilitate 
plantations. Solomon Islands had also begun a 
plantation purchase program several years earlier, 
taking the heat of particular pieces of land. 
Independence brought some new ideas: 
PNG and Solomon Islands toyed with different 
forms of registration. Fiji devised more inventive 
joint ventures on customary land. Vanuatu 
probably made the sharpest intellectual break with 
its past, devising new forms of title such as 'public 
land' and insisting on reconstructing its title system 
from the ground up, rather than (as in PNG and 
Solomon Islands) tinkering at the edges or (in Fiji) 
leaving well alone. However the interpretation of 
Vanuatu' s constitution and land legislation, through 
routine official and judicial action, seems to have 
become more conventional, though the hybrid 
Anglo/French/customary basis of law in Vanuatu 
makes unorthodoxy easier. 
Table 4 shows the magnitude and 
direction of precolonial changes in land ownership 
that anticipated the changes that took place at 
independence. Data is not available for Fiji. 
Foreign ownership was already falling fast in PNG 
and Solomon Islands (and to a much lesser extent 
in Vanuatu). The state was emerging as the major 
player in Solomon Islands, and its share survived 
independence. 
Melanesians had a much larger stake in the 
system of alienated land before independence in 
Solomon Islands (67 %) than in PNG (0%) and 
Vanuatu (4 %). 
There was less change after than before 
independence. In PNG the national government 
made minor amendments to land legislation in 
1987, making it easier to register customary land 
and use it as security for loans, while the East 
Sepik provincial government introduced legislation 
for a strongly state supervised system of customary 
land registration. 
Table 5, 'winners and losers' tries to show 
the directions of flow of ownership in these two 
periods. Everywhere except Fiji, for which the 
figures are not available, the flow of ownership 
was from foreigners to Melanesians. The flow was 
already established in Solomon Islands, and 
independence only really made a difference in 
Vanuatu, where a shift of 3 percentage points 
before independence became a massive transfer of 
96 points afterwards, and PNG where there was no 
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shift before independence and a shift of only 3 
percentage points afterwards. 
The state was a beneficiary of transfers of 
alienated land before and after independence in 
PNG, before independence in Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, and a loser after independence in 
Vanuatu. In PNG state ownership stayed high, and 
even grew to 90 % of all alienated land after 
independence. In Solomon Islands it started lower, 
but grew to two thirds of all alienated land before 
independence, and kept that share afterwards. In 
Fiji the state owned about half of all alienated land 
after independence (figures before are not 
available). In Vanuatu, state ownership was much 
lower, and fell to mro at independence. 'The 
state' is not like a smallholder, or a plantation 
company. Here it becomes important how we 
conceptualise it. 
'The state' is not an owner like others. In 
some ways its ownership is· simply formal, as 
lessor to a company or small holders who are the 
effective beneficiaries of ownership. In some 
cases, such as Solomon Islands at independence, 
state ownership is transitional. The government 
presented itself as holding land on behalf of its 
traditional owners, until they could be properly 
identified and handed it back. Or more generally, 
it claims to be owning land in a wider public 
interests, which may include a public interest in 
lower taxes, which would have to be raised if the 
state gave up leasing its land to raise budget 
revenue. 
Preoccupation with formal ownership may 
underrate the role of the state in land ownership. 
Fiji's Native Land Trust Board, for example, is 
indubitably a state instrumentality, and while it 
consults traditional owners, and pays them some of 
the rents it raises, it is in many important ways the 
effective owner of the land it leases. If these leases 
are counted in, then 'the state' in Fiji effectively 
owns about a third of the land. State banks with 
mortgages over freehold land also have some of the 
attributes of owners. More generally, as 
MacWilliam7 argues, 'the state' was involved in 
providing the conditions for subsistence production, 
and reproduction, on customary land - labour 
regulations that tried to conserve village life, 
education and (latterly) technical assistance, and 
infrastructure. 
To explain the differences we need to tum 
to the more general theories of state-society 
relationships introduced at the start of this paper. 
Patterns of variation do not speak for themselves -
they require explanation. Different kinds of 
explanation highlight different parts of the pattern. 
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Liberals would notice the persistence of 
property rights through independence, in spite of 
shifts in who owned them, and the continuing state 
interest in registering customary land. The 
transformation of complex, ambiguous and 
overlapping rights to land into simple, clear and 
distinct titles, backed up by courts, is a classic 
liberal project. It facilitates liberals' preferred 
regime of self interested private trading, in which 
the state only get involves to correct market failure 
and enforce contracts. 
Marxist scholars have always been 
reluctant to ascribe much independent agency to 
'the state' , preferring to see it implicated in 
overarching class conflicts. Like liberals, they 
would notice the persistence of property rights 
through independence, in spite of changes in 
ownership. They would Marxists be surprised that 
PNG's plantation redistribution scheme was 
starved of support, and eventually halted, in favour 
of encouraging the sale of plantations as going 
concerns to Melanesian capitalists. Similarly the 
Solomon Islands state protected Unilvever's vast 
plantations from being handed back to traditional 
owners in Solomon Islands, and instead invested in 
a joint venture to redevelop them. In these cases 
the state was clearly acting in the long term 
interests of capital-in-general, even if it meant a 
few particular capitalists lost out. 
However, there was no simple 
determination of policy by bourgeois class interests. 
It was a close run thing in PNG and Solomon 
Islands, where there was strong pressure to break 
up plantations, or simply return them to 
descendants of the original owners, who might not 
have the desire or ability to redevelop them. In 
Vanuatu and to a lesser extent Solomon Islands 
many plantations were simply taken over, and the 
government had neither the desire nor the ability to 
evict squatters. 
Marxist explanations are also sensitive to 
the big picture - changes in the world economy 
that may affect the outcomes in particular countries 
(thus Marxism involves the third type of 
comparison referred to above of explaining 
particular cases as effects of a more encompassing 
system). It may be no accident that independence 
was during the 1970s, the high water mark of the 
post war boom, while the period of post colonial 
policy inactivity was the 1980s when, throughout 
the world, markets were favoured over states. 
Weberians often identify the state with the 
elites who seek to direct it. Studies of the 
implementation of (precolonial) land registration 
schemes8 and (post-colonial) plantation 
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redistribution schemes in PNG show an enormous 
gap between what state elites propose, and what 
junior officials do in the field. Policy is frequently 
captured by local sub-elites, and systems of 
decentralisation adopted at independence in PNG 
and Solomon Islands (but not Vanuatu and Fiji) 
allow this capture. So much so that the initiative 
for customary land registration in PNG during the 
1980s passed partly to provincial level, with one 
Provincial government introducing its own 
legislation. A Weberian focus on state elites also 
raises questions of public and private duty, the 
relationship between bureaucratic culture and the 
surrounding societal culture, and the temptations 
available to officials to use state power to benefit 
themselves and their families. In PNG and 
Solomon Islands there have been allegations of 
corruption in the allocation of government land, 
particularly high value sites in urban areas, or 
during sell-offs of government housing. 
Weberian theorists of 'bringing the state 
back in' also note the relationship between the 
state's external relations and its domestic relations 
with society. The end of budgetary transfers, and 
the rise of foreign aid after independence put 
pressure on the states to raise more domestic 
revenue, and hence brought them into potential 
conflict with taxpayers. Revenue is a clear 
example of the state having interests of its own that 
may be different from particular taxpayers, or even 
'capital in general' .  Much of the expansion of the 
role of the state as landowner in Solomon Islands 
particularly had to do with the perceived urgency of 
securing land for revenue raising. Similar 
pressures came from Vanuatu's National Planning 
Office at independence, but were resisted in favour 
of fulfilling constitutional requirements and political 
pressures to 'return land'.  
There were strong nationalist reactions to 
liberalism: Solomon Islands started no new land 
registration schemes after the early 1970s, and in 
Vanuatu a widespread rural revolt led the 
government to abandon support for statutory 
property rights outside the two towns. 
A nationalist would notice that 
Melanesians benefited from once-off transfers of 
alienated land from foreigners in PNG, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu. But it is less easy to see a 
nationalist explanation for the inactivity thereafter. 
Here we might distinguish three aspects of the 
nationalist picture of state-society relations. First, 
as we have seen, nationalists see the state in 
expressive terms, and expect the independent state 
to express 'our ideas'.  Another aspect of 
nationalism is more material: foreigners had the 
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good life, now its 'our tum' . Nationalists tend to 
explain lack of change in personal rather than 
structural terms, as the consequence of betrayal 
by an unauthentic or corrupt leadership, excessively 
influenced by its foreign advisers. Or they look to 
a smaller political unit that will be better able to 
express the aspirations of the society the state 
claims to govern. 
While there is much of this disappointed 
nationalist talk in Melanesia, the evidence from 
land policy is of a substantial shift in favour of 
Melanesian ownership of alienated land, on the 
basis of 'our tum' .  And it may be significant that 
the pressure for 'our ideas' - particularly new 
ways of registering land - came from the provincial 
rather than the national level, particularly the East 
Sepik Provincial Government. 
Why were changes in land policy before, 
or at, independence followed by so few changes 
afterwards? There are several possible 
explanations. 
First, land policy may have been displaced 
from the agenda by more pressing concerns, such 
as forestry or mining policy, where there was 
considerable legislative activity. The late colonial 
activity in (particularly) Solomon Islands suggests 
that in some ways Independence was the 
culmination of the colonial period of land policy, 
rather than the inauguration of a national phase. 
Second, independence itself may have had 
a conservative effect, bringing the separate colonies 
under a common international regime. The 1980s, 
as we have seen, were a period of global 
retrenchment of state activity. 
Third, there are a number of possible 
political explanations for policy inactivity. 
Governments in PNG and Solomon Islands have 
always been coalitions. Vanuatu, formerly the 
exemplar of party government, has become 
increasingly governed by coalitions, and Fiji looks 
to be heading in the same direction. Coalitions are 
perhaps less likely to embark on controversial 
initiatives. Even if they embark on them they may 
not be able to follow through. Turnovers of 
governments, individual ministers, and department 
heads have been high, particularly in PNG, 
encouraging the reversal and abandonment of 
predecessors' initiatives. The introduction of 
systems of provincial government, and the 
uncertain location of 'land' in the division of 
powers, has also not encouraged central initiatives, 
though it has made local initiatives, like the east 
Sepik's, possible. 
MacWilliam9 explained the absence of new 
legislation in PNG in political terms. Apart from 
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tidying up the legislation passed just before 
independence, there has been no new legislation 
proposed in Vanuatu since the early 1980s (though 
the return of freehold has been floated in election 
campaigns, Van Trease: pers comm). Nor has 
Solomon Islands legislation been changed since 
1977, though as in PNG there have been proposals 
for new forms of customary land registration. 10 
Independence was a constitutional change, 
but also it was often associated with a political 
crisis, not exactly contemporary, in which the 
withdrawal of colonial government forced new 
domestic alignments (as between a national 
bourgeoisie and smallholders, in MacWilliam's 
account). It also might shake loose established 
interest groups, such as Chambers of Commerce, 
until they made their peace with the new 
leadership. In Vanuatu independence was much 
more of a clean break, but early decisions may 
establish coalitions of interests that are hard to 
dislodge in future. The Fiji coups have provided a 
opportunity for political realignments, such as the 
collapse of the Alliance Party, and the support of 
the Labour party for Rabuka's candidacy as Prime 
Minister. 
The idea of an historic compromise 
expresses the idea that state structures reflect 
underlying social and economic forces, but that 
these have to be expressed (by parties etc) in a 
form that can admit of compromise. It also 
suggests that there are pressures to keep to the 
agreement once reached, but that at some point it 
may need to be renegotiated. The idea of an historic 
compromise also appears in accounts of land in 
Fiji's independence constitution, at least until the 
1987 coup that let loose some muffled Fijian 
criticism of the role of the NLTB, and the renewal 
of (mainly Indian) leases . It may be better to look 
for Fiji's historic compromise over land back to the 
1940s, and the establishment of the NLTB. If so, 
the events of 1987 perhaps marked the breakdown 
of this historic compromise, and the beginning of 
a search for a new settlement between of the forces 
at work in Fijian society. 
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LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Institutional Transfer and Industrial Dispute Settlement in 
Independent PNG 
James Gissua 
Like most other countries with a colonial past 
Papua New Guinea inherited many social, 
economic and political institutions from its 
coloniser, Australia. The introduction of these 
institutions was made under the pretext that they 
constituted a more 'civilized' from of behaviour 
and thus were good for the colonized. It was only 
after independence that indigenous governments 
were able to free themselves from the shackles of 
colonialism and decide for themselves what they 
wanted of those institutions. One of these 
institutions in the case of PNG is the industrial 
relations system based on the Australian model. Of 
particular interest here are the workings of its 
dispute settlement mechanisms, how they appear on 
paper and what actually occurs at the work place. 
The paper has four sections. In the first 
the concept of 'institutional transfer' is investigated 
with a view to showing that colonial transfer of 
institutions was usually based on a common 
assumption of 'solving' certain problems. The 
second part relates to the adoption which this 
institutions underwent in its new environment. The 
third section focuses on contemporary development 
involving some examples of disputes in which the 
formal system is seen at work, which the formal 
system was seen at work, while the final section 
presents some tentative conclusions about the 
dispute settlement process in the post colonial 
milieu. 
Institutional Tramfer 
While there might be several perspectives on the 
concept of institutions it is generally understood as 
basic to sociology (Friedland, 1964, 1969: 4; 
Toynbee, 1947; Maciver, 1942; Parsons, 1960). 
Definitions of the concept might include a number 
of approaches, particularly from the disciplines 
such as politics, anthropology and sociology. 
Daniel Lemer's (1964: 3), obviously from a 
sociological perspective, considered institutions 
as: 'behavioural patterns performed by people 
whose goal is to enhance as much as possible the 
values which they hold important. ' 
Lerner states that the process of creating 
an institution or an aspect of it involves the use of 
available skills and knowledge upon 'raw materials' 
at hand. The main object of this process essentially 
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is one of conversion. Accordingly, an institution is 
a finished product of this process. In other words, 
it is an end product of a particular raw material 
after it has undergone an adjustment process and 
forms a set pattern of behaviour in a society. In 
short Lerner states, 'an institution is a code of 
rational, routine activity' . In this sense Western 
and all other cultures had their own respective 
social institutions. Given these distinct behavioural 
patterns, an imposition of Western institutions on 
other cultures often causes great difficulties. 
Apter (1955: 274) and Lerner (1964: 8), 
state that the use of the concept 'institutional 
transfer' might be misleading in that so often the 
concept is treated by scholars as if recipient 
cultures accept Western institutions readily. 
Instead Lerner preferred the phrase 'communication 
of codes' as more appropriate. The basis of this 
argument was that the process by which 
behavioural codes of one socio-culture are 
communicated to another is an act of intrusion. 
The term transfer was rejected because it failed to 
convey the disruption and often the violence that 
took place in the process. This is an important 
point in the sense that the industrial dispute 
settlement process, as part of the industrial 
relations system, was established in Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea (TPNG) by the colonial 
administration to protect the interests of industry 
and a handful of capitalists although many of them 
argued that there was no need for such legislations 
(Department of Labour and Employment, 1962: 8-
9). Obviously, this development took place with 
little regard for the views of the small percentage 
of indigenes in employment at that time. 
Friedland (1969) analysed the early 
development stages of the British model of trade 
unionism in Tanganyika within the context of 
institutional transfer. He saw institutions as 
consisting of well established, understood, and 
organized patterns of behaviour that fulfil certain 
functions for groups in society as a whole. Both 
Friedland (1969: 4) and Lerner (1964: 7) mention 
the fact that while Western institutions were 
codified, those of most non-Western cultures were 
the products of centuries of 'lived through 
experience' . Obviously, PNG's institutions fitted 
in the latter group. 
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The process of institutional transfer occurs 
when institutions are taken from one socio-cultural 
context to another. Many former colonies have 
inherited the institutions of their colonisers through 
this process . When interpreted into physical 
material, institutions become buildings, machines 
and personnel. When interpreted as non-physical 
material however, the concept relates to rituals, 
structures, ideas, rules of conduct and behaviour. 
For my purpose the important point is that it is 
specifically the non-physical elements Friedland 
saw as being subject to transfer: 
it is not the institution that is 
transferred but the idea that 
actors have of the institution. 
. . .  unions were not brought from 
England to Africa; instead a set 
of ideas about a constellation of 
roles organised to carry on 
particular activities and solve 
certain problems was transferred 
(Friedland, 1969: 4). 
A major problem for such a concept, and 
more specific to the industrial dispute settlement 
process, is that the possession of institutions or 
indeed ideas was not just the prerogative of the 
colonial 'mastas' . The colonised had institutions of 
their own, as well as ideas about practical activities 
and problem solving which had evolved over 
centuries before the arrival of colonial 
administrators. For some 'western' scholars this is 
easily explained by way of convergence theory, 
which holds that the more nations 'develop' the 
more similar they became until presumably they all 
become no more than adaptations of the American 
model (Kerr et al. : 1962; Kerr, 1983). Alternative 
paradigms vary from the intricacies of the New l,eft 
debate on the articulation of the modes of 
production (Foster-Carter, 1978) to a dual history 
of institutions in colonial situations driven by both 
the necessities of colonisers and the colonised (Rey, 
1973). 
Here two major points need to be carried 
forward. The first is that the Australian industrial 
relations system was transferred to the TPNG as 
part of core institutions of colonial administration. 
The core institutions vital to the process of transfer 
obviously pertain to the legislature, judiciary, 
military, administration and the economic system. 
An important point however, is that these 
institutions are part and parcel of the over-all 
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process of transfer and hence, an institution in a 
new environment ought to be viewed in the context 
of the existence of others. Lerner (1964: 26) 
makes an important point that there is little chance 
of one institution surviving in a new environment 
without the existence of all others. In this sense 
the industrial relations system was part of the over­
all socio-political and economic development 
process formulated by the colonial administration. 
Obviously, it was intended to settle potential 
industrial disputes in the capitalist production 
process. Hence, its effectiveness depended on the 
existence and prosperity of other institutions such 
as the schools, judiciary, legislature, police, 
plantations and economic system. 
The second point is that the formal 
industrial dispute settlement process, within the 
industrial relations framework, is a Western 
institution that most PNG workers come into 
contact with in a tangible way in the course of their 
employment. Every worker at one time or other 
finds himself/herself in situations where concerns 
about hours of work, overtime, rates of pay or 
annual leave become the focus of attention. Many 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers have 
encountered the formal dispute settlement process 
for the first time when a grievance occurs between 
themselves and their employer. Of course given 
PNG's diverse ethnic and cultural differences, 
many of these workers were accustomed to their 
own traditional methods of resolving disputes. 
They were often confronted with much confusion 
and uncertainty as to which of the approaches they 
should adhere to. The term 'cognitive dissonance' 
often used by psychologists to describe an 
emotional state of the mind when two conflicting 
beliefs pose a challenge (Tiffin and McCormick, 
1965: 345-346; Reber, 1985: 129) appropriately 
describes this situation. In this sense it means that 
PNG workers often find themselves in a confused 
psychological state between two different socio­
cultural modes of behaviour. 
Industrial Dispute Settlement � 
In the history of industrial regulation we often see 
major changes coming about as a result of 
confrontation. So in Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand new industrial relations systems were 
established after periods of major disputation 
(Bamber and Snape, 1987: 42; Lansbury and 
Davis, 1987: 1 12-1 13). In PNG the earliest record 
of collective industrial action by workers comes 
from Rabaul in 1929 (Willis, 1970; Gammage, 
1975). Although a major event, the Rabaul Strike 
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did not cause the colonial authorities to seek special 
industrial legislation. A possible explanation for 
the inaction could lie in the disbelief that such 
sophisticated behaviour could ever be the making of 
anunsophisticated group of native workers. The 
colonial authorities could have considered the strike 
as a 'one off incident' instigated by foreign sailors 
on transit in Rabaul. 
In PNG rather than a sharp confrontation 
it was gradual social and economic change which 
created the conditions for the introduction of 
specific industrial legislation (Hess, 1983 : 58-64). 
In terms of international comparisons the TPNG 
Administration's view of this lack of legislation in 
the 1950s is similar to the response of the Donovan 
Commission in Britain or the Hancock Committee 
in Australia. That is to say it was a response to 
slow structural change rather than to a particular 
crisis. Australia had not clung on to the Territory 
for economic reasons but rather for strategic 
interests (Mair, 1948: 1 12). There was no 
industrial activity of any significance that might 
create potential industrial problems and thus, there 
was no impetus to review existing colonial labour 
policy. 
So in the case of TPNG there were no 
clear reasons for the introduction of the conciliation 
and arbitration system. In fact most submissions in 
response to Administrator Donald Cleland's 
invitation from the public reflected this perception 
(Department of Labour and Industry, 1962: 9). 
Most submission came from expatriate groups such 
as planters, settlers, businessmen, industrialists and 
organisations such as the Highlands Farmers 
Association. Arguably, these were Australian 
employer groups who expressed no desire to deal 
with trade unions in the Territory. However, there 
were no worker organizations or informed 
individuals to represent the interests of indigenous 
workers. Hence, it seems that the invitation for 
submissions was a mere formality so that Hasluck 
could be seen in Canberra as having consulted the 
'people' of the Territory. 
The Australian system of industrial 
relations was introduced to TPNG as a result of 
Hasluck's own determination (Gissua and Hess, 
1992: 39). As already indicated, in the absence of 
any major industrial development programs or 
capital intensive industries or major industrial 
unrest in the Territory, one could only associate the 
promulgation of the 1962 industrial relations and 
industrial organisations legislations with Hasluck's 
administrative and expansion policies (Downs, 
1980: 93). Influenced by international and 
Australian domestic politics he ignored bureaucratic 
advice as well as settler opinion and departed from 
the existing indenture labour system and pushed for 
modem industrial relations legislations to be 
introduced in the Territory. Hasluck stated that the 
legislations would pave the way for the Papua New 
Guineans to develop a system suited to their own 
conditions. He would 'clear the path but let them 
walk it' (Department of Territories, 196 1 :  6) . 
If the introduction of the institution of the 
conciliation and arbitration system was in response 
to social and economic demands by the various 
ethnic organisations during Hasluck's 'visiting 
people' tour of the Territory in 1959 (South Pacific 
Post, 18/12/59: 1), as was commonly perceived 
(Hennessy, 1964; Metcalf, 1968: 1 16 ;  Patterson, 
1969: 27; Hess, 1990: 94), then the initiative could 
be seen as one of over-reaction. Perhaps there was 
no need for such legislation given the under­
developed state of the Territory's economy. 
However, if there was a need it could only be 
concluded that Hasluck had seen the necessity to 
'fill the gap' in view of what he envisaged for the 
immediate future in the Territory. Such a rationale 
again is difficult to comprehend in view of the 
primitive state of all spheres of development 
including the fact that close to 100 per cent of the 
indigenous population was dependent on subsistence 
agriculture. 
At the centre of the formal dispute 
settlement process lies its conciliation element. 
The proactive procedure requires all parties 
concerned in an industrial dispute to ensure that 
everything possible be done to avoid any 
occurrence of industrial unrest. And if a dispute 
were to occur despite all preventive measures the 
system provides that the prescribed procedures be 
adhered to for a possible settlement at arbitration. 
Unlike the Australian system, in PNG rights and 
interest disputes in the private sector follow the 
same process . However, compliance by disputants 
rely inevitably on the conciliator's persuasive skills. 
A conciliator has no power to compel disputants to 
attend conferences and where a party refuses to 
attend then there is little a conciliator can do (Daly: 
1983: 33-34). Although there exists provisions for 
prosecution in a common law (District) Court, the 
general course of action is for the Minister for 
Labour and Employment to refer the matter directly 
to arbitration. 
Daly (1983: 85) provides some statistics 
on industrial disputation in PNG between 1963 and 
1982. A total of 1 ,  278 disputes were recorded by 
the Department of Labour and Employment. Out 
of this total only 18  per cent went to arbitration. A 
similar trend is noticeable in the following decade 
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(Gissua and Hess, 1992: 47). This development 
raises the question about the suitability of the 
system from another perspective. An orthodox 
explanation is that such a trend is expected of the 
institution because it emphasises conciliation first 
and arbitration only as a last resort. However, the 
argument here is that this trend could also reflect a 
development beyond the mere 'voluntary 
arbitration' which is supposed to be the norm of the 
dispute settlement machinery. If this trend 
indicates a new development then it is suggested 
that the present dispute settlement machinery ought 
to facilitate this. 
The past initiatives by principal parties to 
bring about inter alia changes to the two industrial 
relations have failed. It was a shared view by the 
parties that close consultation was needed in an 
endeavour to resolve problems which could cause 
industrial conflict or inhibit economic and social 
development (Kem, 1981 :  14). The Labour 
Advisory Council (LAC) of Papua New Guinea 
was disbanded in 1974 three years after it was 
established principally because there was no 
agreement among the parties to the proposed 
amendments. In 1982 another attempt was made 
by the Department of Labour and Employment in 
which a tripartite working party worked on possible 
amendments but this only reached first reading 
stage in parliament. The trade unions considered 
the proposed amendments to be harmful to the 
growth of the trade union movement so they 
withdrew co-operation and the process collapsed. 
Another attempt was made in 1989 with the 
establishment of the National Tripartite Council 
(NTCC) by an Executive Direction with similar 
objectives as those of the LAC. However, already 
the NTCC is faced with some difficulty in getting 
legal recognition. The point is that the initiatives 
to 'improve' industrial relations taken at political 
and bureaucratic levels appear to have failed and so 
future proposals ought to consider workplace views 
as a vital component. 
A number of typical industrial disputes in 
PNG over the last eight years have been examined 
in another study' to show how the formal dispute 
settlement mechanisms actually work in an 
industrial dispute situation at a work place. While 
the object of that study might be different it is 
somewhat related here in the sense that the case 
studies might provide information so that the 
working of the formal industrial dispute settlement 
process from this angle might provide a better 
understanding about formidable difficulties, 
attitudes and the chance of consensus between the 
managers and the managed. 
LINES ACROSS THE SEA 
Dispute Settlement in Practice 
Although occurring at different times and in 
different industries between 1987 and 1991 the 
disputes were analysed from a number of common 
stand-points, two of them appear relevant here. 
Firstly, the study looked at the negotiation process 
by the parties in dispute at the shop-floor level. 
This approach was intended to ascertain if in fact 
parties have actually exhausted all settlement 
means, formal and informal, at their disposal. This 
is an important consideration in view of the 
insistence by Industrial Relations Officers of the 
Department of Labour and Employment that 
disputants explored all possible options before 
seeking third party intervention. Secondly, it took 
an overview of settlements reached at the end of 
disputes with a view to showing if efforts by parties 
were commensurate with the outcomes. 
The 1988 Ok Tedi industrial dispute 
between Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) and Ok 
Tedi Mining Construction and General Workers 
Union (OMCGWU) first emerged in July. It 
started as a grievance and was followed 
subsequently by a wild-cat strike by mine pit 
operators in protest over a management proposal 
for a third shift but eventually led to a full scale 
industrial dispute involving the entire blue collar 
workforce. After having raised his concerns with 
the operators regarding the importance of upholding 
organiutional interests the union president assumed 
responsibility for the dispute. However, two 
additional but on-going demands were also included 
in the list of issues for negotiation with the 
management. The issues then were the union's 
demands for more housing and a review of training 
and localiution program (TLP), and the final 
immediate issue was the 'sudden introduction' of a 
third shift. 
The union blamed the Executive Manager 
(Mines) Rick Gau.ard and Employee Relations 
Manager Bebea Konie for lack of consultation 
about proposed shift changes and demanded the 
termination of these members of management. 
This issue became the central focus of the dispute 
and caused the major disruption to OTML's 
operations since its formation in 1981 .  
The background to the dispute was that 
negotiations with management by the union over 
the years for more housing for union members had 
produced little result. Much of the available 
housing was allocated to staff and senior members 
of management most of whom were expatriates. 
Many union members had been separated from 
their families for years due to the shortage of 
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housing. Another factor was that most mine pit 
operators had formerly been employees of 
Panguna's Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) 
where they had better wages and conditions 
including housing. Having been deprived of hard 
fought conditions they once enjoyed at Panguna the 
operators knew the 'path' towards achieving what 
they wanted at the Ok Tedi mine. 
In the case of the long running issue of 
training and locali:zation the union had accused 
OTML of having failed to adhere to its TLP. In 
particular the union provided examples of how 
OTML would make internal transfers of foreign 
employees within the company without first 1 
obtaining necessary Department of Labour 
approval. This, the union claimed, was a 
deliberate attempt by management to stall 
promotion opportunities for its members, 
particularly the tradesmen. These issues triggered 
one of the most difficult disputes PNG's industrial 
relations system has had to face. 
It took well over six months from mid 
1988 before a solution was found. The wild-cat 
strike by operators and continuous union pressure 
for management to act on the demands provided 
little opportunity for the conduct of any sensible 
bipartite negotiations. Based on management's 
failure in the past to respond favourably to housing 
and TLP grievances, the union perceived that 
bipartite negotiations would be a waste of time. 
The whole gamut of formal conciliation had been 
exhausted and little was achieved. A first and 
major reason being that management and union had 
little flexibility. Secondly, the process of 
conciliation was too long with no proper 'signposts' 
to point the parties towards what was expected of 
them in terms of the 'proper' operation of the 
dispute settlement machinery. The notion held by 
Industrial Relations Officers of the Department of 
Labour that unlimited conciliation conferences 
should be conducted as long as there was optimism 
that a settlement could be reached outside 
arbitration had proved to be futile in this instance. 
An obvious difficulty was the non-industrial nature 
of the termination demand but the legislation gave 
the officers no precise signal as to what needed to 
be done under such circumstances. 
The dispute which had attracted the 
attention of politicians, the government, BHP 
executive and the involvement of riot police and 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) 
soldiers concluded in a mundane procedure with the 
establishment of a Board of Inquiry (BOI) provided 
for under the Industrial Relations Act. The trade 
union movement referred to various industrial 
actions staged by the union as 'the only way to 
attract attention of management to address union 
demands' (Interview, Titimur and Futengim).2 
Perhaps it might have been the only way but it was 
rather expensive in view of the limited resources 
available particularly for the union and the 
Department ofLabour and Employment. However, 
of fundamental importance is the question of 
whether or not the end result equates with the 
costly efforts employed. Given that the inquiry 
merely endorsed the October 1 agreement by the 
parties in which OTML agreed to build 250 new 
houses, affirmed alO grade structure and called for 
more consultation with the union on major 
industrial relations issues in future, one would have 
to conclude that its real use was a face-saving 
device for the parties directly involved. It added 
nothing new to the discussion of the issues. 
Like the Ok Tedi dispute, the 1989 Postal 
and Telecommunications (PTC) dispute had a 
spectacular beginning. The Post and 
Telecommunications Workers Union(PTCWU)had 
submitted its first ever log of claims to PTC 
management in November 1988 - it covered a 
broad range of employment conditions. However, 
a first major hurdle before negotiations commenced 
was the refusal by management to accept the fact 
that PTC's own Welfare and Counselling Manager 
Andonia Lynch was appointed by the union as part 
of its negotiation team. Management and union 
differences over this issue resulted in a number of 
violent industrial actions staged by the union after 
which the matter was referred to the National Court 
for a ruling. Before the Court made a decision the 
union removed Lynch from its team. The 
controversy had taken six months before it was 
resolved while little had been accomplished in 
terms of the actual negotiation of the claims. 
When negotiations resumed in the latter 
half of 1989 the union's central claims were 15 per 
cent wage rise across the board, housing for all 
employees, 12 weeks maternity leave, 2 weeks 
paternity leave and industrial allowances3 (Post 
Courier, December 20, 1989). These claims in 
terms of cost to PTC were considerable. 
Successive negotiations between the parties on the 
issues failed to achieve any progress partly because 
the parties constantly issued threats to each other 
and simply had no trust in the other's good 
intentions. Obviously, little could be achieved in 
such an environment. Hence, the utilization of 
negotiation avenues at the shop-floor were never 
fully explored. 
The other important matter which 
complicated negotiations was the procedure 
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involved. Being a public corporation meant that 
PTC management could not independently deal with 
the log of claims particularly where salary and 
conditions were involved but had to consult the 
Salary and Conditions Monitoring Committee 
(SCMC) before an offer was made. The SCMC is 
a statutory body established by government to 
ensure parity in salaries and conditions throughout 
the Public Service. So management had to first 
consult its Board of Directors, then go through the 
SCMC and only then could it deal directly with the 
union on wage issues. This process has proved in 
this case to be cumbersome, time consuming and 
costly. 
The conciliation process was exhaustive 
but little progress was made. A major difficulty 
faced here was the refusal by parties to adhere to 
conciliation meetings organised by the Industrial 
Relations Officers of the Department of Labour and 
Employment. Under the current procedure there 
was little the conciliator could do in terms of 
compelling the parties to accept notices for 
conferences. It is clear here and at the Ok Tedi 
dispute that persuasive skills of experienced 
Industrial Relations Officers were not sufficient to 
compel disputants to comply with statutory 
requirements. 
When the dispute reached the arbitration 
stage in May 1990 another significant development 
took place. The parties apparently had struck a 
deal in which the union accepted a KlO wage rise 
across the board for all workers. An interesting 
aspect of the deal was that the union had conceded 
to management's condition to withdraw all 
outstanding claims in the dispute. 4 Further, the 
union had also agreed not to lodge any fresh claims 
during the four year life time of the agreement. 
From the management's perspective the KlO 
payment may be seen as a good way out of the 
dispute. So for management the end of the dispute 
could be seen as a win because it was settled on the 
terms set by management. From the union's point 
of view, on the other-hand, the acceptance of KlO 
could also be seen as victory on a number of 
fronts. More particular is the fact that it favoured 
lower paid workers rather than the already well 
paid technically skilled and clerical personnel. In 
this sense it appears to be a win-win situation. 
However, when analysed from the 
perspective of costs and benefits it appears that the 
costs out-weigh the benefits for the union. The 
union had staged an up-front battle to ensure its 
place within the operations of the corporations. 
Compared to the small gain of a one-off wage 
increase the costs seem to have been unnecessarily 
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great. The solution appears simple but the method 
of achieving it was unnecessarily complex. 
Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the industrial dispute 
settlement procedure in PNG and provided two 
examples of its recent operation. The purpose of 
this has been to show some of the difficulties 
presently existing in the operation of the dispute 
settlement machinery. With many more indigenes 
workers now in the labour-market compared to the 
1960s and 70s, it is suggested that any change to 
the machinery without input from management and 
the managed could only exacerbate further the 
existing difficulties. The disputes cited would have 
never occurred if effective mechanisms were used 
at the shop-floor level. The solution appears to be 
two-fold. Firstly, the present industrial dispute 
settlement procedure needs 'tuning up' in order to 
respond to present day requirements but, more 
importantly is the need to define the procedure 
more precisely. The conciliation process is vague 
and time consuming. Secondly, management must 
accept the inevitability of trade union interests. If 
management has the attitude of 'playing down' the 
interests of workers then the present trend of wild­
cat strikes and violent forms of behaviour by 
workers could continue. In a situation in which 
trade unions are openly stating that these extreme 
measures must be taken to get management to the 
negotiation table there is little chance of industrial 
harmony. 
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From Colonial to Independent Unionism: The Case of the PNG's 
Public Employees Association 
Mamu Andrew 
Unionism in Papua New Guinea has its origins in 
the colonial past when Papua New Guinea was 
under the administration of Australia. Unionism 
was one of the institutions transplanted as part of 
Australia's good intentions toward modernizing the 
society and the economy of the territory. 1 Some 
have seen this as a paternalistic attitude aimed at 
protecting natives first and very slowly introducing 
them to civiliution and western institutions. 2 Other 
commentators suggest that the transfer of unionism 
was not simply a paternalistic gesture but was a 
conscious effort to lay the foundations of 
capitalism. 3 
Whatever the reasons behind the transfer 
of unionism, well before independence Papua New 
Guinea had already shown an interest in some form 
of union activity. 4 Initially workers formed 
organisations such as the Methodist Welfare Society 
and the Kerema Welfare Society. 5 These societies 
provided the opportunity for workers to organise 
and to pursue their interests within the colonial 
environment. However the aims of these societies 
were not specifically industrial, ranging from 
pastoral care to organiution of recreational 
activities and provision of accommodation. 6 
These organisations were significant 
because they revealed the desire of the workers to 
belong to bodies that would provide both services 
and representation and this naturally led to the 
adoption of unionism. Equally, because of these 
societies, the colonial administration recognized the 
fact that unionism in Papua New Guinea would be 
inevitable and therefore moved to formally and 
legally create the environment for unionism to 
exist. Moreover, colonial unions, particularly 
those in the public sector which predominantly had 
dimdim (white) membership, began to open the 
door for natives to join unions and therefore 
created the inevitability of union growth in Papua 
New Guinea.7 
Some qualifications need to be stressed. 
First, this is a descriptive attempt to present 
developments in Papua New Guinea unionism over 
time with emphasis on its existence and survival. 
Secondly, the assumption is made that capitalism is 
here to stay and therefore so is the labour force, 
but that this system will co-exist with the 
'traditional' subsistence economic system. Thirdly, 
cultural practice, in particular family relationships, 
will remain strong. It is within the confines of 
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these assumptions that Papua New Guinea unionism 
shapes its nature and its characteristics. 
Colonial unionism is a reference to the 
transfer of unionism from Australia to Papua New 
Guinea before independence on the 16 September, 
1975. The unionism that was practised in Australia 
and later transferred to Papua New Guinea, is 
about 'a continuous association of wage-earners for 
the purpose of maintaining or improving the 
conditions of their working lives', 8 Jackson 1988: 1-
2, Martin 1989: 8). Although various definitions 
have been developed since, the distinctive feature 
of this definition, developed by Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb in 1894, is that the existence of trade unions 
has to do with wage-earners and that the purpose of 
unions is maintaining and improving the conditions 
of their members.9 
However the form and nature of Australian 
unionism were based on the compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration system. 10 This system 
of Australian unionism was brought about through 
the enactment of the conciliation and arbitration 
legislation, both at State and Federal levels, as 
methods through which labour disputes were 
prevented and settled, and to encourage the 
formation of representative trade unions. 1 1  The 
encouragement of the formation of representative 
trade unions was through political initiative. So 
there is a political dimension to the nature of 
Australian unionism which is shown by the 
relationship between unions and the Australian 
Labour Party - the latter being the vehicle for 
legislation. 
On paper, it was this Australian form of 
unionism that was transferred or transplanted12 and 
was the most influential model for unionism in 
Papua New Guinea. 13 However, Papua New 
Guinea unions were not simply replicas of their 
Australian counterparts. 14 The reasons for this 
will be examined in the discussion on independent 
unionism. 
Colonial unionism went through a process 
whereby welfare societies (not entirely for work 
related matters) for workers were first established. 
These societies were encouraged by the colonial 
authorities because the natives were assumed not to 
be able to form proper unions. 15 These societies 
also facilitated and provided the opportunity for 
many political activists to pursue political and 
industrial concerns of workers. Many of these 
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political activists were employees in the public 
service which at that time had unions already in 
existence although their members were 
predominantly dimdim employees. 
During the process of transplanting 
Australian unionism what may have also 
encouraged the creation of unionism was the fact 
that there were already unions in existence in Papua 
New Guinea that were based on Australian union 
models. us It was the pre-existence of these 
organisations that seems to have encouraged the 
colonial Administration to pass the Industrial 
Organisations Ordinance and Industrial Relations 
Ordinance in 1962 legalising unions in Papua New 
Guinea for the first time. 
Independent unionism, from Papua New 
Guinea's perspective, is simply defined as the 
unionism that was inherited and its subsequent 
development consistent with the industrial 
legislation that governed the existence and the 
operations of unions. Independent unionism is 
therefore about Papua New Guinean unionism 
which has since independence tried to developed a 
character of its own. The inherited unionism was 
based on Australian union models. 17 In practice, 
this meant that unionism in Papua New Guinea was 
less related to work needs and more related to the 
needs of labour policy. Or as Hess puts it, 'the 
course of union development has been affected by 
both the needs of the workers and those of the 
state' . 18 
The basic role and characteristic of Papua 
New Guinea unionism are primarily seen in its 
industrial bargaining because of the industrial 
legislation inherited from Australia. Despite 
attempts to amend this legislation from time to 
time, it remains largely unaltered. There has been 
no real departure from the compulsory conciliation 
and arbitration nature of the system aiming for the 
prevention and settlement of disputes between 
workers and management. 
While this system has helped unions 
become established - by 1990, 70 unions had been 
set up - it has not helped them become strong. 
Many of these unions have small membership and 
therefore have difficulty in raising funds and 
establishing offices with full time officials. 19 It is 
fair to say that the majority of the unions are weak 
or inoperative. 
Whilst this situation is a serious concern 
for the development of an effective and active 
unionism, it has to be appreciated that unionism in 
Papua New Guinea is only in its infancy. It was 
only in the last thirty years that the first non­
expatriate unions were established and it was only 
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in the last seventeen years that the first unions had 
to learn to survive and develop without paternalistic 
colonial protection. 
In summary then, unions in Papua New 
Guinea were established under legislative 
protection, primarily to pursue the industrial 
concerns about wages and conditions of 
employment directly affecting their members. But 
when overall union development is examined, it 
may be that Papua New Guinea unionism has also 
from the start been based on welfare and political 
concerns as well as industrial matters of wages and 
conditions of employment. These welfare concerns 
also relate to social, cultural and religious interests. 
This attitude or expectation of unions playing a 
welfare as well as an industrial role developed from 
the initial welfare societies of the 1950s. 
Politically the unions directly confronted the 
authorities to raise matters of national interest and 
benefit that will also benefit the workers. This 
may also be observed in the post-independence 
development of unionism where unions may claim 
to represent the interests of the nation as a whole. 
It was estimated that by 1992 there were 268,000 
workers in the formal employment in Papua New 
Guinea31 and given the approximate extended 
family dependence ratio of ten to one for each 
worker, the workers would have been responsible 
for about one-half of the population of the country. 
This situation of a broader union constituency 
applies with particular force to the Public 
Employees Association (PEA) because of the 
dominant role of the public sector in Papua New 
Guinea's economy. 
The PEA is the largest union in the 
country and its history goes as far back as 1947 
when public servants, employed by the separate 
administrations of Papua and of New Guinea, 
decided to form a single union, the Public Service 
Association of Papua and New Guinea (PSA). 21 
The PSA was formally recognised by the 
authorities in 194822 and had only dimdim 
membership until 1957 when it technically 
inaugurated unionism among Papuans and New 
Guineans by extending its constitutional coverage to 
local employees in the auxiliary division of the 
public service. 13 Martin points out that the 
auxiliary division was a natural sequel to localising 
the public service24 and it also involved Papua New 
Guineans becoming union members. Both 
localisation and unionism were seen as part of a 
wider development agenda in which access to 
economic opportunities and to political rights would 
go hand in hand. 
ANDREW - From Colonial to Independent Unionism 
The PSA started off with a membership of 
some 1,500 expatriates and by 1963 had a 
membership of 2,064 with the indigenous 
membership numbering up to 918.25 After large 
scale recruitment of local members in 1966/67, the 
total membership of the PSA reached 9,544 of 
which three-quarters were indigenous members. 26 
The PSA was registered on the 17 January 
1964 following the enactment in 1962 of the two 
pieces of industrial legislation, n and by 1972 the 
PSA had a total membership of 16, 134 of which 
13,000 were indigenous officers and 3 , 134 were 
overseas officers. 28 By this time other public sector 
unions , such as the Police and the Teachers 
associations, were being formed and although PSA 
membership was growing, it was witnessing the 
break-away of occupational groups. 
The most significant break-away came in 
1973 when the PSA decided to become a 
specifically Papua New Guinean union. The 
Overseas Staff and Assistance Association was 
formed to look after expatriate employees and the 
old PSA's funds and assets were equitably shared 
between that organisation and the new local PSA. 
The local PSA also employed an Australian union 
advocate (lawyer/economist) whose task was to 
train local union staff to run the PSA. Within two 
years of that move, the PSA had a membership of 
local officers only and its office was staffed by full 
time local union officers. 
The local PSA then moved to establish 
four regional offices in Lae, Mt Hagen, Rabaul and 
Port Moresby, and set up branches in all the 
headquarters of the government's  main 
administrative districts. By 1975 the PSA had a 
total membership of about 25,000 public servants 
and by 1979 the membership peaked at just over 
3 1 ,000 with a staff of 68 full time union officials 
located at headquarters and at regional offices. 
From its formation the PSA had been pre­
occupied, through the collective bargaining process, 
negotiating on behalf of its members on wages and 
conditions of employment. It also assisted other 
workers with the technicalities of the industrial 
relations system.29 However, between 1960 and 
1970 some of the union leaders of the PSA began 
to pursue political interests under the union 
umbrella. These leaders included Michael Somare, 
Paulus Arek, Lepani Watson, Boyamo Sali, Gavera 
Rea, and Albert Maori Kilci. They began to 
participate in wider political debate that would lead 
to Papua New Guinea seeking and achieving self 
government followed by independence in 1975. 
These unionists were later to gain political power 
181  
and several of them were ministers in the first 
Somare Government. 30 
The PSA also felt that as a union, it 
needed to respond to the social welfare concerns of 
the members, over and above industrial welfare 
matters. Thus it moved to establish the PSA 
Savings and Loans Society for PSA members only. 
This Society was among the fastest growing 
financial institution owned by workers and during 
its peak in the mid-seventies PSA assets were 
valued at about A$40 million. The Society 
provided loans facilities for the members and was 
able to establish automatic deductions from salary 
which were processed by government departments. 
The PSA and the PSA Savings and Loans Society 
also constructed a seven-storey complex to house 
their offices with five floors being fully tenanted by 
the Education Department and the Tourism Office. 
In 1979 at the biennial congress of the 
PSA, the Association felt that it should vigorously 
move to pursue the possibility of developing further 
socio-economic activities with the intention of 
providing more services to the members. It was at 
this time that the flat rate subscription fee 
arrangement was abolished and the percentage rate 
subscription fee was introduced; the rate being one 
per cent of the gross salary of a member. Three 
major reasons seem to have emerged to encourage 
socio-economic activities. Firstly, union 
subscription fees were not to be increased in the 
immediate future and therefore other sources of 
union income would have to be identified. 
Secondly, it was thought that the success of the 
PSA Savings and Loans Society had been 
encouraging and therefore members thought other 
socio-economic activities should be explored. 
Finally, socio-economic activities outside of 
industrial activities would bring direct benefits not 
only to the members and their dependents, but also 
to the union as well. 
In 1981 ,  the PSA constitution and rules 
were amended which led to the name PSA being 
changed to Public Employees Association of Papua 
New Guinea (PEA) and membership extended to 
cover employees in statutory authorities. Even 
within this amended constitution, one of the general 
guiding principles requires that the Association 
endeavour to secure better working conditions for 
its members and ensure that its members receive 
better service in order that they may better serve 
the nation and its people. 31 
It can be deduced that the PEA 's existence 
as a union is explained in part by its colonial 
inheritance. As observed, when the PSA was 
predominantly a white fellows union, it seemed to 
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have a task of assisting modernire the society and 
the economy of Papua New Guinea. 32 The PEA 
constitution and roles suggest that it shared a 
common goal with the employer, the government. 
The relevant roles provide that the Association shall 
endeavour; 
(a) To improve, protect and foster the best 
interests of all members by any means 
consistent with the laws of Papua New 
Guinea. 
(e) To formulate and pursue schemes for the 
industrial, social, educational, cultural or 
vocational welfare of all members and/or 
their dependents. 
(h) To invest any monies of the Association as 
the Association may deem fit. 33 
These objects have been maintained despite later 
amendments to the constitution and roles. 34 It is 
these general aims that have determined the type of 
unionism that the PEA pursues - it is based on 
industrial and socio-economic as well as political 
activities - it is holistic unionism. 
In the last decade the PEA started a 
number of socio-economic activities besides the 
Savings and Loans Society. Recently, the PEA 
established a private superannuation fund which 
also has life insurance and health insurance 
components. It had gone into supermarket 
operations and has established a number of social 
clubs at branch and sub-branch levels. The concept 
behind the development of these socio-economic 
activities had been the pooling of financial 
resources of the members and investing in ways 
that would bring return directly to them rather than 
depending on the employer to provide benefits by 
way of improved wages and conditions. The 
activities have not only contributed direct benefits 
to members and their dependents, but they have 
increased the Association's income as well. 
The PEA as an individual union, in its 
endeavours to participate in the political life of the 
nation, had in 1987 attempted to sponsor candidates 
for the national elections. However this proved a 
dismal failure. No serious post-mortem was 
carried out but it would appear that this result may 
have been due to the fact that the membership was 
not fully involved in discussions. Nevertheless, the 
PEA continues to be a powerful union both 
industrially and politically and this is clearly 
demonstrated in the sire of its membership, and its 
political influence. For instance, the PEA 
vigorously opposed the 1989/90 Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the government 
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which included massive cuts in the public service 
and wholesale privatisation of public services. A 
major submission was presented to the government 
seeking a negotiated settlement with 'the objective 
of minimizing the detrimental effects of current 
revenue short fall on medium and long term 
conditions' .  35 Whilst the government did carry out 
its SAP, major concessions were made due to the 
PEA's opposition and constructive input. 
On industrial matters, the PEA continues 
to display professionalism and responsibility in the 
pursuit of claims for its members and to set the 
pace for union development in the country. One of 
its major achievements was the introduction of 
wage indexation of salaries according to cost of 
living increases, and this has helped provide 
economic stability in the country. Other 
achievements include numerous improvements and 
reclassifications of salary levels for many 
occupational groups such as nurses, fire-fighters, 
electricity workers, and so forth. 
The above PEA achievements are the 
result of a committed membership which now 
stands at about 22,000 despite a fall in 1986 from 
31 ,000 to 18,000 members. Its membership 
includes officers ranging from departmental heads 
to the lowest classified employees in the national 
public service, provincial departments and 
statutory authorities . The Association has 
branches and sub-branches in all parts of the 
country and members participate in the 
running of the union through elected leaders at 
sub-branches, branches, the national executive 
level and at the national congress . 
Another reason for the PEA's success 
is that its staff are full time employees. It is 
one of the few unions that has employees who 
possess tertiary qualifications in economics, 
law, accountancy, arts and education. This 
enables the union to research thoroughly issues 
confronting it before submitting them to the 
employer. Further, because the Association 
has lawyers, individual members can have 
access to these lawyers to represent them in 
court on civil and criminal matters . 
The other main reason, as implied 
earlier, is the union's unique ability to muster 
political power through its network of 
members located in urban and rural areas. 
PEA members are the first line of contact the 
people have before they meet the government 
and government services . Thus it has the 
ability to influence and mobilize grass-roots 
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opinion on political matters affecting the nation 
and therefore an ability to influence 
government policies. 
The case of the PEA illuminates the 
type of unionism practised in Papua New 
Guinea. Papua New Guinea unionism has 
been, to a major extent, influenced by its 
colonial past. It is unionism that was 
transplanted from Australia together with 
Australian industrial legislation. However 
Papua New Guinea unionism has since tried to 
develop a character of its own - a holistic and 
encompassing unionism which reflects Papua 
New Guinea attitudes and aspirations. The 
existence and survival of Papua New Guinea 
unionism is therefore dependent not only on 
how well unions can deliver the services that 
will meet the needs of the members, but also 
on the attitudes of the members towards their 
unions and to their country. 
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The Colonial Inheritance and Labour: Structure, 
Conditions and Identity in Fiji 
Jacqueline Lee/de 
In this examination of the changes in the structure, 
conditions and identity oflabour in Fiji between the 
early 1970s and the early 1990s, three dynamics 
are stressed. The first is the tension between 
labour and the state, the latter usually, but not 
always, bolstering capital. Most recent studies of 
labour in the Pacific and elsewhere recognise this 
antagonism but differ in the degree to which they 
acknowledge accommodation between labour and 
capital. 1 A vital issue is the role of the public 
sector, essential to colonial labour development but 
too often glossed over by scholars. The second 
dynamic is the articulation between organised and 
unorganised labour. This involves the need to 
emphasise the role the domestic, subsistence, or 
'informal' sectors had in colonial and post-colonial2 
labour policies and practice. The third dynamic in 
this comparison of labour at the time of Fiji's 
independence and two decades later, is the 
relationship between class, and other identities, 
such as gender, ethnicity, region and clan. It is 
impossible to put any measure on such constructs 
and although the question of working identity has 
many contradictions, it is still an aspect of labour 
that needs to be raised. Labour policies and 
practices were a cornerstone of economic and 
political control in most colonies. These had 
implications not only for the development of Fiji's 
subsequent industrial relations but also for the 
structure and conditions of labour and class 
identity. Colonial policies which ensured political 
control also fostered other identities such as 
ethnicity and region, so that analysis of class 
structure and identity 1s fraught with 
contradictions. 3 
The Structure of Labour 
As Fiji prepared for political independence, the 
question of economic development was paramount. 
Economic stability depended upon political 
stability. A crucial issue was not only the 
industrial but also the political role which workers 
might play in an independent state. Before 
considering this, some discussion is needed of the 
structure of Fiji's labour force and the extent to 
which this changed after colonial rule ended. 
Fiji's labour market was markedly 
different from that of other newly independent 
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Pacific Islands states. It had, and still has, the 
largest and most diverse proletarian and industrial 
base. Sugar was the mainstay of Fiji's colonial 
economy and the legacy of this has not just been its 
central place in post-colonial development but it 
also has been significant for Fiji's demographic and 
ethnic mix, as well as the structures and identities 
of labour. The sugar industry was labour intensive 
and for a number of reasons, 4 the state turned to 
migrant labour. Initially, sugar and copra 
plantations were worked by indigenous labour as 
well as by other Melanesians and Gilbertese 
immigrants, but from 1886 indentured Indian 
labour became essential to sugar production. The 
shift partly reflected the increasing cost of imported 
Melanesian labour as well as colonial policies 
which attempted to restrict indigenous labour to the 
communal production of crops in villages. 5 
Unlike other Pacific Islands states, in Fiji 
a large proletarian base had been established almost 
from the beginning of colonial rule. Colonial land 
and 'native' policies determined that these workers 
would have restricted land and political rights. As 
well as being ethnically distinctive, a notable 
feature of sugar plantation workers was their 
gender composition. Legally at least 40 per cent 
were female migrants and while most of these 
women and their descendants became unwaged 
domestic and rural workers, many also worked for 
wages.6 
Sugar remained paramount in Fiji's 
economy but by the time of independence the 
workforce in this sector had undergone substantial 
changes. After the abolition of indenture in 1916 
the organisation and burden of cane production 
were transferred from plantation to small farm 
production. Although the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company (CSR) restricted its activities to milling, 
it still dominated the sugar industry and Fiji's 
political economy throughout the colonial period. 
State labour policies were geared to protect this 
industry but by the 1940s the company's resistance 
to recognising workers' associations came into 
conflict with colonial policy. The sugar industry 
became the centre stage for many of the industrial 
battles in colonial Fiji which left a tremendous 
legacy for Fiji's industrial relations and labour 
organisations. 
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An important pattern laid during the 
colonial period for labour in Fiji was the thin line 
between small-scale 'independent' cane farmers and 
the proletariat, wholly dependent upon wages. The 
CSR continued to dominate labour in farm 
production by leasing land and determining cane 
prices. Family production usually involved unpaid 
labour, including that of women and children, 
while cash contributions from outside work made a 
crucial difference to household economies. This 
pattern intensified during periods of inflation, such 
as after World War 1 1 ,  in the early 
post-independence period and during the recession 
of the mid-1980s. The crunch came in the latter 
period when employment opportunities began to 
shrink severely and partly due to this cane farming 
communities supported alternative political options. 
The ethnic bias in Fiji's labour market was 
a result of colonial policies although upon closer 
examination the demarcation of lndo-Fijians as 
dominating the formal waged sector and indigenous 
Fijians, the subsistence sector was never clear cut. 
Such contradictions left a considerable legacy for 
the post-colonial period. As noted, unpaid 
Indo-Fijian labour was crucial to the development 
of the sugar industry particularly after large 
plantations were abolished. Fiji's first governor, 
Sir Arthur Gordon, established early colonial 
policies, which attempted to segregate indigenous 
Fijians from Europeans, Indians and other ethnic 
groups, to ostensibly preserve the 'Fijian way of 
life' . Chiefs took an ambivalent role towards 
external labour demands, at times recruiting but 
also opposing the extraction of wage labour from 
their villages. 7 From the late 19th century until 
1908 indigenous Fijians were levied a Produce Tax 
on crop production, so that within the so-called 
subsistence sector, colonial policies established 
'disguised proletariats' who 'although they possess 
the means of production, the earnings of these 
producers from the sale of their crops may be 
viewed as ways needed for subsistence. '8 Money 
also became necessary for paying a provincial tax, 
village, church and kin obligations and for various 
commodities. Fijians living in regions where crop 
production was not widely established were 
compelled to migrate and seek work on copra and 
sugar plantations. A legacy of the colonial labour 
structure was that village labour formed a reserve 
with many of the costs of maintaining and 
reproducing workers being passed on to the kin 
group and not to the employer or the state. 
During the colonial period indigenous 
labour came to dominate the goldmining and 
stevedoring sectors. Initially chiefs and 
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administrative officers procured this labour but 
increasingly Fijians migrated independently. 
Throughout much of the colonial period both the 
official authorities and many chiefs were concerned 
that a permanent indigenous proletariat did not 
develop. 9 A marked change in the labour market 
by independence was the acceptance and awareness 
of the need for a permanent multi-ethnic 
workforce, although the 'informal' sector, 
comprising both urban and rural workers persisted 
as an integral part of post-colonial capitalist 
development in Fiji. After 1970 the workforce was 
increasingly ethnically , industrially and 
occupationally heterogenous with more skilled and 
educated workers. 
The pace of localisation of Fiji's 
workforce was a major concern of both the state 
and organised labour in the immediate years before 
and after independence. 10 Many of these positions 
were localised but the continued employment of 
expatriates was attacked by the Fiji Public Service 
Association (FPSA). Twenty years after 
independence expatriate staff are still employed in 
some senior positions in both the public and private 
sector. Recent advertisements use the 'freedom to 
repatriate capital and profits' as a selling point for 
investment in tax free factories. 
A major structural change in Fiji's 
workforce at independence was the expansion of 
the public sector. As in many newly independent 
states, this came to dominate a large sector of Fiji's 
labour market and economy11  but because of the 
established industrial and agricultural base, the 
labour market in Fiji was not as centred around the 
public sector as it was in other Pacific Islands 
states. The growth in the number of established 
posts12 had importallt implications for the 
development of organised labour and class identity 
in post-colonial Fiji. The dramatic expansion of 
the public service led to the growth of powerful 
public sector unions, especially the FPSA, 13 which 
by the early 1980s played a dominant part in Fiji's 
industrial relations and political scene. Just as the 
expansion of the public service helped shape 
aspects of labour so did the contraction of the 
public sector. Twenty years on, partly precipitated 
by the 1987 coups, but also as a reflection of 
international economic and political trends, the size 
of Fiji's public sector fell. The industrial strength 
of the FPSA has also been tested by the 
corporati.zation of several public services since 
1990. 
By independence a manufacturing base to 
Fiji's labour market had been well established. 
This continued to grow especially during the late 
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1980s. The service industries, particularly tourism, 
have represented another important component of 
Fiji's labour force cemented by the colonial state. 14 
A major structural change has been in the gender 
composition of the workforce. By 1970 women 
represented around 14 per cent of those the work 
force but two decades later, although employment 
for men had shrunk, the proportion of women in 
the paid work force increased to over 21 per cent. 15 
Conditions of Labour 
Labour conditions relate to the structure of the 
labour market and the perceived ideologies of 
workers. It could be argued that labour conditions 
reflected the contemporary standards of colonial 
and post-colonial society and the degree to which 
colonised and 'free' workers could contest this. 16 
The literature on the conditions and 
relative 'humanity' of indentured labour in the 
Pacific Islands and elsewhere is contested17 both in 
terms of its acceptability according to the 
international standards of industrial and 
indigenous societies, and in the nature of the 
engagement. The record of labour conditions in 
Fiji18 is replete with examples of both extreme 
exploitation and beneficent acts by patrons. The 
colonial state demarcated its role in regulating 
labour conditions, which later embraced a limited 
concern for some provisions for workers in areas 
outside employment. This included, for example, 
education, health, housing and the establishment of 
the Fiji National Provident Fund in 1965. The 
record of labour protest and attempts to form 
workers' associations is also indicative of the 
contest between workers and employers over labour 
conditions in both colonial and post-colonial Fiji. 
The earliest regulations to impinge upon 
the conditions of labour in Fiji concerned 
indigenous workers. Like most labour regulations, 
they were as much about the control of the 
workforce as they were to maintain an assured 
supply and the satisfactory performance oflabour. 19 
While the rationale was that the state was 
'protecting' native labour 'Atu Bain20 notes that 
since the late 19th century the majority of ethnic 
Fijians were recruited under the same conditions as 
lndo-Fijians. These were the invidious Masters 
and Servants' Ordinances of 1888 and 1890, in 
which the balance of the law was tilted heavily in 
the employers' favour. 
Similar regulations concerned the 
recruitment and conditions of work of the 
girmityas. Not only these labour regulations, but 
also the actual treatment and conditions of work, as 
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well as workers' resistance and accommodation to 
this has left an indelible legacy from Fiji's colonial 
period which had implications for class and ethnic 
identity. 
The colonial labour systems left an 
inheritance which encouraged the exploitation of 
cheap labour with wages and conditions far below 
those acceptable in metropolitan countries. In 
post-colonial Fiji, the advantage of cheap and 
docile labour has continued to be pushed as a 
selling point for foreign investment, most notably 
since 1987 with the promotion of tax-free factories, 
particularly in the garments industry. Although 
critics condemn garment workers' wages which in 
1990 were reported to be as low as Fijian $25 a 
week, 21 there are others who argue that such 
disparities are inevitable if the third world is to 
'develop' .  During the colonial period 
contemporaries also denounced the wages and 
conditions of workers. 22 Labour costs during the 
girmitya period were estimated to be a seventh of 
those paid to white field labourers employed by 
CSR in Australia. 73 
While organised labour has had an image 
of indifference to wage disparities among workers, 
in practice this was a major anomaly raised by the 
Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC). By the 
mid-1970s the FTUC .became increasingly critical 
of the exploitation of non-unionised workers24 but 
rather than endorsing industrial action, it advocated 
a minimum wage. Government opposed this and 
instead laid down minimum wages and conditions 
under wages councils in certain selected industries. 
The wages councils were established in 1961 to 
enforce some minimum standards in industrial 
sectors, which were increasingly important in Fiji's 
economy. 25 It took over two decades for a wages 
council to be introduced within the garments 
industry, although women workers at G.B. Hari's 
clothing factory struck over low wages in 1960. 26 
Nineteen years later, FTUC general secretary, 
James Raman, drew attention to inadequate wages 
there alleging collusion between employers and 
government. 27 Such allegations resurfaced during 
and after the 1987 parliamentary election campaign 
when labour leaders highlighted deploring 
conditions and wages in Fiji's garments industry 
and in the mines at Vatukoula. 28 
From the indenture period the state 
attempted to lay down regulations concerning the 
medical and living facilities for workers. Tension 
between employers and state authorities over the 
regulation of working conditions is a legacy from 
the colonial period. So is the memory of the 
frustrations workers faced when trying to lodge 
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complaints of breaches of labour regulations. 
Workers did not meekly accept deplorable living 
and working conditions211 but most survived by 
acquiescing into a pattern of avoiding open 
resistance.30 It was usually only after workers' 
associations were established that collective 
improvements were made. As in most colonial 
states, work-sites such as plantations were usually 
enclaves31 in which the employers' actions were 
law. Distance from main centres and ignorance of 
legislation but more often the brute reality of 
physical and financial coercion, mitigated against 
workers successfully registering complaints or 
seeking medical attention. State-backed penal 
regulations made it difficult for a worker to obtain 
permission for absence from a plantation. 32 
The inheritance of enclave production as 
an institution for labour conditions in post-colonial 
Fiji cannot be under-estimated. Labour enclaves 
persisted in long-established sectors such as copra 
and goldmining. While most of the big copra 
estates broke up, economic returns and conditions 
of work continued to deteriorate. In the early 
1990s copra workers and their families were among 
the poorest in Fiji. 33 They also did not organise 
collectively but in another labour enclave, at the 
Vatukoula goldmine, workers did struggle to 
improve wages and conditions. 34 This has been the 
site of Fiji's longest running strike, since early 
1991 ,  where workers have collectively resisted 
employer domination and state indifference to their 
plight. Tax free factories established after the 1987 
coups represent a new type of enclave production 
but with similar employer domination, which has 
opposed collective organisation by workers. 35 
Labour Control and Labour Identity 
A heated debate in the discourse about labour and 
the state is whether the introduction of labour 
legislation and improved working conditions was a 
means of biting labour militancy in the bud, or 
whether it represented the state and employers' 
recognition of the power of labour. Supporters of 
trade unions acknowledge the limitations of trade 
union legislation but interpret its introduction as a 
victory for the working classes , an assertion of an 
institutional base to working class identity. This 
debate examines the nature of colonial rule and the 
changes in labour control, especially as a skilled 
workforce became significant in economic 
development in the post-World War II years. This 
debate also concerns the way in which nationalism 
and development are invoked to harness labour and 
conflicting interest groups within the state. 
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Fiji was marked by a long history of 
workers' struggles to improve working and living 
conditions and to establish collective organisations. 
The most basic response to this was force. The 
colonial record of handling labour unrest shows a 
propensity by the state to resort to force, 
imprisonment and various forms of victimisation, 
as in response to attempts by workers to form the 
Fijian Wharf Labourers' Union in 1916,36 to strikes 
by public sector and sugar workers in 1920-1 ,  37 and 
when the army was despatched to cane-fields 
during the 1943 cane farmers' strike.38 
By World War II the state began to 
encourage labour management tactics that were not 
ostensibly dependent upon force. This was in 
response to directives from the Colonial Office, the 
demand for labour during the war and the growing 
assertiveness of labour. Stuart Reay, Fiji's first 
Commissioner of Labour, warned employers 
against victimising striking garage workers and 
printers. 39 Simultaneously during a brief strike in 
1943, involving mainly carpenters from the Public 
Works Department, a labour officer advised the 
workers to consult his department before resorting 
to industrial action. Although this reflects a 
tendency by the state to attempt to placate unrest 
through guidance and conciliation, it did not see an 
end to the use of brute force or victimisation by 
employers or the state. 
During the 1959 oilworkers' strike and the 
1960 cane farmers' strike the state again reinforced 
capital through resorting to force by calling upon 
the army and in 1959, promulgating Public Safety 
Regulations. After independence, the introduction 
of the restrictive Trade Disputes Act«' suggests that 
the colonial legacy of force as a means of control 
over industrial unrest had not been abandoned but 
rather entrenched in labour legislation. In 1977 the 
penal sanctions of the 1973 act were invoked when 
Taniela Veitata, and other leaders of the Fiji 
Waterside Workers' and Seamen's Union were 
sentenced to six months imprisonment for taking 
illegal strike action. Apisai Tora, secretary of the 
Fiji Sugar and General workers union, supported 
Veitata's union and was sentenced to a year's 
imprisonment under the Sugar Industry Act. 41 
During the 1980s the use of force in 
controlling labour was even more glaring. In 1985 
the Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
threatened to declare a state of emergency, call 
upon the army and sack civil servants if workers 
went ahead with a national strike. 42 The unions' 
threat was a response to the state's imposition of a 
unilateral wage freez.e. 43 It is perhaps less 
surprising that after the military regime had 
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installed itself in 1987, it resorted to force and 
other forms of direct coercion44 to intimidate union 
leaders and workers and to impose drastic wage 
cuts. Labour legislation also contained severe 
penal sanctions. For example in 1991  the interim 
government introduced the extremely restrictive 
Sugar Industry (Special Protection Amendment No 
3) Decree and the Protection of the National 
Economy Decree. 45 Penalties for preventing an 
industry from operating were fines of up to 
$F10,000 or imprisonment for 14 years, or both. 
Although these decrees were lifted new 'labour 
reforms' introduced in November 1991 to tighten 
up on the activities and functioning of trade unions 
also included penal sanctions. 46 
Force and direct coercion as a means of 
labour control was one inheritance of colonialism 
but another legacy was the less brutal, but still 
restrictive, legislative framework for the 
management of industrial relations. By World War 
II the colonial government following Colonial 
Office directives, began to implement labour 
legislation and policies designed to contain and 
preempt militant industrial action. Such strategies 
were in line with British domestic industrial 
relations policy which favoured 'responsible trade 
unionism' based on collective bargaining and 
dispute reconciliation. 47 The Industrial Associations 
Ordinance and the Industrial Disputes (Conciliation 
and Arbitration) Ordinance were introduced in 
1942, to make provisions for the recognition of 
trade unions, collective bargaining, conciliation and 
arbitration. 
There is also considerable debate over 
whether changes introduced by the post-colonial 
state to labour legislation, particularly for trade 
unions, represented a gain and greater power for 
workers, or whether it indicated that workers' 
organisations were under greater state control. 
Two of the most controversial changes were the 
introduction of the 1973 Trade Disputes Act and 
the establishment of the Tripartite Forum in 1977. 
Tora and the Fiji Council of Trade Unions (FCTU) 
(a rival national centre to the FTUC) denounced 
FTUC's acceptance of the Trade Disputes Act as 
having 'sold out the workers of the country' and 
that the FTUC had become an 'official agency' of 
government. 48 Academic commentators have also 
cast divergent interpretations on this act. Hince 
regards it as formalising 'a role for unions in the 
processing of wage bargaining and the settlement of 
disputes, while the subsequent Trade Union 
Recognition Act 1976 established a formal process 
for the legal recognition of unions as the collective 
representative of workers and the right of that 
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collective to bargain. '49 The 1973 act did establish 
restrictions on strike activity and demonstrated that 
the post-colonial state was willing to impose penal 
sanctions. 50 
Critics also dismissed the establishment of 
tripartite industrial relations machinery, comprised 
of representatives of government, unions and 
employers, as another step in the post-colonial 
state's cooption ofworkers.51 Much of the impetus 
for this came from the FTUC which in the early 
1970s did adopt a cautious and conciliatory stand. 
It also was inspired by the example of conservative 
labour movements in other post-colonial states such 
as Singapore. 52 The establishment of the Tripartite 
Forum in 1977 appeared to herald a brave new era 
of consultation and contained wage increases as the 
cornerstone of Fiji's industrial relations. 
Committees were set up, with representation from 
government, the unions and employers to determine 
remuneration guidelines, redundancy, dispute 
settlement and ability to pay. Even Raman 
recognised that this implied another trade off: 'the 
very involvement of the FTUC in the Tripartite 
system connotes the suppression of trade union 
militancy and wage demands based on the capacity 
of each employer to pay . '53 
Workers' Organisations and Labour Identity 
Class identity is the most difficult area to discuss in 
relation to the colonial inheritance for labour in 
Fiji. Given the methodological,54 theoretical and 
cultural limitations of such an exercise I will not 
present any answers but raise questions concerning 
class and identity in Fiji. Of relevance here is the 
extent to which the contradictory actions and 
policies of the colonial state created structures 
which may have moulded working class 
institutions. To what degree did the state's 
attempts to control these institutions, provoke the 
emergence of a stronger sense of class identity? I 
am trying to avoid a positivist, causal explanation 
and also question analyses which attribute class 
identity purely to the legacy of the historical 
super-structure of state and capital. Emergent class 
identities conflated with other identities such as 
ethnicity, gender, clan and locality. In tum the 
colonial state, especially in its control of emergent 
labour organisations, frequently promoted 
ideologies, such as chiefly deference, which 
mitigated against questioning authoritarian 
structures in Fiji. A further issue is that the 
colonial state not only tried to shape organised 
labour but instigated practices which led to the 
development of a large 'informal' sector and the 
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persistence of subsistence labour. It is too 
simplistic to dismiss this by suggesting that 
unorganised workers have no class identity or that 
there were neat demarcations between organised 
and unorganised labour. 
By independence wage-earners and 
producers in Fiji were beginning to be aware of the 
common bond among those dependent for survival 
on their own labour. Despite strong opposition and 
divisive forces, this consciousness emerged 
painfully and slowly, during a century of small, 
usually undocumented struggles and larger 
confrontations with employers, the colonial state 
and the indigenous elite. 
Effective working class organisation and 
identity was inhibited by both external and internal 
dynamics among workers. Ethnic divisions, 
especially between indigenous Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians, and also between Europeans and those 
of mixed ethnic descent, could be to the detriment 
of working class unity but so too could divisions 
within ethnic categories. While sustained resistance 
and organisation was limited in the early colonial 
period, partly due to internal cultural, social and 
religious divisions among the girmitya, the shared 
experience of Girmit became a potent memory55 
which helped to forge a common consciousness 
among Indo-Fijians as workers. 
After the abolition of Girmit, lndo-Fijian 
struggles, particularly within the cane industry, left 
a legacy for class identity in Fiji. Economic and 
ideological divisions emerged between bigger and 
smaller growers and those dependent upon waged 
labour as reflected in the formation of the Kisan 
Sangh and the Chini Mazdur Sangh. 
Simultaneously the militancy of Fiji's canegrowers 
became a potent memory in the identity of not only 
many Indo-Fijians but also became part of the 
labour history of Fiji. Actions such as 
cane-harvesting boycotts or arson, remained 
powerful bargaining threats which sugar farmers 
and workers resorted to on several occasions in the 
post-colonial period. 
A persuasive ethnic stereotype perpetuated 
by certain colonial administrators, chiefs, 
academics, politicians and some working people, 
was that working class organisations were alien to 
Fijian culture. Reay stated in 1949 ' . • •  that Fijians 
have not the same need for industrial organisation 
as Indians and Europeans. '56 The historical record 
shows otherwise. In the early colonial period 
Fijians attempted to resist unacceptable conditions 
by, for example, refusing to renew contracts or 
absconding and engaging in other forms of covert 
action. More organised responses such as the Tuka 
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movement of the 1870s and the Viti Kabani formed 
in 1912 could be interpreted as partly a response to 
unacceptable colonial labour practices. 57 As noted, 
indigenous Fijian wharf labourers attempted to 
form one of the first trade unions in the Pacific 
Islands in 1916. 
In much of the discourse on labour and the 
state in Fiji, particularly in relation to 'class 
consciousness' ,  the test has been that of industrial 
organisation and militancy. I would argue that this 
has led to a distorted emphasis upon manual labour 
and an equation of this with labour identity. The 
colonial state fostered a large white collar and 
public sector which played a prominent part in the 
post-colonial state. Two points require comment. 
The first relates to ethnicity and labour 
organisations. Ethnic Fijian participation was very 
strong in public sector working organisations. The 
membership of the Fijian Teachers' Association and 
Fiji Nurses' Association was almost exclusively 
indigenous Fijian, while the FPSA is probably 
Fiji's oldest multi-ethnic workers' association.58 
The executive was structured so that Fijians, Indo­
Fijians and Europeans each occupied a third of the 
executive posts. Several prominent indigenous 
Fijians served on the executive. 59 This relates to 
my second point. The state quite deliberately 
encouraged the establishment of responsible public 
sector organisations, dating from the Association of 
European Servants formed in 1921 .61 Prior to 
independence the Controller of Organisation and 
Establishments was concerned about the weak 
organisation of the FPSA and advocated 
government strengthen it to avoid facing 
a pack of trouble in the future. It 
is much easier for us to negotiate 
with a sensibly led main union 
than to withstand the claims from 
a horde of splinter unions some 
of which, as in the case of the 
Tele-communication Employees 
Union, could lay a fairly firm 
stranglehold on Fiji's economy. 61 
Instead during the following decade the FPSA grew 
to become Fiji's most powerful union, and on 
several occasions threatened and took industrial 
action. It led the other civil service unions in 
successfully defeating the government's attempts to 
restrict salary increases during the 1970s and early 
1980s. 62 The relationship between government and 
public sector unions was severely strained during 
the 1980s. In 1985 teachers broke their stereotype 
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of industrial passivity by taking strike action for 
two weeks. Public sector unions, with the 
exception of the Public Employees' Union were at 
the forefront of the formation of the Fiji Labour 
Party. 
Union Structure and Identity 
It was not only government officials which assessed 
Fiji's labour movement to be sensible and stable by 
independence. Kevin Hince, an industrial relations 
academic, wrote in 1971 that 'the trade union 
movement in Fiji is now established on a firm basis 
and is well poised to meet the challenges of the 
future. '63 Fiji's rates of unionisation were high not 
only in comparison to countries within the Pacific 
Islands but with Australia and New Zealand. 64 
Around 40 per cent of manual workers were 
estimated to be unionised in 1968. 65 This was not 
just a result of policies of the colonial state but also 
of past struggles by Fiji's workers to organise. 
Despite criticisms of the weakness of many unions, 
a major legacy of the colonial state was the high 
rate of union participation and a recognition by the 
state that unions were an established part of Fiji's 
society. This is in marked contrast to many other 
independent Pacific Islands countries. In 
post-colonial Fiji conflict arose with employers 
and government over the identity and actions 
workers' organisations would take. Twenty years 
after independence and under the severe threat to 
unions following the 1987 military coups, there 
were still 47 unions, representing around 43 per 
cent of workers. There were also 79 industrial 
associations. 66 
The colonial state encouraged unions but 
did not want them to follow a political or militant 
path. Partly because of this, it deliberately 
discouraged large general unions which left a 
legacy not only for union structure but for the 
consolidation of a concerted working class identity 
in Fiji. By independence there were 3 1  unions, 
many with under 250 members. 61 At the other 
extreme were a small number of older bigger 
unions. Although the colonial state discouraged 
large general unions, in 195 1 it actively supported 
the formation of a local national centre of affiliated 
unions, the Fiji Industrial Workers' Congress 
(FIWC).(18 
Critics have implied that the colonial 
policy of encouraging a national centre left an 
inheritance which weakened and coopted organised 
labour in Fiji. This contrasts with colonies such as 
the Cook Islands, where although a large general 
union was encouraged by the New Zealand Labour 
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government during the 1940s, this took a 
paternalistic turn with a stipulation that the Cook 
Islands Industrial Union of Workers be affiliated to 
the New Zealand Federation of Labour. 69 This did 
not promote a strong labour movement in the Cook 
Islands. It could be argued that a positive legacy 
for organised labour in Fiji, which although 
threatened by factionalism and colonial paternalism, 
was the state's support of a relatively independent 
local national centre. 
From the late 1950s until the early 1970s 
organised labour took divergent paths. FIWC 
leaders, particularly Mohamed Ramzan, encouraged 
responsible union development10 and attempted to 
influence state policy through dialogue. A new 
'radical bunch' led at various times by B.D. 
I.akshman, James Anthony, Tora and Michael 
Columbus operated in a more militant fashion 
outside the national centre. The last three were 
leaders in the militant 1959 strike. 71 This became 
an icon in Fiji's labour history representing a form 
of cross-cultural working class solidarity. The state 
clamped down on this through the use of direct and 
legislative force, appealing to chiefly authority and 
labour leaders to quell the unrest. Brij Lal 
identifies the 1959 oilworkers' strike as a 
missed-turning point in Fiji's labour history: 
The once-promising foundation of 
a racially integrated working 
class movement slipped. What 
appeared once to have the 
potential to become a turning 
point in modem Fijian history 
remained an aberration, at least 
for the next two decades, until 
the emergence of the Fiji Labour 
Party in the mid-1980s.72 
Instead ethnically based unions briefly re-emerged 
during the 1960s and the state and national centre 
instigated the deregistration of large general multi­
ethnic unions, which had the potential to 
consolidate a strong class-based labour movement, 
such as the Wholesale and Retail Workers' General 
Union. 13 The strength of the FTUC also built up 
during the 1960s with the formation of new unions 
endorsed by the state and the FTUC such as the 
National Union of Factory and Commercial 
Workers. By 1970 industrial relations appeared 
stable but conflict within organised labour and 
between labour and capital would be reasserted. 
Hince describes the years between 
1970-84 as 'one of consolidation and steady 
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development'74 for the union movement. The early 
post-independence years revealed that this was not 
without tensions. Post-colonial Fiji  was not 
guaranteed an industrial relations honeymoon 
especially as economic conditions for workers 
rapidly deteriorated. 15 Although inflation rose from 
3.9 per cent in 1969 to 14.4 per cent in 1974, the 
country's economic performance was relatively 
positive. 76 Workers sought wage increases but the 
new government strongly resisted this. A test for 
the relationship between labour and the state came 
in 1973 with the introduction of the Trade Disputes 
Act and Counter Inflation regulations. The FTUC 
reached an agreement with govemment77 and 
secured official recognition which considerably 
enhanced its national and international · 
representation. A second trend which had 
implications for the development of class identity 
were the splits within organised labour. This 
became articulated through an attempt in late 1972 
by Tora to form the Fiji Council of Trade 
Unions. 78 The FCTU advocated industrial 
militancy, but its appeal was limited due to 
conflicting political, ethnic and personal79 loyalties 
among organised labour in Fiji. It is difficult to 
neatly categorise these identities and within the 
life-histories of some union leaders, such as Tora 
and dockworkers' leader, Veitata, there are 
ideological shifts over time. FTUC leaders were 
also not united in their political loyalties. Some 
became Alliance parliamentarians.i and openly took 
a conservative stand against labour. Others, such 
as Raman shifted from being an Alliance 
candidate, to supporting the National Federation 
Party (NFP), to a brief stint with the Fiji Labour 
Party, to becoming a NFP member of parliament in 
1992. 
Veitata' s labour identity shifted from being 
a militant trade unionist to becoming Minister of 
Employment and Industrial Relations in the 
post-coup regime. His career also reflects the 
persistence of ethnicity and racialism in 
post-colonial labour relations in Fiji. Howard81 
suggests that ethnic tensions were one reason for 
the FCTU's demise. Ironically, the FTUC, too 
often dismissed as the stooge of government, came 
to have an ethnically diverse representation, while 
many of the unions outside it took a much stronger 
Fijian nationalist and pro-Alliance line. 
Allegiances were never clear-cut. The most 
strongly nationalist union, the Fiji Dock Workers' 
Union, led by Veitata, remained within the FTUC 
until after the 1987 coups. The Public Employees' 
Union, a large union representing waged public 
sector workers left the FTUC in 1982. It was 
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dominated by Alliance stalwart, Joveci Gavoka, but 
had a multi-ethnic membership. 
By the early 1980s splits within the FCTU 
led to the defection of most affiliates to the FTUC. 
The colonial state's legacy of promoting one 
national centre was realised with the ascendancy of 
the FTUC over the FCTU by the late 1970s but 
this no longer guaranteed a compliant labour 
movement. 
An important change was the widening of 
the FTUC's representation. In 1978 it facilitated 
the establishment of a rural workers' industrial 
association, the National Farmers' Union (NFU).82 
This step forged important links between urban and 
rural workers. It also indicated that a sizeable 
portion of farmers identified their collective 
interests along similar lines to that of a trade union. 
The main organiser was Mahendra Chaudhry, 
FTUC's assistant general secretary and general 
secretary of the NFU and the FPSA. Chaudhry 
played a pivotal role in forging ties between urban 
and rural workers' organisations which became an 
important foundation of the Fiji  Labour Party. 
Such links have not rested just upon individuals but 
reflect Fiji's workforce where many families 
comprise urban and rural, public and private and 
white and blue collar workers. This has helped to 
articulate a class identity but it has also been a 
source of contradictions, played out in the political 
sphere. The FLP's strength in 1987 was urban 
based while the 1992 general elections revealed the 
rural support behind labour, especially in the 
cane-growing districts. 
A second change in the representation of 
the national centre, as discussed elsewhere, was the 
growing dominance of powerful white collar 
unions.83 
As organised labour widened its 
representation and took a more assertive role 
against employers and the state, so government 
authorities invoked the rhetoric of nationalism 
where labour should follow 'responsible 
development' . 84 By the late 1970s workers faced 
increasing redundancies, unemployment and a 
rising cost-of-living. The FTUC became critical of 
the limitations of tripartite machinery and the 
failure of government and employers to stem the 
deterioration of the employment market. 85 While 
workers were asked to accept wage restraints and 
redundancies government leaders and conservative 
unionists invoked the need for the now mature 
union movement to act responsibly. For example 
at the annual conference of the FTUC in 1977, 
Jonati Mavoa, the Minister for Urban Development 
and Housing emphasised the part that trade unions, 
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employers and government had to play in the 
economic development of Fiji instead of union 
leaders pursuing 'narrow sectional interests' •86 
Mavoa's rhetoric smelled of the 'labour 
aristocracy thesis' ,  a favourite label dished out by 
leaders in newly 'developing nations'87 to restrict 
wage increases, especially among public sector 
workers. This points to the problems the 
post-colonial state faced in reconciling the 
economic interests of different sectors but too often 
it has been a ploy to impose unilateral state 
development policies. The labour aristocracy in 
Fiji became associated with the significant salary 
gains achieved in the early 1980s by professional 
public sector workers. Government accused civil 
servants of 'getting for themselves a bigger and 
bigger slice of the reducing family income. '88 
Conclusion: The colonial inheritance and 
contradictiom for labour 
By 1985 the broadening role of organised labour 
led to it articulating an overt political identity when 
the FTUC promoted the formation of the Fiji  
Labour Party. Several commentators have 
interpreted this as indicating the emergence of a 
political party which cut through ethnic and class 
hegemonies. 89 Indeed, this was the FLP's 
platform. 
A major irony in an assessment of the 
colonial inheritance and labour is that the FPSA, 
and other professional public sector unions 
considered 'sensibly main-led' and by some to be 
coopted by the state at independence, were a 
leading force behind the emergence of a labour 
party. So also was the FTUC, again partly a 
construction of the colonial state. That colonial 
state structured an economy which required both a 
proletarian and a subsistence base. This inheritance 
continued to play a powerful part in the 
post-colonial period. It threw up contradictions 
between these sectors which forged cohesive and 
divisive dynamics among workers. 
A common theme has been the way in 
which ethnic divisions and racialism have appeared 
to dampen working class identity. That bite has 
not been as big as it appeared. One example of the 
emergence of post-coup ethnic-based unions is the 
Viti Civil Servants' Association. It appeared to be 
a threat to the FPSA and a voice of the post-coup 
regime. Evidence indicates that many defectors to 
this union soon returned to the FPSA 90 while in 
1992 the VCSA was deregistered by the state. This 
does not downplay the persistence of appeals to 
ethnic identity in the post-colonial labour history of 
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Fiji. I argue however that the colonial state also 
formalised union institutions, too-long dismissed by 
academics as coopted arms of the state, which have 
provided a means of fighting against racism. This 
does not overlook the continued factionalism within 
organised labour91 or dismiss the exploitation of 
unorganised workers and especially women. 
Fiji represents a microcosm of the 
contradictions of the inheritance of colonial policies 
towards labour. On the one hand there is the 
persistence of sweat-shop conditions, in for 
example, several garment and other factories; the 
sub-standard living and working conditions of 
mineworkers; women employed as domestic 
workers who are not recognised as part of the 
'formal' workforce and the growing numbers of 
workers living in poverty or considered 
unemployed. This is the inheritance of exploitation 
and force; whether the force is through labour 
legislation or the pull of commodification. On the 
other hand through the domineering and regulatory 
industrial relations administration and also the 
contradictory laissez faire attitudes of the colonial 
state towards various sectors of labour, structures 
were instigated which provided a powerful base 
for fighting unacceptable working conditions and 
through which a democratic workers' identity could 
emerge. This is partly a legacy of colonialism -
but there has been a heavy price which many 
workers have paid. That has been as much due to 
the efforts of the colonised, as the colonisers. 
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Literary Legacies: Faltering Feet; Dancing a Pen to a National Beat 
Paul Sharrad 
One of the most prevalent images of indigenous 
Pacific writing is the schoolroom. From Vincent 
Eri's 'Village, Church and School' through story 
(Rowley Habib's 'Motu'), poem (Konai Helu 
Thaman's 'Uncivil Servants'), autobiography 
(Zoloveke's 'Man from Choiseul'), play (John 
Kneubuhl's 'Think of a Garden') and film (Albert 
Toro's 'Tukaua') the motif is insistent. These 
examples span time (1950 to 1990) and place 
(Papua New Guinea, Solomons, New Zealand, 
Tonga, Samoa and Bougainville) and one can ring 
the changes on them quite readily (Subramani's 'No 
Man's Land' : story, Fiji; Mihela Peleti's 'My 
School, Tialeniu': poem, Tokelau; Kama Kerpi's 
'Voices from the Ridge' : drama, Papua New 
Guinea; Wendt/Sanderson's Flying Fox in a 
Freedom Tree: film, Samoa, etc.). In Melanesia, 
where culture-contact has been relatively more 
sudden and recent, the literary fixation on 
schooling as a central trope for negotiation of 
identity, colonisation, status enhancement, national 
formation and transition to modernity is quite clear. 
This should not be surprising. In real life, 
the kiap came and went, but the teacher or catechist 
stayed. The kiap brought the law and one effect 
was that one's children had to go to school. 
Schooling meant increased reliance on cash to pay 
for fees and books and uniforms. It also meant 
uprooting of children from the village, not just by 
exposing their minds to the world beyond, but by 
transporting their bodies to places outside of the 
clan boundaries. 1 School was also the vehicle 
through which one might arrive at some 
understanding of what the kiap was all about and 
thereby some possibility of control over the 
distribution of the goods that seemed to follow in 
his wake. In literature, school was the basic 
condition for the writer being able to write; it had 
to be cited as a point of origin and authorisation, as 
a modem talisman of mana, an icon of the new self 
and the new society within which such a self could 
be meaningful. 
Paulias Matane has produced an 
autobiography that makes this quite clear. The 
book, My Childhood in New Guinea, is intended 
as a social studies handbook, with pictures of 
traditional customs on New Britain, as well as an 
inspirational story for students striving to better 
themselves in a new nation. It opens with a full­
page photo of a sorcerer and closes with one of 
Matane at his office desk. The narrative is a 
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success story based on the progression from village 
boy to school student to teacher to bureaucrat. It 
is school that is the print-story medium of change 
and as part of schooling it is the widening of vision 
from village to nation that allows such change to be 
meaningful: without the intervening aerial photo of 
the New Guinea landscape and the colonial-induced 
mental vision to go with it, there is no significant 
narrative or cognitive connection between the two 
portraits. The story itself becomes an educational 
text about the place of education and the formation 
of a modem educated consciousness within a 
concept of nationhood. 2 
The questions I want to address in this 
paper include: what was the legacy of colonial 
policies for the Papua New Guinean school system? 
How did it shape the development not just of 
literacy, but of literary expression? To what 
extent, as a consequence, has a literate culture to 
come into being? My doggerel title for this paper 
is modelled on a contemporary Papua New Guinean 
poem, 'Dancing yet to the Dimdim's Beat'3 which 
uses the language and the modes of literacy of the 
coloniser to critique the legacy of colonialism and 
question its own function in a supposedly 
independent nation. 
We are dancing 
Yes, but without leaping 
For the fetters of dominance 
still persist 
Yes, still insist 
On dominating 
Holding us down 
We have been dancing 
Yes, but not for our own tune 
For we are not immune 
Yes, for our truly, our own truly 
Music of life is erodin 
Yes, the mystic tune holds 
Us spellbound 
Our independence abused 
We have been dancing 
Yes, but the euphoria has died 
It is now the dull drumming 
Yes, of the flat drums -
Thud dada thud da thud dada thud 
Yes, it is signalling, not the bliss, 
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But the impending crisis. (Vincent 
Warakai) 
The usual literary history produced by a 
post-colonial society is constructed as a triumphalist 
evolution from imitation of the colonial models and 
self-denigration, through rebellious counter­
assertion and nostalgic reconstruction of the pre­
colonial to cultural self-possession within an 
internationally informed autonomous national 
'industry' of writing, publishing, classroom 
instruction, public debate and scholarship. Papua 
New Guinean literature can be viewed in this way, 
but if it is, we must have certain reservations about 
its success, even at this relatively early stage of its 
history. I want to argue, along with the poet 
above, that in terms of generating a culture of 
literacy, some things have not changed much, or 
have not developed in the way they were expected 
to. This, I argue, is because the optimistic years of 
decolonisation and the busy years of early 
independence carried over in different guises the 
same pattern of colonial thinking about education, 
and this continuity, among many other factors, has 
limited the growth of a real print-culture and 
literary cultural infrastructure. 
I am prompted to consider the whole issue 
by three facts. Firstly, my work in written Pacific 
literature suggests a miraculous decade of 
decolonisation accompanied bya literary outpouring 
that then dwindled to a desultory set of small, one­
off publications and less than a handful of writers 
who have continued to publish, not infrequently 
positioned as somehow eccentric. Secondly, the 
acknowledged instigator of most of the early Papua 
New Guinean creative writing, Ulli Beier, 
following his string of publishing successes and 
literary proteges of the seventies, prefaced his 1980 
collection Voices of Independence with a complaint 
that the education system had abandoned literature. 
He points to a general decline in literary output, 
and focuses on the institution he himself was 
associated with: 
The decline of the university's 
role is tragic • . . .  The secretary of 
education refers to the university 
as 'our chief manpower training 
institution' .  Accordingly, most 
students are channelled into 
education courses. . . .  The 
scienc e s  are  obvi ously 
encouraged, but subjects like 
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literature, history, and political 
science are being regarded as 
both superfluous and potentially 
'dangerous' .  . . .  There is even 
talk in the University Council and 
the Ministry of Education of 
abolishing the Arts Faculty 
altogether. 4 
Thirdly, I understand there was a change of policy 
in Papua New Guinea around 1986 to re-emphasiz.e 
the teaching of literature and creative writing in 
schools. 5 This has been reflected in a number of 
education staff being sent abroad for higher degrees 
in literature in recent times where once 
'development' studies were 'the go' and linguistics 
the closest anyone got to departments of literature. 6 
I take the shift to imply an admission that the 
schools have somehow not been adequately 
positioned to develop a culture of literacy or a 
literary culture in the modem nation, despite, and 
maybe because of, all the effort of the three 
decades, 1945-1975 and the educational practices 
before the War. 
To see some of the complicated network of 
forces surrounding the emergence of a literary 
culture in Papua New Guinea, I want to take a case 
study of a particularly fascinating figure, one that 
brings together in his own poetry and life the 
growth of modem schooling, the several theories of 
education that held sway, the decolonising period of 
literary boom led by Beier, and the post­
independence disillusionment signalled above by 
Vincent Warakai. In surveying this poet's career, 
it becomes possible to sketch a rough answer to my 
questions. 
Allan Natachee was born Avaisa Pinongo 
in the Mekeo District of Papua in 1925. His 
mother died when he was five and he was taken in 
by nuns of the Inawaia Catholic mission. It was 
there that he found a fragment of Tennyson and 
was 'hooked' on poetry.7 One of the nuns 
'christened' him Natachee after an Apache Indian 
figure because, like him, he was always leaping 
around. He dates his writing from 1935 when he 
was ten and wrote, 'I am a poor beggar and roam 
around the world to find a shade to dwell' -
prophetic lines when we think of Russell Soaba's 
extended fictional portrayal of the 'Odd Man Out' 
forty years later, notably in his novel Wanpis 
(1977). 
When he was 16 in 1940, Natachee wrote 
'Law and Lore of Nature' : 
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According to law and lore of our nature, 
Man is bound to go on and on, 
Solving adventure after adventure, 
With an endlessness leading him on! 
And for that cause that which is yet 
unseen, 
And that which is yet unknown: 
On the morrow it shall be seen! 
On the morrow it shall be known! 
Around and above the margin of earth's 
airy space, 
There shall for evermore revolve, 
A man-made world for his problem to 
face, 
And his problem of space to solve! 
A man-made world shall indeed be strong, 
To stand against mighty attacks, 
From debris of lost world - but not for 
long; 
Man shall again repair the cracks. 8 
When War came, Natachee volunteered as 
a carrier, but was rejected as too young. He 
worked as a 'bosboi' on the mission's rubber 
plantation and after cessation of hostilities got a job 
as a joinery machinist in the Department of Lands 
from which he was discharged with eye trouble. In 
1950, Percy Cochrane, Senior Broadcast Officer 
and later editor of the Journal of the Public 
Service, TPNG, was alerted by his friend Barwick 
in Native Affairs to the presence 'of a 
Mekeo . . .  always writing in a big black book' in the 
'boihouse' of a friend.11 Cochrane took him on as 
a translator and journalist for Territory 
broadcasting (Natachee spoke Roro, Kuni, Motu, 
Mailu and Mekeo as well as English, and there was 
a post-war shortage of educated workers). Sent off 
to produce news items, he would write them up as 
'sonnets' , 10 and he was eventually dismissed from 
the Broadcasting section because he would 
disappear to collect material from old relations, 
especially sorcerers, who had come to Moresby to 
sell betel. Cochrane tried to get him into the 
government anthropologist's department, but that 
figurehead was ageing and ill. Natachee eventually 
became a clerk for a building company. 
In the meantime he had been championed 
by Percy Cochrane and his wife Renata so that his 
poems got into Oceania in 1951 . 1 1  As a result, he 
was contacted by a Philippines poetry society and 
given a laurel crown and a certificate declaring him 
poet laureate of Papua! After that he was much 
republished: in Journal of the Public Service, 
Australian Territories, Westerly, Gavin Souter cited 
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part of his work in New Guinea, the Last 
Unknown, and the South Pacific Post ran his poem 
celebrating the House of Assembly elections in 
1964; he even had ABC radio readings and a 
television appearance. 12 When he was interviewed 
in 1972, he had returned to his village to 'work in 
the rice fields and help the people fix fences . . .  or 
work on the roads' .  He also continued to record 
traditional songs and poems for the benefit of the 
next generation, served on the Local Government 
Council and advocated self-government in 1973, 
with independence 'six or eight years after' . He 
still wore his silver crown from the United Poets 
Laureate International. 
Natachee's literary career was clearly 
shaped by his upbringing on the Yule Island­
connected mission. For most of post-contact 
history, education was run by the missions, starting 
with the efforts of four Pacific Island catechists of 
the London Missionary Society sent to Moresby by 
Lawes in 1873, and they obviously had an 
influence on any literary products that emerged 
from the schools. Vincent Eri contrasts the 
Catholic and LMS systems in 1he Crocodile. 13 Leo 
Hannett invokes his experiences in Catholic 
seminary to mount an attack on colonialist 
Eurocentrism, 14 Russell Soaba recreates his time at 
Martyrs' Memorial, Popondetta in his novel 
Wanpis, 15 which depicts the tension between 
missions wanting mostly to instil holiness and 
discipline in a protective environment and students 
wanting to acquire knowledge that would bring 
material advancement and a chance to 'see the 
world' .  Overall, however, the pidgin term skul, 
which conflates the meanings of 'mission' and 
'place of instruction' is a fair reflection of the role 
played by churches in Paupa New Guinean 
education. 
Within mission education, however, there 
were differences of educational opinion as well as 
creed. The LMS,  while favouring English, did use 
Motu and local languages (Toaripi, Hula, Suau, 
Orokolo, for instance) as vehicles of instruction in 
junior school. They also put some emphasis on 
trade training and developing rural-based skills. 
The Catholics, on the other hand, pushed a more 
assimilationist policy, in keeping with French 
colonial practice as introduced by the Yule Island 
priests. Bishop de Boismenu records confrontations 
between catechists over 'poaching' students from 
one school to another16 and boasts in 1916 that: 'It 
is the will of the Church that Catholic children 
taught in her schools be in no way inferior to 
children educated elsewhere. '  17 This argument was 
used during the decolonisation of the New 
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Hebrides, when the French said that if they were 
supported, any Di-Vanuatu could get an education 
that would allow equal relations with anyone in 
Paris, whereas under the British and supporters of 
the English-language system, natives would be 
schooled only in their own tongues and acquire a 
smattering of English. 18 In Papua, it became a case 
of LMS pastors teaching in the major language of 
the district, and the Catholics teaching in English. 19 
It will be recalled also that it was a French order 
which produced the first Papuan ordained priest, an 
event that caused Hubert Murray to pen his famous 
opinion of the native intelligence. 31 In any case, 
the missions had the ability to sequester students in 
a 'total learning environment' .  Greg Dening's 
comment on Marquesan history is as true for Papua 
New Guinea: 
The m i s sionaries  n e v e r  
discovered a sure way to 
persuade children or adults to 
give time or be regular in the 
giving of it . . . .  [They] were 
convinced that boarding schools 
offered the best chance of 
discipline and distance from 
distraction . . . .  literacy was itself a 
vehicle for the new abstractions 
of the civiliz.ed . . . .  The boarding 
schools were effective total 
e n v i r o n m e n t s  fo r t h e  
reconstruction of a new reality. 21 
As a 'mission boy' , Natachee was part of 
the more concentrated assimilation of the Mekeo 
district missions and later, the Bomana De La Salle 
school. 22 As such, he might be expected to rise 
reasonably high in life, within the limitations of the 
time. But as a mission scholar, he was 
unorthodox. He refused the catechist role and he 
failed to stay in the village or on the land. He 
celebrated modem secular knowledge (the 'fix-it' 
optimism of his youthful poem is matched by a 
later exhortation, 'Advance Atomic Age') and he 
also retained a close connection to old 'pagan' 
knowledge before it became 'trendy' as part of a 
(re)construction of national identity. 
Natachee also became an unwitting pawn 
in the often strange relationship between the 
missions and the government. 23 Despite the best 
intentions of the missions, they could not be 
everywhere at once, and they were saddled with the 
task of training their own teachers and setting up 
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schools from overseas donations. The 
Administration, while it introduced taxes to 
promote habits of capitalist labour and to develop 
schools of its own, had to spread limited revenue 
across a wide area of land and social issues. Pre­
War educational development was at best isolated, 
unsystematic and in most places just not there. 
Until the late sixties, the government never really 
had the cash or the will to push state schooling, 24 
and at one stage even sought to foist all 
responsibility for schooling onto the missions!25 In 
1939 there were only 600 students in 
Administration schools in New Guinea. 26 Hank 
Nelson points out that 'there were virtually no 
Administration secondary schools for indigenous 
students before 1957' .  r1 By 1963 there were still 
only 3,700 secondary students in the whole 
country. 28 The Administration was in a bind of 
having to allow the missions carry the burden of 
educational development in a 'cloistered' village 
subsistence context, while increasingly wanting 
skilled labour in secular, urban and cash 
environments. It also had at its back a white lobby 
wanting trained help, but only as domestics, lathe 
operators, book-keepers etc. ,  so even its own needs 
for medical orderlies, agricultural advisers, 
teachers, co-operative managers, local council 
leaders and so on were met under constraint. 29 
Government subsidies to schools up to the fifties 
only went as far as standard 5 and were paid 
according to exam results in basic maths, 
geography and English competency. F .E. 
Williams in Papuan Villager, 1932, makes 
abundantly clear the rural, artisanal, small-scale 
capitalist, and racist context in which education was 
to be conceptualised for many years: 
The white men know far more 
than you do. They make and do 
a lot of things that are quite 
beyond you. You cannot be the 
same as the white man; and there 
is no reason why you should. It 
is true that there are many of the 
white man's ways you can copy; 
you can learn to work hard and 
save money; you can learn to 
read and do arithmetic; you can 
learn to buy and sell and be 
'business-like' ;  you can learn to 
look after your health and guard 
your villages from sickness; you 
can learn to use tools in your 
gardens; and there are all sorts of 
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useful things you can buy in the 
stores. But you can never be the 
same as the white men; and you 
will only look silly if you try to 
be.30 
D.J. Dickson summed up this early phase of 
educational development: 'in theory and in fact, 
Murray placed literary or academic education as 
last on the list of educational priorities. '31 This has 
remained true ever since, despite momentary 
appearances to the contrary. 
In this context, Natachee was too highly 
educated; he had a love of words and ideas for 
their own sake, and could be seen as socially 
useless and a classic case of the mission-educated 
'bikhet'. He was well versed in English long 
before the Administration approved a pro-English 
policy for schools in the fifties. He was too good 
a mimic and his mimicry could be construed as a 
threat of potential indigenous competition for a 
share of white jobs, wealth and knowledge. It also 
had the potential to expose some of the fallacies of 
development policy (the Atomic Age might well 
roll on, but for the average Papuan, it was not 
going to get him a high-paying job or even into a 
white's-only bar, or on to Ela Beach32) even as it 
could be paraded as a success story for paternalistic 
colonialism. In this context, Natachee had to be 
contained, by paternalistic tones of wonder and 
self-congratulation. These implied both the 
educability of the native but also the uniqueness of 
this particular case of accelerated development, and 
could be matched by polite smiles over the 
sentiments and style that kept this fellow in his 
place as merely a mimic, a poor imitation 
unconscious of his own shortcomings. 33 Just as his 
Native American namesake had been 'contained' 
within a Eurocentric Romantic literary frame by 
poems like Hiawatha, Avisai had been 'framed' 
firstly by the nun's imposing on him that identity, 
(a singular one amongst all the Stephens and 
Aloysiuses, or the Rudyard Kiplings and Gordons 
of the more jingoistic Anglican system) and 
secondly by the gradualist liberal paternalism of the 
Australian Territories magazine and fifties colonial 
policy. Natachee as anything more than a 
curiosity, becomes an early example of the 'hot­
house' argument applied to the literary boom of the 
seventies. Insofar as there was no climate for 
literary nurture outside of the boarding school or 
the university, it was a valid argument; but it was 
also a colonialist discursive ploy that threatened to 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. There was no 
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institutional place for Natachee, even though, 
unlike later writers, he was construed as saying 
what the advocates of 'controlled progress' wanted 
to hear. 
The system's inability to use or develop 
Natachee's skills was also because he was not 
'educated enough' for late colonialism; he did not 
affect the tie and long socks of the new breed of 
Papua New Guinean students; he chewed betel and 
'went bush' to talk to the old sorcerers instead of 
keeping office hours; he 'did' oral history and 
anthropology, but his fieldwork was his own and 
not mediated into academic structures or supervised 
by a white expert as so much other material was. 
Nor did he seem to be part of the general 
indigenous interest in schooling as a vocational, 
materialist enterprise - even as he trumpeted the 
virtues of W estem knowledge, he used it to 
preserve the old traditions at no evident gain to 
himself in either town or village. 
Natachee revealed his skills at a tuming­
point in educational as well as political history. 
Vincent Eri, basing his opinion on the oral history 
from which he built his novel, distinguishes 
between the World War Two carriers who got 
some school and more 'on-the-job' training in 
modem ways34 and the generation one or two 
removed who became the first University and 
college graduates. 35 This generational shift spans 
the change in policy from gradual democratised 
development on a shoestring budget with a strong 
lobby to make the native useful but keep him out of 
competition with whites ('It was deliberate 
government policy not to educate an elite. ' Smith, 
1987: 17), to accelerated growth in the number and 
levels of schools open to indigenes in order to train 
the administrative elite of a new nation. The break 
in general policy came with the United Nations' 
anti-colonialist interest after the War. The Minister 
for Territories in 1955 declared a policy of 
universal primary education, and then in 1962 a 
United Nations' enquiry led by Sir Hugh Foot 
urged the development of tertiary training under a 
program of increased administrative and political 
self-determination. A national system of education 
came into force in 1970, two years after the 
foundation of the University of Papua New Guinea. 
But this change was primarily at the macro-political 
level. 
Whether schooling occurred under the 
mission or the government, it was never schooling 
for the love of learning per se; it was schooling for 
some collective functional purpose - 'manpower 
management' of souls or hands or both. 
Traditional education had been the same: survival 
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skills learned by imitation of adults and esoteric 
knowledge, both at the service of enhancing one's 
own wealth and status and the general well-being of 
the community. 36 In modem times the range of 
operation had merely widened, from clan to nation. 
For literacy development, to see oneself as a 
reader, one must be able to imagine oneself as a 
writer, and vice versa. In the context of literature, 
this entails a certain degree of individual enjoyment 
of the processes of reading and writing and in 
entertainment for its own sake. It also implies the 
acceptance of a separation between reader and 
writer. Village oral tradition, on the other hand, 
operates in a mode that assumes the close 
connection of speaker and listener and which serves 
the communal need. (This is one reason why 
writers rehearse their childhoods in the village: it's 
not just romantic political ammunition against the 
corrupting effects of colonialism, it's a confession/ 
celebration of the disjunction of modernity -
embodied in the classroom experience - which is 
the condition for their entry into print culture.) The 
'double bind' that the decolonising process 
introduces for cultural production is the 
contradiction of invoking a set of icons of identity 
(village, vernacular, orality/dance, 'magic' ,  
agriculture) in the name of the nation (represented 
in terms of town, English, writing, science and the 
office). 'Literature' becomes a problematic 
construct, produced in the name of the nation but 
under a definition that negates its modem form. It 
repeats obsessively, not just the political problems 
of the time but its own difficulty in coming into 
being. Eventually that repetition assumes the shape 
of a tradition itself and generates new developments 
within its own print-culture context, but in a 
country like Papua New Guinea, this may be a 
longer and more troubled process than the 
materialist-political emergence of the nation. In the 
meantime, the contradictions are ideologically 
'papered over' by the continuity of an unexamined 
assumption about education. Writing, like story­
telling, is at the service of the community; the scale 
is different, but the function is the same, and the 
cultural arena remains public and pragmatic, rather 
than allowing for the privacy and aestheticism that 
seems to be required for a literary print culture. 
Education is schooling; schooling is training; 
training is for material gain. So for Warakai, the 
pen continues to dance to the beat of a drum and 
the nation to the tune of its former masters. It is 
this kind of discursive circle that inhibits the 
reception development and of Natachee's work. 
In 1965, Oscar Spate, contemplating 'A 
Territory University' ,  saw the need for its offerings 
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to be related to 'the local environment if it is not to 
be an artificial veneer' and adverted to a planned 
localisation of the secondary curriculum. He went 
on: 
Oxbridge and ivory towers are 
out, the real issues are in the 
marketplace and must be met 
there; but we shall very ill serve 
New Guinea and ultimately 
ourselves, if we adopt nothing 
but a meanly utilitarian 
approach. 37 
In 1980, that was exactly what Ulli Beier accuses 
the University and its political controllers of doing. 
But even at the height of benevolent decolonisation, 
when indigenous culture was being frantically put 
into writing and creative writing was being 
promoted in schools, a Director of Education chose 
to discuss curriculum only in terms of cost­
efficiency and productivity and English teaching as 
a tool related to conveying maths concepts. 38 
With all the changes in policy, from top­
down westernisation, to Ivan Illich's grass-roots 
'deschooling' theory, only a very few people seem 
to have questioned the rationale for literacy 
training; parents wanted it; politics demanded it; it 
was done. Many, like Nelson Giraure, reflected 
wryly on the alienating effect of school and literacy 
on village students and 'The Need for a Cultural 
Programme' . 39 Vincent Eri, two years earlier in 
1972, was also expressing dissatisfaction: 
The whole of English teaching 
could do with some reshaping. 
Composition writing from 
primary and secondary schools 
has not produced much creative 
thinking. . . .  There's no use in 
knowing all the parts of grammar 
if you can't write creatively. 40 
Paulias Matane, one of the most literary people in 
the country, dared to ask 'Education for What?' ,  41 
but his replies were as rhetorical as the question, 
amounting to more practical training to produce 
'people who were happy to work on the land', 
'service of the nation' and little more.42 
With the development of the University 
picking up on the Administrative College as 
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training-ground for the leaders of the future, there 
was an obvious push towards a highly literate and 
English-language literate group of people. African 
affairs had influenced educational thinking in Papua 
New Guinea since Murray had looked to Nigerian 
policies and UNESCO had sponsored a plan for 
Third World educational development at 
conferences in Madagascar, Tanganyika and 
Pakistan. (African affairs had also influenced 
Papua New Guinean political opinion; both Somare 
and Kiki attended conferences in East Africa; Tom 
Mboya had been a prominent member in a 
delegation to Papua New Guinea, and the die-hard 
highland planters with a mixture of fear and 
aggression christened the UPNG the 'mau mau 
factory'). 43 It is logical then, that cultural elements 
in the curriculum should be taken from the 
decolonising nations of Africa as well. Chinua 
Achebe's fiction was on the English syllabus; 
several of the university staff came from service in 
Africa. 44 One of these was Ulli Beier, who had 
worked with Yoruba art and literature in Nigeria 
and began to teach creative writing at UPNG, 
generating in a few years Kiki and The Crocodile, 
(independently authored and published but produced 
under his tutelage) a small-press poetry series 
(Papua Pocket Poets), a journal ofliterature and the 
arts (Kovave) and a significant interest in Papua 
New Guinean writing in Australia and abroad, 
notably through the anthologies of the University of 
Queensland Press, Black Writingfrom New Guinea 
(1978) and Voices of Independence (1980). 
During the new phase of proto-nationalist 
decolonisation, Beier, the promoter for people like 
Kumalau Tawali, Vincent Eri, Kama Kerpi, John 
Kasaipwalova and others, encountered Natachee. 
Protege of another, and paragon of a less politically 
crirrect era, Allan comes in for a roasting: 
Contempt for the past goes hand 
in hand with admiration for the 
whi te  man . . . .  For  b l a c k  
nationalism Natachee has no time 
at all. . . .  His praise of Britain is 
embarrassing in its naivety . . . .  
Future generations of Papuans 
will undoubtedly despise him for 
such sentiments. 
What is interesting about 
Natachee is not that he is a bad 
poet, nor that his bad poetry 
brought some success. The 
question that intrigued me from 
the start was: what made this 
charming man, who is sincere, 
but without the gift of language, 
want to write?-45 
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Only when Natachee turns to 'englished' versions 
of traditional Mekeo chants, does he find favour 
with Beier and a place in his stable of published 
literary names. 46 And what spontaneous music is 
tapped by his 'return' to authenticity? what literary 
energy is released? what traditional elegance of 
form? 
Aia on the road he walks! 
Aia all naked, 
On the road he walks! 
Aia my hand is faultless! 
Aia all naked, 
My hand is faultless. 
Aia you shake your spear! 
Aia all naked, 
You shake your spear. 
Aia in war decoration! 
Aia all naked, 
In war decoration! 
Without suggesting any inadequacy of the 
original expressive material, I dare to assert that 
this 'beautiful "stone age poetry"'  is no less 
wooden or, to use Beier's word, 'trivial' than any 
of Natachee's own verse, despite its having been 
tidied up into a formal regularity and dredged up 
from childhood memories innocent of mission 
interference. 47 Though it may be an accurate literal 
translation, it is certainly bad cultural translation; 
the text is emptied of significance and resonance by 
being stripped of its performative and ritual 
context. The erasure of the music of Mekeo 
syllables and tune, and of the accumulations of 
situational and cultural association leave the text 
bared of all save an impression of childishness that 
is potentially more damaging than the kind of 
mixed admiration even a local readership might feel 
for a poet who had attempted 'big words and 
rhyme' in English verse forms. How could it 
happen that an otherwise well-intentioned and 
competent literary critic could skew our reading of 
Natachee in this way? And I do not mean to single 
out Beier for blame - Nigel Krauth also labelled 
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Natachee a misguided eccentric, largely for writing 
and especially for writing in English. 48 
AB already suggested, Beier himself was 
contained, like Natachee, in a discursive operation 
that prevented certain definitions of cultural 
production from being considered. In a sense, 
paternalism had merely changed its politics, radical 
anti-colonialist gurus replaced missionaries and 
kiaps. This is a simplification, of course, but in 
education whether official curriculum policy was to 
blend traditional and modem ways (Groves) or 
offer a choice between old and new (McKinnon), 49 
to promote smart farmers in the village or 
bureaucrats and businessmen in town, institutional 
practice functioned to keep the reins of power in 
the liberal, western and national epistemological 
camp that emphasised materialist development. 
Ulli Beier, benevolent, non-directive, anti­
colonialist cultural agent though he may have 
been, 50 was still part of this system and his literary 
judgement functioned within its network of forces. 
So when in 1980 he complains of the University 
betraying the cause of the arts, he is merely noting 
a shift in priorities in a system that was no more 
pragmatic or politically interested than the one 
which had allowed his cohort of UPNG students a 
few years of literary glory. That literature had 
been at the service of the emerging national 
community and the community found it expedient 
to emphasi7.e folklore but necessary to package it 
within modes of modem print-culture production. 
So Beier refashions Natachee and becomes, yet 
again, his 'discoverer' . Once the nation had 
arrived, literature had fulfilled its function; writers 
could go on to other things. There was no 
established culture of literacy or literary 
production, no infrastructure, no readership to 
sustain a tradition. 51 Indeed, the tradition was that 
schooling was a means to practical social ends and 
writing simply a modem adjunct to this, operating 
in a special social sphere of its own. 52 
Russell Soaba has a Chemistry lecturer 
mouthing the 'official cultural line' in his novel 
Wanpis: 
What they, the Papuans and New 
Guineans should write about . . .  
were stories that helped shape 
and developed the nation; a 
writer's duty is to provide 
national consciousness, to 
stimulate national unity; to 
educate the village masses; to 
guide those promising young 
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writers who are lost to come 
back to the right path of creative 
writing; to go through the right 
kind of training and ultimately 
take over from their expatriate 
counterparts as the future literary 
leaders of this country; to make 
one plus one equal two and not 
five or ten, no not even x . . . . .  
(164-S) 
But he points out the impossibility of this 'policy 
for the arts' of developing a truly literate culture. 
Under such a pressure of expectation and 
literalism, the writer feels crushed, and demanding 
something greater for art than literalist social 
engineering, retreats to anomie and defeatism: 
Even now while planning this 
novel, while treating it as a 
spare-time hobby, I am afraid. 
Afraid because I am too young to 
attempt an effort as ambitious as 
this: and since I am too young 
and underdeveloped I feel as if I 
am fooling over two and a half 
million people. 
there are no definitive enough 
forces to help create that self­
determination in me; every book 
I read is simply a dream which 
automatically gets crushed by the 
next book I pick up. I am all 
confusion. 
I torment myself by being alive. 
The others are just simply 
blinded by this dawn, and 
thereafter have only the dreams 
of a pot-bellied future and beer­
stained independence to resort to. 
(1 18) 
It is ironic that Beier, who helped to start Soaba, 
was unable to recognise or praise the truly 
educated, genuinely literary aspects of Natachee's 
work until he had packaged him as a 'native 
informant' trading in folklore that sounded 
authentically exotic to the onlooker ('purity' and 
'simplicity' are words Beier uses), which could be 
mediated by the white decolonising agent, and that 
looked acceptably indigenous in a programme 
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amung at national cultural identity. Russell 
Soaba's career has in many ways echoed that of 
Natachee, save that he has the aid of an 
international post-colonial consciousness to carry 
him tenuously along. Institutionally, not much has 
altered in developing a widespread and well 
supported literary culture. 
After the early sponsorship by Cochrane, 
the picture seems to be one of an older Natachee 
hanging around the University campus writers 
group, attracting a mixture of respect and derision. 
He is presented as even more a figure of pathos 
than Somu Sigob, former politician then university 
security guard. 53 This is something of a convenient 
construction, though Natachee can be pitied for the 
scant support given to developing his personal 
creative talent. Both Cochrane and Beier talk in 
terms of tragic inhibition of potential; the one by an 
inflexible bureaucracy that denied him material 
comfort and professional development, the other as 
a cultural cripple who 'takes no pride in being a 
Mekeo and 'whose spirit was crushed by an 
insensitive missionary effort' . 54 While it is no 
doubt true that his education and his historical 
moment have hampered the full expression of his 
talent, it is not true that Beier rescued Natachee 
from a pathetic alienation and set him on the path 
to recovering his native authenticity. Before Ulli 
'discovered' him, Natachee was painstakingly 
recording Mekeo lore in decorated manuscript. 55 
He is, but is not only, someone caught between the 
cross-fire of culture-contact and decolonisation; he 
is also one trapped as a seemingly genuine literate, 
educated person, within systems of educational 
thinking - village and national, mission and 
government, pre- and post-independence - which 
define schooling as training, writing as functional, 
English as public, official and Western-dominated. 
It is because of this that his Stone Age appears to 
have passed, even as his literary Atomic Age 
glimmered and proved a false dawn, despite and 
also because of the arc-lights of cultural 
nationalism. 
This pattern of metaphor is, however, 
perhaps misleading in itself. Natachee has written 
verse that is reminiscent of mid-nineteenth-century 
Australian or tum-of-century Indian poetry in 
English, and certainly, from the perspective of 
print-literate, English-speaking, street-wise modern 
readers, it seems at first reading clumsy in 
technique, culturally alienated, fawning in politics, 
and fatuously optimistic in its cliched rhetoric of 
progress. It is out of this kind of thinking that we 
must agree with Nigel Krauth that literary culture 
after a brief efflorescence, faded to dust. 56 But in 
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a fully developed literary culture, to regard 
Natachee's work or its colonial counterparts 
elsewhere merely as an incompetent imitation of 
British literature to be superseded as quickly as 
possible is uncritically to dehistoricise it within its 
own sphere of cultural politics and literary history. 
Indeed, the forces behind Natachee's production 
seem still to operate today. English is still the 
means to a job; education is still schooling and 
schooling a ritual aimed at getting access to 
material benefits and social status, or at least to the 
bright lights of the city. Most of the poetry coming 
out of the Pacific, when it is not 'chopped-up­
prose' statement, has the same inflated diction, 
formal or forced metre and rhyme, moral 
exhortation and public tone. Seen in this light, 
Natachee is indeed, as Beier termed him less 
positively, a 'Pilot Poet' . 
Seen as transitional negotiations rather than 
poor imitations or hesitant beginnings, Natachee's 
poems become quite interesting as both hybrid 
literary texts and examples of intelligent use of 
education to express a personal vision. Given the 
contradictory forces at work in the institutions 
shaping his career, it is hardly surprising that his 
poetry is shot through with inner tensions and that 
the formal elements threaten to collapse under the 
strain. It is often this strain, however, that 
energises the writing in a more authentic literary 
manner than the folkloric concoctions of his 
'Mekeo Songs' .  Though he characterises tradition 
as a dark age of 'worthless heathen rubbish' ('What 
ancestral wealth and knowledge?'), the terms in 
which he represents the inexorable onrush of 
western modernity (the Horishima/ Nagasaki blasts) 
are as much redolent of horror as of admiration, 
and the dialogue in 'Advance Atomic Age' is by no 
means a paean to progress. The new age is urged 
to advance 'cautiously' as well as 'courageously' 
because its heavy tread is painful to a stubbornly 
resistant 'groaning' stone age that, despite its 
inevitable fall into the pit of history will, in the 
admission of the very force crushing it, 'live and 
die for evermore' .  51 Equally, in 'Our land of 
countless dark ages' 58 with its alternate rhymes and 
quatrains, the first three stanzas depict a 'long dark 
night of savagery' (to cite Achebe), but the second 
half of the poem turns into a dramatic celebration 
of warrior life, as does his poem 'Fear' ,59 which, 
after the opening six lines, has all the marks of his 
translated traditional material in Aia. In fact, it is 
the survival of traditional literary conventions of 
ritualistic incantation in his verse that gives it drive 
but also makes it sound emptily repetitious or 
strange. 60 It is as if the rhythmic rehearsal of the 
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white man's ideas in the white man's language will 
bring the modem world into possessed 
consciousness. From one point of view, this is the 
magical partial understanding of the cargo cultist, 
but it is not out of keeping with certain romantic 
notions of the western artist; and the vision of 
progress that informs his strategic depiction of 
Papua New Guinean tradition as the darkness of 
savagery is equally informed by a relentless 
evolutionary drive that is not always the 
triumphalism of colonial will, but much more akin 
to Russell Soaba' s modem Melanesian 
existentialism. In his 16-year-old poem 'law and 
Lore of Nature' Darwinian theory via space comics 
transmutes into an uneasy combination of fifties 
'space-race' technological optimism and the echoing 
void of Spencerian thought found in other early 
post-colonial writers. In any case, it is a complex 
literary vision that is more than the kind of slavish 
self-denial Beier castigates. 'Sweet and Kind 
Voice' does allow the narrator to refer to himself 
as 'an unworthy native' ,  but the rest of the pithy 
two-stanza poem is a Blakean attack on charity and 
paternalism that is problematically but powerfully 
double-edged: 
For my other fellow-children of my race indeed, 
Sweet and kind voice is part of their 
encouragement, 
But for me an unworthy native, I do not need, 
For sweet and kind voice, I call my 
discouragement. 
We all know that sweet and kind voice is good in 
some way, 
But we know also it never makes one 
succeed, 
So please whoever you may be, for now and for 
aye, 
I tell you that sweet and kind voice, I do 
not heed. 
This may sound quaint to modem ears, but anyone 
who can come up with the line, 'A river that 
bickers down a valley'61 is clearly no more devoid 
of a sense of language and its expressive capacities 
than Nigel Krauth' s hope for the literary future, 
Apisai Enos,62 even if Natachee's colonial 
education has imposed a cultural double vision that 
sees 'lads' and 'lassies' 'for aye' in the village 
gardens of the Mekeo and inserts Old Testament 
images and rhythms into 1he History of the Mekeo. 
Where traditional incantation and modem verse 
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form come together to wonderful effect is in the 
poem 'Merry-go-round and Balls and Dolls' .  63 
After the heady rush of ideologically sound 
decolonisation that found such a piece 'trivial' ,  this 
post-colonial critic has the luxury of recuperating 
for an even more ideologically sound reading of 
that very triviality. Apart from a stray 'And lo! ' 
(which arguably is reflexively critiqued by the 
vapid content and unusual prosiness of the rest of 
the poem), the insistent repetition of lines and 
rhymes (only 'ground/ round' and 'dolls/ balls' for 
four stan7.as) emulates the endless turning of the 
merry-go-round and the knock-em-down, set-em-up 
routine of the fairground sideshow until it comes to 
suggest the absolute fatuousness of this kind of 
modernising 'bread-and-circuses' colonialism. 
Two weeks for Europeans in Konedobu ground, 
Where they have set up a thing called a merry-go­
round, 
Besides merry-go-round are many balls and dolls, 
Prizes are won by hitting down dolls with balls. 
Come then my fellow-children and gather around, 
Let us yell at dolls and balls and merry-go-round, 
For here we go in wild merry-go-round with dolls, 
Round and round in merry-go-round with dolls and 
balls.64 
The first indigenous Director of Education, 
Alkan Tokolo, ended a speech asking a necessary 
question: 'What are our Melanesian values, and 
which ones do we want to keep?' .  65 He failed to 
ask the next important question: 'How do we keep 
them under a new regime of national collectivity, 
institutionalised knowledge and print-culture 
transmission?' Tokolo himself offers some hope of 
an answer akin to Eri's championing of creativity 
when he begins his talk with folktales and 
anecdotes. But his lead seems not to have been 
followed until the putative shift of schools 
curriculum policy towards literature in the mid 
eighties. Certainly, while schooling continues to 
function as vocational training in a national frame 
of economic development, students will fail to 
develop a literary consciousness that will allow 
them to see themselves as producers of their own 
culture rather than frustrated consumers of someone 
else's and they will continue to drift to the bright 
urban lights of global materialism. 66 Writers will 
continue to be flashes in the pan unless they find a 
recipe that sells to the multinational publishers. 
And under the glamour of the high-tech and the 
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foreign, local culture will be steadily eroded. As 
I have shown, the post-independence system bas 
not found a counter to this phenomenon because it 
bas not really changed its thinking from pre-contact 
or colonial conceptualising of education. People 
like Natachee or Soaba, who have tried to negotiate 
a real cultural shift and inhabit a literary culture 
that is genuinely of its time and place, have been 
caught and marginalised by this. 
In a sense, they have been caught by this 
paper as well, in that I have looked at official 
institutional treatment of cultural process and have 
thereby concentrated on print-culture literature. 
(As a teacher of literature I also have a vested 
interest in seeing new literary traditions emerge.) 
There is a non-formal cultural infrastructure and 
tradition being generated in Papua New Guinea in 
which street theatre and string bands connect 
village performance tradition with radio and video 
technology. John Kasaipwalova linked into this 
network when he moved from written poetry to his 
folk-opera, Sail the Midnight Sun. 67 When we shift 
the focus of our gaze away from the schoolroom, 
then the writer becomes a necessary but limited 
component in a larger movement, and his or her 
limited edition, one-off production may start to 
constitute a tradition of its own, a local mode of 
literary culture. In this context, literate culture 
becomes one in which the success-figures (Eri, and 
all those 'one-off-wonders') are peripheral and the 
eccentrics (the ones wandering the street, producing 
hybrid texts like Natachee and his contemporary 
counterpart Soaba) are central. 
References 
1 .  It was also the indentured labour schemes that 
enforced movement and induced the attitudinal and 
economic shifts which opened up a 'space' in the village 
for schooling. Geoffrey Smith, Education in Papua New 
Guinea (Melbourne, 1975) pp. 2-3. 
2. Vincent Eri's novel, The Crocodile (Brisbane, 
1970), is a case of the text recording the historical 
growth of such a consciousness during and after the War 
as it also rehearses in its own construction the growth of 
a national citizen that is the precondition for the 
existence of novel readers in Papua New Guinea. See 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 
1983), for an extended exploration of this idea. 
3. Vincent Warakai, 'Dancing Yet to Dimdim's 
Beat' , Ondobondo, 4,1984. 
209 
4. Uilli Beier (ed.) Voices of Independence (St 
Lucia, Queensland, 1980) pp. xii-xiii. 
5. PNG Commission for Higher Education, 
Higher Education Plan: A Strategy for Rationalization 
1986-1990 (Port Moresby, 1986). This document 
specifically refutes Beier's charges: 'University teaching 
is not identical to manpower training . . . .  Manpower 
approaches universally downplay reflective critical 
studies in the humanities . . . .  Such studies are however, 
vital if Papua New Guinea is to preserve and enhance a 
distinct identity. '  (pages 1 ,5). As the title suggests, 
however, the bulk of the report is directed at achieving 
institutional 'efficiency' and in fact works by the 
principles of manpower training it purports to eschew. 
There is another 1986 government document issued by 
the Committee on Philosophy of Education that addresses 
more fully the development of a literate culture. 
Significantly, this was produced under the direction of 
Paulias Matane. 
6. It seems to be as true of educational policy as 
of other colonial systems in Papua New Guinea that 
'Colonial governments have tended to define 
"development" in two broad ways: as an economic 
phenomenon,  or in terms of their own administrative 
convenience. '  Edward P. Wolfers, Race Relations and 
Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea (Sydney, 1975) p. 
23 .  
7. UiliBeier, ' "Cautiously Advance Atomic Age" : 
A Papuan Pilot poet' , Kovave (1 . 1  1968) p. 42; P. 
Cochrane, National Library. 
8. 'Natachee, Distinguished Poet of Papua New 
Guinea' (interview plus three poems: 'Law and Lore of 
Nature' ,  'Aia' , 'Red Leaf), Papua New Guinea Writing 
(7, 1972) p. 13. 
9. According to Cochrane, the book contained a 
recipe for beer, jottings from other books and poems. 
The beer recipe is of interest, since alcohol was 
prohibited to natives and became one of the earliest 
bones of contention in the burgeoning movement towards 
self-determination in the sixties. (The Cochrane 
collection in the National Library contains a compilation 
of radio listeners' questions to the 'Native Session' in 
which the issue of unequal drinking laws feature.) It 
certainly renders problematic Natachee's supposedly 
subservient relationship to white authority, as does the 
fact that when he was away compiling The Legendary 
History of the Mekeo (a title which indicates its predating 
the fashion for 'oral history'), he would send Cochrane 
letters of rebuke for speaking harshly to his workers. 
The biographical information here is collated from the 
Cochrane papers in the University of Wollongong 
Library the New Guinea Writing interview and Beier's 
article. 
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Creative Writing in West Polynesia1 - Development, Themes and Trends 
Sina Va'ai 
In the Pacific Islands, literature in its oral form 
goes back to the beginning of memory and the 
spoken word as exemplified by the Samoan saying 
'E fafaga tama a manu i ia ma fuga o laau ae 
fafaga tama a tagata i upu ma tala' which translates 
as 'animals and birds feed their young with fish and 
the bloom and berries of trees but the young of 
humans shall be fed with words and stories' . Even 
today the emphasis on orality and the spoken word 
is seen in the importance given to oratory and 
performance. With colonisation came a shift in 
emphasis and the effects of the shift to a written 
creative literature is now seen in the widespread 
use of these local texts in Pacific school and 
university curricula, in the interest in creative 
writers associations, in the steady output of fiction 
published locally and internationally by South 
Pacific Islanders and the fact of increasing local 
readership of newspaper publications both 
government and private sponsored. 
The cord that tied the introduction of the 
written to the colonising impetus of the imperial 
nations from Europe resulted not only in 
translations of the Bible into island tongues but also 
in the translations of the values of things 
homegrown which were then relegated to second 
place after things European. It is interesting to 
note that in 1993 the United Nation's Year of 
Indigenous Peoples, the focus on indigeneity in the 
mosaic of countries which form the South Pacific, 
has come at a time when issues of race, class, 
nationalism and multiculturalism are also in the 
foreground of debate. 
Pacific literature had its genesis in the 
islanders' need to address the legacy and impact of 
colonialism - to liberate and understand themselves 
in a rapidly changing world. Pacific Islanders who 
had been educated in New Zealand and Australia, 
returned to their homelands as part of the new 
professional, administrative and academic elites. 
The two Pacific universities, one in Papua New 
Guinea and the other in Suva, Fiji, were to provide 
a forum for writers and artists to gather and form 
associations for publication of these Pacific texts. 
At the University of the South Pacific a 
group of committed individuals 'saw the need for 
a loose voluntary organisation' 2 to achieve these 
goals and they were instrumental in forming the 
South Pacific Creative Arts Society in 1972. Key 
among these was Marjorie Crocombe, a Cook 
Islander, who was to become the editor of Mana, 
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which began as a section published in the Paci.fie 
Islands Monthly (PIM) in March of the following 
year. Mana was described in the PIM as 'an 
upsurge of creative talent that has remained passive 
for generations (and which is) breaking forth across 
the whole Pacific' 3• This upsurge was attributed 
to the factors of independence or self-government 
and the successful first South Pacific Arts Festival 
held in Suva the previous year. These factors, it 
was stated, had 'heralded a new wave of 
confidence among the Island peoples and visions 
which formally lay dormant are now being 
expressed' 4• Mana was described as the 'new 
vessel which would contain and transport the best 
of this creativity' s. Pacific writers and 
personalities on the editorial committee included 
Albert Wendt, Futa Helu, John Saunana, Ken 
Arvidson, Radike Qereqeretabua, Nicolai 
Michoutouchkine, Walter Lini, Maunaa Itaia, Sione 
Tupouniua, Satendra Nandan as well USP students 
like Vanessa Griffen, Ata Ma'ia'i and Neal 
Engledow. The first president of the South Pacific 
Creative Arts Society was Ratu Jo Nacola 6, the 
vice-president was Raymond Pillai and the 
secretary Howard Van Trease. Most of the 
founding Pacific islanders involved, represented a 
wide range of island nations and they published in 
the first and subsequent editions of Mana which 
stayed with the PIM until 1976 when it became a 
separate publication under Mana Publications. A 
few individuals like Albert Wendt, Marjorie 
Crocombe and later Subramani, the editor of the 
first Mana Review in January 1976, have exerted 
an enormous influence on the development of South 
Pacific literature from the 1970's up until the 
present time. At the University of Papua New 
Guinea, Ulli Beier was to have a similar influence 
in promoting writing from Melanesia. 
Albert Wendt, from Western Samoa, 
probably the best known Pacific writer, stated that 
'any real understanding of ourselves and our 
existing cultures calls for an attempt to understand 
colonialism and what it did and is still doing to us. 
This understanding will better equip us to 
control or exorcise it so that in the words of the 
Maori poet, Hone Tuwhare, 'we can dream good 
dreams again' , heal the wounds it inflicted on us 
and with the healing will return pride in ourselves 
- an ingredient so vital to creative nation-building' 7 
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The Role of USP in Developing and Promoting 
Pacific Literature 
In describing the role of the University of the South 
Pacific as a catalyst in the development of creative 
writing in the region in 1979, Raymond Pillai, a 
noted Indo-Fijian short story writer and academic, 
noted that, 'a catalyst speeds up a process without 
itself undergoing permanent change during this 
process and this is precisely how USP may be 
characterised' 8• There was initial resistance in the 
early 1970's within the university to the 
establishment of creative writing courses. 9 This 
was countered successfully by student and staff 
pressure in the 1970s. Further development was 
seen with the pioneering of creative writing and 
Pacific literature courses taught by Wendt, the first 
to be given a personal chair as Professor of Pacific 
Literature in the 1980s, and now, in the 1990s, 
with Subramani occupying the chair, Pacific 
Literature is an even more established degree 
course both on campus and through extension 
studies. 
Notwithstanding these developments, it is 
significant that the last writers conference, 
promoted by the USP, was held in 1984 10 and it 
could be said that nine years is far too long a gap 
and that more initiatives are needed to push South 
Pacific literature into a more recognised position. 
Indeed, in his silver jubilee anniversary lecture, the 
USP Vice-Chancellor, Esekia Solofa, made it very 
clear that he felt that Pacific literature was one 
field, integral to our identity and being as Pacific 
peoples, which could be explored in the teaching of 
the university. He added, 'what better way is there 
in the department of literature and languages to 
assert our humanity as Pacific peoples than to teach 
about and promote our literatures. How can 
anyone disagree with that? Well, if the university 
calendar is any indication, then I will have to admit 
that I am wrong' .  1 1 Taking the broadest 
interpretation of Pacific literatures to include the 
literatures, both oral and written, in the mother 
tongue of Pacific Islanders as well as the literature 
written in English by Pacific Islanders, it seems 
that there is a 'felt need' to offer more courses in 
this area. Solofa also noted that these courses 
needed to move beyond the anti-colonial 
perspective or colonial bashing (so prevalent at the 
time of USP's founding in the wake of 
independence and in the midst of decolonisation in 
the Pacific, which had pervaded other fields 
'especially area studies such as history and politics' 12 
) to examining Pacific Islanders, as 'free, 
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decolonised, independent citizens of independent 
states' 13• 
Albert Wendt, Subramani, Vilisone 
Hereniko and Sudesh Mishra have been 
instrumental in promoting creative writing courses 
at the University and were often mentioned in my 
interviews 14 with writers in West Polynesia, as 
people who had encouraged and challenged them to 
write. Since creative writing is such a personal and 
often painful exercise, it was no surprise that 
charismatic, sensitive and sympathetic role models 
were needed to inspire other Pacific islanders to 
write and believe in themselves. 1993 is the 25th 
Anniversary or Silver Jubilee of the University of 
the South Pacific. I was informed that one of the 
honours to mark this occasion would be the 
presentation of an honorary degree to a writer from 
the Pacific, namely Jogindar Singh Kanwal, who 
has written prolifically in Hindi (four novels, one 
'Savera' translated into English, two works of 
non-fiction, one poetry and one short story 
collection) 15• His novel, The Morning 16, is based 
on the indenture system of Fiji. 
Creative Writers from Tonga 
Of the many Tongan writers who have published 
locally in Faikava11 and abroad in other 
publications, four writers stand out as having 
persisted - Konai Helu Thaman, Epeli Hau'ofa 
(both at USP), Pesi Fonua and Tupou Posesi 
Fanua. Thaman's poetry is found in her four 
poetry collections - You the choice of my parents 
(1974), Langakali (1981) reprinted in 1991 ,  
Hingano (1987) reprinted 1991 and her latest, 
Kakala (1993). 18 When the USP Silver Jubilee 
celebrations were held in Nukualofa at the USP 
centre at Atele in September 1993, over nine 
hundred secondary school students came to hear 
Thaman speak about and recite her poetry. The 
USP Director of Extension Services, Clare 
Matthewson, reported that the overwhelming 
response demonstrated the popularity of this 
national poet and also the interest from young 
Tongans in creative writing 19• Thaman herself felt 
that the response reflected the tremendous potential 
that is there to be tapped and developed for the 
future of creative writing in Tonga 20• Added to 
this is the fact that Thaman's poetry is firmly 
ensconced in the secondary school curricula in 
West Polynesia and is used in other countries in the 
Pacific. She is also one of the major poets studied 
for the USP Pacific literature course and at the 
National University of Samoa in its literature 
courses at the preparatory and degree level. 
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Epeli Hau'ofa, currently Professor and 
Head of the School of Social and Economic 
Development at USP, has published one collection 
of short stories, Tales of the Tlkongs (1983) and 
Kisses in the Nederends (1987) 21 which is not 
available in Tonga because of its subversive satire. 
Hau'ofa's sketches, which hold Tongan social 
practices up to close ironic scrutiny, have 
antagonised many Tongan readers and he openly 
admits, even many of his own family. 22 Given, the 
many commitments he has in his academic career, 
he has found it very difficult to pursue creative 
writing as much as he would wish but he hopes to 
find time for this in the future. 
Pesi Fonua, manager of the Vava'u Press 
and editor and publisher of Matangi Tonga, is in 
the business of writing for a living. He was 
awarded the 1993 Pacific Journalist of the Year, 23 
the first to be presented by Pacific Islands News 
Association (PINA). He has published Sun and 
Rain: and other stories in English and Tongan,24 a 
collection of six short stories translated from their 
original Tongan. In the preface to his collection, 
Fonua observes 
For many years the only form of 
creative writing that we found 
here in Tonga was the work of 
our ancestors and that of 
papalangis . . . Most of the stories 
are printed in the English 
language and relate to people and 
ways of life remote from ours in 
the Tonga of today . . . For most 
Tongans, then, reading is not a 
pleasant past-time but a struggle 
However, in the last few 
years we have started to read the 
work of Tongan writers, in our 
own languages and in English, 
relating to our lives in modem 
Tonga. Creative writing has a 
new breath of life, and we are 
once again the actors and not 
merely the audience. 25 
This feeling of taking charge, being the 'actors' 
and not the 'acted upon' , is seen in the current 
interest in journalism. As Fonua explained, there 
is a great increase in applications for cadet 
journalist positions in Nukualofa. In the past, 
journalism was not so popular among young 
school-leavers and job applicants and it is an 
interesting development which augurs well for 
creative writing in Tonga. 26 
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Tupou Posesi Fanua turned eighty this 
November. She has published two bilingual 
collections - Po Tatala and Po Fananga, (both in 
1982) n - and is in the process of publishing a 
short novel on The Love Story of 
Tokanga-Fuifuilupe and Fotofili. Although elderly, 
Fanua is extremely energetic and is still invited to 
literary meetings overseas to discuss her writings. 
Having worked as secretary to the late Queen 
Salote for many years and with her unique 
upbringing with her foster parents - (her foster 
father was Tonga's Director of Education and 
principal of Tonga College in her youth) - she felt 
she had been very fortunate in being able to publish 
her creative works to date but was still concerned 
and rather impatient that her latest novel had done 
the rounds of publishers in Tonga and was no 
nearer publication than a couple of years ago when 
she first handed it in for editing. 28 
Other Tongan writers are still hopeful of 
publishing more of their work. One example is 
short story writer, Viii Vele, principal of St. 
Andrews College who is in the midst of publishing 
a sequel to his short story 'For Change' 29 which 
has been dramatised into a play called Ana mo 
Sione. His short story sequel is titled 'For Change, 
Part Two' 30• Leta Havea and Elaiona Tongilava 
are young women writers who aspire to put more 
of their work into print; they have published in 
Faikava, the Tongan literary journal which started 
in April 1978 but lapsed in December 1983. 
Barbara Hau'ofa was the publisher and assistant 
editor and Epeli Hau' ofa, Futa Helu, Konai Helu 
Thaman as well as Thomas Schneider formed the 
editorial board of Faikava. This endeavour was 
supported by the USP centre in Nukuualofa and 
even though publication has lapsed, creative writing 
workshops in the 1980s and the promotion of 
Pacific literature in the school curricula have 
helped to foster an interest in creative writing 
which is still supported by many writers and 
academics in Tonga. I was informed that in 1993 
there was an attempt to revive the Creative Writers 
Association with a view to resurrecting the 
publication of Faikava. 31 
According to Professor Futa Helu of 
Atenisi University in Nukualofa, it was the 
development of independent newspapers (four in 
all) that had created a reading society in Tonga but 
still not much creative writing effort is being seen. 
However, he felt now that a reading public had 
been created all that was needed was to produce the 
writers. Tonga, in his view, was now right for the 
reception of writers because people are interested 
in reading materials and this had come about in the 
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process of Tonga's conversion from an oral society 
to a reading one. 32 
Commenting on the situation in present 
day Tonga, Kenneth Bain noted 'Discontent and 
pressure for constitutional and structural change in 
parliament, government and society is no longer 
concealed beneath the surface of life . . . ' 33 and 
this is most obviously witnessed in the 
pro-democracy movement led by Akilisi Pohiva, a 
politician in Tonga's present government and until 
recently by Bishop Patelesio Finau who died in 
October 1993. Much of the creative writing 
already mentioned from Tonga has focussed on the 
themes of change and the adaptation of traditional 
society to western influence, of treading a fine line 
and finding a balance or blend between the old and 
the new. Thaman's poem 'Different Eyes (for 
Ron)' eloquently spells out this dilemma. The 
poem begins with a description of the cross-cultural 
contact situation which is part of the modem 
Pacific -
this global life 
gives us light 
and love 
but it also gives us death. 
Further on, the poet describes the salusalu as 'lost' 
and the soft scent of the heilala 'drowned' by the 
'strenuous sounds of our rational minds' .  She then 
addresses the concerned, empathetic outsider with 
the sentiment -
you came 
took away our fears 
heard our silent songs 
felt our pain 
of not being able to go back . 
And is le 
ft to conclude -
now we look at tomorrow 
with different eyes 
the truths about us 
weigh us down. 34 
Creative Writers from Western Samoa 
The Creative Writers Association of Western 
Samoa, like those of Fiji and Tonga, has had a 
staggered history. Prominent writers such as 
Albert Wendt, Momoe Von Reiche, Ruperak:e 
Petaia, Tate Simi, Noumea Simi, Tunumafono 
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Apelu Aiavao and Makerita Va'ai have been the 
initiators and promoters of creative writing in 
Western Samoa. As Tunumafono Apelu stated in 
discussing the place of Pacific literature in the 
school and university curricula, 'People are 
becoming very nationalistic - we want to do our 
own thing. We want to do the things we know' . 35 
It is clear from the imaginative writing of many 
Samoans, that one of the things they know from 
their own cultural experience and grounding, is the 
power of the word. As Aiono F. Le Tagaloa, 
Professor of Samoan Studies at the National 
University of Samoa, explains, 'In Samoan, the 
term for Culture is Aganuu. Aga is the basic 
nature of being. Nuu is the total sum of the 
learned social experience as evident when the 
Samoan language describes a momentous occasion 
as 'a meeting within the most humane milieux' -
'Ua tatou feiloai i luma o le Nuu . .  ' .  The Samoan 
word for culture therefore speaks of a world that 
recognises the ideal as a 'complete whole' - like the 
circle of the full moon - le atoa lio o le Masina. In 
other words, the basic nature of man that he 
inherits genetically is as important, as powerfully 
influential as his cultural inheritance through his 
language and other activities of Samoan society. 
The Samoan way of life is very aware of the all 
powerful influence of man's genetic inheritance -
hence the insistence that the proper diet for the 
human young are WORDS. For the words or the 
mother tongue will transform the young animal into 
a human (literally). Words will shape the mind, 
the soul and even the sight of man . .  Words will 
colour and organise his specific world: because 
words have the power to control and channel into 
socially acceptable ways the biological inheritance 
of man' .36 
The fact that Albert Wendt has published 
so prolifically and is widely recognised bas boosted 
interest in the Creative Writers Association. His 
published work includes five novels - Sons for the 
Return Home, Pouliuli, Leaves of the Banyan Tree, 
Ola and Black Rainbow - two collections of short 
stories: Birth and death of the Mirade Man and 
Flying Fox in a Freedom Tree, as well as two 
personal poetry collections, 37 and these texts are 
increasingly studied at the secondary school and 
university level in the Pacific. At present, Momoe 
Von Reiche and Makerita Va'ai, themselves 
published poets, 38 are promoting monthly readings 
at meetings of the society in Apia. 
Other writers like Agafili La'au 
Tuitolova'a, Fepai S. Kolia, Emma Kruse Va'ai, 
Leua Latai, Tamari Mulitalo and Meleisea Isitolo, 
are newer writers coming to the fore 39 and most of 
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them are part of the core that forms the Creative 
Writers Association which is under the umbrella of 
the USP Extension Services at Malifa, Apia. Last 
year, Tate Simi, Ruperake Petaia, Noumea Simi 
and Fata Sano Malifa, published bilingual poetry 
collections with the Samoa Observer. 411 The debate 
about which language (either Samoan or English or 
both) to use in creative writing had been discussed 
at the Creative Writers meetings in the mid-1980s 
so this development in the early 1990s of bilingual 
publications is very significant. It points to a 
desire on the part of these established writers to be 
heard, read and appreciated locally in the mother 
tongue as well as internationally in the 'other' 
tongue of English. Albert Wendt discusses the 
same feeling when he describes listening to a series 
of taped lectures by the Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa 
Thiong'o who now promotes plays and writes 
seriously in his mother tongue of Kikuyu and also 
advocates that if you are committed to your people, 
you must write in their language. Wendt comments 
'that made me feel guilty because up to now I've 
been writing in English. Right now I'm seriously 
debating where I should go from here. It would be 
ideal for me to write in Samoan and English, or 
translate my published work into Samoan. I 
believe that the most authentic Pacific literature will 
be in the mother tongues because that is the way 
into the souls of our peoples. ' 41 In a more recent 
interview in 1992 in Hawaii, Wendt stated 'If I 
decided to write a novel in Samoan, it would take 
me a long time. My facility in the language is still 
good but it would take me a long time to use it 
again as well as I use English. ' 42 
Previously published collections of poetry 
by writers like Fata Sano Malifa and Ruperake 
Petaia 43 in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had 
provided much needed material for schools which 
were and still are looking for appropriate and 
relevant material especially at the senior secondary 
level. Three novels are in process, two by Sano 
Malifa, titled After the War and Alms for Oblivion, 
being published in America and one by Meleisea 
Isitolo, subtitled A Novel of Samoan Passion, 
planned for publication either in Apia or New 
Zealand in 1994. 44 
The development of support networks as 
well as individual writers from West Polynesia 
sharing and motivating others in the region is an 
interesting fact which can be seen as part of the 
overall philosophy of Pacific regional cooperation. 
Recent examples of these in Western Samoa are 
Makerita Va'ai who was instrumental in setting up 
the Nauru Writers Association. This was in 
relation to her role as Centre Director at the USP 
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Centre in Nauru for the last eight years before she 
returned to Apia in 1993. The Nauru writers 
published a small collection of eight short stories in 
a short story collection edited by Larry Thomas. 45 
In the Foreword to the collection, commenting on 
the origin of the collection which stemmed from a 
creative writing and drama workshop organised by 
the USP Centre in Nauru in 1990, Va'ai notes 'it 
was organised so that a conscious effort would be 
made to encourage Nauruans to write and record 
their folklore in the attempt to build up a Nauruan 
literature. '46 In a similar way, Momoe Von Reiche 
has inspired young writers from Tokelau (mainly 
women) in the creative writing workshops that she 
has conducted for young writers from Tokelau 
under the auspices of the USP Centre in Apia. The 
result has been a collection of poetry from nine 
Tokelauan poets called Nuanua of Tokelau. 41 
Several of these Tokelauan writers resident in Apia, 
like Tiga Galo and Teresa Manea Pasilio, are 
active members of the Western Samoan Writers 
Association. 
Universal suffrage was introduced in 
Western Samoa in 1991 after many long years of 
public and parliamentary debate. The political 
developments and changes that have happened in all 
three countries - Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji -
mark a new phase which will inevitably have an 
impact on the issues and subjects addressed by 
creative writers in their writing if as many believe 
like Rushdie that 'writers and politicians are natural 
rivals' . 48 
Creative Writers from Fiji 
Fiji presents a most interesting mosaic of creative 
writing which is understandable when one considers 
the following factors; the multi-racial background 
of its inhabitants, the fact of relatively recent 
textuality of Fijian literature and the long history of 
written literature of the Indo-Fijian population, the 
political situation which developed there post-1987, 
and the existence of the University of the South 
Pacific at Laucala Bay in Suva, providing a focal 
point for the academic study and criticism of South 
Pacific texts. In a very real sense, writers in Fiji 
speak of a post-coup as well as a post-independence 
period for creative writing in Fiji which may have 
implications of self-censorship for the individual 
writer. Subramani, Professor of Pacific Literature 
at USP, has, since 1988, become a speechmaker 
and is planning to publish his collection of speeches 
titled Reconciliations, the thread of which is the 
theme that indigenous Fijians will have to think 
more of human rights and Indo-Fijians will have to 
218 
think more of indigenous rights 49 •  He, along with 
Satendra Nandan, Raymond Pillai, Pio Manoa, 
Vanessa Griffen, Ratu Jo Nacola and Vilisoni 
Hereniko, are foundation writers of the 1970's and 
except for Griffen and Nacola, they have continued 
to publish. 
Most recently published fiction from 
among this group of foundation writers, are 
Satendra Nandan's novel The Wounded Sea and 
Vilisoni Hereniko and Teresia Teaiwa's play Last 
Virgin in Paradise. so New writers that emerged in 
the 1980's include the playwright Larry Thomas 
whose plays Just Another Day, Outcasts, Yours 
Dearly and Men, Women and Insanit/1 have been 
very popular because of their local context, topical 
social comment and use of local idioms and 
inflections which Suva audiences recognised as 
their 'own inner dialogue'.  52 Thomas' enthusiastic 
use of Fiji English (or 'Finglish' as it has 
sometimes been labelled) makes his dramas 
immediate and relevant. His next play, In Search 
of a Smile and a collection of stories, which are yet 
unpublished, deal with the situation of post-coup 
Fiji. 53 Joseph Veramu is another writer who 
published The Black Messiah54 in 1989 and is at 
present working on the final drafts of his next 
novel, to be published in 1994. He also writes 
short stories in Fijian for the local Fijian 
newspapers and as a lecturer in Education in the 
School of Humanities, is very keen to keep on 
writing about what he sees as the dilemmas facing 
the peoples of Fiji. 
He believes that the 'writer has a social, 
moral and political role in bettering the society of 
which he is a part' . 55 Sudesh Mishra has published 
two collections of poems, Rahu and Tandava, 56 
and his production of the drama Ferringhi, staged 
by the USP Drama Society in December 1993 , 
points to a new creative direction. Pat Craddock, 
the director of the play, described it as a play in 
which Mishra 'looks at the Indian indenture system, 
the exploitation of women in the garment industry, 
the coups, capitalism, the losing of national identity 
and the gaining of personal identity which suggests 
that there will be a new identity for the people of 
Fiji. ' 57 The play is also unusual in that the 
audience form a circle around the actors who sit 
around a kava bowl on a large mat and listen and 
interact with two storytellers. Mishra has been a 
prominent figure in the Fiji Writers Association 
until he departed for Flinders University in 
mid-1993. Emerly Chang Lee, Nemani Mati, 
Seona Smiles, Teresia Teaiawa and Nancy Byrne 
are writers who are beginning to publish more. 58 
In addition, a recent novel by a Fijian woman, 
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Elizabeth Tuiqilai, called The Little Lost Giantr9 
has been well received and is the first in her new 
collection of books entitled Album of Yesterday's 
Sunrise. m 
An interesting development for creative 
writing in Fiji are the plans for the establishment of 
a Fiji National Cultural Centre in Suva 61 where 
writers may have the opportunity to come for short 
spells to work on their writing with a view to 
publishing and adding to the corpus of Pacific 
literature. At present there are cultural centres in 
various parts of Fiji but it is hoped that one on the 
national level will provide a productive meeting and 
publishing point in the future. 
In a country where questions of national 
identity and even a national name are being debated 62 
as well as calls made for unity and healing in the 
midst of 'genuine multi-racialism' , 63 this would be 
a very fruitful exercise in creativity as well as 
human understanding. 
The most recent published play from Fiji 
by Vilsoni Hereniko and Teresia Teaiwa debunks 
the colonial imaging and myths of the Paradise of 
the Pacific. The Last Virgin in Parodist!' is a 
'serious comedy' looking at the search for 
innocence and simplicity in the post-colonial 
Pacific. In a note to the director, the authors 
suggest that 'Casting that brings together people 
from different Pacific Islands is encouraged and 
where possible vernacular expressions should be 
used and a way found to communicate their 
meanings in English. Another possibility is to have 
the non-English dialogue in the native language of 
the local inhabitants wherever the play is 
performed, for example, using the Hawaiian 
language in Hawaii. ' 65 They add that the 
anticipated audience should influence language 
choices, that the success of the wedding scene will 
depend on the talents of clowns who know how to 
make people laugh, and involving the audience in 
the singing of popular songs and in the dancing in 
the play is also important. 66 This improvisation, 
flexibility and innovation adds a Pacific flavour to 
the play which should make each performance 
(since it is dependent on the ethnic composition of 
the audience) unique. 
The action centres around Helmut, Hina, 
Jean and Temanu. Helmut Klinghorst is of 
unknown European origin and arrives on the 
imaginary Pacific island of Marawa ('Marawa' 
means happy in Fijian), in search of a virgin 
(intimations of Rousseau's quest for the noble 
savage). He finds Hina with the help of the clown, 
Jeke, and thinks that his quest is complete until his 
life is complicated with the arrival of Hina's 
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cousin, Temanu, herself an islander, educated at 
the Australian National University. The inevitable 
anthropologist is a woman, Jean, who has come to 
study sexual harassment among the Marawan 
people on a Fulbright grant of $20,000. The 
comedy of the play hinges on the fact that Helmut 
is searching for a lost paradise, Hina and her 
people seem simple and naive but they are all well 
aware of the issues and they are just as 
quick-witted, manipulative and shrewd as others 
are. They are all very aware of what they want out 
of life and the advantages as well as the limitations 
that their small island existence places upon them. 
Hina sees Helmut as a ticket out and while Temanu 
tries to discourage her cousin from this marriage, 
Hina is intent on leaving to discover what lies 
outside of Marawa. 
Ironically, it is Jean, the anthropologist, 
who is the virgin and not Hina (these confessions 
are made to Temanu). 67 Jean is depicted as a very 
naive outsider with pre-determined expectations and 
little experience of island life. She tells Helmut in 
Scene Three 'I came here expecting Marawa to be 
primitive and what do I find? Natives dressed to the 
ankle, a fledgling feminist from ANU and a 
toupeed alcoholic from a continent called Europe. 
We all think that Paradise is a place when all the 
time it's a state of mind' . 611 This play illustrates 
many of the conflicts that come from expectations 
not grounded in the reality of the present day 
Pacific. If these conflicts are to be described as 
post-colonial, we should be clear that 'post' 'does 
not mean simply "after" but instead refers to a 
continuous engagement with the effects of colonial 
occupation' , (/} an ambivalent and demanding 
position. 
Themes and Trends in Creative Writing in West 
Polynesia 
Creative writing in the Pacific is obviously on the 
increase as Pacific islanders focus on education 
(reading and literacy), and the national development 
of their own peoples. Creativity is a very 
personalised matter and this is seen in the fact that 
often creative writers associations flounder without 
committed individual or individuals who are 
prepared to give up their time to promote the 
Pacific and its literary representations. This 
sentiment was supported by Marjorie Crocombe 
who felt that the South Pacific Creative Arts 
Society suffered from the fact that editing is very 
much a voluntary affair which depends on a few 
committed individuals .10 In fact, when one 
considers the concept of centre and 
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margin/periphery (used in relation to colonial and 
post-colonial situations), it could be said that much 
of the creative writing of West Polynesia and even 
throughout most of the Pacific, is not even in the 
margin, it is literally off the page, either 
unpublished or left in its oral form. 
In the early 1970's the major thrust of 
Pacific writing was regional and looked at the 
enemy without - the former colonisers and the 
impact of colonisation on the islanders and their 
cultures. Increasingly in the late 1970's, 1980s and 
1990s, Pacific writing has become nationalistic, 
looking inward at the enemy within - at the 
neo-colonial practices continued by island elites 
who have come to political power since 
independence. This has coincided with the drive 
fostered by the South Pacific Creative Arts Society 
and the University of the South Pacific to 
encourage literatures in the indigenous languages. 
Indeed, in 1976 and 1977, through the extension 
services of the USP and their local extension 
centres, creative writing workshops in the 
vernacular languages were held. Out of these 
workshops came the indigenous literary periodicals 
like Moana in Samoa, Faikava in Tonga and Sinnet 
in Fiji. Interestingly enough, creativity and 
publication in the mother tongue has long been a 
concern of writers and academics in Western 
Samoa, most notably the Professor of Samoan 
studies of the National University of Samoa, 
Professor Aiono Fanaafi Le Tagaloa, her colleague, 
Koke Aiono, and other writers such as government 
journalist Tunumafono Apelu and teachers Agafili 
Tuilotova'a and To'oto'o Pulotu. 71 
Of the many constraints to publication for 
Pacific writers, the most obvious and most 
important one is financial. Most Polynesian 
writers, even Albert Wendt, do not make a living 
from their writing. While this may not be 
uncommon in other parts of the world, in the South 
Pacific economic barriers are often insurmountable 
and many local writers now are actively seeking 
avenues for funding their publications. To this 
end, writers like Sano Malifa of the Samoa 
Observer Press and Pesi Fonua of the Vava'u Press 
in Tonga, feel a certain satisfaction that they are in 
charge of the means of production, though this does 
not mean that they have no financial problems. 
What it does mean is that they are able to publish 
their own material more easily. 
The publication of a collection of poems 
and stories of the Pacific, Te Rau Maire, which 
came out of the Sixth Festival of Pacific Arts, held 
in Rarotonga in 1992, looks to be the first of many 
in this series. As the Prime Minister of the Cook 
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Islands stated at the beginning of the collection in 
his official message, 'the written word is now so 
much part of our culture that it is fitting that we 
complement the traditional arts by this publication 
to mark the hosting of the Festival of Pacific Arts 
in our small nation' . 72 This is a significant 
development for creative writing in the Pacific. 
Writing from women, examining their 
place, status and treatment in the modem day 
Pacific, is also increasing noticeably. In West 
Polynesia, Thaman, Von Reiche and Noumea Simi 
stand out in this regard. Simi's recent collection 73 
has four poems under the heading On Women 's 
Issues. In 'Misconceptions' there is the powerful 
stanza -
O man  
from behind the walls 
you will hear my song 
that women and property are not friends 
and that in your oppression 
I will rise to hold the skies 74 
In 'I remember' ,  a tribute to the women of Samoa 
on the 25th anniversary of Independence in 1987, 
the following lines have a resonance for many 
women of Oceania -
I remember 
seeing you rise to lead and guide 
while the world cried for equality 
I remember that 
in the global awakening of womanhood 
development for you was already 
a passing tune. ' 15 
Noumea Simi has already recorded some of her 
poems from this collection for a German radio 
program which was interested in broadcasting them 
in English, Samoan and German. 76 This interest 
from international sources looks like highlighting 
the already growing interest in Pacific women's 
writing. 
Epeli Hau'ofa, in a paper, 'Our Sea of 
Islands' 77 based on his lecture delivered at the 
University of Hawaii at Hilo in March 1993 , puts 
forward a very challenging and I believe, very 
relevant theory both for Pacific Islands generally 
and for any one engaged in academic study of the 
Pacific. He suggests that in the past the peoples of 
the islands conceived of their universe as 
comprising 'not only land surfaces but the 
surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and 
exploit it, the underworld with its fire-controlling 
and earth-shaking deniz.ens, and the heavens above 
UNES ACROSS THE SEA 
with their hierarchies of powerful gods and named 
stars and constellations that people could count on 
to guide their ways across the seas. Their world 
was anything but tiny' .18 Colonisation divided the 
region into 'islands in a far sea' 79 which bound 
colonial and post-colonial administrators to notions 
of smallness which often bred a sense of 
dependency and despair. Hau'ofa, in turning this 
notion of smallness around from tiny 'islands in a 
far sea' to the vast expanse of a 'sea of islands' ,  
makes for a shift in emphasis which is supported by 
the belief held by some in the Pacific like the 
Samoans that they did not originate from anywhere 
outside their own island groups, that in fact their 
homeland is the centre from which other migrations 
occurred. This theory which is advocated by most 
Samoans and supported by its oral history and 
traditions 80 is represented by a response from a 
Manua orator to a statement by Sir Peter Buck 
about Polynesian migration. 'The Polynesians may 
have come from Asia, but the Samoans, no. We 
originated in Samoa' ,  81 the orator told the Maori 
anthropologist. The concept of a sacred centre 
denoted in the name Samoa - (Sa meaning sacred, 
Moa meaning heart or centre) adds further credence 
to this view. Hau'ofa's paper stimulated responses 
and discussion within the USP community during 
its Silver Jubilee, an important year for the USP 
and for the Pacific region which it serves. The 
debate is an on-going and important one because it 
involves the horizons of minds and imaginations of 
the peoples of the South Pacific and the desire to 
free them from past colonial constraints imposed 
from without and newer neo-colonial and 
post-colonial constraints imposed from within. The 
debate is also an attempt to remind the peoples of 
the Pacific of their origins in a vast ocean whilst 
not forgetting the present challenges of 
development in a modem world. 
Creative writing in the Pacific is often 
thought to have gone through a 'boom-full stop or 
comma' cycle from the initial flowering in the early 
1970s to a very slow growth in the 1980s and 
1990s, and in terms of production, this may well be 
true. The 'golden' , optimistic time of 
independence produced a fruitful response in the 
writing of many Pacific Islanders throughout the 
1970s. Many of these writers are now approaching 
their 40s or middle age and hold responsible and 
influential positions in governments, private 
enterprise and academia in the Pacific of the 1990s. 
Many writers in West Polynesia, interviewed as 
part of my fieldwork, expressed the desire to write 
more if they could. Often however, this is just not 
possible because of time constraints connected with 
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family and career interests. The fact that the 
Pacific of the 1990s is in the midst of great social 
and political changes which involve an examination 
of what makes them peculiarly unique as Pacific 
Islanders, together with the changes associated with 
literacy and modernisation, provides a challenge for 
the Pacific writer of the 1990s. With the 
development of relevant curricula at the secondary 
and university level, many of the Pacific island 
texts are included in the literature courses for study 
at this level. As Pacific creative writing becomes 
more recognised and accepted by Pacific 
educational institutions, the most obvious 
consequence of this will be that much greater 
numbers of writers from the Pacific will emerge 
into print. 
Acknowledgments: Many thanks to the writers and 
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Reporting From Port Moresby 
Sean Dorney 
Two weeks ago last night, I was working back 
late at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
office in Port Moresby preparing a radio current 
affairs report on Amnesty International's 'Under 
The Barrel Of A Gun' report into human rights 
atrocities on Bougainville over the past two years. 
The item I was working on was intended for the 
ABC's flagship public affairs program, 'AM'.  I 
rang 'AM''s night reporter to alert her to the fact 
that I'd be transmitting the piece to her via satellite 
in the following hour or so. 
'Is this the first Amnesty Report since the 
funeral?' she asked. 
'What! ' I replied. 
'Is this the first report since the funeral?' 
'Look, ' I said, not having a clue what she 
was talking about. 'It's Amnesty's Report on 
human rights atrocities allegedly committed by both 
the Papua New Guinea military and the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army over the years 
from 1991 to '93 . '  
'Yes, but what I need to know, ' she said 
with a hint of exasperation in her voice, 'is whether 
this is the first report since that funeral procession! ' 
I exploded with rage. 'That was East 
Timor! I'm talking about demands by Amnesty for 
Australia to review all its military aid to Papua 
New Guinea, not Indonesia! '  
I cooled down enough to complete the item 
and send it through. But as those who listened to 
the main edition of 'AM' that next morning, 
Friday, November 19th, 1993, could testify it was 
not used. It did get an airing on the early morning 
edition but not on the main program at 8 o'clock. 
I begin my address with that tale because I feel that 
both the reaction of the journalist on the night shift 
for 'AM' and the decision by the program's acting 
executive producer to put it aside when the main 
edition of the program came along both illustrate 
what John Kaputin, Papua New Guinea's Foreign 
Minister, described to the National Press Club here 
in Canberra a month ago as the 'drift' in interest in 
Australia in affairs in what is Australia's nearest 
neighbour and what was its only major colony. 
In passing, might I say that it is impossible 
to imagine that the same confusion between East 
Timor and Bougainville ever occurring if I was 
attempting to file from the ABC's London office on 
an Amnesty Report - and Amnesty has produced 
two reports in Europe within several months of 
each other dealing with allegations of ethnic 
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atrocities in Northern Ireland and Bosnia. That 
may seem a weird comparison but Belfast and 
Sarajevo are, if you check the map, closer to each 
other than Dill is to Arawa. 
I cannot whinge about the overall usage I 
get on the ABC, especially on other public affairs 
programs such as 'The World Today' and 'PM'.  
Nor about the number of stories run on radio news 
bulletins and the ABC TV news. 'Foreign 
Correspondent' ran a 3 1  minute story on 
Bougainville which, I understand, was the longest 
single item they ran all year. Radio National's 
specialist programs are always interested. And 
Radio Australia and Australia Television 
International have insatiable appetites and would 
like me to do more. I also do regular chat 
segments with a number of ABC Metropolitan 
Radio stations including, for example, weekly 
segments of 10 to 15 minutes with the station here 
in Canberra and the one in Townsville covering 
North Queensland. However, all of these outlets 
seem to be out of step, and AM in step, with the 
general downgrading of stories about or from 
Papua New Guinea to the status of being of minor 
to marginal interest to the Australian public. 
The ignorance of Papua New Guinea 
amongst many in the media in Australia is matched 
by the antagonism of Papua New Guinea politicians 
towards Australian journalists in general. Just this 
week, Papua New Guinea's Deputy Prime 
Minister, Sir Julius Chan, told Australian 
International Development Assistance Bureau's 
PNG Aid Forum in Brisbane during his keynote 
address that: 'People in Australia have been fed a 
steady appetite of negative images of PNG by your 
(Australian) media for so long that, at times, 
getting the message successfully across seems 
almost impossible. '  The message he was talking 
about was 'promoting' PNG 'in the best possible 
light' .  Sir Julius went on to say that to some extent 
he didn't blame the media because most of those 
writing about PNG had very little knowledge of the 
country themselves. 'Their views, '  he said, 'are 
thus frequently narrow and insular, upsetting not 
only PNG but also others in the Asia-Pacific 
region. ' Sir Julius's point was inadvertently 
reinforced by one journalist covering the Aid 
Forum who mistook the definition of tied aid and 
led his story by saying Australia had decided to tie 
future aid to PNG to the issue of human rights - a 
scoop so exclusive that not only did he have it on 
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his own, but none of the ministers or officials from 
either country knew about it. 
I remember being quite appalled back in 
1980 when Michael Prain (who was the last Papua 
New Guinea based correspondent for the then 
Herald and Weekly Times group) told me that all 
his editorial bosses back in Melbourne were 
interested in Papua New Guinea for were stories on 
plane crashes, tribal fights and rascals� That 
slotting of PNG into the minor interest category 
covering the awful, the weird and the exotic has, 
unfortunately, expanded not shrunk in the past 
domn years. For instance, the only story that the 
executive producer of ' AM' has rung me about this 
year - rung me because I hadn't filed on it - the 
only story that he felt he needed for his program 
relating to PNG that he had read in the morning 
papers but did not have from me, was a 'Lost 
Tribe' story. There have been a few 'lost tribe' 
stories this year, I know. But this was the Liawep 
of the West Sepik who have been lost and 
discovered on a number of occasions now - several 
times since 1990 by the PNG media. 
Writing about the Eurocentric media 
fascination with lost tribes a few years ago, Rowan 
Callick told the story about how the Daily Mail in 
London had run a breathless report about how an 
intrepid group of British students travelling the 
world led by the magnificently named Colonel 
Blashford-Snell had discovered a lost tribe in the 
Eastern Highlands. Of course this group was said 
to have had absolutely no knowledge of or contact 
with the white man before. Rowan said that when 
this report landed on his desk at the Times of PNG, 
William Williando, one of PNG's best news 
photographers - who incidentally had just had a 
photo he had taken used in Time magazine's 
international edition - looked over his shoulder and 
said in some disbelief, 'That's my tribe! That's my 
tribe they've named! ' 
In attempting to satisfy myself that this 
1993 'discovery' of the lost Liaweps was, at best, 
a rediscovery of a group already recorded in the 
Australian colonial days, I put a call through to the 
nearest district station, Telefomin. It took two 
days for the PNG Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation to connect me, via Wewak and PTC's 
high frequency, two way, outstation radio network, 
with Telefomin high up in the remote mountains 
near the head-waters of the Sepik River and the 
junction of the West Sepik, East Sepik and Enga 
Provinces. 
'Hello. This is Telefomin. Over, ' the 
distant voice on the other end of the phone 
eventually said. 
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'It's Sean Dorney from the ABC calling 
from Port Moresby, '  I shouted, spacing out my 
words in the hope that whoever had answered in 
that supposedly primitive, isolated spot would 
understand me. 'I'm trying to find anybody who 
might be able to tell me something about a new 
tribe claimed to have been found near Oksapmin, 
over. ' 
'Oh, good morning, Sean. I'm the 
headmaster of the Telefomin High School. I know 
who you are. We watch you on Australia 
Television International each night. ' 
Papua New Guinea has leap-frogged its 
former colonial boss, Australia, when it comes to 
public access to the world's electronic media. For 
those who can afford it - and in the major towns it 
costs barely one kina a day - you can link yourself 
up to a cable network and have the choice of CNN, 
ESPN - the global sports channel, the ABC -
Queensland, QTV - North Queensland (essentially 
Channel 10), SBS, ATVI, Malaysian Television, 
Indonesian Television, a Philippines channel, even 
French television and for subscribers to the one I 
am connected to, for instance, two home movie 
channels. A K20 attachment also delivers, through 
your FM radio, the ABC out of Townsville, Radio 
National, ABC FM and Radio Australia. 
Accurate figures on the Papua New Guinea 
audience size for this smorgasbord of international 
electronic entertainment are exceptionally difficult 
to obtain because of the very deregulated nature of 
it all. But one of the cable operators has given me 
a guesstimate that up to 200,000 people in PNG 
watch satellite television. There has been a 
substantial increase, too, since independence, in the 
range of media produced locally in Papua New 
Guinea. But I will come back to that later in this 
address when I move onto the issue of what the 
colonial inheritance is in PNG as far as the local 
media is concerned. But first, let me continue with 
the subject of the Australian media's treatment of 
Papua New Guinea now compared with what it was 
in 1975. 
When I arrived in PNG for the first time 
in April 1974, about 17 months before 
independence, there were more than half a domn 
journalists earning their living writing or 
broadcasting about PNG to an Australian audience. 
The ABC had two Australian journalists, Don 
Hook and Jim Hall, and a complete ABC television 
camera team all based in Port Moresby. Barry 
Wheeler was the AAP Correspondent; Gus Smales, 
represented the Herald and Weekly Times group -
that included the Herald, the Sun, the Courier Mail 
and many others; Pat Boyce was there for the Age 
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and the Sydney Morning Herald; Chris Ashton 
wrote for a range of publications including the 
National Times and the Financial Review; and, if 
my memory serves me correctly, Margaret Wilson, 
was stringing for the Australian. Peter Hastings 
was always ducking in and out as well. I was not 
reporting for Australia then. I was on secondment 
to the newly formed National Broadcasting 
Commission, the NBC of PNG. 
With such a contingent of fine journalists 
competing with each other - and driven by the 
suspicion of many of their editorial chiefs back 
home that Australia was helping hurtle an 
unprepared PNG towards a disastrous independent 
future - there was plenty of copy generated from 
Port Moresby then that found its way into the 
Australian media. 
Four years after independence, in 1979, 
when I returned to Port Moresby to take up the 
ABC correspondent's job, there bad been no 
dramatic collapse of the new nation into blood 
spilling chaos and the ranks of the Moresby 
Foreign Correspondents Club bad thinned to four. 
Another year and a half later, there were just two. 
And that is the number still today, another twelve 
years further on: myself and the AAP 
Correspondent, Belinda Goldsmith. The dreadfully 
high costs involved in basing anybody in Port 
Moresby these days is perhaps the main reason the 
rest of the Australian media is no longer 
represented. But two other journalists have shown 
bow this problem can be side-stepped. Mary­
Louise O'Callagban has fought a valiant battle to 
get the Age and the Sydney Morning HeraUJ 
interested in Papua New Guinea again and she 
visits regularly from her base in Honiara from 
where she also covers the rest of the Pacific. 
Mary-Louise does an extraordinarily good job and 
I suspect that if the ownership of the Solomon 
Islands/PNG telecommunications link was based on 
who paid for its use, she would be the controlling 
shareholder. The other journalist who covers PNG 
exceptionally well from a distant base is Rowan 
Callick. Rowan spent ten years in PNG, started off 
the Times of PNG and writes for the Australian 
Financial Review from Melbourne. 
But just the same as there are fewer and 
fewer Australian academics with recent bands-on 
experience in Papua New Guinea we four are a tiny 
breed. All four of us get criticised by PNG 
Government Ministers occasionally - Rowan is 
probably ahead in that contest but I'm confident I 
lead the field when it comes to hostility from the 
PNG Security Forces. But the 'drift' in Australian 
interest in PNG that John Kaputin spoke about and 
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that Andrew Peacock mentioned [in bis opening 
speach] is undoubtedly a reality. When was the 
last time any of the commercial television news 
bulletins ran a story on Papua New Guinea? 
Would I be far wrong if I said it was Paul 
Keating's Pope-like embrace of the earth at Kokooa 
well over a year and a half ago? Getting visas to 
get into PNG is always a problem for journalists 
but now is the time, I believe, for the Australian 
media to take up John Kaputin's challenge and 
demand easier entry. 
With luck, the redirection of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of Australian aid to programs 
aimed at putting more money into the pockets of 
Australians will help spark a resurgence of more 
general interest in the country - even if it fails to 
achieve its most lofty aim of not just checking the 
decline in PNG's rating on the social indicator 
scale but, somehow, send it soaring. Being an 
optimist, I hope that the 400 or so hungry eyed 
consultants, NGOs and others who turned up in 
Brisbane for the PNG aid forum earlier this week 
marks the beginning of this public re-embrace of 
PNG. The media, I trust, will follow. 
Let me now tum to what the internal 
media is like today in Papua New Guinea compared 
with what it was like at independence. Back then, 
there was the daily newspaper, the Post Courier, 
majority owned by the Herald and Weekly Times, 
the Tok Pisin newspaper, Wantok, kicked off by 
the Catholic Church and coming out of Wewak, 
and the National Broadcasting Commission, formed 
at Self Government in 1973 out of what bad been 
the PNG Branch of the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, the Australian Administration's 
district radio service and the broadcast transmission 
arm of the Posts and Telecommunications 
Department. There was no television. 
Now, as well as the downpour of 
television signals from the satellites mentioned 
earlier, there is a PNG television station, EMTV, 
owned by Kerry Packer. There are two vigorously 
competing national dailies, the Post Courier, now 
62.5 % owned by Murdoch, and The National, 
funded by Malaysian logging interests. There are 
two national weeklies, the Times of PNG in English 
and Wantok in Tok Pisin, both owned by the 
Church-backed, Word Publishing (60% Catholic, 
20 % Evangelical Lutheran, 10% Anglican and 10% 
United). The NBC bas a commercial FM service, 
Radio Kalang, broadcasting from almost 20 
transmitters around PNG, as well as its national 
medium wave and short wave service, Radio Karai, 
and its 19 provincial radio stations. There is a 
range of new publications: PNG Business and 
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Weekend Sports, both products ofWord Publishing, 
a rugby league newspaper that now comes out 
weekly off the Post Courier's presses during the 
football season; and a couple of magazines. There 
are also a number of provincial newspapers, the 
best being the Eastern Star in the Milne Bay 
province edited by a retired Australian newspaper 
man who is in PNG with his wife as a volunteer. 
The late Peter Henshall did an extensive 
study a few years ago into the possibility of setting 
up an indigenous national newsagency in Papua 
New Guinea and he turned up some very 
interesting facts about the number of people 
employed by Provincial Governments in 
information offices. There are at least 220 such 
people, about half of them involved in journalistic 
type endeavours - putting out at least 21 
publications some on a weekly but most on a 
monthly basis. While Peter commented that they 
may have slightly exaggerated their productivity -
'For example, '  he wrote, 'people in the offices 
visited did not generally seem to be as busy as one 
would have expected them to be in order to get 
through the amount of work claimed' - he found 
many of them had a very liberal idea of their roles. 
In a questionnaire he circulated he found about half 
responded either positively or very positively to the 
suggestion that 'an Information Officer should 
uncover corruption and other malpractice in the 
organisation' they worked for. 
All in all, it is a very healthy media scene 
considering the size and literacy of the population -
one that is far livelier than it was when Australia 
left. On the first day of this conference, one of the 
speakers mentioned that the Internal Security Act 
was passed with very little debate in the National 
Parliament earlier this year. That was true. But 
there has been enormous debate on the Act in the 
PNG media since - so much so that Paias Wingti 
has announced he will review it and his Police 
Minister, Avusi Tanao, told the NBC recently, in 
some anger, that he would repeal it and when he 
did he would take no further responsibility for 
containing the breakdown in law and order! Within 
days of the Bill being passed, the Times of PNG 
ran a front page story explaining its implications 
and the paper reprinted the entire Bill in a two page 
feature spread. Numerous stories and articles have 
appeared since in the Post Courier questioning the 
Act including one detailing the wonderful about­
turn by the Housing Minister, John Jaminan. After 
being beaten up at two in the morning by traffic 
police, Mr Jaminan told a Post Courier reporter he 
had changed his mind on the Internal Security Act 
and it was a dreadful piece of legislation! 
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Roger Hau'ofa on his Monday to Friday, 
nine till noon, talkback show on Radio Kalang has 
done a remarkable job focussing public attention on 
issues such as the Internal Security Act. Sir Buri 
Kidu, the former Chief Justice, has become a star 
radio performer on Roger's show. Sir Buri has not 
only poured immense scorn on the Act but he has 
also examined in detail for Kalang's considerable 
nation-wide audience the implications of several of 
Prime Minister Wingti's proposed constitutional 
changes - like switching the presumption of 
innocence in serious criminal matters to a 
presumption of guilt and the scrapping of bail. The 
news and current affairs programs on the Karai 
service of the NBC have increased in number and 
quality in recent years and the NBC is quite robust 
in defence of its independence. 
The most recent development in the PNG 
media, and one that has raised several interesting 
questions about media ownership and control in 
Papua New Guinea, is the launching of the majority 
Malaysian backed daily newspaper, the National. 
It came into being on Armistice Day, November 
the l lth, but the deal to set it up was done ten 
months before that, on January the 19th, 1993, at 
the home of the Papua New Guinea High 
Commissioner in Malaysia when Paias Wingti 
dined with Datuk Tiong Hiew King. Datuk Tiong 
is the Chairman of the Rimbunan Hijau group. 
'Rimbunan Hijau' is Malaysian for 'Green Jungle' 
and the company and its many subsidiaries in PNG 
are extracting logs from Papua New Guinea's green 
jungles at an alarming rate. Datuk Tiong also 
owns the company that prints Sin Chew Jit Poh, the 
largest selling Chinese newspaper in Malaysia. At 
that dinner in Kuala Lumpur Paias Wingti invited 
Datuk Tiong to set up a newspaper in Port 
Moresby. 
While Datuk Tiong has provided most of 
the money for the establishment of the National, 
there are Papua New Guinean shareholders - the 
two most prominent being Highlands businessmen, 
Simon Korua from the Western Highlands, and 
Peter Kama from Simbu. Korua and Kama are 
both firm backers of Mr Wingti and his Peoples 
Democratic Movement Party. The only other non­
Malaysian member of the Board is the PNG based 
expatriate lawyer, Michael Wilson. The Deputy 
Editor of the National is Frank Senge Kolma, Mr 
Wingti 's former Press Secretary. 
The National has spelt out its mission. It 
says: 'The newspaper will be nationalistic in 
outlook, putting the country above all else. We 
will actively support, ' the paper proclaims, 'any 
effort that improves the welfare and security of the 
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people; that brings progress and advancement to the 
country; and that enhances and enriches the quality 
of life in the nation. ' Amongst its goals it lists 
'communal peace and harmony' and 'political 
stability' .  It says it will 'not lend itself to be used 
by any person or group who want to cause 
disunity, disaffection or dissension' .  It does say 
that it intends to 'challenge and expose any abuse 
of power and position, any misuse of privilege, 
graft and corruption, nepotism and all forms of 
unhealthy practices' .  
The paper has been going less than a 
month and, unlike some of my colleagues, I am not 
rushing to judge it. Some have already condemned 
the National as a propaganda sheet for the Wingti 
Government and the logging industry. However, 
I have considerable faith in a number of the Papua 
New Guinean journalists the National has 
employed. Already in one editorial we have had 
the paper calling on Paias Wingti to 'belittle' 
himself in the national interest and go to Arawa to 
negotiate directly with Francis Ona. Let me just 
say I suspect the owners of the National and the 
Wingti Government may not find the paper to be as 
tame as they may - and others do - expect. 
The media in PNG has come under a lot 
of pressure from various PNG governments since 
independence. The most threatening period - apart 
from Iambakey Okuk putting the NBC off the air 
one night in the early 1980s during its evening 
current affairs program - was during the attempts 
by the former Communications Minister, Gabriel 
Ramoi, to restrictively licence the media through a 
Mass Media Tribunal. The media won great public 
support during that period. The Catholic Church, 
for instance, told the Government it was confident 
it could get a million signatures on a petition 
against the Bill - not bad in a country where there 
are not a million literate people! Incidentally, 
Ramoi is now in jail where he is helping fellow 
prisoners file appeals against their sentences. 
I am not sure just how much credit we as 
Australians can claim for what I consider to be the 
quite healthy state of the media in Papua New 
Guinea. But it is interesting to compare the 
media's record in PNG over the past 18 years with 
that of other developing countries and their first 18  
years of independence. As far as the Australian 
media goes, I welcome this sudden surge of interest 
since John Kaputin's speech but as with much else 
that is going on in our former colony, Australians 
will have to accept that the PNG media will go its 
own way and grow ever less dependent on 
Australia. 
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